Gordon v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources
[2000] QLC 22
•6 April 2000
|
BRISBANE
6 April 2000
Re: Appeal against Annual Valuation
Valuation of Land Act 1944
Valuation Roll Nos: 11665, 11625, 7412, 14858,8987/50000, 11468.
11468; 11625; 11665; and 14858.
Local Government: Redland Shire-139
(AV99-1355/1356/1357/1358/1359 and 1360).
Keith S Gordon
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources
DECISION ON JURISDICTION
Background:
These six matters deal with lands at 6 Basket Beach Road (AV99-1355), 25 Poinsettia Court (AV99-1356), 32 Fiji Street (AV99-1357), 8 Currajong Road (AV99-1358), 29-31 Patterson Street (AV99-1359), and 10 Vernon Way (AV99-1360), Russell Island, Parish of Redland. The six matters are all owned by the appellant, and were lodged together. The matters before the Court relate to the preliminary questions of whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear the merits of the matters in respect of appeals against annual valuations at 1 October 1998, under the Valuation of Land Act 1944. The six matters were heard concurrently.
Keith S Gordon appeared and gave evidence on his own behalf. Mr J O'Rourke, Principal Legal Officer, appeared for the respondent.
The Facts:
In order to understand the history of the appeals, the following chronology of events needs to be considered:
· 29 March 1999 - The Chief Executive issued valuations at -
§ $ 1,800 - (AV99-1355)
§ $ 1,400 - (AV99-1356)
§ $ 2,900 - (AV99-1357)
§ $ 2,600 - (AV99-1358)
§ $34,000 - (AV99-1359)
§ $ 3,100 - (AV99-1360)
· 6 May 1999 - Objections were lodged against each of the six valuations.
· 10 May 1999 - Due date for lodging of objections.
· 16 August 1999 - The Chief Executive issued decisions disallowing each of the six objections.
· 27 September 1999 - Due date for lodgment of appeals on all six matters.
· 29 September 1999 - Notices of appeal (Form 59) signed for AV99-1356/1357/1358/1359.
· 30 September 1999 - Notices of appeal (Form 59) signed for AV99-1355/1360.
· 6 October 1999 - The six notices of appeal lodged by post with the Registrar of the Land Court.
· 11 October 1999 - Land Court Registrar wrote to the appellant notifying that the six appeals appeared to be out of time, and seeking advice within 21 days whether the appellant wished to continue the appeals.
· 13 October 1999 - A reply was signed stating that the appellant would endeavour to satisfy the Court that any delay in receiving the appeals had been occasioned as a result of delays in the ordinary course of post.
· 19 October 1999 - Date of receipt by the Gold Coast Centre of Australia Post of the reply to the Registrar.
· 21 October 1999 - Reply received by Registry of the Land Court.
· 21 October 1999 - Acknowledgement of receipt of reply by the Registrar of the Land Court.
· 10 March 2000 - Notice from the Registrar notifying that the matters (6) have been set down to determine whether jurisdiction lay with the Court on 27 March 2000.
· 27 March 2000 - Hearing to determine jurisdiction.
Decision:
Before considering the events surrounding the lodgment of the appeals, I turn to the Valuation of Land Act. I note that in respect of an Annual Valuation, section 45(1) provides for a dissatisfied person to appeal to the Land Court, and section 45(2) states:
"(2) Except as hereinafter by this section provided, an appeal shall not lie unless it is instituted within 42 days after the date of issue to the owner concerned by the chief executive by notice of the chief executive's decision upon the objection (which date of issue shall be stated in such notice). "
Any such appeal is to be lodged with the Registry of the Land Court under section 45(3), and the burden of proof is placed upon the appellants under section 45(4). I note also that the procedure to start an appeal is covered by section 56, and the responsibility of the Land Court Registry and the owner in the late filing of an appeal is covered in section 57. I note particularly section 57(1), which states:
"57.(1) Where a notice of appeal is filed in the Land Court Registry but not within the time prescribed by section 55(2), the registrar of the court shall notify the owner that, as the notice of appeal was not filed in the Land Court registry within the time prescribed by section 55(2), the appeal does not lie unless the owner -
(a)proves to the satisfaction of the court that the failure to institute the appeal within the time so prescribed was caused by undue delay in the transmission of mail in the ordinary course of post; "
In the event that the owner satisfies the response to the Registry in respect of the timing of due responses; and to the Land Court that the failure to institute the appeal was the result of acceptable delays within the legislation, then the appeal shall lie, but otherwise under section 57(2) the appeal shall not lie.
The due date for the lodgment of an appeal relates to a specified 42 days after the date of issue of the decision by the Chief Executive. The right for an owner to appeal against the valuation is provided under section 45(2), which states that an owner may appeal within a statutory period "after the date of issue to the owner".
I consider now whether this Court has any power to extend that statutory period, and I note in JJ Bidner v. Valuer-General (1992-93) 14 QLCR 88, where the learned Member found at page 93:
"As has been noted in previous cases, the Land Court is a Court of statutory creation and its jurisdiction is bestowed by statute. It has no inherent jurisdiction. Because it is a Court of limited jurisdiction, it must necessarily only assume jurisdiction when and in the manner authorised by the Legislature. (See Gold Coast Milk Pty Ltd and South Coast Co-operative Dairy Association Limited v. The Valuer-General (1983) 9 QLCR 13, at 17.)"
A similar finding was also found in KW Fry v. Commissioner of Water Resources (1986-87) 11 QLCR 92 in respect of the statutory period for lodgment; AJ and E Schirmer v. The Valuer-General (1974) 1 QLCR 144, in respect of other details missing on a notice of appeal; RG Ubank v. Queensland Housing Commission (1954-55) 25 CLLR 5, in respect of failure to meet the statutory time limits for lodgment of an appeal.
In the circumstances of the current matters, I note that the appellant concedes, through an oversight on his behalf, that he failed to calculate the correct date for the lodgment of the appeals. It is Mr Gordon's evidence that he had incorrectly estimated the maximum period of 42 days from the date of issue of the notice from the Chief Executive to fall on 6 October 1999. He now concedes that the correct date for lodgment of the appeal was 42 days after 16 August 1999, or 27 September 1999.
While conceding that the error of miscalculation was a mathematical error on his own part (Exhibit 2), Mr Gordon seeks the support of the Court to relax that direction in the legislation. Mr Gordon also argues that the miscalculation, in part, is contributed to by the wording of the notice of the Chief Executive of 16 August 1999. Mr Gordon argues that the information supplied in that notice by the Chief Executive, should be more explicit in respect of the day at which an appeal is due. However it is also noted that the appellant contributed to his own problems by delaying the lodging of appeals until the last moment.
Mr O'Rourke rejects such claims by the appellant, noting that Mr Gordon has acknowledged that the lateness was due entirely to his own error of calculation. It is also noted that the notice of appeal must have been posted sometime after the 30 September 1999, the latest date on which an appeal was signed. In view of the late date stamp of both Australia Post and the Registry of the Land Court, there would appear to be no basis for the delay to be as a result of any undue delays in the post, which is the only reason allowed for under section 57(1)(a) of the Act.
As to whether the respondent has contributed to the confusion, by the wording of the notice issued to the appellant, I note that the wording of that letter would appear to closely mirror the wording of section 45(2) of the Act. While, it may seem to be some support for Mr Gordon's confusion of dates, the wording of the notice from the respondent is quite clear, in that it mentions the number of days in which to appeal, and also the date of issue of the notice. All that is then required of the appellant is a matter of simple arithmetic. While the public relations exercise of such a notice is a matter for consideration by the respondent, it is also to be noted that, should the respondent make an error of calculation in specifying a date for receipt of the appeal, the onus could then, in some part, be adduced to lie with the respondent in the event of a late appeal. That would be contrary to the intentions of the Act, and I can understand the current approach by the Chief Executive.
In the end it comes to a matter of whether this Court can exercise some discretion, bearing in mind the pursuit of natural justice for the appellant, and, in Mr Gordon's opinion, the overall intentions of the Act. In that regard I note that the purpose of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 is stated to be:
"An Act to make better provision for determining the valuation of land for rating and taxing purposes, and for matters incidental thereto or consequent thereon."
Enshrined within that purpose would be processes and procedures which are geared to ensure a fair and reasonable valuation system for all owners of land. However the Act is very specific in terms of the intentions of the legislation, specifically in respect of what is required of an appeal. As noted in the decision of Bidner and Others (supra), this Court is a statutory creation, and its jurisdiction is bestowed by statute, and there is no inherent jurisdiction. Because it is a court of limited jurisdiction, it must only assume jurisdiction within the specific authority of the legislation. The Court has no power to ignore the directions of the Act in this matter.
Conclusion:
It is the responsibility of the appellant to satisfy the requirements of the law as espoused in the legislation. I therefore find that I have no jurisdiction to hear these matters, and the six appeals are all found to not lie with the Court. All six appeals are struck out for want of jurisdiction.
Member of the Land Court
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