FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gomma v WSP Australia Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 353
File number(s): BRG 472 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE JARRETT Date of judgment: 25 February 2021 Catchwords: HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – Federal Circuit Court – procedure – ending proceedings early – summary disposal or stay.
CONTRACTS – General contractual principles – discharge, breach and defences to action for breach – accord and satisfaction.
Legislation: Dispute Resolution Centres Act 1990 (Qld) ss. 2, 36
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s. 131(2)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss. 340, 344, 351, 368, 368(2), 368(3)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s. 17A
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r. 13.10
Cases cited: Australian Postal Corporation v Gorman [2011] FCA 975
Hunter v Anthony Costello [2017] FWCFB 5839
Number of paragraphs: 37 Date of last submission/s: 30 October 2020 Date of hearing: 30 October 2020 Place: Brisbane The Applicant: Self-represented Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Coulthard Solicitor for the Respondent: HFW Australia ORDERS
BRG 472 of 2020 BETWEEN: ADAM GOMMA
Applicant
AND: WSP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 078 004 798)
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE JARRETT
DATE OF ORDER:
25 FEBRUARY 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application in a case filed on 29 September, 2020 be dismissed.
2.The application is adjourned to 19 March, 2021 at 9:30am for directions.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE JARRETT:
The issue in this application is whether the applicant has compromised the claim that he now has before this Court by settling a claim that he had before the Fair Work Commission. The respondent argues that a settlement was reached between the applicant and the respondent in the Fair Work Commission and that the applicant’s cause of action has now merged in that settlement agreement. Accordingly, the respondent argues that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting his application for relief and that his application should be summarily dismissed pursuant to s.17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), and rule 13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
The applicant opposes the application. The applicant says that there was no settlement agreement.
The applicant’s proceeding is a general protections court application commenced pursuant to Part 3-1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). As a necessary precursor to the present proceeding, he made a General Protections Application Involving Dismissal in the Fair Work Commission. The respondent argues that the evidence demonstrates that the applicant and respondent entered into a binding settlement agreement in full and final settlement of all current and future claims he may have against the respondent arising directly or indirectly out of his employment with the respondent, save for any claims with respect to workers’ compensation or minimum statutory superannuation contributions.
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- Case
- [2021] FCCA 353
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether a binding settlement agreement had been reached between the parties during the Fair Work Commission conciliation conference. This involved determining whether the applicant's solicitor had the authority to accept the respondent's settlement offer on the applicant's behalf, and whether the evidence of the settlement discussions was admissible. The court also considered the effect of a valid settlement agreement on the pre-existing cause of action.
Jarrett J reasoned that a settlement agreement, if validly concluded, would extinguish the applicant's pre-existing cause of action, rendering the current proceedings frivolous or vexatious. The court found that the respondent's objections to adducing evidence of settlement discussions were unfounded, as the *Fair Work Act* did not prohibit evidence of an agreement reached, and the *Evidence Act 1995* (Cth) provided an exception to the rule against admitting evidence of settlement negotiations where the making of such an agreement was in issue. Crucially, the court held that the applicant's solicitor possessed ostensible authority to compromise the claim on behalf of the applicant, a principle well-established in Australian law. Despite the applicant's later assertion that his solicitor lacked actual authority, the court found that the solicitor's ostensible authority was sufficient to bind the applicant to the compromise, as there was no evidence that the applicant had restricted his solicitor's authority prior to the acceptance of the offer.
The court concluded that a binding settlement agreement had been reached. Consequently, the proceedings were summarily dismissed on the basis that the applicant's cause of action had been extinguished by the settlement.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant did not sign the deed. On 23 July, 2020 he sent an email to the respondent’s lawyers rejecting the offer and making a counteroffer. CONSIDERATION The respondent submits that on an application of the relevant legal principles to the facts, a binding settlement agreement was reached when the applicant, by his legal representative, communicated his acceptance of the settlement offer to the respondent’s legal representative. The applicant argues that his solicitor had no authority to accept the respondent’s offer on his behalf. But despite him filing an affidavit in these proceedings, the applicant’s evidence is not that he withdrew his solicitor’s authority to act for him before the offer was accepted. Nor is his evidence that he did not instruct the solicitor to accept the offer. He says that the offer was not accepted at the conciliation conference conducted by the Fair Work Commission. I accept that is so because on the respondent’s case the acceptance was not communicated until after the conference on 17 July, 2020. Although the applicant gives evidence that he ceased his solicitor’s instructions on 22 July 2020, that was well after the respondent’s offer was accepted on 17 July, 2020. In oral argument before me the applicant suggested that his solicitor did not have his authority to accept the respondent’s offer, but whether he had actual authority is beside the point. The solicitor, acting in contentious business, had ostensible authority to compromise the applicant’s claim. The position was usefully summarised by Crispin J in Dai Zhi Zhen, Zhang Gui Ying v Alexander John Gosse Downer Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Commonwealth of Australia [2006] ACTSC 120 as follows:25. More than a century ago, Farwell J said that it was even then clear that a solicitor had a general authority to compromise an action on behalf of a client: see In re Newen; Carruthers v Newen [1903] 1 Ch 812 at 818. During the succeeding century the nature and extent of this authority has been repeatedly discussed and in Waugh and Others v H B Clifford & Sons Ltd and Another [1982] 1 Ch 374 Brightman LJ traced the history of this aspect of the law and provided (at 387) the following succinct summary:The law thus became well established that the solicitor counsel retained in an action has an implied authority as between himself and his client to compromise the suit without reference to the client, provided that the compromise does not involve matter ‘collateral to the action’; and ostensible authority as between himself and the opposing litigant to compromise the suit without actual proof of authority, subject to the same limitation; and that a compromise does not involve ‘collateral matter’ merely because it contains terms which the court could not have ordered, by way of judgment, in the action.26. His Lordship also suggested that a liberal approach should be taken to the scope of the ostensible authority that arises from the retainer, explaining at 398 that:I think it would be regrettable if this court were to place too restrictive a limitation on the ostensible authority of solicitors to bind their clients to a compromise. I do not think we should decide that matter is “collateral” to the action unless it really involves extraneous subject matter ... So many compromises are made in court, or in counsel’s chambers, in the presence of the solicitor but not the client. This is almost inevitable where a corporation is involved. It is highly undesirable that the court should place any unnecessary impediments in the way of that convenient procedure. A party on one side of the record and his solicitor ought usually to be able to rely without question on the existence of the authority of the solicitor on the other side of the record, without demanding that the seal of the corporation be affixed; or that a director should sign who can show that the articles confer the requisite power upon him; or that the solicitor’s correspondence with his client be produced to prove the authority of the solicitor. Only in the exceptional case, where the compromise introduces extraneous subject matter, should the solicitor retained in the action be put to proof of his authority. Of course it is incumbent on the solicitor to make certain that he is in fact authorised by his corporate or individual client to bind his client to a compromise. In a proper case he can agree without specific reference to his client. But in the great majority of cases and certainly in all cases of magnitude, he will in practice take great care to consult his client, and I think that his client would be much aggrieved if in an important case involving large sums of money he relied on his implied authority. But that does not effect his ostensible authority vis-à-vis the opposing litigant.27. On the other hand, it has long been clear that a court may set aside a compromise agreement that has been entered under a mistake by counsel for one party and before judgment has been perfected: Hickman v. Berens [1895] 2 Ch 638. This power is said to be derived from the court’s “general authority over justice between the parties”: Neale v Gordon Lennox [1902] AC 465, at 470. See also Shepherd v. Robinson [1919] 1 KB 474 at 477.28. In Emily Joan Harvey v Coralie Ngarita Phillips and Another (1956) 95 CLR 235 the High Court of Australia explained, at 243-244, that in contracts for the compromise of legal proceedings the possibility of successfully alleging ostensible authority had been much restricted by earlier authorities and that courts will not feel bound to enforce a compromise made by counsel contrary to any restriction that had been placed upon his or her authority, even though the lack of actual authority was not known to the other party. At least until any judgment or order embodying the compromise has been perfected, the courts have power to set aside such a contract and that power will be exercised as a matter of discretion when in the circumstances of the case it would be unjust to allow the compromise to stand in view of the restriction on counsel's authority. Their Honours added, however, that:… in the case of a compromise which is made within the actual as well as apparent authority of counsel a court does not appear to possess a discretion to rescind it or set it aside. The question whether the compromise is to be set aside depends upon the existence of a ground which would suffice to render a simple contract void or voidable or to entitle the party to equitable relief against it, grounds for example such as illegality, misrepresentation, non-disclosure of a material fact where disclosure is required, duress, mistake, undue influence, abuse of confidence or the like.