IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
Application No. 1084 of 1992
[Grahame Allen & Sons Pty Ltd v Water Resources Commission]
BETWEEN:
GRAHAME ALLEN & SONS PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND:
WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION
First Defendant
AND:
DAVID J TARDREW
Second DefendantREASONS FOR JUDGMENT - WILSON J
Delivered 8 September 1998
I have for determination an application to amend the statement of claim.
The action concerns claims arising out of the construction of the Kroombit Dam near Biloela. The plaintiff was an earthmoving contractor. The first defendant was a corporation sole constituted under the Water Resources Act 1989, and the second defendant was a superintendent appointed by the first defendant.
By the writ issued on 20 July 1992 the plaintiff claimed against the first defendant damages for breach of contract and against the first and second defendants damages for negligence.
The statement of claim was delivered on 25 January 1993. It has previously been amended. The amendments for which leave is sought are contained in a draft amended statement of claim which is exhibit RWQ 1 to the affidavit of Roger William Quick filed on 11 August 1998. They are unopposed except for paragraph 62 of the draft, which raises an additional cause of action, namely misfeasance in public office.
The statement of claim alleges that in about September 1991 the first defendant invited tenders for the performance of certain excavation, processing and stockpiling of filter materials and concrete aggregates. The plaintiff was the successful tenderer, and a contract was entered into between the plaintiff and the first defendant on 1 November 1991. The second defendant was the superintendent appointed by the first defendant under the contract.
The information supplied to tenderers was in two volumes which contained a number of representations. In substance these were that:
(a)Particular areas (identified in the statement of claim as “the Source”) contained a sufficient quantity of processable materials from which the tenderer could obtain the necessary filter materials and concrete aggregates: paragraph 18.
(b)The processable materials did not contain more than 2% of material passing through a certain (small) sized sieve: paragraph 19.
Both representations are alleged to have been false, and negligently so: paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 26. The plaintiff contends that because of the inadequacy of the quantities of processable material in the Source, it was more expensive and time consuming to obtain and process relevant materials.
The plaintiff claims in negligence as well as contract. It alleges that the existence of inadequate quantities of processable material in the Source was a latent condition within the meaning of the contract, entitling it to payment for a variation: paragraphs 28-35. It alleges that it received various directions from the second defendant to carry out more expensive and difficult processing procedures for which it is entitled to payment as a variation: paragraphs 36 - 40. It alleges that the tender documents contained errors and omissions for which the first defendant is liable under the contract: paragraphs 41 -…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Grahame Allen & Sons Pty Ltd v Water Resources Commission and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1998] QSC 181
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the amendment could be allowed under O 32 of the Supreme Court Rules, which permits amendments adding or substituting new causes of action if they arise from the same or substantially the same facts. The limitation period for misfeasance in public office is 6 years unless the defendant's fraud or mistake postpones the running of the period. The plaintiff argued that the facts giving rise to the new cause of action were only ascertainable through discovery, which took place in 1993.
The court found that reckless indifference or deliberate blindness to invalidity or lack of power satisfies the malice element of misfeasance in public office. If the plaintiff can prove the defendants acted with such knowledge or indifference, then their conduct amounts to fraud under s 38(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, postponing the limitation period. Since the new cause of action arises from the same facts, the court has discretion to allow the amendment even if the limitation period has expired.
The court held that allowing the amendment would not substantially lengthen the trial or prejudice the defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the statement of claim to include the new cause of action for misfeasance in public office.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter is an application to amend the statement of claim in an ongoing legal proceeding. The writ was issued on 20 July 1992, and the original statement of claim was delivered on 25 January 1993. The plaintiff seeks to amend the statement of claim to include an additional cause of action for misfeasance in public office. The application for leave to amend was filed on 11 August 1998, and the first defendant objects to the inclusion of the misfeasance in public office claim on the basis of limitation period issues.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to amend the statement of claim to include a cause of action for misfeasance in public office.
2. Whether the limitation period for the tort of misfeasance in public office applies to bar the plaintiff's claim.
3. Whether the proposed amendment arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action for which relief has already been claimed.
Held
1. The court granted leave to the plaintiff to amend the statement of claim to include a cause of action for misfeasance in public office.
2. The limitation period for the tort of misfeasance in public office does not apply to bar the plaintiff's claim.
3. The proposed amendment arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action for which relief has already been claimed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: DAVID J
The court considered whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to amend the statement of claim to include a cause of action for misfeasance in public office. The court noted that the power to allow amendment is contained in O 32 of the Supreme Court Rules, which provides that an amendment may be allowed if it arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action in respect of which relief has already been claimed. The court found that the plaintiff's proposed amendment did arise out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action for which relief has already been claimed. Therefore, the court granted leave to the plaintiff to amend the statement of claim.
Next, the court considered whether the limitation period for the tort of misfeasance in public office applies to bar the plaintiff's claim. The court noted that misfeasance in public office is a tort for which the applicable limitation period is 6 years unless s 38(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 applies. The plaintiff argued that it was only on discovery that the relevant facts were ascertainable. The court accepted the submission that if it can be inferred that the plaintiff knew that its conduct was beyond power or that it acted with reckless indifference, then there was “fraud” within the meaning of s 38(1) as that provision was interpreted in Applegate v Moss and Seymour v Seymour. The court found that the limitation period has not expired.
Finally, the court considered whether the proposed amendment arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action for which relief has already been claimed. The court found that the primary facts relied on by the plaintiff did not differ and that the new cause of action arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts. Therefore, the court had a discretion to allow the amendment even if the limitation period has expired. The court concluded that not to allow the amendment would be to shut the plaintiff out of a cause of action. The court also noted that the addition of the new cause of action is unlikely to substantially lengthen the trial or prejudice the defendants. Therefore, the court allowed the amendment.