Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2018] QCAT 182

PARTIES:

DARREL WILLIAM GRAHAM
(applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND RACING INTEGRITY COMMISSION

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCR200-17

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

DELIVERED ON:

21 June 2018

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Olding

ORDERS:

1.   Queensland Racing Integrity Commission must pay to Darrel William Graham costs in the amount of $853.60, by: not later than 23 July 2018.

2.   Unless either party submits otherwise in writing by not later than 4-00pm on 6 July 2018, the application for review of decision filed by Darrel William Graham on 13 September 2017 will be dismissed without a further decision by the Tribunal.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where harnessing racing driver applied for review of decision of Queensland Racing Integrity Commission – where Tribunal invited Commission to reconsider decision – where Commission set aside decision – where general rule that parties bear their own costs – whether interests of justice require award of costs

Australian Harness Racing Rules, r 149(2)
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act
2009 (Qld), s 23, s 32, s 100, s 102

Medical Board of Australia v Alroe [2016] QCA 120 Queensland All Codes Racing Industry Board v Abbott (No 2) [2016] QCATA 49
Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412

REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Self-represented

Respondent:

Self-represented

APPEARANCES:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. These reasons concern a claim for a costs order by the applicant, Mr Graham, in respect of his application for review of a decision of the respondent Commission.

  2. Mr Graham is a harness racing trainer-driver. He was convicted by the Stewards of driving a horse in a race ‘in a manner which in the opinion of the stewards is unacceptable’ pursuant to r 149(2) of the Australian Harness Racing Rules.

  3. When the respondent Commission confirmed that decision on internal review,


    Mr Graham applied to the Tribunal for review of the Commission’s decision. After Mr Graham filed and served his witness statements, the Tribunal, pursuant to s 23 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’), invited the Commission to reconsider its decision, whereupon the Commission found that Mr Graham did not breach r 149(2) and set aside the Stewards’ decision.

  4. Mr Graham says that he should never have been charged and that, although he was not represented by a lawyer, it is unfair for him to be out of pocket for filing fees and other costs incurred in bringing his application for review.

    The incident

  5. The particulars of the charge as stated by the Stewards were:

    . . . that as the driver of Corrinyah Conman in Race 3 at Albion Park on Tuesday, 15 August 2017, Mr Graham drove in a manner which in the…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCAT 182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission, the applicant, Darrel William Graham, a horse racing driver, sought a review of a decision made by the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (QRIC). The decision related to a sanction imposed on Graham for his conduct during a race, which was deemed unacceptable by the Stewards. The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) was tasked with reviewing the QRIC's decision and determining whether to award costs. The central legal issue was whether the interests of justice required the QCAT to order the QRIC to pay Graham's costs despite the general rule that parties bear their own costs. The Tribunal examined various factors, including the relative strengths of the parties' claims, the nature and complexity of the dispute, and whether natural justice was afforded to Graham by the decision-maker.

The Tribunal found that Graham's claims were supported by his consistent position and the statements of experienced trainer-drivers, and the QRIC had set aside the Stewards' decision, indicating a shift in the balance of the relative strengths of the parties' claims in Graham's favour. The Tribunal also considered the credible and rational nature of Graham's explanation for his conduct, which was consistent with the statements of the experienced trainer-drivers, although these statements were not tested in a hearing. Given these circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that it would be unfair for Graham to bear the cost of bringing the application for review. The Tribunal observed that while the principle that costs follow the event does not apply, the relatively modest sum involved was a factor in its consideration. Therefore, the Tribunal determined that the interests of justice required an award of costs in Graham's favour.

Based on the Tribunal's reasoning, the QRIC was ordered to pay Graham's costs in the amount of $853.60 by a specified date. The application for review of the QRIC's decision was to be dismissed unless either party submitted otherwise by a certain date. This outcome reflects the Tribunal's consideration of the specific circumstances of the case and its determination that an award of costs was necessary to achieve justice in this instance.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Queensland Racing Integrity Commission must pay to Darrel William Graham costs in the amount of $853.60, by: not later than 23 July 2018.

2. Unless either party submits otherwise in writing by not later than 4-00pm on 6 July 2018, the application for review of decision filed by Darrel William Graham on 13 September 2017 will be dismissed without a further decision by the Tribunal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having regard to the state of the evidence before the Tribunal on financial matters, I do not need to reach any definitive conclusions on these matters, other than to observe that the source of the Commission’s funding does not, in my view, weigh significantly against an award of costs in this case.Conclusion on whether costs should be awarded While giving full weight to judicial statements about the contra-indication in s 100 against the awarding of costs, I must not be distracted from answering the ultimate statutory question: do the interests of justice require the making of a costs order? With one exception, in my view the factors outlined above, when weighed up collectively, are broadly neutral and do not make a case for the interests of justice requiring an award of costs. The exception is the relative strength of the parties’ claims. There is no argument about where Mr Graham positioned the horse during the race. This is not a case where factual findings requiring choices between contradictory evidence of witnesses needed to be made. Mr Graham did not deny, in fact openly acknowledged, that he had done what the Stewards thought had been done from their viewing of the race video. Nor is it a case where a range of factors had to be weighed up, some for and some against, in deciding whether a statutory discretion should be exercised. In this case, in the face of Mr Graham’s long record, which the Chairman of Stewards described as ‘exemplary’ in relation to r 149(2),[7] and having confirmed that there was nothing unusual in betting patterns for the race, the Stewards, and the Commission on internal review, rejected Mr Graham’s clear, consistent and repeated explanation of the reasons for his positioning of the horse during the race. [7]Stewards’ Inquiry transcript 21 August 2017, page 18, line 19. While it is difficult for the Tribunal to judge the validity of such an explanation, I was able to form the view that the reasons given by Mr Graham seemed credible and rational. I observe that they were also consistent with the statements of the experienced trainer-drivers, although I give their statements little weight, as they were not tested in a hearing. In any case, the Commission no longer asserts that Mr Graham’s conduct in the race was unacceptable. These circumstances, in my view, set this matter aside from the general run of matters in which a decision-maker, upon an application being made to the Tribunal, reviews a decision, with or without the benefit of further evidence, and comes to a view that a different decision is required. Decision-makers are to be encouraged to do just that in an appropriate case. In this case, because of the particular circumstances I have outlined, I cannot but agree with Mr Graham that it would be unfair for him to bear the cost of bringing the application for review. In my view, the ‘interests of justice require’ an award of costs. In coming to the view that an award should be made, I have taken into account the relatively modest sum involved.Amount

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The principle in civil litigation that generally ‘costs follow the event’ does not apply. In other words, success in the litigation does not create a prima facie case for a costs award.[3][3]Medical Board of Australia v Alroe [2016] QCA 120, [19].Consideration I start by addressing each of the factors to which, by virtue s 102(3), the Tribunal may have regard in deciding whether to award costs.(a) whether a party to a proceeding is acting in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party to the proceeding, including as mentioned in section 48(1)(a) to (g) Section 48(1) is concerned with behaviours, such as failing to comply with Tribunal requirements, causing adjournments, deception and vexatiousness, that disadvantage another party. There is no suggestion that the Commission acted in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged Mr Graham, either in these or any other ways, nor of any untoward conduct by Mr Graham. This factor does not point in favour of the proposition that the interests of justice require an order for costs.(b) the nature and complexity of the dispute the subject of the proceeding Although perhaps daunting for Mr Graham as an unrepresented applicant, there is nothing particularly complex about the application for review. Aside from sanction, the single issue raised by the application was whether Mr Graham’s acknowledged conduct in the race was or was not ‘unacceptable’. The level of complexity of the dispute is at best a neutral factor. The nature of the dispute raises a little more difficulty because of the lack of specificity in r 149(2) in relation to basis for formation by the Stewards of an opinion that the manner in which the horse was driven is ‘unacceptable’. This calls for a judgement, which, of course, is not to be made lightly, but upon which in particular circumstances reasonable, informed minds might differ. The element of subjective judgement required points to a need for particular care in reaching a decision but also care in not rushing to draw adverse conclusions from the decision being set aside. In that regard, while the decision of the Stewards was ultimately set aside by the Commission, it does not appear that there was any lack of due care by the Stewards. I note that the Stewards’ hearing was adjourned to allow time for consideration of the matter. These factors do not weigh in one direction or the other, but provide some context for the next factor.(c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties to the proceeding Mr Graham’s claims are supported by his own consistent position since the Stewards’ inquiry began along with statements by the two experienced trainer-drivers. From the Commission’s decision to set aside the conviction, it is reasonable to conclude that the balance in the relative strengths of the parties’ claims favoured Mr Graham. This factor – which weighs in favour of an award of costs, but against the background that success in an application for review, as mentioned, does not bring with it a prima facie case for costs - is discussed further below. (d)(i) whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker for the decision