QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION:
Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2018] QCAT 182
PARTIES:
DARREL WILLIAM GRAHAM
(applicant)v QUEENSLAND RACING INTEGRITY COMMISSION
(respondent)
APPLICATION NO/S:
OCR200-17
MATTER TYPE:
Occupational regulation matters
DELIVERED ON:
21 June 2018
HEARING DATE:
On the papers
HEARD AT:
Brisbane
DECISION OF:
Member Olding
ORDERS:
1. Queensland Racing Integrity Commission must pay to Darrel William Graham costs in the amount of $853.60, by: not later than 23 July 2018.
2. Unless either party submits otherwise in writing by not later than 4-00pm on 6 July 2018, the application for review of decision filed by Darrel William Graham on 13 September 2017 will be dismissed without a further decision by the Tribunal.
CATCHWORDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where harnessing racing driver applied for review of decision of Queensland Racing Integrity Commission – where Tribunal invited Commission to reconsider decision – where Commission set aside decision – where general rule that parties bear their own costs – whether interests of justice require award of costs
Australian Harness Racing Rules, r 149(2)
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 23, s 32, s 100, s 102Medical Board of Australia v Alroe [2016] QCA 120 Queensland All Codes Racing Industry Board v Abbott (No 2) [2016] QCATA 49
Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412REPRESENTATION:
Applicant:
Self-represented
Respondent:
Self-represented
APPEARANCES:
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).
REASONS FOR DECISION
These reasons concern a claim for a costs order by the applicant, Mr Graham, in respect of his application for review of a decision of the respondent Commission.
Mr Graham is a harness racing trainer-driver. He was convicted by the Stewards of driving a horse in a race ‘in a manner which in the opinion of the stewards is unacceptable’ pursuant to r 149(2) of the Australian Harness Racing Rules.
When the respondent Commission confirmed that decision on internal review,
Mr Graham applied to the Tribunal for review of the Commission’s decision. After Mr Graham filed and served his witness statements, the Tribunal, pursuant to s 23 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’), invited the Commission to reconsider its decision, whereupon the Commission found that Mr Graham did not breach r 149(2) and set aside the Stewards’ decision.
Mr Graham says that he should never have been charged and that, although he was not represented by a lawyer, it is unfair for him to be out of pocket for filing fees and other costs incurred in bringing his application for review.
The incident
The particulars of the charge as stated by the Stewards were:
. . . that as the driver of Corrinyah Conman in Race 3 at Albion Park on Tuesday, 15 August 2017, Mr Graham drove in a manner which in the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] QCAT 182
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal found that Graham's claims were supported by his consistent position and the statements of experienced trainer-drivers, and the QRIC had set aside the Stewards' decision, indicating a shift in the balance of the relative strengths of the parties' claims in Graham's favour. The Tribunal also considered the credible and rational nature of Graham's explanation for his conduct, which was consistent with the statements of the experienced trainer-drivers, although these statements were not tested in a hearing. Given these circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that it would be unfair for Graham to bear the cost of bringing the application for review. The Tribunal observed that while the principle that costs follow the event does not apply, the relatively modest sum involved was a factor in its consideration. Therefore, the Tribunal determined that the interests of justice required an award of costs in Graham's favour.
Based on the Tribunal's reasoning, the QRIC was ordered to pay Graham's costs in the amount of $853.60 by a specified date. The application for review of the QRIC's decision was to be dismissed unless either party submitted otherwise by a certain date. This outcome reflects the Tribunal's consideration of the specific circumstances of the case and its determination that an award of costs was necessary to achieve justice in this instance.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Queensland Racing Integrity Commission must pay to Darrel William Graham costs in the amount of $853.60, by: not later than 23 July 2018.
2. Unless either party submits otherwise in writing by not later than 4-00pm on 6 July 2018, the application for review of decision filed by Darrel William Graham on 13 September 2017 will be dismissed without a further decision by the Tribunal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The principle in civil litigation that generally ‘costs follow the event’ does not apply. In other words, success in the litigation does not create a prima facie case for a costs award.[3][3]Medical Board of Australia v Alroe [2016] QCA 120, [19].Consideration I start by addressing each of the factors to which, by virtue s 102(3), the Tribunal may have regard in deciding whether to award costs.(a) whether a party to a proceeding is acting in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party to the proceeding, including as mentioned in section 48(1)(a) to (g) Section 48(1) is concerned with behaviours, such as failing to comply with Tribunal requirements, causing adjournments, deception and vexatiousness, that disadvantage another party. There is no suggestion that the Commission acted in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged Mr Graham, either in these or any other ways, nor of any untoward conduct by Mr Graham. This factor does not point in favour of the proposition that the interests of justice require an order for costs.(b) the nature and complexity of the dispute the subject of the proceeding Although perhaps daunting for Mr Graham as an unrepresented applicant, there is nothing particularly complex about the application for review. Aside from sanction, the single issue raised by the application was whether Mr Graham’s acknowledged conduct in the race was or was not ‘unacceptable’. The level of complexity of the dispute is at best a neutral factor. The nature of the dispute raises a little more difficulty because of the lack of specificity in r 149(2) in relation to basis for formation by the Stewards of an opinion that the manner in which the horse was driven is ‘unacceptable’. This calls for a judgement, which, of course, is not to be made lightly, but upon which in particular circumstances reasonable, informed minds might differ. The element of subjective judgement required points to a need for particular care in reaching a decision but also care in not rushing to draw adverse conclusions from the decision being set aside. In that regard, while the decision of the Stewards was ultimately set aside by the Commission, it does not appear that there was any lack of due care by the Stewards. I note that the Stewards’ hearing was adjourned to allow time for consideration of the matter. These factors do not weigh in one direction or the other, but provide some context for the next factor.(c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties to the proceeding Mr Graham’s claims are supported by his own consistent position since the Stewards’ inquiry began along with statements by the two experienced trainer-drivers. From the Commission’s decision to set aside the conviction, it is reasonable to conclude that the balance in the relative strengths of the parties’ claims favoured Mr Graham. This factor – which weighs in favour of an award of costs, but against the background that success in an application for review, as mentioned, does not bring with it a prima facie case for costs - is discussed further below. (d)(i) whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker for the decision