Government Employees Insurance Company v Blood Sacrificee

WIPO Case No. D2024-3682

ARBITRATION

AND

MEDIATION CENTER

ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

Government Employees Insurance Company v. Blood Sacrificee

Case No. D2024-3682

1. The Parties

The Complainant is Government Employees Insurance Company, United States of America

(“United States”), represented by Burns & Levinson LLP, United States.

The Respondent is Blood Sacrificee, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

2. The Domain Name and Registrar

The disputed domain name <eams-geico.com> is registered with Amazon Registrar, Inc. (the “Registrar”).

3. Procedural History

The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on September 11,

2024. On September 12, 2024, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar

verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On September 13, 2024, the Registrar transmitted

by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed

domain name which differed from the named Respondent (Registration Private, Identity Protection Service)

and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on

September 16, 2024, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting

the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amendment to the

Complaint on September 17, 2024.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amendment to the Complaint satisfied the formal

requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for

Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for

Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).

In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the

Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on September 18, 2024. In accordance with the Rules,

paragraph 5, the due date for Response was October 8, 2024. The Respondent did not submit any

response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent’s default on October 9, 2024.

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The Center appointed Archibald Findlay SC as the sole panelist in this matter on October 14, 2024.

The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and

Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the

Rules, paragraph 7.

4. Factual Background

The following facts and circumstances are to be found in the Complaint and its Annexures and, in the

absence of challenge, can be accepted as background.

Complainant is an internationally well-known insurance provider who has provided its insurance services –

including insurance brokerage and underwriting for automobiles, motorcycles, homeowners, renters,

condominiums, mobile homes, commercial properties, overseas travel, floods, and boats – throughout the

United States under the trademark GEICO since at least 1948.

Further evidencing its trademark rights, Complainant holds United States Federal trademark registrations for

its trademark GEICO, including trademarks registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office,

registration No. 763274, registered on January 14, 1964, and registration No. 2601179, registered on to July

30, 2002; as well as trademarks registered with the European Union Intellectual Property Office, trademark

No. 1178718, registered on September 4, 2013, and an International registration, No. 1178718, registered on

September 4, 2013.

Through extensive use and promotional activities, the GEICO trademark has become uniquely associated

with Complainant and its services. In fact, Complainant has over 16 million policies and insures more than

28 million vehicles. Complainant also has over 38,000 employees, and is one of the fastest-growing auto

insurers in the United States.

The Complainant maintains various social media accounts under its famous GEICO trademark on platforms

that host tens of thousands, and in some cases millions, of followers.

In connection with its insurance products and services, Complainant has established a website located at

“ which Complainant uses to promote and sell its insurance services under its GEICO

trademark. The “ website enables computer users to: access information regarding

Complainant’s insurance services, learn more about Complainant, and obtain insurance quotes. In

connection with providing its services, Complainant also maintains a sub-page at “

This page allows customers to log in and manage their policies.

The disputed domain name was registered on August 19, 2024, and consists of Complainant’s entire GEICO

trademark, plus the prefix “eams”: “eams-geico”, similar to Complainant’s URL <ecams.geico.com>.

The disputed domain name does not presently resolve to an active website, however, previously (in

September 2024), the disputed domain name resolved to a webpage requiring visitors to enter their

confidential GEICO user ID/email/policy number and password data into a form on a webpage that imitated

the “look and feel” of the Complainant’s GEICO customer portal.

5. Parties’ Contentions

A. Complainant

The Complainant submits that it is the owner of registered trademarks for GEICO and highlights the goodwill

and recognition attained under the name GEICO. It asserts that the disputed domain name is confusingly

similar to the trademark or service marks owned by the Complainant.

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The Complainant avers that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name

and, to the best of the Complainant’s knowledge, the Respondent does not have any trademark rights to the

term GEICO. Neither has the Respondent received any license from the Complainant to use domain names

featuring the GEICO trademark.

The Complainant submits that the Respondent has not used, nor prepared to use, the disputed domain

name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services but rather in connection with conducting

illegal activities (purportedly posing as the Complainant without its knowledge or consent in order to harvest

sensitive information from unsuspecting victims), which cannot characterize a bona fide offering of goods

and services under the Policy.

The disputed domain name formerly resolved to a webpage requiring visitors to enter their confidential

GEICO user ID/email/policy number and password data into a form which was a Spanish translation of the

text contained on the Complainant’s GEICO customer portal and was strikingly similar in appearance.

The Complainant asserted its conviction that, once a user entered their credentials, the information is likely

captured before the user was redirected to the legitimate GEICO website, leaving the customer potentially

unaware of any compromise to their personal data. The Complainant further stated that it believed that the

Respondent had registered the disputed domain name to intentionally attract Internet users and consumers

looking for legitimate GEICO services to induce unsuspecting users to enter confidential information for

Respondent’s illicit commercial gain.

Accordingly, the Complainant has set out, in detail, contentions supported by previous UDRP decisions as to

why:

(a) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the trademark or service marks owned by

the Complainant;

(b) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(c) the disputed domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Complainant submits that it has presented a prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights or

legitimate interests in the disputed domain name for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy and that

the burden of production now shifts to the Respondent to show that it has rights or legitimate interests in the

disputed domain name.

The Complainant further contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a

transfer of the disputed domain name.

B. Respondent

The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant’s contentions.

6. Discussion and Findings

A. Substantive Elements of the Policy

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules requires that:

“A Panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance

with the Policy, the Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

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Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy directs that the complainant must prove each of the following:

(i) that the disputed domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a

trademark or a service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(ii) that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name;

(iii) that the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out four illustrative circumstances or acts which would, for the purposes of

paragraph 4(a)(iii) above, be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith. These are

non-exclusive.

Similarly, paragraph 4(c) of the Policy sets out three illustrative circumstances which would demonstrate the

Respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name for the purpose of paragraph 4(a)(ii).

B. Effect of Default

Notwithstanding the fact that a respondent may be in default, a complainant bears the burden of proof in

respect of each of the three main elements in terms of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy. Such default does

not, per se, entitle a complainant to a finding in its favor by reason thereof, as failure by the complainant

to discharge the burden of proof will still result in the complaint being denied (M. Corentin Benoit

Thiercelin v. CyberDeal, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2010-0941). It follows that such default does not, of

itself, constitute an acceptance or an admission of any of the averments or contentions put forward, or of

the supporting evidence put up (Standard Innovation Corporation v. Shopintimates USA, WIPO Case

No. D2011-0049). The Panel is nevertheless not bound to accept all that has been put up by the

Complainant but must evaluate it as it stands (Brooke Bollea, a.k.a Brooke Hogan v. Robert McGowan,

WIPO Case No. D2004-0383; San Lameer (Pty) Ltd and Sanlam Ltd v. Atlantic Internet Services (Pty)

Ltd, WIPO Case No. D2010-0551).

However, paragraph 14(b) of the Rules provides that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, a panel

shall draw such inference as it considers appropriate from the failure of a party to comply with a

requirement of the Rules (Allianz, Compaña de Seguros y Reaseguros S.A. v. John Michael, WIPO Case

No. D2009-0942).

In the present instance, the Panel finds that there are no exceptional circumstances for the failure of the

Respondent to submit a Response, particularly in the light of the fact that the Center wrote to the

Respondent when dealing with procedural matters and advising the Respondent of time limits.

From this, the Panel considers that it may accept that the Respondent does not deny the facts asserted and

contentions made by the Complainant based on such facts (Reuters Limited v. Global Net 2000, Inc, WIPO

Case No. D2000-0441; LCIA (London Court of International Arbitration) v. Wellsbuck Corporation, WIPO

Case No. D2005-0084; Ross-Simons, Inc. v. Domain.Contact, WIPO Case No. D2003-0994; Standard

Innovation Corporation v. Shop Intimates USA, supra; VKR Holding A/s v. Above.com Domain Privacy/Host

Master, Transure Enterprise Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2012-0040; Knorr-Bremse AG. v. WhoisGuard

Protected, WhoisGuard, Inc. / Mosco Binzu, WIPO Case No. D2019-0616).

Thus, in the view of the Panel, it may accept asserted facts that are not unreasonable, with the consequence

that the Respondent will be subjected to inferences that flow naturally from the information provided by the

Complainant (Reuters Limited v. Global Net 2000, Inc, supra; RX America, LLC. v. Matthew Smith, WIPO

Case No. D2005-0540; Allianz, Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros S.A. v. John Michael, supra; Standard

Innovation Corporation v. Shopintimates USA, supra; VKR Holding A/s v. Above.com Domain Privacy/Host

Master, Transure Enterprise Ltd., supra; Groupe Auchan v. Anirban Mitra, WIPO Case No. D2012-0412;

Barclays Bank PLC v. Miami Investment Brokers Inc, WIPO Case No. D2012-1213).

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C. Identical or Confusingly Similar

It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing

(or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison

between the Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel

Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition, (“WIPO Overview 3.0”), section 1.7.

The Complainant has shown rights in respect of a trademark or service mark for the purposes of the Policy.

WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.2.1 and the issue of “identical or confusingly similar” for the purposes of

paragraph 4(a)(i) should be adjudicated upon by utilizing a side-by-side comparison to decide “whether the

alphanumeric string comprising the challenged domain name is identical […] or sufficiently approximates [the

trademark]”. (See Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. d/b/a Condé Nast Publications v. MSA, Inc. and

Moniker Privacy Services, WIPO Case No. D2007-1743.)

The entirety of the mark is reproduced within the disputed domain name which is sufficient to establish that it

is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s registered mark (Quixtar Investments, Inc. v. Dennis Hoffman,

WIPO Case No. D2000-0253; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. David Burns and Adam-12 Dot Com, WIPO

Case No. D2001-0784; Lilly ICOS LLC v. John Hopking / Neo net Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2005-0694;

Société Des Produits Nestlé SA v. Mustafa Yakin / Moniker Privacy Services, WIPO Case No. D2008-0016;

LEGO Juris A/S v. Registration Private, Domains By Proxy, LLC / Carolina Rodrigues, Fundacion Comercio

Electronico, WIPO Case No. D2021-4146).

Accordingly, the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the mark for the purposes of the Policy.

WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.7.

Although the addition of the term “eams” may bear on assessment of the second and third elements, the

addition of the term “eams” does not prevent a finding of confusing similarity between the disputed domain

name and the mark for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.8. (Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche

AG v. Rojeen Rayaneh, WIPO Case No. D2004-0488 and particularly Carvana, LLC v. Domains By Proxy,

LLC. / Fundacion Comercio Electronico, Carolina Rodrigues, WIPO Case No. D2022-1099).

The generic Top-Level Domain (“gTLD”) “.com” featured in the disputed domain name is viewed as a

standard registration requirement and not an element that generally would be taken into consideration when

evaluating the identity and similarity of the Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name

(Magnum Piering, Inc. v. The Mudjackers and Garwood S. Wilson, Sr., WIPO Case No. D2000-1525.

Rollerblade, Inc. v. Chris McCrady, WIPO Case No. D2000-0429; Phenomedia AG v. Meta Verzeichnis

Com, WIPO Case No. D2001-0374; Qantas Airways Limited v. Minh Huynh, WIPO Case No. D2008-1382;

L’Oréal, Lancôme Parfums Et Beauté & Cie v. Jack Yang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1627; Fry’s Electronics,

Inc v. Whois ID Theft Protection, WIPO Case No. D2006-1435; Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba d/b/a Toshiba

Corporation v. Marko Tusla d/b/a/ Toshiba-Club.com, WIPO Case No. D2004-1066).

Accordingly, the Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.

D. Rights or Legitimate Interests

Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate

rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name.

Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized

that proving a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task

of “proving a negative”, requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the

respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or

legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with

relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of

proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant

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evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element. WIPO Overview 3.0,

section 2.1. (See also, Document Technologies, Inc. v. International Electronic Communications Inc., WIPO

Case No. D2000-0270; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. David Burns and Adam-12 Dot Co, supra).

Having defaulted, the Respondent has placed itself in a position that it has not produced any evidence to

rebut such prima facie case as may have been established by the Complainant, and the enquiry must

therefore focus upon what is evidenced by the Complainant in order to determine whether or not it has been

so established.

The Complainant contends that it is the proprietor of the trademark GEICO and that the Respondent has not

been given any permission to register or use any domain name incorporating the trademark of the

Complainant.

Apart from there being no authorization on the part of the Complainant, there is no evidence of a relationship

or association between the Complainant and the Respondent, whether by license or otherwise, which also

militates against the Respondent having rights or legitimate interests in or other entitlement which might fall

within that purview (Sybase, Inc. v. Analytical Systems, WIPO Case No. D2004-0360).

Having reviewed the available record the Panel finds that, by failing to provide a response to the Complaint,

the Respondent has not rebutted the prima facie case made by the Complainant. Panels have held that the

use of a domain name for illegal activity, here, claimed impersonation/passing off and phishing, can never

confer rights or legitimate interests on a respondent. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 2.13.1.

The Panel is therefore satisfied that, in the circumstances, the Complainant has established the second

element of the Policy.

E. Registered and Used in Bad Faith

The Panel notes that, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy

(WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.2.1.) establishes circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, that, if

found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad

faith, namely:

(i) circumstances indicating that [the respondent] has registered or [the respondent] has acquired the domain

name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to

the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for

valuable consideration in excess of [the respondent’s] documented out of pocket costs directly related to the

domain name; or

(ii) [the respondent] has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or

service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that [the respondent] has

engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii) [the respondent] has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a

competitor; or

(iv) by using the domain name, [the respondent] has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial again,

Internet users to [the respondent’s] website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion

with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of [the respondent’s]

website or location or of a product or service on [the respondent’s] website or location.

As found by previous UDRP panels such as Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO

Case No. D2000-0003 and Bridgestone South Africa Holdings (Pty) Ltd v. Anthony Marcus, Auto Align and

Tire CC, and Glen Martin, WIPO Case No. D2023-1359; as well as section 3.3 of the WIPO Overview 3.0 it

has been concluded that the non-use of a domain name does not prevent a finding of bad faith. Generally,

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therefore, the non-use of a domain name is considered not to be a bona fide offering of goods or services.

In this instance, it appears that the Respondent has deliberately registered the disputed domain name which

is confusingly similar to the distinctive GEICO trademark. This name is not a phrase a trader would

legitimately choose unless seeking to create an impression of association with the Complainant.

The implication arising from the disputed domain name, in the mind of a would-be user, is therefore clearly

that it is either of or in some way associated with the Complainant. In turn, in the view of the Panel, this

leads to the inescapable conclusion that such potential user is invited to do business with either the

Complainant itself or someone authorized on its behalf. That would, by application of paragraph 4(b)(iv) of

the Policy, constitute bad faith registration and use. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.2.1. (Media24 Limited v.

Llewellyn Du Randt, WIPO Case No. D2009-0699; San Lameer (Pty) Ltd and Sanlam Ltd v. Atlantic Internet

Services (Pty) Ltd, supra).

The selection of a disputed domain name that is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s trademark and the

Complainant’s domain name, particularly in the absence of any explanation, leads to the conclusion, in the

view of the Panel, that the Respondent must have known of the reputation of the Complainant in the market

and therefore it selected the disputed domain name in circumstances where it was very well aware of the

Complainant’s reputation and intended to benefit therefrom (Deutsche Post AG v. MailMij LLC, WIPO Case

No. D2003-0128; Barclays Bank PLC v. Miami Investment Brokers Inc., WIPO Case No. D2012-1213),

particularly where it is so widely known globally. Moreover, such conduct by the Respondent implies that it

intended to suggest to would be users that it was in some way linked to or associated with the Complainant

and thereby take advantage of the Complainant's reputation and unsuspecting third parties.

In particular, the disputed domain name initially resolving to a page strikingly similar to the Complainant's

customer portal and containing the same images and text, albeit in Spanish, as the Complainant’s own

website, falsely suggests a link or arrangement between the Respondent and the Complainant endorsed by

the Complainant. (Kelley Blue Book Company, Inc. v. Nikolay Golovin aka Buy-movie.net, WIPO Case

No. D2005-0837). The use of such an inherently misleading website to seek sensitive login information from

unsuspecting third parties constitutes clear evidence of bad faith.

Panels have held that the use of a domain name for illegal activity, here, claimed impersonation/passing off

and phishing, constitutes bad faith. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.4. Having reviewed the record, the Panel

finds the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name constitutes bad faith under the

Policy.

The Panel is therefore satisfied that the Complainant has established the third element under

paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.

7. Decision

For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel

orders that the disputed domain name <eams-geico.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

/Archibald Findlay/

Archibald Findlay

Sole Panelist

Date: October 23, 2024