Reported Decision: [2001] 19 ACLC 593
New South Wales
Supreme Court
CITATION: Gramwick Investments Pty Ltd v Advanced Underpinning Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1131 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity FILE NUMBER(S): SC 4356/00 HEARING DATE(S): 1 December 2000 JUDGMENT DATE: 1 December 2000 PARTIES :
Gramwick Investments Pty Limited (P)
Advanced Underpinning Pty Limited (D)JUDGMENT OF: Hamilton J
COUNSEL : D R Stack (P)
No appearance (D)SOLICITORS: Ian D Elvy & Associates (P)
No appearance (D)CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS [211] - Winding up by Court - Grounds for winding up - Insolvency - Application to set aside demand - Extension of time and generally - "May only" be made within limited time - No power to extend time - Whether Court may grant injunction to restrain filing of winding up summons as abuse of process where genuine dispute as to debt and company solvent. LEGISLATION CITED: Corporations Law s 459G
Evidence Act 1995 s 160CASES CITED: David Grant & Co Pty Limited v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265
Re J & E Holdings Pty Ltd and the Corporations Law: J & E Holdings Pty Ltd v Vaughan (1995) 36 NSWLR 541DECISION: Injunction to restrain filing of winding up summons granted.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISIONHAMILTON J
FRIDAY, 1 DECEMBER 2000
4356/00 GRAMWICK INVESTMENTS PTY LTD v ADVANCED UNDERPINNING PTY LTD
JUDGMENT1 HIS HONOUR: The defendant company by an originating process filed on 25 October 2000 (“the OP”) made application under s 459G of the Corporations Law for an order that a statutory demand dated 6 September 2000 served on it by the defendant on 6 October 2000 be set aside. As appears from the dates stated above the application was filed within the time limited for the filing of such applications. However, it was served by post and, as a result, the time at which the application and the affidavit supporting it were deemed to be served was outside the statutory time: see Evidence Act 1995 s 160. In those circumstances it appears to me that its application to set aside the statutory demand cannot succeed: David Grant & Co Pty Limited v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265.
2 With this in mind Mr Stack, of counsel for the plaintiff, applied to the Court instead for an injunction restraining the defendant from filing a winding up summons based upon the statutory demand on the ground that the filing of that summons would be an abuse of the process of this Court. The evidentiary material on which he relies in support of that application is affidavit evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute as to the debt on which the demand is based and that the company is able to pay that debt and is otherwise solvent, so that it would be an abuse of process for a winding up summons, with all its potential consequences, to be taken out against a company in that position. The…
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- Case
- [2000] NSWSC 1131
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the statutory provisions and case law that restrict the circumstances in which an extension of time for such an application can be granted. It was noted that the statutory language indicates that extensions are only possible under very limited conditions, and the court does not possess the inherent jurisdiction to extend these time limits. The court examined whether there were exceptional circumstances that warranted an exception to the statutory scheme. However, the court concluded that the mere existence of a genuine dispute about the debt and the solvency of the company did not constitute sufficient grounds for an exception. The court also found that the appropriate remedy for a genuine dispute about the debt is to contest the winding up summons on the merits, rather than seeking an injunction to prevent the summons from being filed.
Ultimately, the court ruled that it did not have the power to grant an injunction to restrain the filing of a winding up summons, as this would amount to an abuse of process. The court emphasised that the proper course of action for a company facing a winding up summons is to contest the summons on the merits, rather than seeking to prevent its filing through an injunction. The application to set aside the demand for payment was dismissed, and no injunction was granted. As a result, Advanced Underpinning was free to proceed with its winding up summons.
Background
Background to the litigation
Gramwick Investments made an application to set aside the demand for payment issued by Advanced Underpinning. This was followed by an application for an injunction to restrain Advanced Underpinning from filing a winding up summons. The application was heard by the court, which had to determine whether it had the jurisdiction to grant an injunction and whether such an injunction could be granted as an abuse of process where there was a genuine dispute over the debt and the company was solvent. The court also considered whether there were any grounds to set aside the demand for payment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the Court have the jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain the filing of a winding up summons as an abuse of process where there is a genuine dispute as to the debt and the company is solvent?
2. Are there grounds to set aside the demand for payment issued by Advanced Underpinning?
Held
1. The Court held that it does not have the jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain the filing of a winding up summons as an abuse of process where there is a genuine dispute as to the debt and the company is solvent. Consequently, the application for an injunction was dismissed.
2. The Court found that there were no grounds to set aside the demand for payment issued by Advanced Underpinning. The application to set aside the demand was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court first addressed the issue of whether it has the jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain the filing of a winding up summons as an abuse of process where there is a genuine dispute as to the debt and the company is solvent. The Court noted that the jurisdiction to grant an injunction as an abuse of process is limited and generally applies in cases where there is a clear abuse of the court process. In this case, while there was a genuine dispute over the debt and the company was solvent, the Court found that these factors alone did not constitute an abuse of process sufficient to warrant an injunction. The Court also considered that the winding up provisions under the Corporations Act provide a specific remedy for situations involving insolvency, and the jurisdiction to grant an injunction should not be used to circumvent these statutory provisions.
The Court then turned to the issue of whether there were grounds to set aside the demand for payment issued by Advanced Underpinning. The Court noted that demands for payment under the Act must be made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose. The Court considered the evidence presented and found that there was no evidence of bad faith or an improper purpose on the part of Advanced Underpinning in issuing the demand for payment. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to set aside the demand.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court's jurisdiction to grant an injunction as an abuse of process is limited and should not be used to circumvent statutory provisions such as those related to winding up under the Corporations Act. Additionally, demands for payment under the Act will only be set aside if there is evidence of bad faith or an improper purpose. This decision reinforces the principle that the statutory process for winding up a company should be followed unless there are clear grounds for intervention by the Court.