GR v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice

[2021] NSWCA 301

Court of Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

GR v Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice; Minister for Families, Communities & Disability Services [2021] NSWCA 301

Hearing dates:

1 December 2021

Date of orders:

10 December 2021

Decision date:

10 December 2021

Before:

Simpson AJA

Decision:

1. On the notice of motion filed by the first and second respondents on 10 November 2021:

a. Pursuant to s 14 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) dispense with the requirement of UCPR 7.17(1) that the applicant (GR) take no further step in the substantive proceeding until a tutor has been appointed for the fourth respondent (AB).

b. Direct that an Independent Legal Representative be appointed for the fourth respondent to the substantive proceeding (AB).

c. Request the Crown Solicitor (i) to liaise with the Legal Aid Commission of NSW in order to effect such an appointment; and (ii) to advise the parties of any proposal in that respect with a view to the appointment of a specific person as Independent Legal Representative.

2. Dismiss the amended notice of motion filed by the third respondent (BB) on 26 November 2021 with costs.

3. Dismiss the notice of motion served by the applicant (GR) on 26 November 2021 with costs.

Legislation Cited:

Children & Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)

Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

GR v Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice [2021] NSWCA 267

GR v Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice; Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice CBW (a pseudonym) [2021] NSWCA 157

GR v Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice; The Minister Families, Disabilities & Community Services [2021] NSWCA 234

GR v The Department of Communities & Justice (2021) NSWSC 1081

Category:

Procedural rulings

Parties:

GR (in person) (Applicant)
Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice (1st Respondent)
Minister for Families, Communities & Disability Services (2nd Respondent)
BB (in person) (3rd Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
Self-represented (Applicant)
M Anderson (1st & 2nd Respondents)
Self-represented (3rd Respondent)

Solicitors:
Self-represented (Applicant)
Crown Solicitor’s Office of NSW (1st and 2nd Respondents)
Self-represented (3rd Respondent)

File Number(s):

2021/262590

Judgment

1. SIMPSON AJA: This is the third occasion since September of this year on which this proceeding has been before the court for interlocutory orders. I have delivered judgment on two previous occasions: GR v Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice; The Minister Families, Disabilities & Community Services [2021] NSWCA 234 (“the 28 September 2021 judgment”) and GR v Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice [2021] NSWCA 267 (“the 5 November 2021 judgment”).

2. Much of the relevant background has been stated in those judgments. The following assumes familiarity with the facts and circumstances there stated. I will, accordingly, confine to a minimum the recitation of the factual and procedural background. It is sufficient to say that the substantive proceeding is an application for leave to appeal (to which I will refer as “the appeal proceeding”) against orders made in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court on 27 August 2021: GR v The Department of Communities & Justice [2021] NSWSC 1081. By those orders Sackar J dismissed an appeal brought under s 91 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) (“the Care and Protection Act”) (“the s 91 appeal”) against an order of the Children’s Court of 3 April 2020 pursuant to which all aspects of parental responsibility for the person (known in these proceedings as “AB”) who is named as fourth respondent were allocated, pursuant to s 79(1)(b) of the Care and Protection Act to the Minister, Families, Communities and Disabilities Services (“the Minister”, the second respondent) on the application of the Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice (“the Secretary”, the first respondent). The parties to the present application are the Secretary, the Minister (to whom I will collectively refer as the first and second respondents), the father of AB (the third respondent, who is referred to as “BB”) and AB himself as fourth respondent.

3. Following an order for expedition made by me on 20 September 2021, the appeal proceeding was fixed for a 2 day hearing on 1 and 2 December. When it became apparent that the parties were not in a position to proceed, those dates were vacated. A hearing in early February 2022 is now anticipated. There has been, therefore, a degree of urgency in the present interlocutory applications.

4. Three notices of motion are for present determination. They are:

1. a notice of motion filed by the first and second respondents on 10 November 2021. The orders sought relate to the representation of AB in the appeal proceeding;

2. an amended notice of motion filed by BB on 26 November 2021. The orders sought concern the issue of a subpoena to a single named medical practitioner;

3. a notice of motion filed by the applicant in the appeal proceeding (GR, AB’s mother). GR seeks a variety of orders (12 in number) to which I will return.

   5. At the request of the Registrar, the Crown Solicitor, acting for the first and second respondents, prepared a Court Book, incorporating each of the notices of motion, and the evidentiary material supplied as at the date the Court Book was prepared. The Court Book has been supplemented with additional material provided since its preparation.

   6. I will deal with the notices of motion in the sequence in which they were filed.

Representation of AB in the appeal proceeding

7. An unavoidable level of informality has attended the reception of evidence. That is, in part, because of the relative urgency of the issues to be decided, and, in part, because three of the parties (GR, BB and AB) are unrepresented.

1. The notice of motion filed by the first and second respondents on 10 November 2021.

8. The orders sought in this notice of motion are directed solely to the manner in which AB is to be represented on the hearing of the appeal proceeding. Order 11 as sought by GR is also directed, in a different way, to that question. It is therefore convenient to deal with them together.

9. The orders sought by the first and second respondents are:

“That pursuant to s 14 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) the requirement for the appointment of a tutor for the fourth respondent, the young person, AB, be dispensed with.

That pursuant to s 44 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 the fourth respondent, the young person, AB, be separately represented by an Independent Legal Representative and that the Crown Solicitor ask Legal Aid NSW to arrange the representation.”

10. The order sought by the applicant in prayer 11 of her notice of motion, also stated concisely, is:

“Appoint Pastor Paul Robert Burton as tutor for [AB].”

11. The notice of motion filed by the first and second respondents was supported by an affidavit affirmed by Ms Amy Eldridge, who identifies herself as a Manager, Casework, employed by the Department of Communities and Justice. A number of documents were annexed to Ms Eldridge’s affidavit.

12. In support of her notice of motion GR, on the morning of the hearing, forwarded by email an unsworn affidavit that was, she said, to be sworn later that day. A number of documents were also attached to that affidavit. A sworn version of the affidavit has since been provided by email.

13. Notwithstanding the simplicity with which the notices of motion are framed the issue has a degree of complexity. It is first necessary to recount some history.

14. By order of Slattery J on 22 May 2020 AB became a party (the fifth defendant) to the s 91 appeal. At that time an Independent Legal Representative (Ms Wooi) who had been appointed, pursuant to s 99(2) of the Care and Protection Act, was (anomalously, in my opinion – see Re Jayden (2007) NSWCA 35) named as a party (the fourth defendant) to the s 91 appeal. The circumstances of Ms Wooi’s appointment were reviewed by Sackar J in GR v The Department of Communities and Justice [2020] NSWSC 1622 at [92]-[101].

15. On 17 November 2020 Sackar J ordered, purportedly pursuant to s 98(2A) of the Care & Protection Act, that a guardian ad litem be appointed for AB. To do so his Honour had to be of the opinion that AB was incapable of giving proper instructions to a legal representative. His Honour so found. Sackar J declined to order the removal of Ms Wooi as a party.

16. On 30 July 2021 this Court allowed an appeal by GR against the order for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and set aside the order to that effect made by Sackar J: GR v Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice; Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice v BW (a pseudonym) [2021] NSWCA 157.

17. The position now appears to be that AB is a party (the fourth respondent) to the appeal proceeding. Although he is, by reason of his age, a person under legal incapacity, he is not represented either by a tutor, guardian ad litem, or legal representative. The proposal of the first and second respondents is little more than to explore the possibility of the appointment of an Independent Legal Representative. In saying this, I do not mean any criticism of the first and second respondents, or their legal representatives: there is no avenue of which I am aware by which they could secure representation for AB without compromising the appearance of this objectively.

18. By rule 7.14 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules a person under a legal incapacity may not commence or carry on proceedings except by a tutor. Just what is meant by “carry on proceedings” is unclear. By r 7.17(1) the plaintiff in proceedings against a defendant who is a person under legal incapacity may take no further step in the proceedings following service of the originating process until a tutor has entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant. (By r 51.1(4) a reference to the plaintiff includes a reference to an appellant, or applicant for leave to appeal; a reference to a defendant includes a reference to a respondent). Accordingly, r 7.17(1) would prevent GR taking any further step in the appeal proceeding unless, pursuant to s 14 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), compliance with that rule is dispensed with. By s 3 of the Civil Procedure Act a tutor, in relation to a person under legal incapacity, is a tutor appointed to represent the person in accordance with the Uniform Rules.

19. By r 7.18(1)(a) in any proceedings in which a person is or becomes a person under a legal incapacity the court may appoint a tutor. By sub r (5)(b) a motion for appointment of a tutor must be supported by evidence that the proposed tutor consents to the appointment and does not have any interest in the proceedings adverse to the person under legal incapacity. It is, presumably, r 7.17(1) that the first and second respondents seek in prayer 1 of their notice of motion to have dispensed with. Section 14 of the Civil Procedure Act empowers the Court, by order, to dispense with any requirement of the rules if satisfied that it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances of the case.

20. In the 5 November 2021 judgment I discussed (expressing some reservations about power) the basis on which this Court, as distinct from the Children’s Court, may appoint a separate legal representative for a person under an incapacity.

21. In support of their notice of motion the first and second respondents provided a further copy of submissions they had made in the previous proceedings (which I had found unpersuasive). Additionally, annexed to Ms Eldridge’s affidavit, was a written submission dated 11 October 2021 signed by a solicitor (Ms Kerri Phillips) employed by the Legal Aid Commission of NSW. In the written submissions Ms Phillips acknowledged that she “currently [had] no standing in the proceedings”, but said that she had been invited to appear to assist the Court. It was not made clear by whom she was invited. Ms Phillips recorded that AB had previously been represented by Ms Wooi, but that Ms Wooi is no longer available to continue in that role. Ms Phillips said that, in the September proceedings, she had indicated a willingness to accept appointment as an “Independent Legal Representative”. She did not expressly repeat that willingness, but volunteered, if so appointed, to:

“… review the material, including the submissions that will be filed on behalf of the first and second respondent and consider whether it is necessary to participate in the appeal.”

Ms Phillips said that, at the time of writing, she was not in a position to indicate to the Court whether she would wish to be heard in relation to the application for leave to appeal or an appeal.

22. The competing proposal is that of GR. By prayer 11 of her notice of motion, GR seeks, presumably pursuant to r 7.18(1)(a), the appointment of Pastor Paul Burton as tutor for AB.

23. Annexed to GR’s unsworn affidavit was a signed consent by Pastor Burton to act as tutor. A pro forma certificate of a legal representative that Pastor Burton had no interest in the proceeding adverse to the interests of AB was unsigned. At the commencement of the hearing on 1 December 2021 (which was a remote hearing) Pastor Burton attended by telephone. He did not take any part in the proceedings. Subsequently my associate received an email from Pastor Burton, which included the following:

“I respectfully request that if Her Honour intends to consider the matter of me being a tutor that she kindly also consider allowing me the right to provide a brief submission as to why I would be a suitable tutor for AB and to at least also afford me the right of a response to the comments that were made about me by the other parties as I was afforded no opportunity to respond.

I have many years of experience in assisting children, and have a genuine and sincere desire to help AB DOB 27 October 2004, and to make his views and his position known to his independent representation. I am of the view and belief he may not have been heard because of the situation he has been in for over 3 years. I have experience attending all Courts including the Court of Appeal in DCJ and other matters as a paralegal and as an advocate for children removed by the State. I have no conflict of interest in this case and believe I would make a most suitable tutor because I am truly independent and not chosen by the department.”

24. BB opposed the appointment of Pastor Burton as tutor for AB.

25. The position is far from satisfactory. There is no challenge to Sackar J’s findings that AB is incapable of giving proper instructions to a legal representative. As a party, and particularly as a party under an incapacity, he needs to be represented and, indeed, by reason of r 7.17(1), unless I were to dispense, pursuant to s 14 of the Civil Procedure Act, with the requirement for the appointment of a tutor, GR can take no further step in the appeal proceeding until a tutor is appointed.

26. The evidence in relation to the three notices of motion exposes a deep rift between the parents of AB (GR and BB) exemplified by hostile and vituperative exchanges between them, both in correspondence and in submissions made during the course of the hearing. As parents of AB, each has an interest in the outcome of the appeal, although they take diametrically opposed positions as to what the outcome should be. BB supports the current care arrangements. GR seeks restoration of AB to her care. In those circumstances I am satisfied that it would be entirely inappropriate to appoint as tutor of AB a person who has been selected by one parent but strongly opposed by the other. This should not be taken as a reflection on Pastor Burton, about whom I know only what he has stated in his email. It is a recognition that, should he be appointed as tutor, the already fierce level of acrimony in the appeal proceeding will certainly escalate.

27. I therefore decline to appoint Pastor Burton as tutor for AB. There being no alternative proposal for a tutor, I will, at least at this stage, pursuant to s 14 of the Civil Procedure Act, dispense with the requirements of r 7.17(1) for the appointment of a tutor.

28. The only remaining option is that proposed by the first and second respondents. While I am far from unappreciative of the efforts already made, and the support given, by the Legal Aid Commission so far, what is now proposed lacks an element of certainty. Ms Phillips has not, so far, undertaken to represent AB at a contested hearing.

29. The best I can do is to accept what I take to be a standing offer made by Ms Phillips on behalf of the Legal Aid Commission to accept appointment as an Independent Legal Representative for AB to the point of considering what further involvement she, or the Legal Aid Commission, should have. What is to happen after that assessment remains uncertain.

30. I have previously expressed some doubts about the statutory basis for appointment by the Supreme Court or this Court of an Independent Legal Representative: see 5 November 2021 judgment. In GR v Secretary [2021] NSWCA 157 at [8] Gleeson JA considered that the Supreme Court (and this Court) has the functions and discretions of the Childrens Court under Ch 5 and 6 of the Care and Protection Act. As I have previously mentioned, judges of the Equity Division have regularly appointed independent legal representatives in cases involving the parens patriae jurisdiction. I propose to follow that course.

31. As proposed by the first and second respondents I will direct that an Independent Legal Representative be appointed to represent AB. The Legal Aid Commission should be asked, if possible, to arrange representation, so that an appropriate order can be made. It will be necessary for the Crown Solicitor to make the approaches to the Legal Aid Commission.

32. That disposes of first and second respondents’ notice of motion.

1. The amended notice of motion filed by BB on 26 September 2021.

33. By his notice of motion BB seeks orders in the following terms:

“1.   Leave to issue the subpoena to Dr Anthony Samuels.

2.   Dr Samuels is to release documents as per schedule (item (a) to (e)

in page 3 of 6 of my Subpoenas”

34. A draft subpoena accompanying the notice of motion sought production of:

“(a)   The Psychiatric Report you provided to Healthcare Complaints Commission (‘HCCC’) on 30^th of April 2021.

(b)   The previous Psychiatrists reports that you relied on and authored by the following Psychiatrists [the names of four doctors, presumably psychiatrists, follow];

(c)   Final findings from the s 150A Hearing conducted by the Medical Council of (NSW), the (‘Council’), and chaired by Dr Michael Giuffrida, that led to [GRs] suspension starting from 6/12/2016.

(d)   All the complaints received by HCCC from the patients, colleagues and peers of [GR] that was provided to you for making your assessment.

(e)   Any written reason if provided, by [GR] or her lawyer [named] on why she failed to keep an appointment with you for in-person assessment in April of this year before wrote the Report for HCCC.”

35. In order to deal with BB’s notice of motion it is necessary to recount some further history.

36. GR was a general practitioner. By order of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) of 13 October 2021 GR’s registration as a medical practitioner was cancelled. The Tribunal ordered that no application for review of that order could be made by GR for a period of three years; Health Care Complaints Commission v [GR] [2021] NSWCATOD 162. The coversheet of the Tribunal decision shows that the proceedings occupied six days of hearing time. The Tribunal was constituted by a Principal Member (Balla ADCJ), two Senior Members (Drs Yeo and Morris, one of whom (Professor P Morris) practises as a psychiatrist), and a General Member, (Dr Berglund).

37. In reasons that extended over 522 paragraphs, Balla ADCJ and Doctors Yeo and Berglund agreed in the orders made by the Tribunal. Dr Morris dissented.

35. Eight separate complaints made by the Health Care Complaints Commission (“the HCCC”) concerning GR as a general practitioner were before the Tribunal. For present purposes, it is not necessary to explore the nature of the complaints. The majority in the Tribunal found that GR was suffering an impairment within the meaning of s 5 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) that detrimentally affected, or was likely to affect, her capacity to practise medicine, and that she was not competent to practise. Perusal of the reasons shows that the impairment is psychiatric (or is, in the language of s 5, a mental impairment). A number of medical practitioners practising as psychiatrists gave evidence. Dr Samuels (to whom BB’s proposed subpoena is directed) was one. It is apparent that the majority in the Tribunal accepted Dr Samuels’ evidence. Dr Morris did not. Important to Dr Morris’ rejection of Dr Samuels’ evidence was that Dr Samuels did not, at any time, examine or consult with GR because GR declined to attend a consultation that had been arranged.

36. BB’s objective in seeking access to Dr Samuels’ report, and the material he had available to him in its preparation, is plain. He wishes to contest what will be GR’s central claim in the appeal proceeding, that she, and not the Minister, should have parental responsibility for AB. He wishes to use the material to demonstrate that she is not suitable to have the ongoing care of AB.

37. BB’s wish to have access to the material is understandable. However, I am not persuaded that the report of Dr Samuels, prepared for the purposes of a proceeding in the Tribunal brought by the HCCC, has sufficient relevance to the issues in the appeal proceedings. The proceeding in the Tribunal was directed to GR’s capacity as a medical practitioner. The appeal proceeding will concern, first, whether any error can be identified in Sackar J’s judgment, and second (potentially) GR’s capacity as a parent. While there would, undoubtedly, be some common elements, there was a great deal of evidence in the s 91 appeal (before Sackar J) specifically directed to the issue of parental responsibility. Further, as Dr Morris emphasised in his dissenting decision in the Tribunal, Dr Samuels has never conducted a clinical examination of GR. The likelihood that Dr Samuels could throw any useful light on the issues in the appeal proceeding is remote. Finally, and decisively, as explained below the appeal proceeding will be decided on the basis of the evidence given in the s 91 appeal proceeding before Sackar J. It will be necessary for “special grounds” to be established before any additional evidence of circumstances that existed at the time of the s 91 appeal hearing is admitted. Dr Samuels’ opinions can only relate to circumstances that existed at the time of the Tribunal proceeding (May 2021, which predates the s 91 appeal proceeding). BB has established no such “special grounds”. There is no basis for leave to issue the proposed subpoena.

38. I will therefore dismiss the amended notice of motion filed by BB on 26 November 2021.

1. The notice of motion filed by GR (served) on 26 November 2021

42. In her notice of motion GR sought twelve orders. I have already dealt with that sought in prayer 11 (the appointment of Pastor Burton as tutor). I will deal with the remaining orders sought in the sequence in which they appear in the notice of motion.

1. (i): By prayer 1 GR seeks, pursuant to s 75A(7), (8) and (9) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) leave to adduce new evidence.

43. The relevant provisions of s 75A are subss (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10). By subs 5, where the decision under appeal has been given after a hearing (as in this case) the appeal is to be by way of rehearing. By subs (6) this Court has the powers and duties of the first instance court, including (relevantly) powers and duties concerning the drawing of inferences and the making of findings of fact. By subs (7) the Court may receive further evidence; however, by subs (8), and notwithstanding subs (7), where the appeal is from a judgment after a hearing on the merits the Court is not to receive further evidence except on “special grounds”. By subs (9) that prohibition does not apply to evidence concerning matters occurring after the hearing. By subs (10) the Court may make any finding or assessment, give any judgment, make any order or give any direction which ought to have been given or made or which the nature of the case requires.

44. As the orders of Sackar J were made following judgment after a hearing on the merits, subs (8) is central to GR’s application. She needs to establish “special grounds” for the Court to receive additional evidence. GR has not identified any “further evidence” which she seeks to have received. It follows that, also, she has not identified any “special grounds” for the reception of any further evidence. There is no basis for making order 1 as sought.

(ii):   Prayer 2 as sought is in the following terms:

“Grant 1^st access to the Appellant for 11 days, for general access to all subpoena records produced to date.”

45. I am not aware of any outstanding material produced on subpoena for the purpose of the appeal proceedings or any material produced on subpoena to which GR has not been given access. In the 5 November 2021 judgment I set aside six subpoenas purportedly issued by GR. I have refused (or am about to refuse) leave to BB to issue a further subpoena to Dr Samuels. I have no evidence of any material to which the proposed order to could conceivably relate. I will not make an order in terms of proposed order 2.

(iii):   By prayer 3 GR seeks that a costs order made against her by me on 5 November 2021 be set aside and that a costs order made against BB in her favour (or partly in her favour) be quantified as a gross sum costs order.

46. In the 5 November 2021 judgment, I made the following orders:

“2.   The notice of motion filed by [GR] … is dismissed with costs.

3.   The notice of motion filed by BB on 19 October is dismissed with costs.”

47. Ordinarily, as a self-represented litigant, GR would not be entitled to an order for costs, other than for certain quantifiable expenses. In the 5 November 2021 proceeding, however, GR was represented by counsel and solicitors. It was partly for that reason that I ordered that BB pay costs of his failed application.

48. A application for a gross sum costs order needs to be supported by evidence demonstrating why the ordinary order for costs, subject to assessment under the relevant legislation, should not be made. It also needs to quantify the costs claimed. Neither has been done. There is no basis for making order 3 as sought by GR.

(iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (ix): By prayer 4 to 7 and 9 in the notice of motion GR seeks orders that have already been the subject of notice of motion in this Court and dealt with by me in the 28 September 2021 judgment. No additional evidence has been provided to justify departure from the previous orders. I decline to make any order as sought in those prayers for relief.

1. (viii): By prayer 8 GR seeks leave to file a notice of discontinuance against BB. To make such an order would deprive BB of the opportunity to participate, and to be heard in the appeal proceeding. BB was a party (although non-active) in the s 91 appeal before Sackar J. He is the father of BB and is entitled to be heard. The only reason advanced by GR for discontinuing against him is that he did not participate in the s91 appeal. That is an insufficient basis to deprive him of a fundamental right in relation to the allocation of parental responsibility for his own child. I decline to make order (8) as sought in the notice of motion.

2. (x):   By prayer 10 GR seeks that BB’s amended notice of motion filed on 26 November 2021 be dismissed and the subpoena he proposes to issue to Dr Samuels be set aside. I have already indicated that I intend to dismiss BB’s notice of motion. There is no subpoena to set aside.

3. (xi):   I have dealt above [at [27] with prayer 11.

4. (xii):   By prayer 12 GR seeks a gross sum costs order against the first and second respondents (the Secretary and the Minister) and the third respondent (BB) “for this application”. Such order depends, first, on GR having at least some measure of success in the present application. With the exception of prayer 10, none of the orders she has sought will be made. GR has otherwise been singularly unsuccessful. Five of the prayers for relief will be dismissed because they are repetitive of applications already made and disposed of.

49. There is not the slightest basis for making a costs order in favour of GR, much less an order for gross sum costs.

50. I will dismiss GR’s notice of motion filed and served on 26 November 2021 with costs.

51. The orders I make are:

1. On the notice of motion filed by the first and second respondents on 10 November 2021:

(a) Pursuant to s 14 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) dispense with the requirement of UCPR 7.17(1) that the applicant (GR) take no further step in the substantive proceeding until a tutor has been appointed for the fourth respondent (AB);

(b)   Direct that an Independent Legal Representative be appointed for the fourth respondent to the substantive proceeding (AB);

(c)   Request the Crown Solicitor (i) to liaise with the Legal Aid Commission of NSW in order to effect such an appointment; and (ii) to advise the parties of any proposal in that respect with a view to the appointment of a specific person as Independent Legal representative.

1. Dismiss the amended notice of motion filed by the third respondent (BB) of 26 November 2021 with costs;

2. Dismiss the notice of motion served by the applicant (GR) on 26 November 2021 with costs.

**********

Decision last updated: 10 December 2021