Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2008] AATA 102
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No 2007/3419
VETERANS’ APPEALS DIVISION ) Re PENELOPE GRAFF Applicant
And
MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President P.E. Hack SC
Air Vice Marshal F.D. Cox AO, MemberDate8 February 2008
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review. ......................[Sgd]....................
Deputy President
Note 1: Sections 17 and 18 set out some examples of when a person is wholly dependent on a member.
Note 2: This section also applies to former members (see section 20).
(2)These are the persons who can be a dependant of a member for the purposes of subsection (1):
(a)any of the following persons:
(i)the member’s partner;
(ii)the member’s father, mother, step‑father or step‑mother;
(iii)the father, mother, step‑father or step‑mother of the member’s partner;
(iv)the member’s grandfather or grandmother;
(v)the member’s son, daughter, step‑son or step‑daughter;
(vi)the son, daughter, step‑son or step‑daughter of the member’s partner;
(vii)the member’s grandson or grand‑daughter;
(viii)the member’s brother, sister, half‑brother or half‑sister; or
Note: This paragraph is affected by section 16.
(b)a person in respect of whom the member stands in the position of a parent; or
(c)a person who stands in the position of a parent to the member.”
5.The issues that arise for determination are these:
(a)was the child a dependant of Squadron Leader McCarthy immediately prior to his death?
(b)was the child partly dependent upon Squadron Leader McCarthy as set out in s 15(1)(a) and (b) of the MRC Act?
Dependant
6.Ms Graff’s argument in support of the proposition that the child was a dependant was that the child satisfied s 15(2)(b)[2] of the MRC Act, that is, the child was a person in respect of whom Squadron Leader McCarthy stood in the position of a parent. The argument, agitated in correspondence by the solicitors for Ms Graff, that, on its proper construction, s 15 of the MRC Act was not an exhaustive list of those who could be a dependant was abandoned, correctly in our view since it is contrary to well-settled drafting practice[3].
[2]It was accepted that the child did not come within any of the categories in s 15(a) of the MRC Act.
[3]See Pearce DC and Geddes RS, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 6th ed, Lexis Nexis, Australia, 2006, at paragraph [6.56] and the cases there cited.
7.The argument put forward by Mr Richards, counsel who appeared for Ms Graff, relies upon the notion that Squadron Leader McCarthy stood “in the position of a parent” to the child. We are not aware of any judicial consideration of the meaning of this phrase and none was cited to us. There is, however, some learning about the similar expression in loco parentis. Sir George Jessel said this[4]:
[4] Bennet v Bennet (1879) 10 Ch 474 at pp. 477-8.
“Now what is the meaning of the expression ‘a person in loco parentis’?
I cannot do better than refer to the definition of it…
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- Case
- [2008] AATA 102
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues primarily centred on the interpretation of the term "dependant" as used in the Act. The court had to consider whether the claimant's relationship with the deceased service member met the statutory criteria, specifically the requirement that the claimant be a person in respect of whom the deceased stood in the position of a parent. This involved assessing the degree of dependence and the nature of the financial support provided, as well as distinguishing between actions more readily explicable on the basis of friendship rather than parental responsibility. The court also examined relevant case law, including Bennet v Bennet, Ex parte Pye, and Powys v Mansfield, to provide context for the interpretation of the term "dependant."
The court found that the relationship between the claimant and the deceased service member did not meet the statutory definition of a dependant. It concluded that the financial contributions and the overall relationship were more consistent with the nature of a friendship rather than a parental role. The court held that the ordinary duties of a parent, as understood in the context of the statutory provisions, were not met. The decision of the Tribunal to deny compensation was affirmed, with the court upholding the interpretation that the claimant did not qualify as a dependant under the Act.
The Tribunal's decision was upheld, and no compensation was awarded to the claimant. The court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory interpretation and the evidence presented regarding the nature of the relationship and the financial contributions. The decision reflects a cautious approach to the application of the statutory definition of "dependant" in the context of compensation for dependents of deceased service members.
Orders
Orders of the court
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi