Gottschalk-Krutsky v Commissioner for Social Housing in the Act (Appeal) - [2014] ACAT 74

ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

GOTTSCHALK-KRUTSKY & ANOR v COMMISSIONER FOR SOCIAL HOUSING IN THE ACT (APPEAL) [2014] ACAT 74

AA 14/41, RT 14/106
Catchwords: APPEAL – RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES – breach of standard residential terms – application of section 48 of Residential Tenancies Act 1997 – need to consider exercise of discretion in section 48 – discretion not considered is an error of law – decision set aside

List of Legislation: Residential Tenancies Act 1997 ss 48, 79(3), 82, clause 70 , 48(1)(a)(ii) & (iii), 48(2)(a)(ii), Schedule 1, Clause 70
Human Rights Act 2006, section 82

Cases Cited: Commissioner of Housing of the Australian Capital Territory v Nicole Smith [1995] ACTSC 17
Project Blue Sky Inc v. Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
Commissioner for Housing for the ACT v Lisa Margules (RT 2954 of 2002 and 2661 of 2002,)

PAAN Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Commissioner for ACT Revenue2014] ACTSC 161
West Australian Field and Game Association Inc v Pearce (1992) 8 WAR 64

Appeal Tribunal: Mr C.G Chenoweth, OAM – Acting Presidential Member

Date of Orders: 4 December 2014
Date of Reasons for Decision: 4 December 2014

ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

AA 14/41, RT 14/106
BETWEEN:
CAMILLA INEZ GOTTSCHALK- KRUTSKY
First Appellant

AND:
DYLAN JAMES HUTCHINGS
Second Appellant

AND:
COMMISSIONER
FOR SOCIAL HOUSING
IN THE ACT
Respondent

APPEAL TRIBUNAL: Mr C.G Chenoweth, OAM– Acting Presidential Member

DATE: 4 December 2014

ORDER

The appeal is allowed and the Original Tribunal’s orders of 29 August 2014 are set aside.

………………………………..

Mr C.G Chenoweth, OAM
Acting Presidential Member

REASONS FOR DECISION

History of the Matter

On 16 April 2013, the appellants signed a tenancy agreement with the respondent in respect of a property owned by the respondent. That agreement provided for a commencement date of 16 April 2013. Attachment A to the agreement set out the standard residential tenancy terms from Schedule 1 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 ("RT Act"). One of those terms, clause 70, provides as follows:
"The tenant must not:
(a) use the premises, or permit them to be used, for an illegal purpose to the detriment of the lessor’s interest in the premises; or
(b) cause or permit nuisance; or
(c) interfere, or permit interference, with the quiet enjoyment of the occupiers of nearby premises."
The application to terminate the lease and recover possession was brought by the respondent under section 48 of the RT Act. That section provides as follows:
48Certain breaches of standard residential tenancy terms
(1)On application by a lessor, the ACAT may make a termination and possession order if—
(a)satisfied that—
(i)the tenant has breached the standard residential tenancy terms (other than by failing to pay rent that has become payable); and
(ii)the lessor has served a termination notice on the tenant based on the breach; and
(iii)the tenant did not vacate the premises in accordance with the notice; and
(iv)the breach of the standard residential tenancy terms was not in accordance with a term of the residential tenancy agreement endorsed by the ACAT; and
(v)the breach justifies the termination of the tenancy; or
(b)the ACAT—
(i)has made an order under section 83 (b); and
(ii)is satisfied that the tenant has breached that order; and
(iii)is satisfied that the breach justifies the termination of the tenancy.
(2)The ACAT may, if satisfied that it is appropriate and just to do so in relation to an application mentioned in subsection (1)—
(a)refuse to make a termination and possession order if—
(i)the tenant has remedied the relevant breach; or
(ii)the tenant undertakes to remedy the breach within a reasonable specified period and is reasonably likely to do so; or
(b)make a termination and possession order but suspend it for a period of no more than 3 weeks if satisfied that—
(i)were the order not suspended for a specified period of no more than 3 weeks the tenant would suffer significant hardship; and
(ii)that hardship would be greater than the hardship that would be suffered by the lessor if the order were suspended for the specified period.
Shortly after the appellants moved into the property, they commenced having loud verbal arguments both in the house and outside. These were violent and abusive arguments, containing a lot of swearing and offensive language, and sometimes went on for considerable periods of time. In addition, while arguments were being conducted inside the house there was much banging of doors and other disturbances. Complaints were made to the respondent by neighbours and people in the street about the behaviour of the appellants. The conduct complained of continued over a number of different occasions and there were further complaints to the respondent. At times, the police attended at the premises at the request of neighbours. The concern of the neighbours was exacerbated by late-night arguments, slamming doors, screams from the first appellant which indicated that she was being assaulted and that the police should be called, and generally a situation causing disturbance and concern to people in the immediate vicinity.
On one occasion the second appellant threatened people in the neighbourhood with a large knife or machete, as a result of which he was charged and dealt with by the Magistrates Court. He is presently serving a sentence in the community under a probation and parole order.
On 3 May 2013, the appellants were served a notice to remedy breaches of the lease for interfering with the quiet enjoyment of the neighbourhood. It is a reasonable inference to draw that the respondent’s officers would have discussed the matter with the appellants on a number of occasions by way of advice and counselling, and sought to get them to change their behaviour.
Notwithstanding the service of the notice to remedy, the unacceptable behaviour of the appellants appears to have continued during 2013, leading to the service of a notice to vacate the tenancy.
The respondent served a notice to vacate (termination notice) on the appellants on 8 October 2013. This notice required the appellants to vacate the premises before 24 October 2013, and gave as its grounds the breaches of clause 70 referred to above. The notice also set out the following
"As you have had more than three substantiated breaches in your tenancy Housing ACT is issuing you with a Notice to Vacate on the following grounds: Between 16 April 2013 there has [sic] been seven formal complaints received concerning disruptive behaviour. These complaints indicate that you have interfered with a quiet enjoyment of others in and around Elkington Street Florey. On the 2 October 2013 there was [sic] further disturbances witnessed by a Housing ACT official whom [sic] was undertaking their usual duties. The tenancy shall end on the day you vacate the premises.”
No immediate steps appear to have been taken to enforce the notice, although it is a reasonable inference that there were further discussions between the appellants and the respondent. On 4 December 2013, the appellants attended at the offices of the respondent and had a discussion with one of the respondent’s officers, Mr Chadwick. Mr Chadwick prepared a file note which was included as part of the documents filed in the matter. The file note of Mr Chadwick indicated that he had discussed the offensive behaviour and tried to assist the appellants to understand that it could not continue, but they were not co-operative towards him. The second respondent made a verbal threat towards the officer.

The Initial Hearing

On 5 February 2014, the respondent filed an application in the tribunal for the termination of the tenancy agreement. Directions were made for the hearing of the application.
The matter came on for hearing on 15 July 2014 before Appeal President Stefaniak, (“the Member”) sitting in the tribunal's original jurisdiction. The matter resumed on 15 August 2014 and on 29 August 2014.
At the hearing, evidence was given for the Commissioner by two close neighbours, living across the street from the appellants’ house. They both gave evidence by telephone. Mr Scott Giles gave evidence of disruption, loud noises and threats by the appellants to each other. The uncertainty of not knowing when an argument might break out, and the loudness and aggression of the language caused he and his wife considerable concern and apprehension. He had once been sprayed with gravel from a car reversing out of the appellants’ property, but the second appellant had apologised for this. Mr Giles gave evidence of doors slamming at all hours of the night as part of the arguments. He denied that he was simply trying to get rid of people that he did not like, or with whom he had nothing in common, but was concerned about the loss of amenity to his family and his business, which was conducted from home.
Mrs Karen Giles gave evidence by telephone and confirmed the general tenor of her husband's evidence. She indicated that the stress of the situation had caused her much anxiety and may have contributed to a decline in her physical state.
Mr Robert Keys gave evidence by telephone. He referred to the shouting, swearing and the police being called and his concern that there may be drug dealers at the premises. His two children had become very anxious and spent more time in their rooms to avoid being able to hear the arguments, something which he attributed to the behaviour of the appellants.
He did acknowledge that the tenants had improved their behaviour in recent times.
Audio from the police incident reports was also played to the tribunal.
The first appellant gave evidence. She acknowledged that there had been a lot of loud arguments at the front of the house as well as in it. She acknowledged that this would have upset the neighbours and that it was conduct that she was not proud of. She had been under a great deal of stress as a result of some serious criminal charges affecting her mother, and also charges laid against her. She acknowledged that on one occasion her partner had been aggressive towards some people with a big knife, and that he had been prosecuted for this. She acknowledged that the police had been at the property a number of times.
The first appellant maintained that the second appellant never hit her, nor she him, but said that she was highly stressed about the court proceedings. She and her partner argued in the street to avoid arguing in front of their child. She had problems with her mother, who used to come around and be disruptive. She maintained that she and her partner were now working with Relationships Australia to improve their situation. She acknowledged that they had been in the wrong, but that things were better now. The witness was cross-examined about the terms of a statement by another neighbour, Troy Wilson. The statement was not tendered, nor was Mr Wilson called to give evidence.
The second appellant also gave evidence. He described his problems with epilepsy and a lack of employment. He acknowledged the extensive arguments in and at the front of the house, and also denied that there had been physical assaults on his partner. The arguments had been out the front to try to avoid arguing in front of their child. He acknowledged the incident with the knife or machete in May 2013 and said he was now on parole for that. He acknowledged that they had been working with Relationships Australia and support group to try to improve and remedy their family interaction. He now had better techniques to overcome the frustration that caused him to get into these loud arguments. He was concerned that if the tenancy was terminated, they would have nowhere to live, and the probation and parole authorities may take steps to require him to serve the balance of his sentence in custody rather in the community. Both he and his partner were concerned that the care and protection authority would seek to take their child away if they lost their tenancy.
The statement of Mark Chadwick referred to in paragraph 8 was not tendered, nor was Mr Chadwick called, but the statement was referred to during the course of Mr Hutchings’ evidence and he did acknowledge that he had difficult relationships with him.
Submissions were made by both parties. The Commissioner’s representative referred to the breaches having occurred over a number of instances over a considerable period of time, with significant disturbance to the neighbours. It was submitted that the breaches did not abate despite complaints and the issuing of a Notice to Remedy and the Notice to Vacate.
The submissions on behalf of the appellant raised the question of whether there could be a breach of "quiet enjoyment" in circumstances where there was no intention directed towards the neighbours, and (apart from the incident with the knife or machete) all of the conduct had taken place on the appellants own property and was directed towards each other.
An oral decision was given. In it, the Member discussed the evidence and the weight that he had attributed to various parts of it. He also referred to statements which had been filed in the matter but not tendered. The witnesses giving them had not been called, and so there was no opportunity for cross examination. He acknowledged that there had been some improvement in the appellants behaviour and referred to some of the authorities to which his attention had been directed during the hearing.
The Member made an order on 29 August 2014, terminating the residential tenancy agreement with effect from 4 PM on that day, but suspending the process of eviction until 3 PM on 19 September 2014. The order also had a note that encouraged the respondent to find alternative accommodation for the tenants where problems evident in the tenancy would not be so problematic, especially given (a) an improvement in their behaviour and the tenants taking some steps to address the behaviour; and (b) the apparent availability of flats being available that tenants reject as not suitable. The note to the order is an expression of discussions held during the hearing of the matter, where the Member explored the prospect of alternative accommodation for the tenants, and also noted that over recent periods, their behaviour had improved and that they were taking steps to overcome their serious problems and improve their relationship. A copy of the order made is annexed to these reasons for decision.

The Appeal

The appellants appealed the order by an application dated 16 September 2014. In that application, the appellants sought the appeal to be conducted as a new hearing with the Commissioner’s witnesses to give evidence in person, and also sought to bring further evidence about the impact of eviction upon the probation and parole orders affecting the second appellant. The grounds of appeal also sought to bring evidence of the appellants continued engagement with support services to address their underlying issues.
The appeal notice also stated that the original tribunal had erred in the weight that it had placed on various witnesses, a failure to give adequate consideration to the nature of the complaints in 2014 and the reduction in complaints since 2013, that the Member was biased because of comments made at the hearing, and there was a failure to give adequate consideration to the provisions of section 48 of the RT Act. The appeal grounds also alleged as an error the undue weight placed on a hope that the respondent would offer alternative accommodation, expressed by the Member.
At the appeal hearing, the appellant’s counsel made it clear that the allegation of bias against the Member set out in the original notice of appeal was withdrawn. I had pointed out at a directions hearing that this was a serious allegation which would require a high degree of proof to be upheld, and in the absence of that proof should not be made at all. In my view there was nothing in the transcript which justified it having been included in the original notice of appeal, and it should not have been done.
The warrant of eviction was stayed pending the hearing of the appeal, and the usual directions were made for filing of statements. Leave was given to file a new notice of appeal, specifying more precisely the questions of law or fact that the appellants relied upon, in accordance with the provisions of section 79 (3) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (“ACAT Act.”)

Amended Appeal Notice

An amended notice of appeal was filed by leave and dated the 23 October 2014. The questions of law in the notice of appeal were whether the tribunal erred by failing to provide an adequate statement of reasons and findings, and whether the tribunal erred by failing to adequately consider the submissions of the appellants. The appeal notice also raised as a ground that the tribunal had relied on evidence of a person not available for cross-examination at the hearing. The appeal notice added a further ground disputing the basis on which the tribunal applied an earlier authority of Commissioner for Housing for the ACT v Lisa Margules (RT 2954 of 2002 and 2661 of 2002,) and also disputed whether the tribunal had considered the appellants human rights under the Human Rights Act 2004 of the ACT.
The appeal notice raised the issue of whether the tribunal had made findings that were not reasonably open to it because the person whose statement was relied was not available for cross-examination and also whether the tribunal had appropriate evidence to support findings that the breaches were severe and continuing. The appeal notice raised a number of points from the comments in the oral reasons for decision, alleging that there had been no, or incorrect, weight given to them in the determination of the decision. The final ground of appeal was that the tribunal had erred by failing to properly consider section 48 of the RT Act. The tribunal had failed to give consideration to the factors that need to be taken into account in considering the exercise of its discretion under section 48.

Nature of an ACAT Appeal

The manner in which an appeal within the tribunal should be undertaken is an important one, in particular considering the interaction between the right of appeal under section 79 and the consequences of the appeal under section 82 of the ACAT Act.
Section 79(3) provides "A party to the original application may, by application, appeal the decision to the tribunal on the question of fact or law." This requires that there be an identifiable question of either or both law or fact, or a mixed question of both fact and law. These must arise from the original hearing itself. While these are not always easy to formulate, I am satisfied that in this case there was a question of law arising as to the manner in which the tribunal exercised its powers and obligations under section 48 of the RT Act.
It should also be noted that it is not a valid ground of appeal to argue that the original tribunal should have preferred or given greater weight to the appellants witnesses as against the respondents, or to minutely analyse what was a lengthy set of oral reasons for decision to extract a phrase here and there which, construed in isolation, might be thought to support the appellants’ case. The reasons must be looked at as a whole. The original tribunal’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is a matter for it unless it can be shown that matters taken into account were irrelevant, or were matters that no reasonable tribunal could have considered or used in coming to a supportable conclusion.
The interaction of section 79(3) and section 82 of the ACAT Act does not appear to have been considered prior to the Supreme Court case of PAAN Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Commissioner for ACT Revenue[1](“PAAN”). Prior to that case it had been my practice to review the transcript and appeal notice of a matter in the appeal division, and then determine at a directions hearing and on the basis of argument by the parties whether it was appropriate to deal with the matter as a rehearing of the whole case, or a review in a manner contemplated by section 82(b). The use of the phrase "deal with" in section 82 gave no indication as to whether the choice should be made prior to the hearing of an appeal, or as a consequence of finding that there was an appeal that should be upheld.
[1] [2014] ACTSC 161

In the PAAN decision, Foster J considered at length the powers of the Supreme Court when the matter had been referred to it from the tribunal, and also the interaction between the two sections referred to above. The decision of Foster J indicates that the correct approach is for the appeal to be determined on the usual principles applicable to an appeal, as a first step. Following that, the tribunal then had the discretion under section 82 to either make its own determination of the correct or preferable outcome by treating the matter as a new application and then determining that new application, or by reviewing the whole or part of the original decision – see paragraphs 41 and 61 – 63 inclusive of PAAN.
While I had indicated in the directions hearing that I would first have regard to section 82 and would not re-hear the matter with new evidence and as a new application, in view of the conclusions that I have come to those indications do not prevent me from considering the appeal on the basis outlined by Foster J.

The Appeal Hearing

At the appeal hearing, it became clear that the substantive issue which lay between the parties was whether section 48 of the RT Act had been properly applied. There was no argument that the necessary procedural steps under section 48 (1)(a)(ii) and (iii) had not been taken. The Member had come to the view on the evidence that there had been interference with the quiet enjoyment of the occupiers of nearby premises, as referred to in clause 70(c) of the standard residential tenancy terms. The extent to which the arguments have gone on, the fact that they were at the front of the house, that they were conducted at all hours of the day and night and went on for long periods of time, and the attendance of police on a number of occasions, must be sufficient to justify such a finding.
The argument was raised for the appellants that the interference was not specifically directed at the neighbours, and therefore could not be construed as a breach. While this portrayal of the conduct appears to be generally true, except in the case of the threat to neighbours with the machete or knife, there is no such limitation in clause 70 of the standard terms. Further, common forms of disruption of neighbours such as the playing of loud music at all hours of the day or night, or the driving and revving of vehicles may also not be specifically directed to the neighbours, but be quite predictable as a cause of the loss of enjoyment.
The appellants also argued that there had been a significant reduction in their disputes, they had taken steps to obtain counselling assistance to resolve their problems, and the strain and pressure of the court cases for both of them had been resolved so that the tension on them as individuals and between them was now substantially lessened.
The appellants referred to the role of the respondent as the landlord of last resort, and referred to the well-known comments of Higgins J. (as he then was) in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the case of Commissioner of Housing of the Australian Capital Territory v. Nicole Smith[2] (“Smith”). In that decision Higgins J. noted that, while acknowledging the right of the respondent as landlord to protect the public from physical or financial abuse of housing facilities offered, and to ensure that tenants do not create a nuisance to neighbours, (emphasis added) regard must also be had to the hardship to a public housing tenant if a tenancy is terminated.
[2][1995] ACTSC 17
Leniency in respect of arrangements to remedy past breaches and the capacity to address problems and change behaviour will be an important consideration as a relevant matter when the tribunal is exercising any discretion in relation to a tenant of the respondent. What has been done in the past cannot change, but if tenants are able to demonstrate that they are conscious of their bad behaviour its effect on the neighbours and the damage that it has done, and show that they can behave in a different way, then this must be taken into account.
The respondent argued that the breach had continued for a substantial period of time, there had been many attempts to get the appellants to change their behaviour which they had failed to do, and that the tribunal could have no confidence that the breaches would not continue in the future. The conduct of the appellants and the interference with the right of quiet enjoyment of the neighbours, together with the repeated police attendance, meant that it was appropriate that the occupancy be terminated.

Consideration

In giving his reasons for decision, the Member did not specifically refer to the provisions of section 48 of the RT Act. While it can be drawn from the terms of the oral decision that he may have had aspects of it in mind when coming to his decision, the specific provisions of the section do in my judgement need to be referred to in determining whether the discretions given under the Act have been appropriately exercised.
Clearly the Member had determined that the appropriate notices had been given and that the tenant had failed to vacate. The Member was also satisfied that the breach justified the termination of the tenancy under section 48 (1)(a)(v). The Member made the order and then went on and suspended the order for a period of time. This was an option open to him under section 48 (2)(b)(i) and (ii).
Section 48(2)(a) empowers the tribunal to refuse to make a termination and possession order if the tenant has remedied the breach, or undertakes within a reasonable specified period to do so, and the tribunal is satisfied that the tenant is reasonably likely to do so. That power is expressed to be discretionary by the use of the word "may", and it therefore cannot be interpreted as requiring the tribunal to exercise that discretionary power in a particular way. However, while the exercise of the power itself is discretionary, a failure to consider whether the power should be exercised at all results in appealable error. The power is a relevant consideration in coming to the final decision as to whether the tenancy is to be terminated and the tenant evicted.
The obligation to consider whether discretion should be exercised or not, is separate from a decision about the way in which the discretion may be exercised. There can be a statutory obligation on a decision maker to consider the matters in the section although the way in which the factors affecting the decision are evaluated is still a matter for discretion. A failure to even consider whether to exercise the discretion is a failure to consider a relevant matter.
"It should not be overlooked when considering whether a provision is obligatory or discretionary that, even when the power is discretionary the decision-maker must still consider whether, on the facts, the discretion should still be exercised in favour of the person.” (Pearce and Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 14th edition, page 439, quoting West Australian Field and Game Association Inc v Pearce[3].
[3] (1992) 8 WAR 64
Such an approach is consistent with the accepted principle of statutory interpretation that all words are to be given meaning within the statute. See Project Blue Sky Inc v. Australian Broadcasting Authority[4].
[4] (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 382 per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
In the serious business of terminating the right to occupy a home, particularly in the case of public housing tenants, as noted in Smith above, the tribunal must go further than only considering whether the tenancy should be terminated under section 48(1)(b)(iii). It must then make a separate decision whether to exercise the power given under subsection (2)(a). That decision involves a review of the capacity and willingness of the tenant to remedy a breach.
In the present case, it may be said that the breaches themselves cannot be remedied, as they are in the past. This would be to take a too narrow view of what constitutes the "breach". There is a consistent pattern of conduct which taken as a whole amounts to a breach. If the tenants now cease that conduct, then the breach of disturbing the quiet enjoyment of the neighbours has ceased. To decide otherwise would mean that notwithstanding completely changed behaviour and indeed willingness by the neighbours to overlook the past and establish better relations, that changed circumstance could not be taken into account in determining whether the termination order should be made.
In the present case, there was evidence before the tribunal from the witnesses for the respondent that the shouting and abuse had declined, and from the appellants themselves that they had taken steps to attempt to improve their relationship and change their behaviour. This evidence could reasonably have led the Member to exercise his discretion not to make a termination order. The failure to demonstrate in his reasons for decision that he had considered and given appropriate weight to this, and indeed had undertaken some enquiry which might have led him to be satisfied as to the matters in section 48(2)(a)(ii), has the result that he has not considered matters which were determined by the terms of the statute to be necessary matters to be considered, as a matter of his discretion, before making the termination order. Whether or not he would have exercised that discretion is a separate matter.
The failure to demonstrate that these matters have been considered in my view constitutes appealable error, and accordingly upon review the decision cannot stand and should be set aside. It is not appropriate to treat the appeal as a new application in view of the matters upon which the tribunal would have to be satisfied under section 48(2)(a) of the RT Act.

