Goldsmith v Tasmania - [2006] TASSC 86

[2006] TASSC 86

CITATION: Goldsmith v Tasmania [2006] TASSC 86

PARTIES:  GOLDSMITH, Paul Ronald
  v
  TASMANIA

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (TAS)
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  CCA 86/2005
DELIVERED ON:  1 November 2006
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  22 August 2006
JUDGMENT OF:  Crawford, Slicer and Tennent JJ

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law – Jurisdiction, practice and procedure – Judgment and punishment – Sentence – Miscellaneous matters – Sex offenders incapable of controlling sexual instincts – 20 complainants – Whether 6½ years' imprisonment manifestly excessive.

Aust Dig Criminal Law [900]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
           Appellant:  G A Richardson
           Respondent:  C J Rheinberger
Solicitors:
           Appellant:  G A Richardson
           Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number: [2006] TASSC 86
Number of paragraphs: 26

Serial No 86/2006
File No CCA 86/2005

PAUL RONALD GOLDSMITH v TASMANIA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CRAWFORD J
SLICER J
TENNENT J
1 November 2006

Order of the Court

Appeal dismissed.

Serial No 86/2006
File No CCA 86/2005

PAUL RONALD GOLDSMITH v TASMANIA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
  CRAWFORD J
  1 November 2006

I agree in substance with the reasons for judgment of both Slicer and Tennent JJ and agree that the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
File No CCA 86/2005

PAUL RONALD GOLDSMITH v TASMANIA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

SLICER J
1 November 2006

The appellant was convicted on his plea of thirty-six counts of indecent assault contrary to the Criminal Code, s127, four counts of maintaining a sexual relationship with a person under the age of 17, (s125A), one count of aggravated sexual assault (s127A), and one count of unlawful sexual intercourse with a young person (s124). The crimes were committed between 1976 and 1987 when the appellant was aged between 31 and 42. The sexual misconduct involved adolescent males aged between 13 and 16 years. The learned sentencing judge summarised that conduct in the following terms:

"In order to satisfy your criminal sexual attraction to post-pubescent boys, a condition known as is ephebophilia, you utilised a variety of means to bring yourself into contact with potential victims and obtain their trust. They included:
·maintaining an association with a religion and related youth groups;
·coaching athletics at a school and incidental to this, rubbing down athletes;
·involving yourself with youths through your golf club and other organisations;
·befriending the parents and family of youths;
·taking youths on camping trips and the like;
·inviting youths to your home for activities that included prayer meetings, playing cards and working on your home;
·supplying youths with cigarettes and alcohol; and
·allowing a youth to drive your vehicle.

Once you had inveigled a victim into a vulnerable situation, such as, submitting to a rub down or playing strip poker, you preyed on him sexually. You frequently plied a victim with alcohol in order to diminish his inhibitions. With exceptions to which I will refer, the predominant form of your abuse involved the handling of the boy's or your penis. It began with you touching…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Goldsmith v Tasmania

Details

AGLC: Goldsmith v Tasmania [2006] TASSC 86
Case: [2006] TASSC 86
Decision Date: 1 November 2006

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Goldsmith v Tasmania, the appellant sought to appeal the severity of a sentence imposed by the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The appellant, found guilty of numerous counts of sexual assault involving 20 complainants, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6½ years. The appellant argued that this sentence was manifestly excessive and should be reviewed by the court. The central legal issue for the court was whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in light of the appellant’s inability to control his sexual impulses, a condition which had been highlighted during the trial.

The court considered whether the sentence imposed was appropriate in the context of the appellant's condition, which was described as an incapacity to control his sexual instincts. The court assessed the severity of the crimes, the number of victims, and the impact on each complainant. It was noted that the appellant's condition, though mitigating, did not entirely absolve him of responsibility for his actions. The court balanced these considerations against the need for the sentence to reflect the gravity of the crimes committed. Ultimately, the court found that the sentence, while severe, was not so excessive as to be manifestly disproportionate to the crimes committed.

The court held that the sentence, while harsh, was not manifestly excessive when considering the totality of the circumstances. The court emphasised the gravity of the crimes, the number of victims, and the impact of the appellant's actions. The court found that the sentence appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offences, taking into account the appellant's condition, which, while a mitigating factor, did not negate the severity of the crimes. The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld.

The court did not make any further orders beyond dismissing the appeal and upholding the original sentence.

Orders