Gordon v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gordon v Australian Securities & Investments Commission
[2002] FCA 1155

ROGER CHARLES GORDON & COLIN DOUGLAS TURNER v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION

S.3010 of 2002

MANSFIELD J
17 SEPTEMBER 2002
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.3010 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

ROGER CHARLES GORDON
FIRST APPLICANT

COLIN DOUGLAS TURNER
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

17 SEPTEMBER 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act). The applicants seek to review a decision of the respondent Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) which it is claimed to have made on 5 August 2002 that a nominated delegate (the delegate) would convene separate hearings under s 837 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) on designated dates to determine whether banning orders should be made with respect to each of the applicants. It is alleged that the delegate engaged in conduct which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias that she will not be able to fairly preside over the proposed hearings so as to enliven the ground of review available under s 5(1)(a) and s 6(1)(a) of the ADJR Act.

    BACKGROUND

  2. The delegate is a delegate of ASIC for the purpose of making decisions under the Act and for the purpose of conducting hearings under s 51 of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (the ASIC Act).

  3. On about 27 May 2001, the delegate was allocated a brief dated 13 May 2002 to consider whether a banning order pursuant to s 830 of the Act should be made against the second applicant. The delegate, having considered the brief, on 6 June 2002 issued a notice of hearing to the second applicant under s 837 of the Act. Section 837 relevantly provides:

    “(1)     The ASIC must not:

    (a)…

    …

    (e)make, otherwise than by virtue of paragraph 828(a) or (d) or 829(a), (b) or (c) an order under section 830 against a person;

    …        unless ASIC complies with subsection (2) of this section.

    (2)ASIC must give the applicant, licensee or person, as the case may be, an opportunity:

    (a)to appear at a hearing before ASIC that takes place in private; and

    (b)to make submissions and give evidence to ASIC in relation to the matter.”

  4. The delegate’s letter to the second applicant dated 6 June 2002 identified the matter of the proposed hearing as follows:

    “The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is concerned that:

    ·you may have contravened a securities law (para. 829(d) of the Corporations Act (‘the Act’);

    ·it may have reason to believe that you will not, perform efficiently honestly and fairly the duties of a representative of a dealer or an investment adviser (para. 829(g) of the Act).

    I am a delegate of ASIC and have been appointed to decide what, if any, action should be taken against…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1155
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Gordon and another v Australian Securities and Investments Commission involves an application for judicial review of a decision by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to convene separate hearings under section 837 of the Corporations Act 2001. The applicants argue that the delegate, who was assigned to preside over these hearings, has a reasonable apprehension of bias that would prevent her from fairly conducting the hearings. The applicants seek to have the decision reviewed under sections 5(1)(a) and 6(1)(a) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.

The primary legal issues in this case revolve around whether the decision to convene the hearings is reviewable under the ADJR Act and whether the delegate's alleged bias provides a valid ground for judicial review. ASIC contends that the alleged circumstances do not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the decision to convene the hearings is not a reviewable decision under the ADJR Act. The court must determine the scope of judicial review under the ADJR Act and assess the validity of the apprehended bias claim.

In dismissing the application, the court found that the decision to convene the hearings was not a final or operative decision that would determine the outcome of the proceedings, as it merely initiated a process that could lead to a decision with practical consequences. The court also concluded that even if the delegate had been involved in the earlier stages of the proceedings, the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court held that ASIC and the delegate were entitled to resist the bias claim without it affecting the delegate's ability to fairly conduct the hearings.

The final orders of the court dismissed the application with costs, and the time for any appeal from the decision was set to run from the date of the reasons for judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act). The applicants seek to review a decision of the respondent Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) which it is claimed to have made on 5 August 2002 that a nominated delegate (the delegate) would convene separate hearings under s 837 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) on designated dates to determine whether banning orders should be made with respect to each of the applicants. It is alleged that the delegate engaged in conduct which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias that she will not be able to fairly preside over the proposed hearings so as to enliven the ground of review available under s 5(1)(a) and s 6(1)(a) of the ADJR Act.BACKGROUND The delegate is a delegate of ASIC for the purpose of making decisions under the Act and for the purpose of conducting hearings under s 51 of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (the ASIC Act). On about 27 May 2001, the delegate was allocated a brief dated 13 May 2002 to consider whether a banning order pursuant to s 830 of the Act should be made against the second applicant. The delegate, having considered the brief, on 6 June 2002 issued a notice of hearing to the second applicant under s 837 of the Act. Section 837 relevantly provides:“(1) The ASIC must not:(a)……(e)make, otherwise than by virtue of paragraph 828(a) or (d) or 829(a), (b) or (c) an order under section 830 against a person;… unless ASIC complies with subsection (2) of this section.(2)ASIC must give the applicant, licensee or person, as the case may be, an opportunity:(a)to appear at a hearing before ASIC that takes place in private; and(b)to make submissions and give evidence to ASIC in relation to the matter.” The delegate’s letter to the second applicant dated 6 June 2002 identified the matter of the proposed hearing as follows:“The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is concerned that:·you may have contravened a securities law (para. 829(d) of the Corporations Act (‘the Act’);·it may have reason to believe that you will not, perform efficiently honestly and fairly the duties of a representative of a dealer or an investment adviser (para. 829(g) of the Act).I am a delegate of ASIC and have been appointed to decide what, if any, action should be taken against you arising out of those concerns.The purpose of this notice is to inform you of ASIC’s concerns and to offer you the opportunity of a hearing under section 837 of the Act before I make my decision.”It then explained that s 837 required ASIC to give the second applicant an opportunity to be heard before deciding whether to make a banning order under s 830 of the Act, and the nature of a banning order. By attachments, it identified the concerns which ASIC had about the second applicant’s conduct, and the information upon which those concerns were based. It briefly described the hearing procedures. It nominated a time and place for the hearing, although those arrangements have been put in abeyance pending resolution of the present application. It provided the second applicant with the opportunity to make submissions and to give evidence to ASIC, in addition to providing the opportunity to appear at the proposed hearing.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
The delegate is not said to have played any part at all in any of those matters prior to her consideration of the respective briefs, nor any direct role in the means by which the notices of 6 and 24 June 2002 were served. (The complaint was that the notices were served by leaving them at a front office, readily perused by office staff). The content of the brief concerning the first applicant is also not a matter in which the delegate was involved; her role was to consider the brief as presented. It cannot be a relevant contextual matter to support a claim of apprehended bias that ASIC, and the delegate, resist the claim. Otherwise, the making of such a claim would result in the potential or actual decision maker being disqualified for having declined to acquiesce in being disqualified from the hearing. I have separately addressed the significance, or lack of significance, of the change of the ASIC delegate in respect of the GWFS hearing.CONCLUSION For those reasons, in my judgment the application must be dismissed with costs. I announced my decision on 17 September 2002. As then indicated, I direct the time from which any appeal from my decision may be brought do run from the date of these reasons for judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

ASIC contended that the circumstances, even as alleged by the applicants, could not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the delegate in her conduct of the hearings under s 837 or in any decisions she might make following those hearings. It also contended that the decisions complained of, namely decisions made on or about 5 August 2002 to convene separate hearings under s 837 in respect of each of the applicants on designated dates to determine whether banning orders should be made with respect to each of the applicants, are not reviewable decisions under the ADJR Act.CONSIDERATION(a) Jurisdiction On 5 August 2002, the delegate notified the applicants by their solicitors that she proposed to continue to conduct the hearings under s 837 of which she had given notice on 6 June 2002 to the second applicant and on 24 June 2002 to the first applicant. The notification followed an exchange of correspondence between ASIC and the solicitors for the applicants concerning their request that the delegate not conduct the hearings. The decisions by which the delegate was allocated the task of considering the briefed material to determine whether banning orders should be made under s 830 against the applicants are not the subject of challenge in these proceedings. Nor are the delegate’s decisions notified on 6 and 24 June 2002 that she should give effect to s 837(2) by giving the applicants the opportunity of a private hearing and to make submissions and give evidence in relation to the matters of concern. It is only the subsequent decision of the delegate to continue to conduct the hearings, in effect in the face of the request on behalf of the applicants that she not do so, which is the subject of the present application. Sections 5 and 6 of the ADJR Act permit judicial review of “a decision to which this Act applies”, and conduct which is engaged in or proposed to be engaged in for the purpose of making a decision to which the Act applies. Section 3(1) defines the expression “a decision to which this Act applies” relevantly to mean a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made under an enactment. If the decision complained of is “a decision” made under the Act or the ASIC Act, in my view it would clearly fall within the compass of that definition as it is clearly of an administrative character. In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 (Bond), Mason CJ at 337-338 explained that a decision, to be reviewable under the ADJR Act, will generally entail one required or authorised by statute which “is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue falling for consideration”. Thus, Finn J in McLachlan v Australian Securities Commission (1998) 28 ACSR 473 concluded that a decision to issue a notice of hearing under s 52(2) of the ASIC Act, or under s 837(2) of the Act, is not reviewable under s 5 or 6 of the ADJR Act as such a decision merely puts in train a process which may lead to a decision which has consequences of the kind to which Mason CJ adverted in Bond.