FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gordon v Australian Securities & Investments Commission
[2002] FCA 1155ROGER CHARLES GORDON & COLIN DOUGLAS TURNER v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
S.3010 of 2002
MANSFIELD J
17 SEPTEMBER 2002
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S.3010 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
ROGER CHARLES GORDON
FIRST APPLICANTCOLIN DOUGLAS TURNER
SECOND APPLICANTAND:
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
17 SEPTEMBER 2002
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act). The applicants seek to review a decision of the respondent Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) which it is claimed to have made on 5 August 2002 that a nominated delegate (the delegate) would convene separate hearings under s 837 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) on designated dates to determine whether banning orders should be made with respect to each of the applicants. It is alleged that the delegate engaged in conduct which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias that she will not be able to fairly preside over the proposed hearings so as to enliven the ground of review available under s 5(1)(a) and s 6(1)(a) of the ADJR Act.
BACKGROUND
The delegate is a delegate of ASIC for the purpose of making decisions under the Act and for the purpose of conducting hearings under s 51 of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (the ASIC Act).
On about 27 May 2001, the delegate was allocated a brief dated 13 May 2002 to consider whether a banning order pursuant to s 830 of the Act should be made against the second applicant. The delegate, having considered the brief, on 6 June 2002 issued a notice of hearing to the second applicant under s 837 of the Act. Section 837 relevantly provides:
“(1) The ASIC must not:
(a)…
…
(e)make, otherwise than by virtue of paragraph 828(a) or (d) or 829(a), (b) or (c) an order under section 830 against a person;
… unless ASIC complies with subsection (2) of this section.
(2)ASIC must give the applicant, licensee or person, as the case may be, an opportunity:
(a)to appear at a hearing before ASIC that takes place in private; and
(b)to make submissions and give evidence to ASIC in relation to the matter.”
The delegate’s letter to the second applicant dated 6 June 2002 identified the matter of the proposed hearing as follows:
“The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is concerned that:
·you may have contravened a securities law (para. 829(d) of the Corporations Act (‘the Act’);
·it may have reason to believe that you will not, perform efficiently honestly and fairly the duties of a representative of a dealer or an investment adviser (para. 829(g) of the Act).
I am a delegate of ASIC and have been appointed to decide what, if any, action should be taken against…
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- Case
- [2002] FCA 1155
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues in this case revolve around whether the decision to convene the hearings is reviewable under the ADJR Act and whether the delegate's alleged bias provides a valid ground for judicial review. ASIC contends that the alleged circumstances do not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the decision to convene the hearings is not a reviewable decision under the ADJR Act. The court must determine the scope of judicial review under the ADJR Act and assess the validity of the apprehended bias claim.
In dismissing the application, the court found that the decision to convene the hearings was not a final or operative decision that would determine the outcome of the proceedings, as it merely initiated a process that could lead to a decision with practical consequences. The court also concluded that even if the delegate had been involved in the earlier stages of the proceedings, the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court held that ASIC and the delegate were entitled to resist the bias claim without it affecting the delegate's ability to fairly conduct the hearings.
The final orders of the court dismissed the application with costs, and the time for any appeal from the decision was set to run from the date of the reasons for judgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MANSFIELD J
ASIC contended that the circumstances, even as alleged by the applicants, could not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the delegate in her conduct of the hearings under s 837 or in any decisions she might make following those hearings. It also contended that the decisions complained of, namely decisions made on or about 5 August 2002 to convene separate hearings under s 837 in respect of each of the applicants on designated dates to determine whether banning orders should be made with respect to each of the applicants, are not reviewable decisions under the ADJR Act.CONSIDERATION(a) Jurisdiction On 5 August 2002, the delegate notified the applicants by their solicitors that she proposed to continue to conduct the hearings under s 837 of which she had given notice on 6 June 2002 to the second applicant and on 24 June 2002 to the first applicant. The notification followed an exchange of correspondence between ASIC and the solicitors for the applicants concerning their request that the delegate not conduct the hearings. The decisions by which the delegate was allocated the task of considering the briefed material to determine whether banning orders should be made under s 830 against the applicants are not the subject of challenge in these proceedings. Nor are the delegate’s decisions notified on 6 and 24 June 2002 that she should give effect to s 837(2) by giving the applicants the opportunity of a private hearing and to make submissions and give evidence in relation to the matters of concern. It is only the subsequent decision of the delegate to continue to conduct the hearings, in effect in the face of the request on behalf of the applicants that she not do so, which is the subject of the present application. Sections 5 and 6 of the ADJR Act permit judicial review of “a decision to which this Act applies”, and conduct which is engaged in or proposed to be engaged in for the purpose of making a decision to which the Act applies. Section 3(1) defines the expression “a decision to which this Act applies” relevantly to mean a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made under an enactment. If the decision complained of is “a decision” made under the Act or the ASIC Act, in my view it would clearly fall within the compass of that definition as it is clearly of an administrative character. In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 (Bond), Mason CJ at 337-338 explained that a decision, to be reviewable under the ADJR Act, will generally entail one required or authorised by statute which “is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue falling for consideration”. Thus, Finn J in McLachlan v Australian Securities Commission (1998) 28 ACSR 473 concluded that a decision to issue a notice of hearing under s 52(2) of the ASIC Act, or under s 837(2) of the Act, is not reviewable under s 5 or 6 of the ADJR Act as such a decision merely puts in train a process which may lead to a decision which has consequences of the kind to which Mason CJ adverted in Bond.