Goodluck Holdings Pty Ltd v SAT Civil Engineering Pty Ltd
[2006] QDC 181
•23 June 2006
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Goodluck Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor v SAT Civil Engineering Pty Ltd & Ors [2006] QDC 181
PARTIES:
GOODLUCK HOLDINGS PTY LTD
ACN 100 061 425
First Plaintiff/Respondent
and
DAYAL MANSUKHANI
Second Plaintiff /Respondentv
SAT CIVIL ENGINEERING PTY LTD
ACN 077 817 737First Defendant/Applicant
and
JAN FRANK WEINERT
Second Defendant/Applicantand
VERONICA ANN COOPER
Third Defendant/ApplicantFILE NO:
D501/2005
DIVISION:
Civil Jurisdiction
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Southport
DELIVERED ON:
23 June 2006
DELIVERED AT:
Southport
HEARING DATE:
8 May 2006
JUDGE:
Dearden DCJ
ORDER:
THE CLAIM BY THE FIRST AND SECOND PLAINTIFFS AGAINST THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD DEFENDANTS IS DISMISSED
CATCHWORDS:
APPLICATION – Summary Judgment – Reasonable Prospects of Success
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules
COUNSEL:
Mr T Houghton for the first, second and third defendants/applicants
There was no appearance for the first plaintiff/respondent
Mr S Punalekar appeared amicus curiae for the plaintiff/respondentSOLICITORS:
Provestlaw for the first, second and third defendants/applicants
This is an application by SAT Civil Engineering Pty Ltd (first defendant), Jan Frank Weinert (second defendant) and Veronica Ann Cooper (third defendant) seeking summary judgment[1] on the basis that the plaintiffs’ claim and statement of claim demonstrate that the plaintiffs’ claim has no real prospect of succeeding, or in the alternative, that the plaintiffs’ statement of claim should be struck out on the basis that it discloses no reasonable cause of action; is scandalous and vexatious; and tends to prejudice, embarrass and delay a fair trial[2].
[1] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) r 293
[2] Outline of submissions by the first, second & third defendants dated 17 March 2006
BACKGROUND
It appears from the plaintiffs’ statement of claim[3] that the first defendant is or was relevantly a lessee of the first plaintiff which, as at the date of hearing of this application for summary judgment, was in liquidation and, as the liquidators were without funds, the liquidators did not adopt or continue these proceedings which had been initiated prior to their appointment[4]. The proceedings therefore were only actively defended by the second plaintiff, who appeared at the hearing on 8 May 2006 with the assistance of Mr S Punalekar, who indicated that he had legal qualifications in India and was granted leave by me (effectively as amicus curiae) to address the Court in order to assist the second plaintiff.
[3] Document 2 filed 12 September 2005
[4] Exhibit GWP 7, affidavit of Geoffrey Provest, sworn 8 May 2006
APPLICATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
At best the Court can ascertain the claim, it is (self-styled) as a claim for a “quick eviction order”[5]. As the defendants submit[6], this is not a recognisable cause of action at law, nor is the plaintiffs’ consequent claim for “losses on indemnity basis for the breach of lease[7]” a remedy known to law.
[5] Claim and statement of claim filed 13 September 2005
[6] Outline of submissions of the first, second & third defendants dated 17 March 2006, p 2
[7] Claim and statement of claim filed 13 September 2005
In short, the statement of claim is confused, misguided, contains scandalous and vexatious material which (as the counsel for the defendants submits[8]) is irrelevant, incomprehensible and objectionable, it contains matters of evidence, seeks compensatory damages for, among other things, “torture[9]” and ultimately, in my view, fails to plead any rational or coherent cause of action.
[8] Outline of submissions of the first, second & third defendants dated 17 March 2006, p 2
[9] Claim and statement of claim filed 13 September 2005
THE LAW
As a defence has been filed[10], albeit that it was effectively impossible for the defendants to plead to the vast bulk of the plaintiff’s statement of claim, then summary judgment is available to the defendants[11]. In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo[12] the relevant test was described by Williams JA as follows: “the judge determining [a summary judgment application] is essentially called upon to determine whether the respondent to the application has established some real prospect of succeeding at a trial”[13]. Atkinson J characterised the test as being that “the Court must consider whether there exists a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success” and further stated that “if there is no real prospect that a party will be successful in all or part of a claim, and there is no need for a trial, then ordinarily the other party is entitled to judgment”[14].
[10] Defence of the first, second & third defendants filed 4 November 2005
[11] UCPR r 293
[12] [2005] QCA 227
[13] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] QCA 227 per Williams JA at para 17
[14] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] QCA 227 per Atkinson J at para 47
DECISION
I accept the submission on behalf of the first, second and third defendants[15] that “the claim does not seek relief that a Court could grant.” In those circumstances, it is clear therefore that not only do the plaintiffs have “no real prospect of succeeding,” this is a completely misguided proceeding which is bound to fail. In those circumstances, the Court should, in my view, grant the application for summary judgment and dismiss the proceedings by the first and second plaintiffs against the first, second and third defendants. In the light of this decision in respect of summary judgment, that part of the application which relates to striking out the claim and statement of claim pursuant to UCPR r 171 becomes redundant.
[15] Outline of submissions of the first, second & third defendants dated 17 March 2006, para 8
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court orders that the claim by the first and second plaintiffs against the first, second and third defendants is dismissed.
COSTS
I will hear the parties in respect of costs.
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