Goodfellow v The Commonweatlh of Australia
[1990] HCATrans 91
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Registry No C3 of 1980
B e t w e e n -
FREDERICK WILLIAM GOODFELLOW
Plaintiff
and
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Defendant
Directions hearing
McHUGH J
( In Chambers) Goodfellow TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 8 MAY 1990, AT 9.42 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
C3T6/l/DR 1 8/5/90
MRS. GAGELER: If Your Honour pleases, I appear for the
defendant in the matter and the applicant on the
summons to remit. (instructed by the Australian
Government Solicitor)
HIS HONOUR: Yes, and you appear in person, Mr Goodfellow. MR F.W; GOODFELLOW: Thank you, Your Honour, yes. HIS HONOUR: Mr Gageler. MR GAGELER: If Your Honour pleases, this is an application for the matter to be remitted to the Federal Court
pursuant to section 44(2A) of the JUDICIARY ACT.
The matter has a long and unfortunate history. I think it is sufficient to say that it is now the desire of both parties that it be dealt with expeditiously.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. MR GAGELER:
A further amended statement of claim was delivered pursuant to an order of Mr Justice Deane, made by
consent on 13 February 1990 and a defence was delivered on 3 May. HIS HONOUR: Perhaps I might ascertain Mr Goodfellow's
attitude. Mr Goodfellow, what do you say about remitting the matter to the Federal Court?
MR GOODFELLOW: I strongly resist the remitter action, Your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, well, Mr Gageler, I think at this stage I might hear what the grounds of opposition are.
Yes, Mr Goodfellow.
MR GOODFELLOW: Your Honour, my submission is based in a large part on the chronology of events that have
happened and in this I have prepared some notes
that may save the Court considerable time if I simply hand them up.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, certainly.
(Continued on page 3)
C3T6/2/DR 2 GAGELER 8/5/90 Goodfellow MR GOODFELLOW: Your Honour, I will briefly go through the first part and then, if Your Honour pleases, the
chronology of events can be simply read by yourself.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. MR GOODFELLOW: At a hearing of a summons taken out by the defendant to strike the plaintiff writ many years
ago Sir Harry Gibbs, the then Acting Chief Justice,
said, "The business of this Court does not permit it to take the time that is involved in hearing matters in original jurisdiction, unless they happen to have
some special feature that warrants being heard here". that warrant this matter being heard in the
High Court and at the end I would ask that consideration
of any remitter be delayed until a special case has
been settled between the parties.
In the light of the chronology of the events
that have happened I submit (a) that it would be
unfair and unjust to the plaintiff to remit the
matter and (b), although the matter is in the original
jurisdiction of the Court, the substantive issuesare appropriate for consideration of the Court as if
the matter were in the appellate jurisdiction and
(c) the summons of the defendant is unnecessary and
may tend to delay determination of the matter, andI further submit that the matter is suitable for
determination by the High Court as a special case to
determine the law.
Before I conclude my comments, Your Honour,
would you like to peruse the chronology of events?
HIS HONOUR:
Well, I have read the whole file, so far as in the High Court.
I had a look at it last night.
(Continued on page 4)
C3T7/l/HS 3 8/5/90 Goodfellow
HIS HONOUR (continuing): Well, Mr Goodfellow, what is there special about this case that should take it out of
the general run of cases?
MR GOODFELLOW: Your Honour, in referring to my page 9, I was led into this whole litigious process by a
determination of the Commissioner for Employees
Compensation.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. MR GOODFELLOW: I was invited to take this complaint to the compensation tribunal and this inexorably led to
a blind alley of jurisdiction through no fault of
my own. I went through all the avenues of the court below and, as I say, I now seek the assistance of
this Court.
To go back, albeit with the jurisdiction
of the High Court, could mean a restart at the
bottom of the ladder and without the possibilityof excluding arrival back in this Court. In the
light of these events, I submit that that would be
unjust and the most expeditious way to resolve this
whole tortuous matter would be by special case in
this Court.
HIS HONOUR: Well, that depends whether or not a special _ case can be agreed on by the parties. There may be
facts in dispute. But, a statement of claim has been
filed; defence has been filed. There does not seem
to me to be anything special about the case as to
why this case shoeld be• given preference in this
jurisdiction over other cases which are started in
the court and are remitted either to the State courts
or the Federal Court.
MR GOODFELLOW: Your Honour, may I continue. I alluded to other reasons, Your Honour, why - that is only the
injustice reason. At the back of this submission
is a third draft special case that the parties have been working towards since 1983. A careful perusal of the chronology will show that up until 1987, the parties were working towards the special case. The
emphasis shifted then to settlement but in the
absence of settlement, it was never abandoned that
we would decide this matter on a special case in
this Court. Now, I show that the issues ar~ clearly
set out in the draft special case and in the further
amendment to statement of claim. At one point, theofficer
assisting the defendant in the Australian Government
Solicitor's office and I agreed on all the facts
in the further amended statement of claim. There were
some that re~uired a great deal of clarification. This
was done deliberately to prepare a special case.
C3T8/l/JH 4 8/5/90 Goodfellow
HIS HONOUR: Yes, but the fact that there is a special case does not mean that it is a proper case
to be heard in this Court.
MR GCX)DF'ELLCM: Q~ite so, Your.Honour. Then continuing, there is a question of whether any deduction in
the case was lawful at all.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I appreciate -
~. GX)DFEI..I .. .CM: It would be argued that · Part VI of the Compensation Commonwealth Government Employees Act 1971 does not apply and that does not authorize any
deduction, and this calls into question the
practice of the Australian Government Solicitor.
Now what was done was an arbitrary deduction and,
as it will be submitted, without any statutory
authorization at all - even the Commissioner for
Taxation when he takes your money, gives an assessment that is amenable to review under administrative law. The Commonwealth has gone
to a great deal of expense and trouble to show
that there is no administrative remedy in its
arbitrary action. That is an issue, I feel,that sets it slightly apart.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I just might ask - Mr Gageler, you might
just briefly tell me the grounds upon which you rely.
r1R GAGELER:
Your Honour, there is a substantial dispute of fact between the parties. There are two claims:
the first concerns the lawfulness of the Commonwealth deduction of the sum of $30,000 from the judgment sum paid to the plaintiff. The second appears to be based . ,on a tortious breach of statute or a tortious abuse of process on the
part of the defendant in filing a notice ofappeal and then discontinuing that appeal. Involved in the second claim are allegations of
bad faith on the part of the defendant. Those matter in the second part of the statement of claim could not be the subject of an. agreement between the parties. The suggestion in 1983 that the matter be
dealt with by way of special case related only to
the first part of the pleadings and not the second
part. The plaintiff has persisted in pursuing the
second part of the pleadings. The issues of law -
C3T9/l/LW 5 8/5/90 Goodfellow
HIS HONOUR: Could you just take me to the part of the statement of claim which raises this,please.
MR GAGELER: Paragraphs 20 to 42, in particular paragraphs 21 to 23 and then again and more substantially
paragraph 37 and 38.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. Is there anything further you want to put in support of that?
MR GAGELER: Well, just that the issues of law are not such as to warrant it be kept in this Court,
Your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Well, Mr Goodfellow, what do you say in reply to
those.
MR GOODFELLOW: First, Your Honour, the question of a deduction
is a question of law, whether it was authorized
or not, and I think that was arrived at in both
the further amended statement claim and the draft
special case. As to the second cause of action
I believe those contentious allegations are
not referred to in the draft special case. They - - -
HIS HONOUR: I know, but that is the whole point of the matter. This is an action which claims the reimbursement
of a sum of money, or perhaps two sums of money,
and, in addition, there is an allegation of tort
in which you allege, paragraph 21 of your amended
statement of claim, that the defendant caused you
physical and financial damage and, in addition,
you allege that the defendant without reasonable
and probable cause appealed against the judgment
and d,amages. These all raise questions of fact
which are singularly inappropriate to be tried in
this Court.
