Grafil Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority; Mackenzie v Environment Protection Authority

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[2020] HCATrans 017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney   No S260 of 2019

B e t w e e n -

GRAFIL PTY LTD

Applicant

and

ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AUTHORITY

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Sydney   No S261 of 2019

B e t w e e n -

ROBERT MACKENZIE

Applicant

and

ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AUTHORITY

Respondent

Applications for special leave to appeal

KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 14 FEBRUARY 2020, AT 10.09 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

MR B.W. WALKER, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR T.G. HOWARD, SC and MR C.R. IRELAND, for the applicants.  (instructed by Johnson Winter & Slattery)

MS A.M. MITCHELMORE, SC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.J. ENGLISH, for the respondent.  (instructed by Environmental Protection Authority - Legal Services Branch)

MR WALKER:   Your Honours, there can be, in light of express legislative statement to this effect, no doubt about the public importance of the encouragement of the reuse and recycling of materials produced as a result of ordinary commerce and manufacturing.  There can be no doubt in particular by reason of the unusual and emphatic statement of that matter that you will find by the embedded reference commencing on page 427 of the second volume of the application book. 

I say it is an embedded reference because the objects of the Act, the provisions of which were in question - section 144 and the definition of “waste” – include in section 3 not only the reference in subparagraph (d)(iii) to the promotion of the “re‑use, recovery or recycling of materials”, but also in paragraph (g) at the foot of page 427, assistance, that is, promoting the assistance in the “achievement of the objectives of the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act”, which we have set out at page 425 of the book. 

One will see there that starting with what might be called the headline reference to ecologically sustainable development, Parliament in particular specifies in subparagraph 3(b)(ii) of the objects of that Act, these being explicitly incorporated by reference in section 3 of the relevant Act to what is called:

resource recovery (including reuse, reprocessing, recycling and energy recovery) -

So the public importance of the understanding given by a court to provisions which regulate, including by criminal sanction, conduct in what I will call the recycling sector, cannot really be overstated.  We then come to the provisions which we say display both a very clear failure of purposiveness against that background as well as demonstrating a striking example of the general being permitted to derogate from the special.  So at page 431 you will find it. 

The definition of “waste” has items lettered (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) about which two things can be said that we think the Court of Criminal Appeal regards as being against us.  Only one…

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Details
Case
[2020] HCATrans 17
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Grafil Pty Ltd and Mackenzie, sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal. The dispute concerned the interpretation of the definition of "waste" under the *Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997* (NSW), specifically whether certain recycled materials intended for use as road base constituted "waste" under the Act. The applicants argued that these materials, having been processed and intended for reuse, should not be classified as waste, particularly given the Act's objects of promoting resource recovery and recycling.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in its construction of the definition of "waste". This involved determining the proper interpretation of the word "or" linking the various paragraphs of the definition, and the interplay between the general provisions (such as paragraph (a)) and the specific provision dealing with processed, recycled, reused, or recovered substances (paragraph (d)). The applicants contended that a literal interpretation, which allowed general provisions to encompass specific ones, rendered the specific provisions otiose and undermined the legislative objects of encouraging recycling. They argued for a purposive approach that would give effect to the specific provisions dealing with recycled materials.

The High Court considered submissions regarding the legislative objects of the *Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act* and the *Protection of the Environment Operations Act*, which included promoting resource recovery and preventing environmental degradation. The applicants argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation was anti-purposive, failing to recognise that materials intended for reuse should not be classified as waste unless they fall within prescribed circumstances that indicate potential harm. The respondent argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal's construction was consistent with the regulatory scheme, which aimed to balance recycling objectives with the need to regulate potentially harmful substances. The Court noted that the definition of waste included a specific provision (paragraph (d)) that applied to processed, recycled, reused, or recovered substances only in circumstances prescribed by regulations, and that the last sentence of the definition stated that a substance is not precluded from being waste merely because it is or may be processed, recycled, reused, or recovered.

The High Court determined that the applications for special leave to appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave. Consequently, the applications were refused, and there was no order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Grafil Pty Ltd and Robert Mackenzie (the applicants) sought to appeal against decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales in separate cases concerning the interpretation of the definition of "waste" in the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW). The applicants argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal had incorrectly interpreted the definition of "waste" and had failed to give effect to the purposes of the Act, which include promoting the reuse, recovery, and recycling of materials. Specifically, the applicants argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal had adopted a literal interpretation of the definition of "waste" that rendered specific provisions dealing with recycled materials redundant. In contrast, the respondent, the Environment Protection Authority, argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of the definition of "waste" was consistent with the purposes of the Act and the overall regulatory scheme for waste management. The Environment Protection Authority contended that the Court of Criminal Appeal had properly recognised that recycled materials could still be harmful and needed to be regulated, and that the specific provisions dealing with recycled materials did not exclude them from the scope of the definition of "waste". The High Court ultimately decided that the applications for special leave to appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success and refused the applications. The Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of the definition of "waste" was consistent with the purposes of the Act and the overall regulatory scheme, and that there was no sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal.

Grafil Pty Ltd and Robert Mackenzie, applicants, sought special leave to appeal decisions of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had dismissed their respective appeals against convictions for breaches of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW). The applicants' operations involved the recycling and reuse of materials, which they argued should not be classified as "waste" under the Act. The Court of Criminal Appeal had interpreted statutory provisions in a way that the applicants contended led to an outcome inconsistent with legislative objectives promoting recycling and reuse. The High Court, in this case, heard the applicants' applications for special leave to appeal the Court of Criminal Appeal's decisions. The primary issue before the Court was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of the statutory provisions displayed sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of special leave. The High Court ultimately refused the applications for special leave, finding that the Court of Criminal Appeal's decisions were not attended by sufficient doubt.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the definition of "waste" under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act include recycled materials that are intended for reuse as road base, even if they are processed, recycled, reused, or recovered, and not applied to land or used as fuel in the prescribed circumstances?
2. Has the Court of Criminal Appeal correctly interpreted the definition of "waste" in a way that aligns with the objects of the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act, including the encouragement of recycling and the reduction of harm to human health and the environment?
3. Is there sufficient doubt in the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal, considering the interpretation of the definition of "waste" and the proper construction of the relevant regulations?

Held
1. The High Court held that the definition of "waste" under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act does not include recycled materials intended for reuse as road base, even if they are processed, recycled, reused, or recovered, and not applied to land or used as fuel in the prescribed circumstances. The Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation was consistent with the objects of the Act.

2. The High Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal correctly interpreted the definition of "waste" in a way that aligns with the objects of the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act, including the encouragement of recycling and the reduction of harm to human health and the environment. The Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation was consistent with the regulatory scheme of the Act.

3. The High Court held that there was not sufficient doubt in the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal, considering the interpretation of the definition of "waste" and the proper construction of the relevant regulations. The Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision was not attended by sufficient doubt.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court's decision in Grafil Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority; Mackenzie v Environment Protection Authority [2020] HCATrans 017 concerned the interpretation of the definition of "waste" under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) and the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act 2007 (NSW). The applicants argued that recycled materials intended for reuse as road base should not be classified as "waste" if they were processed, recycled, reused, or recovered, and not applied to land or used as fuel in the prescribed circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeal had held that such materials could still be classified as waste for the purposes of the Act. The applicants sought special leave to appeal this decision, arguing that the Court of Criminal Appeal had failed to properly apply the purposive approach to statutory interpretation and had not given sufficient effect to the objects of the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act.

The Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of the definition of "waste" was consistent with the legislative objects of reducing risks to human health and preventing degradation of the environment. The Court held that the definition of "waste" was an inclusive definition, and that recycled materials could still be waste if they were applied to land or used as fuel in circumstances not prescribed by the regulations. The Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation gave effect to the legislative intent to regulate potentially harmful materials, even if they had been processed, recycled, reused, or recovered. The Court also found that the Court of Criminal Appeal had properly considered the overall regulatory scheme of the Act, including the exemptions available under the regulations.

The Court held that there was not sufficient doubt in the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal. The Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal had properly applied the principles of statutory interpretation and had given effect to the objects of the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act. The Court distinguished the earlier decision of Terrace Earthmoving Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority [2017] NSWCA 314, finding that it did not create a clash with the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation. The Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent to regulate potentially harmful materials, even if they had been processed, recycled, reused, or recovered.

The ratio decidendi of the decision is that the definition of "waste" under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act includes recycled materials that are intended for reuse as road base, even if they are processed, recycled, reused, or recovered, and not applied to land or used as fuel in the prescribed circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of the definition of "waste" is consistent with the objects of the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act, including the encouragement of recycling and the reduction of harm to human health and the environment. The Court found that there was not sufficient doubt in the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal.