Gordon Leslie Howie v Merylyn May Scheer No. SCGRG93/2073 Judgment No. 4334 Number of Pages 5 Vehicles and Traffic Offences
[1993] SASC 4334
•17 December 1993
COURT IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA BOLLEN J
CWDS
Vehicles and traffic - offences - Local Government - parking of vehicles - validity of procedure adopted to pass resolution fixing parking zones - appointment of officer laying complaint - regulations 21 and 29 of the Local Government (Parking) Regulations impose obligations and create offences. RoadTraffic Act 1961 ss2a(1); Local Government (Parking) Regulations 1991 regs 5, 21 and 29 and Local Government Act 1934ss 744 and 794. Ross v Helm (1913) 3 KB 462, discussed.
HRNG ADELAIDE, 30 November 1993 #DATE 17:12:1993
Appellant in person
Counsel for respondent: Mr M M Podobnik
Solicitors for respondent: Mr M M Podobnik
ORDER
Appeals dismissed.
JUDGE1 BOLLEN J The appellant drove into Angas Street at Adelaide on each of the 13th August 1992, 22nd October 1992 and 11th November 1992. He drove to a place where vehicles were required (as the complainant asserts) to park at an angle to the kerb. The appellant was taking on the Council of the Corporation of the City of Adelaide. He believed, and believes, that the requirement to park at an angle there was not lawfully made. So he drew up his vehicle and left it standing parallel to the kerb. He "ranked" his vehicle. 2. Merylyn May Scheer, a clerk employed by that Council, laid three complaints against the appellant, one for each of the three days. An example of the charge laid is the one for the 13th August 1992. It is:-
"...at a place within the area of The Corporation of the City
of Adelaide was the owner of the vehicle referred to in the
Particulars below which vehicle was parked in a PARKING ZONE in
which vehicles must be angle parked in the place referred to in
the Particulars below other than at the denoted or applicable
angle to the kerb or other boundary or line and other than with
the foremost front wheel as close as possible to that kerb,
boundary of line.
Particulars: Vehicle Reg.No: UNN 441 Place: ANGAS STREET
CONTRARY to regulations 21 and 29 of the Local Government
(Parking) Regulations 1991 and section 789b of the Local
Government Act 1934." 3. The appellant appeared before two Justices of the Peace at Adelaide. He refused to plead. The Justices directed that pleas of "not guilty" be recorded on each charge. They were all heard at the same time. The appellant appeared without counsel. He knew the points which he wished to make. He made them clearly and forcefully. So he did before me. The Justices convicted on each complaint. The appellant appeals. 4. I think, if I may say so, that the reasons prepared and delivered by the Justices are admirable in every way. I think that their reasoning is correct on every point. I would be content without more to adopt these reasons but I had better say something for myself. Any difference in expression between my reasons and those of the Justices does not mean that I disagree with anything which they said. 5. I will not set out verbatim the grounds of appeal. Nor will I deal with them in the order in which they appear on the Notice of Appeal. 6. The logical first ground, from the point of view of time, is the assertion that Ms Scheer had not been appointed as an authorised officer and, therefore, had no right to initiate the proceedings. Therefore, says the appellant, the proceedings are all bad in any event. 7. Section 794b(1) of the Local Government Act is:-
"No person, other than a member of the police force, or
an officer or employee of a council who is authorised by the
council generally to take such proceedings in relation to its
area, may commence proceedings against a person for an offence
against a regulation under Part XXIIA without the prior approval
of the Commissioner of Police, or the Chief Executive Officer of
the Council of the area in which the alleged offence was
committed." 8. But s794b(2) is:-
"Where, any proceedings for an offence against a
regulation under Part XXIIA, it appears from the complaint that
the complainant is a member of the police force, or is an officer
or an employee of a council, it will be presumed, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, that the proceedings were lawfully
commenced." 9. Moreover, s744 of the Local Government Act is:-
"It is not necessary in any legal proceedings to prove
the existence or constitution of a council, the appointment
of any officer of a council, or, the appointment of an
authorised person." 10. There was no need to prove the authority of Ms Scheer. And it appeared from the complaint that she was an officer or employee of the Council. The complaint describer has as "Clerk for the Corporation of the City of Adelaide". 11. In fact Ms Scheer gave evidence. Documents were proved. Her authority to lay complaints for parking offences was proved although it was not necessary to have done so. This ground of appeal fails. 12. The appellant mentioned in passing that the inspectors who reported his vehicle did not prove their authority by formal means. It was not necessary for them to do so (Ross v Helm (1913) 3 KB 462). The appellant said that the proceedings "were not initiated by the Adelaide City Council". They were initiated by the Council acting through Ms Scheer. 13. Section 82a(1) of the Road Traffic Act:-
"A council must not, by by-law, or resolution, or
otherwise, authorise a vehicle to stand at any angle on any
road unless the council is acting with the approval of the
Minister." 14. The appellant said that there was "no evidence to the court that the Minister of Transport had given the required approval". He did not take this point before the Justices. Mr Podobnik, for the respondent, said that I should not entertain the point now. I agree. I do not entertain this ground of appeal. 15. The appellant said that the Council had not acted correctly in the way it went about passing (purporting to pass as he would say) the resolution creating the "angle parking zones" that were there in Angas Street on the relevant days. Mr Podobnik told me that for many years it had been angle parking in Angas Street. "New" zones were created with the introduction of "ticket parking". The Council did not pass a resolution for each zone, did not pass a separate resolution to create each zone in Angas Street. The City Engineer made a recommendation for "alteration to kerbside usage". He sent that to the Works and Parks Committee. That committee made a recommendation to Council. On 6th April 1993 the Council passed this resolution:- "That the recommendation contained in Item No.3 of such report be now adopted." 16. Council was referring to the report of the Works and Parks Committee. 17. The appellant said that this way of doing things is not correct. He said that the result is that no lawful resolution to create or establishing the angle parking zones in Angas Street was passed. This ground of appeal (number 1) is expressed thus in his Notice of Appeal:-
"The Justices should have dismissed all three complaints
for a number of reasons including:-
1. The meeting of the council of the Corporation of the City
of Adelaide held on the 6th April, 1992 in merely adopting the
recommendations of the Works and Parks Committee failed to pass
resolutions to make accession to its powers conferred by Section
475a of the Local Government Act 1934 as amended and Regulation 5
of the Local Government (Parking) Regulations 1991. The
resolution establishing each zone should have -
(a) described each area that was to be a zone or specified the
plan which described each area to be a zone;
(b) specified the type of each zone;
(c) specified (if applicable) that the area was to be a parking
zone;
(d) specified (if applicable) that vehicles should be angle
parked and the angle vehicles should be parked;
(e) in the case of each parking zone (if applicable), as in
this case, the specified fee for each parking zone and that
payment should be made by means of a specified ticket dispensing
device.
(f) The Council had ignored the requirements of Regulation 5 of
the Local Government (Parking) Regulations 1991. As the Council
did not pass a resolution meeting the above requirements, or
adopt a resolution of the Committee recommending a resolution
meeting the above requirements, no angle parking zones were
established and any signs or markings for angle parking were
inapplicable and without meaning. The resolution 'That the
recommendation contained in Item No.3 of such report be now
adopted' being useless (Minutes 6 April, 1992 page 1680)." 18. Of the argument to support the contention in this ground of appeal the Justices said:-
"We are satisfied from the evidence presented, including
documents tendered, that a clear line of authority exists for the
imposition of parking controls and that that line has been
followed with a clearly set out approval track, properly recorded
and minuted according to law, flowing from the Engineer to the
Works and Parks Committee to the City Council. We find that
parking controls were established in Zones 9110447, 9110442 and
9110438, setting up Angle Parking, by the Council adopting on 6
April 1992 the recommendation of the Report of the Works and
Parks Committee of 30 March 1992 which report contained reference
to Schedules, Plans and Attachments setting out the necessary
detail. We note also that the Council minuted the adoption by
saying that the report, 'by now adopted' thus bringing the
changes into effect immediately subject only in accordance with
procedures to the erection of appropriate signage and
introduction of markings in situ. We have had the judgment in
Willing v Young drawn to our attention and reference made to
Howie v Hollobone and as stated, earlier reference was made to
another earlier Appeal judgment. We rule that the actions of the
Council of 6 April 1992 on this matter fully comply with the
requirements of Regulation 5 of the Local Government Parking
Regulations, that there is no requirement to set out the
proposals in full detail, that the approval of the Committee
Report has the same effect as a Council resolution which sets the
resolution out 'in extenso'." 19. The recommendation in item 3 of the Works and Parks Committee which was adopted by Council was:-
"Alterations to kerbside usage:
...the committee recommends that:-
1. The zones previously approved by Council and shown in
Schedule A attached to item 8.1 on the agenda for the meeting of
the Works and Parks Committee on 30th March 1992 and in Schedule
B, available at the said meeting for reference be abolished.
2. The amendments to the kerbside usage plans numbered 50-59
(inclusive) and the relevant new zones also identified in the
attached Schedule A, and nos.117- 246 inclusive (in Schedule B
including, where applicable, the period or periods, or variation
of the period or periods which any particular zone shown on the
Schedules A and B are to operate and are displayed at the meeting
which gives effect to the recommendations contained in Schedule A
attached to item 8.1 on the agenda for the Works and Parks
Committee meeting on 30th March 1992 and in Schedule B be
approved." 20. The recommendation going to Council was accompanied by sheets of paper headed "Parking Control" and maps of relevant areas in Angas Street. The nature of parking permitted, the time limit (if any), the times of restrictions eg 9am-5.30 pm Mon-Fri, and any fee were there stated. All the information before Council (sent up by the Works and Parks Committee) contained the information required by reg5 of the Local Government (Parking) Regulations 1991. The finding of the Justices was correct. There was no need for the Council to have done that which the appellant suggested. The method adopted was, and is, lawful. The passing of the resolution had the effect of abolishing existing zones as recommended by the Works and Parks Committee. I see no fault in the procedure adopted by the Council. The resolution was lawfully passed and the "new zones" with their appropriate requirements were all lawfully established or created. 21. Grounds 4 and 5 of the Notice of Appeal are:-
"4. The regulations, particularly Regulations 29 and 21, do
not place any obligation on a person to comply with anything,
that is no offence can be committed under them.
5. The regulations do not require any person to comply with
any sign or road marking. (Note the signs and zones are not
defined as is the case in other jurisdictions in Australia.)" 22. I do not think that ground 5 adds anything to ground 4. The assertion that regs29 and 21 do not place obligations on any person to comply with "anything" or with signs is wholly untenable. Regulation 21 of the Local Government (Parking) Regulations 1991 states that "a vehicle must not be parked in a parking zone in which vehicles must be angle parked unless the vehicle is parked...". Thereafter, are directions about how it is there to be parked. 23. That regulation tells the motorist what he must not do about parking in a zone where vehicles must be angle parked. It imposes an obligation on motorists. Regulation 29 is - "If a vehicle is parked so that it contravenes or does not comply with these regulations, the driver is guilty of an offence." 24. The appellant poured scorn on the language of the regulations. "It makes the vehicle do the contravening...", he said. The resolution should be read and obviously should be read thus: "If a vehicle is parked by its driver so that it contravenes or does not comply with these regulations, the driver is guilty of an offence". Perhaps the making of the driver the subject of a transitive verb in the first clause in the regulation would have been better. But the meaning of the regulation is clear. 25. Grounds 4 and 5 fail. In the result all the grounds fail. I dismiss the appeals.
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