MR GOODFELLOW-: I would point out to Your Honour that the second cause of action is, if the plaintiff
obtains redress on the first cause of action simply because - - -
HIS HONOUR: I appreciate that, it is pleaded in the alternative
but the first claim may fail. Both issues should be determined together. Your have made the point that the matter has been before the Court for years
and these issues cannot be segregated. They have got to be heard together. (Continued on page 7)
C3Tl0/l/CM 6 8/5/90 Goodfellow
:MR GOODFELLOW: With respect, Your Honour, the first cause of action could be decided without difficulty,
there is nothing insurmountable or absolutelycontentious in that.
HIS HONOUR: Well, that may be, let that be accepted, but
if you fail on that particular issue then the
second element would have to be heard. It is far better that the whole matter be disposed of
at once. Is there anything further that you would
like to add to the - - -
:MR GOODFELLOW: There is a third point, Your Honour,
why it ought to be heard. As the Commonwealth has
wished to construe the COMPENSATION ACT, without
any allowance for deduction of tax already paid,
its action increases the national revenue and
this must be explained. It will be submitted that it cannot be characterized as a fee, a licence or
a penalty and can only be argued and explained
on the basis that it was a tax and with the result
that section 55 of the CONSTITUTION,restraint on
power, is offended. That could result in the
Commonwealth being without any remedy to recover
compensatinn. I suggest that has far-reaching effects.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. :MR GOODFELLOW: That is my second argument. Your Honour, so
far as the Commonwealth's action in taking out this
summons, the plaintiff has done everything toprosecute this matter without a great deal of
co-operation from the Commonweal th over the last year.
Now, the defendant was aware that the question of
remitter had to be considered at some stage. We were both informed by the Registrar, and it was
understood that the question would not arise until
all avenues to settle a special case were
investigated. I have done all I could do; the
Commonwealth has not seriously considered the special case. I submit that this summons was quite unnecessary, it has caused some physical distress
and for whatever tactical reasons the defendant wishes
the remitter, this remitter would have the realpossibility of increasing the cost and delaying
determination of this litigation. I do not think I can usefully add, Your Honour, other than that
I would ask the Court to seek the co-operation of the
defendant in settling a special case so that these
difficulties could be overcome. If my further
amended statement of claim is still deficient, then more work could be done on that.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, well thank you,Mr Goodfellow.
C3Tll/l/JL 7 8/5/90 Goodfellow HIS HONOUR: Yes. Well, thank you, Mr Goodfellow.
The Cormnonwealth, which is the defendant in an
action in the original jurisdiction of this Court
brought by the plaintiff, Mr Frederick William
Goodfellow, applies for an order that the matter be remitted to the Federal Court of Australia in the Australian Capital Territory District Registry and for consequential orders.
The plaintiff was injured in the course of his
employment with the Royal Australian Navy as long ago
as 15 May 1969. In May 1970 he was retired from the
navy as medically unfit. From that date until 18 September 1978 he is alleged to have received from
the Cormnonwealth $39,566.81 in compensation payments
for his injury pursuant to the provisions of the
COMPENSATION (COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES) ACT,
1971 and $3,954.04 in payment of his medical expenses
pursuant to that Act. In February 1974, the
Cormnonwealth began to deduct pay-as-you-earn tax
deductions from the plaintiff's compensation payments.
It is alleged that a total sum of $7,747.80 was
deducted.
On 30 March 1978, in an action in the Supreme
Court of New South Wales, the Cormnonwealth was found
liable for negligence in respect of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff in 1969. The plaintiff was awarded the sum of $189,675.00 which was the result
of a verdict for $252,900.00 less a 25 per cent
reduction for contributory negligence.
| T12 | In April 1978, the Cormnonwealth lodged a notice |
of appeal against the judgment. However a few months
later in September 1978 the Cormnonwealth discontinued
the appeal and paid to the plaintiff the sum of
$156,973.10 which was subsequently adjusted to
$157,034.36. The Commonwealth retained the sum of
$32,640.64 from the judgment moneys - allegedly
pursuant to the provisions of the COMPENSATION (COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES) ACT, 1971.
