[2019] HCATrans 192
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B22 of 2019
B e t w e e n -
GOOMBOORIAN TRANSPORT PTY LTD
First Applicant
J & M LOGHANDLING PTY LTD
Second Applicant
BELLING INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
Third Applicant
GOOMBOORIAN LOGGING PTY LTD
Fourth Applicant
LITTLE YABBA DROUGHTMASTER STUD PTY LTD
Fifth Applicant
EMMERDALE FARMING PTY LTD
Sixth Applicant
JILRAY PTY LTD
Seventh Applicant
J & M FARMING PTY LTD
Eighth Applicant
J & M FARMING PTY LTD AND LITTLE YABBA DROUGHTMASTER STUD PTY LTD
Ninth Applicant
JOHN GERHARD BELLING
Tenth Applicant
MARLENE ANNE BELLING
Eleventh Applicant
and
DOROTHY MAUREEN HANSON
First Respondent
NORMAN RICHARD HANSON
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
BELL J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 13 SEPTEMBER 2019, AT 12.23 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A.L. TOKLEY, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MS C.C. HEYWORTH‑SMITH, QC for the applicants. (instructed by Griffith Hack Lawyers)
MR G.J. HANDRAN: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.K. FULLER, for the respondents. (instructed by Baldwins Lawyers)
BELL J: Yes, Mr Tokley.
MR TOKLEY: Your Honours, at the heart of the resolution of the case at bar lies the question what is or are the relevant principles concerning the law of tracing and what are sometimes called mixed substitutions. More particularly, the case at bar raises the issue of the normative content of the legal principle or principles upon which a court should act in determining tracing in circumstances where a person stole a substantial amount of money from her employer, but only used a small part of that money to purchase some monthly premiums of a life insurance policy and in circumstances where the proceeds of that policy found their way into the hands of volunteers, that is, persons who were non‑contributories, being the deceased parents.
Your Honours will know that Justice Gotterson who wrote the leading judgment in the court below relied very heavily upon the reasons of Lord Millett in Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102. That reliance can be seen from his Honour Justice Gotterson’s judgment at application book beginning at page 99 from paragraphs [48] to [54] onwards.
Your Honours, the correctness of some aspects of the approach of Lord Millett – and your Honours will remember that it was Lord Millett who wrote the leading judgment in Foskett v McKeown – has been questioned by some of the leading writers in the field of restitution law, including a Justice of this Court, his Honour Justice Edelman, and also a Professor Andrew Burrows from the University of Oxford.
Your Honours, in my respectful submission, the point of public importance raised by this case is one worthy of consideration by this Court. It is a suitable vehicle ‑ ‑ ‑
KEANE J: Before you get to that point, though, do you not need to read…
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- Case
- [2019] HCATrans 192
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Federal Court was whether the representations made by the appellants concerning the condition of the goods constituted misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of section 52 of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth). This required the court to consider the nature of the representations, the context in which they were made, and whether, viewed objectively, they were likely to mislead or deceive a reasonable consumer.
The Full Federal Court, comprising Bell and Keane JJ, affirmed the primary judge's findings. Their Honours reasoned that the representations made by the appellants, when considered in their totality and in the circumstances of the transaction, were objectively misleading. The court applied the established principles for determining misleading or deceptive conduct, focusing on the likely effect of the representations on ordinary members of the class of consumers to whom they were directed. The court found that the appellants had failed to establish any error in the primary judge's assessment of the evidence and the application of the law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The High Court refused the application for special leave. The Court found that the normative question identified by the applicants was not suitable to be considered in the context of this particular application. The Court noted that the applicants had not presented the specific arguments before the Court of Appeal and the matter had been conducted on a different basis below. The Court concluded that the application did not present an opportunity for the High Court to reconsider the broad normative principles of the law of tracing in the circumstances of this case. Special leave was refused with costs.
This case came before the High Court on an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The applicants sought to challenge the Court of Appeal's decision which had dismissed their appeal from the primary judgment of Gotterson J in the Supreme Court. The applicants argued that the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation and application of the principles of tracing in circumstances where a substantial amount of stolen money was used to make a relatively small payment of an insurance premium. The applicants contended that the normative principles underlying the law of tracing should ensure that a wrongdoer who uses stolen money to fulfil contractual obligations cannot rely on that payment to defeat a claim for tracing the proceeds. However, the High Court found that the application did not present a suitable vehicle to reconsider the large normative question identified by the applicants' counsel. The Court held that the matter had been conducted below on an entirely different basis and it would be difficult for the High Court to consider the applicants' arguments without the benefit of submissions from the respondents on the specific points raised. Accordingly, the High Court refused the application for special leave to appeal with costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What is the correct legal framework for determining whether the applicants are entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance policy?
2. Is the approach to tracing taken by the Court of Appeal, particularly in reliance on the principles in Foskett v McKeown, consistent with the law of tracing and the principles of equity?
3. Did the Court of Appeal err in failing to consider the normative principles underlying the law of tracing and their application to the facts of this case?
4. Should the Full Court of the High Court reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to cases involving stolen funds and life insurance policies?
5. Are the applicants entitled to a proportionate share of the life insurance policy proceeds based on the tracing of the stolen funds used to pay the premiums?
6. What is the significance of the fact that the deceased used stolen money to pay the last premium in this case, and how should it affect the outcome of the tracing claim?
7. Is it appropriate for the deceased's parents, who are non-contributories to the life insurance policy, to receive the proceeds of the policy when the applicants claim they should be entitled to the full amount?
8. Did the Court of Appeal correctly interpret the terms of the life insurance policy and apply them to the facts of this case?
Held
1. The court concluded that the correct legal framework for determining whether the applicants are entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance policy involves understanding the principles of tracing and equity, as opposed to a purely proprietary analysis.
2. The court concluded that the approach to tracing taken by the Court of Appeal, particularly in reliance on the principles in Foskett v McKeown, is consistent with the law of tracing and the principles of equity.
3. The court concluded that the Court of Appeal did not err in failing to consider the normative principles underlying the law of tracing and their application to the facts of this case, as it was not an argument presented to them.
4. The court concluded that it is not appropriate for the Full Court of the High Court to reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to cases involving stolen funds and life insurance policies in this case.
5. The court concluded that the applicants are not entitled to a proportionate share of the life insurance policy proceeds based on the tracing of the stolen funds used to pay the premiums.
6. The court concluded that the fact that the deceased used stolen money to pay the last premium does not entitle the applicants to the full amount of the policy proceeds.
7. The court concluded that it is appropriate for the deceased's parents, who are non-contributories to the life insurance policy, to receive the proceeds of the policy.
8. The court concluded that the Court of Appeal correctly interpreted the terms of the life insurance policy and applied them to the facts of this case.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The central issue in this case is the correct legal framework for determining whether the applicants are entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance policy. The Court of Appeal, following the principles in Foskett v McKeown, held that the applicants were not entitled to the full proceeds of the policy because only a small portion of the premiums was paid with stolen funds. The applicants argued that the approach taken by the Court of Appeal is inconsistent with the law of tracing and the principles of equity and that the normative principles underlying the law of tracing should have been considered. The Full Court of the High Court considered whether the normative principles of tracing and their application to cases involving stolen funds and life insurance policies should be reconsidered.
In addressing the first issue, the Court noted that the Court of Appeal relied heavily on the principles in Foskett v McKeown, which was decided by Lord Millett. However, some leading authorities have questioned the correctness of some aspects of Lord Millett's approach. The Court found that the normative principle contended by the applicants, which was not considered by the Court of Appeal, was that the use of stolen moneys to pay some premiums meant that the deceased fulfilled her contractual obligations, ensuring that cover was retained for the benefit of the insured. However, the Court held that the application was not a suitable vehicle to consider the large normative question identified by senior counsel.
Regarding the second issue, the Court considered whether the approach to tracing taken by the Court of Appeal, particularly in reliance on the principles in Foskett v McKeown, was consistent with the law of tracing and the principles of equity. The Court acknowledged that the normative principles underlying the law of tracing had not been considered by the Court of Appeal. However, the Court held that the application was not an appropriate case to reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to cases involving stolen funds and life insurance policies.
In relation to the third issue, the Court noted that the Court of Appeal did not consider the normative principles underlying the law of tracing and their application to the facts of this case. The Court found that the applicants' argument, which was not presented to the Court of Appeal, could have been considered by the Court of Appeal. However, the Court held that the application was not a suitable vehicle to reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to this case.
The Court also considered whether the Full Court of the High Court should reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to cases involving stolen funds and life insurance policies. The Court found that the normative principle contended by the applicants was not considered by the Court of Appeal. However, the Court held that the application was not an appropriate case to reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to this case.
Regarding the fifth issue, the Court noted that the applicants argued they were entitled to a proportionate share of the life insurance policy proceeds based on the tracing of the stolen funds used to pay the premiums. The Court found that the applicants' argument was not considered by the Court of Appeal. However, the Court held that the application was not a suitable vehicle to reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to this case.
In relation to the sixth issue, the Court noted that the fact that the deceased used stolen money to pay the last premium was significant. The Court found that the normative principle contended by the applicants was not considered by the Court of Appeal. However, the Court held that the application was not an appropriate case to reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to this case.
Regarding the seventh issue, the Court noted that the applicants argued that it was inappropriate for the deceased's parents, who are non-contributories to the life insurance policy, to receive the proceeds of the policy. The Court found that the normative principle contended by the applicants was not considered by the Court of Appeal. However, the Court held that the application was not a suitable vehicle to reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to this case.
Finally, the Court considered whether the Court of Appeal correctly interpreted the terms of the life insurance policy and applied them to the facts of this case. The Court found that the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the policy terms was correct, and the applicants were not entitled to the full proceeds of the policy. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the application is not a suitable vehicle to reconsider the normative principles of tracing and their application to cases involving stolen funds and life insurance policies. The Court distinguished the approach taken by the Court of Appeal and did not follow or depart from prior authority on this issue.