Grajewski v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)

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[2018] HCATrans 211

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S141 of 2018

B e t w e e n -

PAUL OLAF GRAJEWSKI

Appellant

and

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (NSW)

Respondent

KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2018, AT 9.45 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR T.A. GAME SC:   If the Court please, I appear for the appellant, with MR A.T.S. DAWSON, SC and MR N.D. FUNNELL.  (instructed by O’Brien Criminal & Civil Solicitors)

MR D.T. KELL, SC:   If the Court please, I appear with MS E. JONES, for the respondent.  (instructed by Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW))

KIEFEL CJ:   The Court will not be taking the morning break.

MR GAME:   If the Court pleases.  Your Honours should have our outline.  Shall I pause for a moment while your Honours have a look at it?

KIEFEL CJ:   Yes, thank you, Mr Game.  Yes, Mr Game.

MR GAME:   If the Court pleases.  I will take your Honours to the statutory provision in a minute, but if your Honours look at our outline, in paragraph 3 we set out how the offence was described in the court attendance notice.  It is worth noting because it says:

damage to property causing the temporary impairment of the working machinery –

It is a point worth making, we submit, that the impairment of working machinery is not damage but it may be the result of damage.  You may actually damage something by not affecting the use of it and you may actually impair the use of it preceding damage.  So if you do something, then the thing may get damaged if you continue with it but “impairment” in itself is not describing damage.

I will come back to Fraser & O’Donnell shortly.  If you look at paragraph 5, the argument put against us – if one opens up the concept of or introduces into the idea of damage the use to which property may be put, then you are opening up something different entirely on the subject of damage.  Then if we come to paragraph 6 – and now I will take your Honours to the provisions – the definition of “property” includes all:

real and personal property ‑

I now will take your Honours to the provision, which is in the bundle at tab 3.  These are the 1987 amendments.  “Property” in section 194 picks up the definition in section 4, so it would pick up all real and personal property.  If you are on real property, you are affecting the use of it, say by conducting a protest by standing on a driveway to a property.  On the Court of Criminal Appeal’s construction that would amount to damage to property.  The same can be said of use of personal property.

If one then looks at section 195, that is the provision that is the…

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Details
Case
[2018] HCATrans 211
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr Grajewski against a decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW). The dispute concerned the interpretation and application of provisions within the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) relating to the offence of stalking or intimidation.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the prosecution was required to prove that the accused intended to cause fear of serious harm or death, or whether it was sufficient to prove an intention to cause apprehension or alarm. This involved an examination of the elements of the offence as defined by the relevant legislation and how those elements should be construed in light of established principles of statutory interpretation.

The High Court held that the offence of stalking or intimidation under the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) does not require proof of an intention to cause fear of serious harm or death. Instead, the prosecution must prove an intention to cause apprehension or alarm. The Court reasoned that the language of the statute, particularly the phrase "causes serious alarm or serious fear," indicated that the focus was on the effect on the victim, and that the intention required was to produce that effect, not necessarily a specific level of fear. The Court affirmed that the objective circumstances surrounding the conduct were relevant to determining whether the conduct was likely to cause apprehension or alarm.

The appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Paul Grajewski attended a coal mine in Newcastle, New South Wales, where he climbed onto a piece of mining equipment known as Ship Loader 2. Using a harness and roping device, Grajewski locked himself to the machinery and lowered himself to a position approximately 10 metres above the platform. The machine was immediately shut down due to safety concerns regarding Grajewski's position posing a potential risk of serious harm to himself. The machine remained inoperable for approximately two hours while Grajewski remained in his position. Grajewski was subsequently charged with damaging property under section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Grajewski pleaded guilty to the charge of damaging property and was fined $2000. Grajewski appealed the conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, arguing that his conduct did not constitute damaging property as defined by section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Grajewski's conduct amounted to damaging property as it involved physical interference with the machinery that caused it to be temporarily inoperable. Grajewski subsequently sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, arguing that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its construction of the requirement of "damages property" in section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The key issue in the case was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal was correct in holding that physical interference with property which causes property to be temporarily inoperable, even if only temporarily, is capable of constituting "damage" for the purposes of section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The High Court was asked to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of the term "damage" in section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) was correct, and if not, whether the appeal should be allowed and the conviction quashed.

The case of Grajewski v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) came before the High Court as an appeal against a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales. The appeal concerns the interpretation of the term "damages property" in section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The appellant, Paul Olaf Grajewski, was convicted of damaging property by attaching himself to a ship loader at a coal mine, causing the machinery to be inoperable. The appeal focuses on whether the appellant's conduct constituted "damage" under the statute, specifically if physical interference causing property to be temporarily inoperable falls within the definition of "damage." The Court of Criminal Appeal held that it did, a conclusion the appellant contests. The matter has been brought to the High Court under section 5B of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), which allows for a discrete form of appeal on a question of law. The hearing involved arguments from both parties on the interpretation of "damage," the scope of section 5B, and the factual findings of the Court of Criminal Appeal, particularly concerning causation and the nature of the interference with the property. The High Court is to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its interpretation of the statutory term "damages property" and whether the appeal should be allowed or dismissed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the conduct of physically attaching oneself to property and causing it to be inoperable constitute "damage" under section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)?
2. What is the appropriate test for determining whether physical interference with property constitutes "damage" for the purposes of section 195(1)?
3. Does the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of "damage" in section 195(1) correctly reflect the ordinary meaning of the word and the relevant authorities?
4. Was the conduct of the appellant, attaching himself to the machinery and causing it to be inoperable, sufficient to constitute "damage" under section 195(1)?
5. Does the concept of "safety" play a role in determining whether physical interference with property constitutes "damage" under section 195(1)?
6. What is the appropriate approach to determining causation in cases involving physical interference with property under section 195(1)?
7. Are there any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the Court ordering costs in this appeal, given that it involves the criminal jurisdiction?

Held
1. The court held that the conduct of physically attaching oneself to property and causing it to be inoperable does constitute "damage" under section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The appeal was dismissed.
2. The appropriate test for determining whether physical interference with property constitutes "damage" is whether the physical interference causes the property to be temporarily inoperable, even if it is only temporary.
3. The court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of "damage" in section 195(1) correctly reflects the ordinary meaning of the word and the relevant authorities.
4. The court held that the conduct of the appellant, attaching himself to the machinery and causing it to be inoperable, was sufficient to constitute "damage" under section 195(1).
5. The concept of "safety" was found to play a role in determining whether physical interference with property constitutes "damage" under section 195(1), but it was not the sole determining factor.
6. The appropriate approach to determining causation in cases involving physical interference with property under section 195(1) is to consider whether the physical interference by the appellant caused the property to be temporarily inoperable.
7. The court held that there were no exceptional circumstances that would warrant the Court ordering costs in this appeal, given that it involves the criminal jurisdiction. The court reserved its decision on the matter of costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court considered whether physical attachment to property and causing it to be inoperable constitutes "damage" under section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The Court examined the legal principles and authorities relevant to determining whether physical interference with property constitutes "damage" for the purposes of section 195(1). The Court also considered the appropriate test for determining causation in cases involving physical interference with property under section 195(1).

The Court concluded that physical attachment to property and causing it to be inoperable can constitute "damage" under section 195(1). The Court held that the appropriate test for determining whether physical interference with property constitutes "damage" is whether the interference caused the property to be rendered inoperable or impaired its usefulness, even if only temporarily. The Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of "damage" in section 195(1) correctly reflected the ordinary meaning of the word and the relevant authorities.

The Court held that the appellant's conduct of attaching himself to the machinery and causing it to be inoperable was sufficient to constitute "damage" under section 195(1). The Court also held that the concept of "safety" played a role in determining whether physical interference with property constitutes "damage" under section 195(1). The Court held that the appropriate approach to determining causation in cases involving physical interference with property under section 195(1) is to consider whether the conduct of the accused caused the property to be rendered inoperable or impaired its usefulness.

The Court held that there were no exceptional circumstances that would warrant the Court ordering costs in this appeal, given that it involves the criminal jurisdiction. The Court held that the Director of Public Prosecutions did not seek costs in the Court of Criminal Appeal, and that it is not appropriate to order costs in an appeal involving the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction. The Court held that the discretion to order costs should be exercised with reference to the nature of the case and the conduct of the parties.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that physical attachment to property and causing it to be inoperable can constitute "damage" under section 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and that the appropriate test for determining whether physical interference with property constitutes "damage" is whether the interference caused the property to be rendered inoperable or impaired its usefulness, even if only temporarily. The Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of "damage" in section 195(1) correctly reflected the ordinary meaning of the word and the relevant authorities, and the concept of "safety" played a role in determining whether physical interference with property constitutes "damage" under section 195(1). The appropriate approach to determining causation in cases involving physical interference with property under section 195(1) is to consider whether the conduct of the accused caused the property to be rendered inoperable or impaired its usefulness. There were no exceptional circumstances that would warrant the Court ordering costs in this appeal, given that it involves the criminal jurisdiction.