Then in July 1980 the plaintiff issued a
statement of claim against the defendant. In August
1980, the statement of claim was struck out and the
plaintiff was given leave to file an amended statement
of claim. An amended statement of claim was filed on 24 September 1980 and a further amended statement
of claim was filed on 13 February 1990. In the action,judgment which he recovered in the Supreme Court of New South Wales the sum of $32,640.64 or any other amount. In the alternative, the plaintiff alleges
the plaintiff claims a declaration that the
C3Tl3/l/RB 8 8/5/90 Goodfellow that from 15 May 1969 the defendant was a
tortfeasor, that the plaintiff was the victim of
the defendant and that the defendant caused the plaintiff
physical and financial damage. These allegations
seem linked with paragraph 37 of the statement of
claim of the plaintiff which alleges that the
defendant, without reasonable and probable cause,
appealed against the judgment of the Supreme Court
of New South Wales. Mr Gageler, counsel for the Commonwealth, says - and it seems fairly obvious -
that the alternative claim of the plaintiff, which
alleges abuse of process, will raise substantial
disputes concerning the facts of the matter and
for that reason, among others, this action should be
tried in the Federal Court rather than in this Court.
Mr Goodfellow acknowledges that the business of this Court does not ordinarily permit it to take the
time that is involved in hearing a matter in the original
jurisdiction unless it has some special feature that
| r14 | warrants such a case being heard here. But he says | |
| that he will be done an injustice if his action is tried in the Federal Court and not in this Court by | ||
| reason of the delay which has taken place in respect | ||
| ||
| features in this case in that it concerns a question as to the constitutional validity of part of the | ||
| COMPENSATION (COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES) ACT, | ||
| 1971 and that the first part of his case concerning | ||
| the lawfulness of the deduction of the sum of $32,640.64 does not involve any disputed questions of fact and can be conveniently dealt with by way of | ||
| a special case to the Full Court. |
With the possible exception of the constitutional
issue which Mr Goodfellow raises, there is nothing
about the action which takes it outside the ordinary
run of cases which are remitted from time to time
from this Court to the Federal Court and to the courts
of the State. The delay in hearing the action is not
| '15 | enough. |
The constitutional question may or may not
become necessary to decide but assuming in favour of
Mr Goodfellow that it is necessary to decide it,
there is no reason why it should not be disposed of in
the Federal Court with the other issues which arise
on his statement of claim.
In the circumstances, I order that the matter
be remitted from this Court to the Federal Court of
Australia in the Australian Capital Territory District
Registry. I order that the sum of money paid into this Court by the Commonwealth on 26 October 1984 and
any accumulated interest thereon be transferred to the
C3Tl6/l/RB 9 8/5/90 Goodfellow Federal Court to be dealt with as if it had been paid into that court in accordance with the Federal Court
Rules. I think that the appropriate order is that the costs of this application be costs in the cause
before the Federal Court. The matter shall proceed
otherwise as directed by the Federal Court.
Hr Gageler, is there any other order that you
seek in this matter?
MR GAGELER: I am not sure if it is necessary to certify for counsel in these proceedings.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I think it is. Mr Goodfellow, is there any
particular order that you would seek?
MR GOODFELLOW: The question of costs, Your Honour, as I pointed out, this summons was unnecessary since it would have
come up in the normal course of events in this Court.
I feel the cost of this summons and this hearin3 should
be borne by the Commonwealth and the plaintiff's costs
should be paid by the Commonwealth.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you. I domt propose to make any change to the order which I foreshadowed in respect
of costs. I certify for counsel. What about the question of the defence? There is
a summons that the Commonwealth file its defence.
MR GAGELER: Yes, Your Honour. I treated that as having lapsed but perhaps the appropriate order is that that be
dismissed with no order as to costs. The defence, of course, has been filed.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. What do you say about that, Mr Goodfellow?
MR GOODFELLOW: I have no objection to that, Your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you. The summons dated 23 April 1990
in which the plaintiff sought an order directing the defendant to comply with Order 22 rule 6 of the
High Court Rules is, by consent of the parties, dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs. Nothing further, gentlemen?
MR GAGELER: No, Your Honour. AT 10.15 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
C2Tl6/2/RB 10 8/5/90 Goodfellow
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Civil Procedure
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Constitutional Law
Legal Concepts
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Jurisdiction
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Remedies
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Procedural Fairness
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Appeal
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Standing
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