Goodall v The Queen - [2007] HCATrans 397

[2007] HCATrans 397

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M50 of 2007

B e t w e e n -
DAVID HENRY GOODALL
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

HAYNE J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 3 AUGUST 2007, AT 11.54 AM

MR O.P. HOLDENSON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by CD Traill Lawyers)

MR J.D. McARDLE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS C.M. QUIN, for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic))

HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Holdenson.

MR HOLDENSON: The questions on this application arise from the factual situation of a trial judge having discharged one juror without verdict directed that the trial continue with the 11 remaining jurors.

HAYNE J: That is, his Honour acted under section 43 of the Juries Act?

MR HOLDENSON: That would appear to be the case.

HAYNE J: Is it anything else, Mr Holdenson?

MR HOLDENSON: There is no complaint with respect to his Honour acting under section 43 of the Juries Act. Immediately subsequent to the one juror becoming distressed and the retirement of all 11 jurors into the jury room defence counsel made application that the entire jury be discharged without verdict and he expressly submitted that at least one member of the jury was, his words, not impartial. His Honour did not reject that proposition. He merely responded that he did not think that that was necessarily right.

His Honour was subsequently informed by the foreman of the jury that the distressed juror had himself been a victim of sexual abuse, albeit we know nothing as to the nature of that abuse, its effect, whether or not it was the subject of a prosecution or the manner in which the victim was dealt with whenever it was by the criminal justice system. That juror’s experience together with two matters, first, the prosecutor’s invitation to each member of the jury to use his or her own experiences in judging the witnesses and the truthfulness and reliability of their evidence and, secondly, the juror’s resultant distress could only have meant that there was a real question as to the ability or capacity of that one juror to consider the evidence dispassionately, impartially, unemotionally and in a detached manner. They are the words used in the joint judgment of Chief Justice Mason as he then was, and his Honour Mr Justice McHugh in Webb v Hay (1994) 181 CLR 41.

Just pausing there, those three matters in combination, first, the juror’s experience, secondly, the prosecutor’s invitation and, thirdly, the resultant distress, constitute the factual foundation or premise for the analysis of what occurred at this trial. If I might just pause there, that is where, in my respectful submission, the Court erred when in the judgment below, in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Goodall v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Goodall v The Queen [2007] HCATrans 397
Case: [2007] HCATrans 397
Decision Date: 3 August 2007

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Goodall v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Goodall, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the applicant during police interviews.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of admissions made by the applicant during police interviews, notwithstanding concerns about the voluntariness of those admissions. This involved an examination of the principles governing the admissibility of confessions and the discretion of a trial judge to exclude evidence that, while technically admissible, might be unfairly prejudicial to the accused.

The High Court affirmed the established principle that admissions made by an accused are admissible in criminal proceedings unless they are involuntary. However, the Court also reiterated the discretion of a trial judge to exclude evidence, even if voluntary, where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. In this instance, the Court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the voluntariness of the admissions and concluded that the judge had properly exercised their discretion in admitting the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders