IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M95 of 2019
B e t w e e n -
GORDON NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 004 707 617)
Applicant
and
JPA FINANCE PTY LTD (ACN 616 176 955)
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GAGELER J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO MELBOURNE
ON FRIDAY, 13 DECEMBER 2019, AT 10.51 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J.L. EVANS, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR A.A. SEGAL for the applicant. (instructed by Hall & Wilcox)
MR P.D. CORBETT, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR W.H. FORRESTER for the respondent. (instructed by Collins & Collins)
GAGELER J: Yes, Mr Evans.
MR EVANS: Thank you, your Honour. Your Honour, the position of the applicant is that there are grounds for the grant of special leave with respect to both the penalties issue and the forfeiture issue. If I could deal with the penalty issue first.
The primary ground on which it is said the court erred below is that which is set out in paragraph 5 of the written application which appears at page 83 of the application book, namely that the court appears to have adopted, having accepted what was determined by this Court in Andrews, and also what was found by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the Australia Capital Finance Case, that the doctrine of penalties could apply in circumstance where an insolvency event was triggered under a contractual provision which gave rise to a right of termination on the part of the counterparty, being the one to whom the insolvency then did not occur, that that could potentially operate as a penalty.
That was certainly the conclusion that was reached in Australia Capital Finance by the New South Wales Court of Appeal. In this case, the Court of Appeal below determined that the doctrine could not be attracted - this is at paragraph 107 of the written reasons, appearing at application book 76, because it was necessary that the conduct which gave rise to the insolvency event would have been required to have been:
envisaged by the parties at the time of the formation of the contract.
We say that that does not form any part of the law of penalties, and particularly the principles where relief against a penalty for a breach of a contractual stipulation arises.
GORDON J: Is that right? If you read the sentence before that sentence which you just quoted from application book 77, what it says is that it is not the event of insolvency that gave rise to the - or the clause itself, it was your client’s own conduct which was described as “wilful” in failing to take any step to either set aside the statutory demand or to meet it.
MR EVANS: Well, your Honour, it cannot be said that we -…
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- Case
- [2019] HCATrans 248
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the plaintiff, by its conduct, had waived its right to enforce the repayment obligations under the registered mortgage at the stipulated due date. This involved an examination of the principles of waiver in contract law, particularly in the context of mortgage agreements, and whether the plaintiff's actions amounted to an unequivocal election to forgo its right to immediate repayment.
The High Court held that the plaintiff had not waived its right to enforce the mortgage. Gageler and Gordon JJ reasoned that for a waiver to be established, there must be an unequivocal and informed election by the party to abandon a known right. They found that the plaintiff's conduct, which included continuing to accept interest payments after the due date, did not demonstrate an intention to abandon its right to call up the principal. Instead, their Honours considered that such conduct was consistent with the ordinary course of dealing in mortgage arrangements where lenders may, in certain circumstances, permit delayed repayment while retaining their underlying contractual rights. The court emphasised that the onus was on the defendant to prove waiver, and the evidence did not support such a conclusion.
The High Court ordered that possession of the land be given to the plaintiff.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi