IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P16 of 2000
B e t w e e n -
TREVOR JOHN GOLDSMITH
Applicant
and
MICHAEL DARREN SANDILANDS
First Respondent
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Third Respondent
THE STATE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION
Fourth Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
CALLINAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT PERTH ON FRIDAY, 27 OCTOBER 2000, AT 12.03 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR M.D. COLE: I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Terrace Law)
MR G.T.W. TANNIN: May it please the Court, with MS K.E. McDONALD, I appear for the first, second and third respondents. (instructed by Crown Solicitors for the State of Western Australia)
GUMMOW J: I hold a certificate from the Deputy Registrar stating that he has been informed by the solicitors for the fourth respondent that the fourth respondent does not wish to be represented at the hearing of this application and will submit to any order of the Court, save as to costs. Yes, Mr Cole.
MR COLE: Thank you, your Honours. The point that I wish to address your Honours on today concerns the question about whether the applicant injured himself at indoor cricket. You will recall, your Honours, that the case concerned a question of whether he had injured himself in a high‑speed pursuit and the Commissioner found that he had, in fact, injured himself previously at indoor cricket.
Now, there were three bases upon which that could be found. The first was the first respondent alleged that he had collected the applicant from the indoor cricket arena and the applicant had said to the first respondent he had injured himself. Now, on appeal to the Full Court, the Full Court said that the Commissioner had erred in not exercising his discretion to allow the applicant to reopen this case or to call rebuttal evidence. It will be recalled that the matter had been pleaded on the basis that the ‑ ‑ ‑
CALLINAN J: The only evidence that he had injured himself at the cricket match was said to be the admission made by him to another police officer. Is that right?
MR COLE: Yes, that is correct.
CALLINAN J: And did that emerge for the first time in examination in‑chief of that police officer in the defence case?
MR COLE: That is correct, yes.
CALLINAN J: But I take it the matter was put to the plaintiff?
MR COLE: Yes, the matter was put to the plaintiff, your Honour, and the difficulty the plaintiff was confronted with in relation to the matter was that he was not able to recall any details to deal with that matter.
CALLINAN J: How much detail was put to the plaintiff? Was the place where he was said to have injured himself put and was the date put?
MR COLE: It was not a precise date but it was within a…
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- Case
- [2000] HCATrans 649
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal question before the High Court was whether the language of the settlement deed, which stipulated that the respondents would not "carry on or be engaged in or be interested in or concerned with any business of the same or similar kind" as the business previously conducted by a company, implied a right to seek injunctive relief for its breach. The court had to consider the nature of the rights conferred by the deed and the availability of equitable remedies for enforcing such contractual obligations.
The High Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the language of the deed clearly indicated an intention to confer a personal right on Mr. Goldsmith to restrain the respondents from engaging in the prohibited business activities. Their Honours reasoned that the undertaking given by the respondents was a promise to refrain from certain conduct, and the natural consequence of such a promise, in the absence of any express limitation, was that the promisee could seek equitable intervention to prevent its breach. The court affirmed that where a contract creates a negative covenant, the usual remedy for its breach is an injunction, provided the usual equitable considerations are met. The court ordered that the appeal be allowed and that the respondents be restrained from carrying on or being engaged in or being interested in or concerned with any business of the same or similar kind as that previously conducted by the company.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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