Gonot v Director of Public Prosecutions

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Gonot v Director of Public Prosecutions & Anor [2017] QCA 3

PARTIES:

ISMAEL MARIA DESIRE GONOT
(appellant)
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(first respondent)
DIRECTOR OF MENTAL HEALTH
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 2620 of 2016
MHC No 163 of 2013

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal from the Mental Health Court

ORIGINATING COURT:


Mental Health Court at Brisbane – [2016] QMHC 1

DELIVERED ON:

3 February 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

2 August 2016

JUDGES:

Gotterson and Morrison and Philippides JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – NATURE OF RIGHT – APPEALS IN THE STRICT SENSE AND APPEALS BY WAY OF REHEARING – APPEALS IN THE STRICT SENSE – where the appellant was charged with arson and attempted murder – where the matter of the appellant’s mental state was referred to the Mental Health Court – where the Mental Health Court determined that the appellant was not of unsound mind – where some medical evidence was accepted and other medical evidence was rejected – where the appellant alleged an error of fact and an error of law – whether the Mental Health Court failed to take into account all of the relevant evidence – whether the determination of the Mental Health Court was against the weight of the evidence

Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 27
Mental Health Act
2000 (Qld), s 257(1), s 334, s 267(1), s 405

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34, distinguished
Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 58 FLR 407; [1981] FCA 147, considered
DAR v DPP (Qld) & Anor[2008] QCA 309, applied
McDermott v Director of Mental Health; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2007) 175 A Crim R 461; [2007] QCA 51, applied

COUNSEL:

M J Copley QC for the appellant
M T Whitbread for the first respondent
No appearance for the second respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the first respondent
No appearance for the second respondent

  1. GOTTERSON JA:  I agree with the order proposed by Philippides JA and with the reasons given by her Honour.

  2. MORRISON JA:  I have read the reasons of Philippides JA and agree with those reasons and the order her Honour proposes.

  3. PHILIPPIDES JA: This is an appeal pursuant to s 334 of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) (the Act) against the determination of the Mental Health Court (MHC) that the appellant was not of unsound mind at the time of the alleged commission of offences of arson and attempted murder and that proceedings for those offences should proceed according to law.[1]

    [1]In the Matter of Ismael Maria Desire Gonot [2016] QMHC 1 at [81].

    Grounds of appeal

  4. An appeal from the MHC is an appeal in the…

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Details
Case
[2017] QCA 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Gonot v Director of Public Prosecutions, the appellant was charged with arson and attempted murder, with the matter of his mental state referred to the Mental Health Court. The appellant, represented by counsel, submitted that the Mental Health Court failed to take into account all of the relevant evidence and that its determination was against the weight of the evidence. The court was required to decide whether the Mental Health Court had erred in fact or law in its consideration of the appellant’s mental state and whether this led to an unsafe and unsatisfactory conclusion.

The court found that the Mental Health Court had given proper consideration to the evidence, particularly the evidence of Dr Grant, who opined that the appellant was of unsound mind at the relevant time. The Mental Health Court found that the evidence did not support a conclusion that the appellant was in a manic phase of bipolar affective disorder to the extent that he was deprived of a relevant capacity. The court also found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Mental Health Court failed to take into account all of the relevant evidence or that its determination was against the weight of the evidence. The court was satisfied that the Mental Health Court had given proper consideration to the evidence and had reached a conclusion that was open on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed. The court found that the Mental Health Court had not erred in fact or law in its consideration of the appellant’s mental state and that its determination was not unsafe and unsatisfactory. The court found that the evidence did not support a conclusion that the appellant was in a manic phase of bipolar affective disorder to the extent that he was deprived of a relevant capacity. The court was satisfied that the Mental Health Court had given proper consideration to the evidence and had reached a conclusion that was open on the evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The first ground was said to raise an error of law while the second was said to raise an error of fact.[3][3]Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 58 FLR 407 at 410.Facts relevant to the appeal The primary judge summarised the relevant facts as follows:[4]“Prior to the offending which is the subject of charges, there had been other seemingly related incidents involving [the appellant] and the complainants, but these are not the subject of charges. [He] was living in a rented flat and all the incidents, both the subject of charges, and not, concern another house in the same residential street and its occupants.I first describe the behaviour which is not the subject of the charges. The complainants say that on 27 January 2012 someone entered the area under their house, opened the valve on the hot water system, and sliced the hoses between the mains water supply and the washing machine, creating a flood of water. The water which escaped flowed onto the electric power-board and created electrical problems. In another incident tyres on a bike belonging to one of the complainants were slashed; this was on 29 January 2012. Further, on 31 January 2012 [the appellant] knocked on the front door of the complainants’ house. This was the day before the behaviour which is the subject of the two charges before this Court. One of the complainants opened the door in response to his knocking. She said that a man who she described but did not know (accepted to be [the appellant]) was standing outside the front door playing music on an electronic device. To her saying ‘Hello’, he asked, ‘Do two Asian guys live here?’ The complainant replied ‘No’ and [he] continued to stand at the door saying nothing. Eventually the complainant asked whether there was anything else she could help him with and he said, ‘No that’s all’. He again remained standing silently at the door. She closed the door. The conversation unsettled her. She said that [the appellant] had a ‘cheeky, smug smile on his face’ throughout this incident.The Crown case is that at about 10.30 pm on 1 February 2012, when all the occupants of the complainants’ house had either gone to bed, or were in their bedrooms, [the appellant] entered the house, perhaps through the front door. The noise of this disturbed one of the complainants but she was not aware that a stranger was in the house. At around 10.45 pm she left her bedroom to go to the toilet. When she opened the bedroom door she could smell a strange smell and hear a hissing noise. In the kitchen she found that the gas stove was on, and that all four burners had been activated, allegedly by [the appellant]. The complainant turned them off. She noticed that the windows in the kitchen had been closed, again, allegedly by [the appellant]. The complainant then noticed that there was smoke coming from the external stairs at the back of the house. She was halfway down these stairs when she saw that there was an orange glow under the house and called emergency services.Under the house it is alleged that [the appellant] placed a home-made plastic fuel brick and two wooden blocks on a post situated under the kitchen. He set fire to that fuel. Under the house were discovered skewers wrapped in cling-film.When police located [the appellant] he had leather gloves and a knife in his pocket. They found wooden skewers wrapped in cling-film in his laundry, one with a burn mark on the end of it. They found his car, full of possessions, including his wallet, in the street, unlocked, outside the house next door to the complainants’ house, some little distance from his own home.”[4][2016] QMHC 1 at [2]-[6].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The MHC noted that Dr Subramanian raised a concern as to the correctness of the bipolar affective disorder diagnosis and also opined that, even if the diagnosis of bipolar disorder was a correct diagnosis, the objective facts surrounding the offending and the appellant’s behaviour after the offending did not sit easily with his having been manic at the time of the offending, let alone so manic that he was deprived of a relevant capacity.[44][44][2016] QMHC 1 at [45].Dr Grant’s report and evidence The appellant admitted the offending and some of the anterior behaviour to Dr Grant. The appellant’s recollection was described as “rather patchy”. The MHC observed that the appellant told Dr Grant much more about the 2007 episode in France than he had told anyone else who examined him:[45]“He said that he had been admitted to a psychiatric ward in France, but then a doctor who believed in scientology came and took him out of the ward and cared for him at home. There are odd, unsigned documents put forward in relation to this. Their provenance involves [the appellant’s] mother who, herself, adhered to the views of scientology propaganda, at least at some stage. I have not seen [his] mother, nor seen her cross‑examined. The material put before this Court from, and about, her leads, I must say, to a story which becomes more peculiar, she having had quite a psychiatric history herself, according to a GP (who is probably not qualified to say, or is repeating hearsay from those who are), including having been diagnosed with Munchausen syndrome by proxy. None of this history convinces me that the statements made by [the appellant], or his family, as to what happened in France in 2007 is reliable.”[45][2016] QMHC 1 at [49]. In his report of 6 December 2014, Dr Grant opined that the appellant was of unsound mind at the relevant time, stating:[46]“In my opinion, at the time of the alleged offences [the appellant] was suffering from a manic phase of bipolar affective disorder, with that illness building up over the previous two weeks or more. At the time of the offences there is no evidence that he was actually psychotic but he did appear to be elevated in his mood, prone to developing irrational ideas and anger, insightless and irrational in his behaviour. Having taken all the evidence into consideration, I am of the opinion that at the time of the alleged offences [he] would have been sufficiently manic to have been unable to think about his actions with a reasonable degree of sense and composure and that his illness was depriving him of the capacity to know that he ought not do his actions. His control over his behaviour would also have been significantly impaired but perhaps not deprived. He would have been aware of his actual actions in terms of understanding what he was doing, but in my opinion would have been deprived of the capacity to know that his actions were wrong at that time.”[46]AB 1223. In addition to providing a report, Dr Grant gave evidence on 28 May 2015. The contentious parts of his evidence concerned whether or not it was possible for the appellant to have been so manic as to be deprived of a relevant capacity on 1 February 2012 but to have been able to disguise that mania when seen by police and the Prison Mental Health Service and during the two months he was a prisoner and the four months he lived in the community between March and July 2012. The relevant parts of Dr Grant’s evidence, referred to by the MHC, are as follows:[47]“So, Dr Grant, if in fact he was trying not to disclose any history of mental illness, as you’ve mentioned, do you think that if – in a manic state, he would have been capable of masking or covering up his symptoms when he was seen by the prison mental health service?---Well, I think it means that he wasn’t too horribly manic at that point, and for whatever reason, it might have settled to some extent – it certainly got worse later. If he was – I mean, you would have expected to see some other activity and grandiosity and so on. He did get assaulted in prison, and it was not clear why that was, but he suggested – I read something that suggested that he was assaulted because he was too friendly with the prison officers. And so there were some behavioural issues in custody which could indicate that he was disinhibited and inappropriate in his behaviour, and that’s why he got assaulted. So I’m not sure if he wasn’t showing symptoms, but certainly at interview, he appears to have been able to contain any manic overactivity, but he continued to show this blandness and unconcern and lack of insight into the serious situation he was facing, so I think Dr Wolfenden was suspicious about what was wrong with him, and if she’d had the benefit of all of the collateral history, then her conclusions might well have been a bit different or a bit more different.”[48]…“Well, that seems reasonable, doesn’t it?---Well, look, I can’t comment. Dr Wolfenden has her observations and she’s come to whatever conclusions she came to. I’ve come to my conclusions on the basis of all the information I had from him about his mental status at the time, his relatives and his mother and his sister – so his brother and his mother – and I think, you know, I’ve come to the conclusion that I have. Dr Wolfenden may come to a different conclusion on the basis of her evaluation, but I repeat again that I’ve seen many manic patients who have been able to hold themselves together and not appear manic for periods of hours, and a case before a court not that long ago I remember actually got admitted overnight to a hospital and discharged because they couldn’t see enough evidence of any illness. And, again, in interviews, repeatedly, people can hold it together. So he certainly became, obviously, more manic later in that year, and he has a history of severe bipolar disorder. So, I mean, I’ve just put all that evidence together, talked to him about the mental status at the time and what was happening and what he was thinking about, and I’ve come to my conclusions [indistinct].…Dr Grant, but the test is not just that you’ve got a mental illness?---No, I know that.It’s also deprivation, isn’t it, of one of the three capacities?---Absolutely.Yes?---And, you know, the definitions vary, but I think that he was manic enough not to be able to think clearly and rationally about his behaviour at the time, and I think he’d lost insight into what was going on, and he reacted irrationally during the offences. That’s my conclusion.”[49][47][2016] QMHC 1 at [51].[48]AB 32-33.[49]AB 40-41.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Mental Health Court failed to take into account all of the relevant evidence.
2. Whether the determination of the Mental Health Court was against the weight of the evidence.

Held
1. Whether the Mental Health Court failed to take into account all of the relevant evidence: The court held that the Mental Health Court did not fail to take into account all of the relevant evidence. The court found that the Mental Health Court gave proper consideration to the issue of whether the appellant may have been masking his symptoms.
2. Whether the determination of the Mental Health Court was against the weight of the evidence: The court held that the determination of the Mental Health Court was not against the weight of the evidence. The court found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the appellant had masked his symptoms of mania and that there was a deprivation of capacity as a result of the appellant being in a manic phase.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It was argued that the MHC “did not consider at all the significance of this relevant evidence from Ms Nicot in circumstances where Dr Grant regarded it as possibly an important contributing factor in the appellant masking his mania from Dr Wolfenden”. It was also submitted that had the MHC considered it, the MHC “would have had to conclude that the appellant was indeed told to conceal any mental illness”. Additionally, it was submitted that had the MHC taken Ms Nicot’s evidence into account, it may not have rejected[68] the other influences that the appellant claimed contributed to him masking mania, because, it was said, there can be no doubt that the appellant was truthful when he told Dr Grant about what Ms Nicot had said. It was said that, had the evidence been taken into account, the scepticism of the MHC “about all the statements [the appellant] has made”[69] may have resulted in the MHC accepting that the appellant had masked his mania from Dr Wolfenden and others and accepting Dr Grant’s opinion that he masked a mental illness that deprived him of a relevant capacity. A finding of unsoundness of mind, it was submitted, would then have been made.[68]See [2016] QMHC 1 at [49].[69]See [2016] QMHC 1 at [48].Consideration This ground of appeal is not made out for the following reasons. Firstly, I do not perceive from Dr Grant’s evidence that he placed as much significance on what Ms Nicot told the appellant in terms of being careful about what he said to anyone other than his lawyer as the appellant’s counsel placed on it. Further, the real issue was whether or not it was possible for the appellant to have been so manic that there was a deprivation of a relevant capacity although symptoms of mania were unable to be detected soon after the events in question and for a prolonged period thereafter. Counsel for the appellant did not seek to dispute that there was a lack of objective evidence of mania, rather, his argument was that an explanation for the lack of objective evidence was that the appellant was masking the symptoms for a number of reasons, including what he was told by Ms Nicot.[70][70]TS 10-11. Although counsel for the appellant made the point that the lack of detection of symptoms of mania during Dr Mann’s examination might be understood in terms of what Ms Nicot had told the appellant, the weight of the expert evidence, to which the MHC expressly had regard, was against a person with mania being able to mask symptoms for a prolonged period. The fact is that none of the examining psychiatrists reported observing symptoms such as elevated mood, pressured speech and flights of ideas. Significantly, as the MHC observed, mania is not a “subtle mental illness” nor one which would be expected to improve without medication. The advice of Dr Reddan, as assisting psychiatrist was that the appellant may have been “on the prodrome with clear signs of mania only apparent in July 2012”. The MHC did give proper consideration to the issue of whether the appellant may have been masking his symptoms for a number of reasons. In the final analysis, the Court was simply unable to be satisfied to the requisite degree that the appellant had masked any symptoms of mania and that there was a deprivation of capacity as a result of the appellant being in a manic phase.Ground 2 – error in finding that there was no deprivation of capacityThe appellant’s submissions