[2020] HCATrans 192
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B40 of 2020
B e t w e e n -
GOONDIWINDI REGIONAL COUNCIL
Applicant
and
PAULA TAIT
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
NETTLE J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 2020, AT 10.27 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR K.N. WILSON, QC and MS N.A. WOOTTON, for the applicant. (instructed by King & Company Solicitors)
MR S.C. HOLT, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.J. LYNCH, for the respondent. (instructed by Shine Lawyers)
NETTLE J: Yes, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: Your Honours, there was, by most of the States and Territories in the country, a legislative response to the decision and reasoning of this Court in Brodie in 2001. In Queensland, that response was largely to be seen in section 37 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 that your Honours will find at page 81 of the application book, slightly different wording as to the critical provisions that was enacted by New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia. The difference, largely, has to do with subsection (1) rather than what, in the Queensland version, is subsection (2) concerning the disapplication provision.
It is our submission that, given the importance of legislative responses to the common law, given the social and economic significance of responsibility for road maintenance and the obvious social phenomenon of the need for appropriate compensation – the wrongs in relation to it – this is a case fit for special leave for a number of reasons.
First, and negatively, there are not complicated facts. They are straightforward. The unfortunate plaintiff was injured by encountering a pothole which produced the accident. The pothole was produced by the well‑known, that is, familiar, phenomenon of water across a road, temporary flooding or with inundation, initiated by a process which over time – and as the water recedes and as traffic resumes – leads to the predictable development in the places that are not themselves predictably located of potholes, some of which will become dangerously large.
There was in section 37, as your Honours will have seen, a primary rule pronounced which can be seen to have taken an opposite direction from the tendency in Brodie to abolish and to assimilate to the general law of negligence former doctrines concerning misfeasance and non‑feasance. Your Honours will see in particular that the general rule is expressed in, for Queensland, very comprehensive terms:
not liable . . . for any failure . . . in relation to any function it has as a road authority—
(a)to repair a road or to keep a road in repair; or
(b)to inspect a road for the purpose of deciding the need to repair –
et cetera. In our submission, the…
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- Case
- [2020] HCATrans 192
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was the proper interpretation and application of section 37 of the *Civil Liability Act 2003* (Qld), particularly the interplay between its general rule of non-liability in subsection (1) and the exceptions provided in subsection (2). The Council contended that the Court of Appeal had erred by narrowly interpreting subsection (1) and broadly applying subsection (2), thereby creating an unwarranted inroad into the Council's statutory immunity. Specifically, the Council argued that the Court of Appeal had incorrectly found that the Council had knowledge of a "particular risk" of a dangerous pothole materialising, thereby engaging the exception in subsection (2).
The High Court, in dismissing the application for special leave, indicated that it was not persuaded that the appeal would have sufficient prospects of success. While the full reasoning was not articulated in the transcript, the Court's decision suggests it did not consider the Council's arguments regarding the interpretation of section 37(1) and (2) to be arguable on appeal. The Court's focus, as evidenced by Justice Nettle's questioning, was on whether the risk encountered by the respondent was sufficiently specific to engage the exception in section 37(2), implying that the Court of Appeal's finding on this point was likely to be upheld. The application for special leave to appeal was therefore dismissed.
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