………………………………..

Mr C.G Chenoweth, OAM
Acting Presidential Member

ACT CIVIL & )
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) RT 14/106
TERMINATION AND POSSESSION ORDER
Between:Commissioner for Social Housing in the ACT
{Applicant/Lessor}

And: Dylan James Hutchings & Camilla Inez Gottschalk-Krutsky
{Respondents/Tenants}

TAKE NOTICE that on Friday 29th August 2014, the ACT Civil & Administrative Tribunal, made the following ORDERS:

The residential tenancy agreement is terminated at 4:00pm on Friday 29^th August 2014.
The tenant must vacate the premises on or before 4:00pm on Friday 29^th August 2014.
This Order has effect as a warrant for eviction.

All Officers of the Australian Federal Police are hereby authorised to take appropriate action to evict the tenant/s from the premises upon the giving of two days notice in accordance with subsection 40(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997, with such assistance as is necessary and reasonable.

It is noted that pursuant to Regulation 4A(a) of the Residential Tenancies Regulation 1998 it is appropriate for a police officer to enter the premises (by force if necessary) and physically remove a person from the premises between 8 am and 6 pm from Monday to Thursday, other than on a public holiday.

The operation of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Order is suspended until 3:00pm on Friday 19^th September 2014.
Housing is encouraged to find alternate accommodation for the tenants (e.g. in a block of flats) where problems evident in this tenancy will not be so problematic especially given:

a) an improvement in behaviour and the tenants taking some steps to address their behaviour;
b) the apparent availability of flats being available that tenants reject as not suitable.

DATED 29 August 2014

Signed Mr W.G. Stefaniak AM
Presidential Member
ACT Civil & Administrative Tribunal

HEARING DETAILS

To be completed by Presiding Member

To be sent to Parties Only o YES ONLY TO PARTIES

Or;

To Be Published o YES to be published and for parties to collect.

IF YES, Presiding Member to fill out information below :

FILE NUMBER:	AA 14/41
PARTIES, FIRST APPELLANT:	Camilla Gottschalk-Krutsky
PARTIES, SECOND APPELLANT:	Dylan Hutchings
PARTIES, RESPONDENT:	Commissioner for Social Housing in the ACT
COUNSEL APPEARING, APPELLANT	N/A
COUNSEL APPEARING, RESPONDENT	N/A
SOLICITORS FOR APPELLANT	Ms A Aidman, Welfare Rights & Legal Centre
SOLICITORS FOR RESPONDENT	Ms Bayer – ACT Government Solicitor
APPEAL TRIBUNAL MEMBERS:	Mr C.G Chenoweth, OAM
DATES OF HEARING: