JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: GOLDSMITH -v- PRIME HEALTH PTY LTD & ANOR [2005] WADC 94
CORAM: MAZZA DCJ
HEARD: 8 APRIL 2005
DELIVERED : 20 MAY 2005
FILE NO/S: CIV 2317 of 2001
BETWEEN: IAN JAMES GOLDSMITH
Plaintiff/First Respondent
AND
PRIME HEALTH PTY LTD
First Defendant/Second RespondentANDREW SMITH
Second Defendant/Appellant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application to withdraw unconditional appearance - Writ issued and served on second defendant outside jurisdiction without leave - Writ expired - Exercise of discretion - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court of Western Australia 1971, O 2 r 1, O 5 r 9, O 12 r 6, O 23 r 1
Result:
Appeal allowed in part
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff/First Respondent : Mr S Melville
First Defendant/Second Respondent : Mr D Bristol
Second Defendant/Appellant : Mr P D Quinlan
Solicitors:
Plaintiff/First Respondent : Chapmans
First Defendant/Second Respondent : Murcia Pestell Hillard
Second Defendant/Appellant : Clayton Utz
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Brealey v Board of Management Royal Perth Hospital (1999) 21 WAR 79
Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529
Firth v John Mowlem & Co Ltd [1978] 3 All ER 331
Hazart Pty Ltd v Rademaker (1993) 11 WAR 26
Kent v Lechmere Financial Corp [2002] WASC 75
Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Barbrak [1987] AC 597
Rothmans of Pall Mall (Overseas) Ltd v Saudi Arabian Airlines Corporation [1981] 1 QB 368
Case(s) also cited:
BP Australia Ltd v Kirki Shipping Corporation & Anor, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 940612; 1 November 1994
Greenhill Associates (WA) Pty Ltd v Directories (Aust) Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 5493; 4 September 1984
Leal v Dunlop Bioprocesses International Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 874
Somportex v Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation [1968] 3 All ER 26
Van Leer Australia Pty Ltd v Palace Shipping KK (1981) 180 CLR 337
MAZZA DCJ: In this judgment I will refer to the appellant as the second defendant, the first respondent as the plaintiff, and the second respondent as the first defendant.
By notice of appeal filed 16 December 2004 the second defendant appeals against orders made by Deputy Registrar Harman on 10 December 2004 in respect of the second defendant's application to withdraw his unconditional appearance filed in this Court on 22 March 2004. The learned deputy registrar's orders were:
(1)the second defendant's application for leave to withdraw his unconditional appearance be dismissed;
(2)the second defendant pay the plaintiff's and first defendant's costs of the application; and
(3)the second defendant file its defence within 21 days.
The orders sought by the second defendant in his notice of appeal are:
(1)the unconditional appearance entered in the action on behalf of the second defendant be withdrawn;
(2)the writ naming the second defendant as a party to this action be set aside; and
(3)there be no order as to costs.
This appeal is a rehearing de novo: Hazart Pty Ltd v Rademaker
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- Case
- [2005] WADC 94
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether it should exercise its discretion to allow the second defendant to withdraw their unconditional appearance, as well as whether the writ should be set aside in relation to the second defendant. The second defendant's counsel argued that the writ should be withdrawn and set aside because the service was defective, and the delay in issuing the writ had prejudiced their client's ability to defend the proceedings. Conversely, the plaintiff and the first defendant contended that the second defendant should not be granted relief, citing the protracted nature of the proceedings and the existence of contribution and indemnity proceedings.
The court considered the arguments presented by both sides, acknowledging the procedural errors made by all parties. The court noted that while the proceedings had indeed become protracted, the primary cause of the delay was the plaintiff's actions, not the second defendant's. The court also recognised that the second defendant bore the burden of proving that the writ should be withdrawn and the appearance set aside. Ultimately, the court determined that the second defendant had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify the exercise of the court's discretion, and therefore, the second defendant's applications were dismissed.
The court made no orders allowing the second defendant to withdraw their unconditional appearance or to set aside the writ in relation to them. The proceedings against the second defendant continued as per the original writ.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The plain words of the rule provide the court with a complete discretion. Having said this, the discretion must be exercised judicially and with caution: Rothmans of Pall Mall (Overseas) Ltd v Saudi Arabian Airlines Corporation [1981] 1 QB 368 per Mustill J at 377. The discretion is not limited to circumstances where there has been a mistake of some kind, although the existence of a mistake is relevant to the exercise of the discretion. Each case has to be looked at on its own particular facts: Firth v John Mowlem & Co Ltd [1978] 3 All ER 331 per Megaw J 334 – 335. The second defendant's counsel, Mr Quinlan, submitted that I should exercise my discretion to allow the unconditional appearance to be withdrawn. Further, he submitted that I should set aside the writ itself, insofar as it relates to the second defendant. Both the plaintiff and the first defendant submit that I should refuse the second defendant's applications. Mr Quinlan submitted that had an application been made to set service aside, it would have inevitably succeeded. He further submitted that the second defendant would have successfully resisted any application brought by the plaintiff to remedy the writ's irregularities. Mr Quinlan makes the last mentioned submission on the basis that the second defendant had an accrued right of limitation: Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Barbrak [1987] AC 597 at 616, and that the delay in issuing the writ in the first place, coupled with the time which has elapsed since the issue of the writ has seriously prejudiced the second defendant in the conduct of his case. The plaintiff and the first defendant, through their counsel, Mr Melville and Mr Bristol submitted, in effect, that the second defendant was bound by the conduct of his solicitors, and that the proceedings have become protracted and especially in light of the contribution and indemnity notice have just gone too far. Both Mr Melville and Mr Bristol placed considerable emphasis in the existence of the contribution and indemnity notice. Both submitted that the plaintiff would have to appear at those proceedings which would cover the same factual issues raised by the plaintiff in his statement of claim. This is a case where both parties have made serious procedural mistakes. However, the resolution of this appeal is not to be determined by deciding which parties mistake was worse. It is the second defendant who seeks to be relieved of his solicitor's mistake, and it is the second defendant who bears the onus of proving that the court should exercise a discretion to allow him to withdraw his unconditional appearance. I have carefully considered the various competing arguments raised by counsel. I am mindful of the existence of the indemnity and contribution proceedings. However, those proceedings may be resolved without the need for a trial. They do not involve the plaintiff. I have also reflected on the question of the protracted nature of the proceedings. Without doubt, the proceedings have become protracted. The cause of action arose in September and October 1995 yet the writ did not issue until 2001. Even then service on the first defendant did not occur until September 2002 and the second defendant was not purportedly served until March 2004. This case has been conducted in such a way by the plaintiff that it would be wrong for me to punish the second defendant for any delay in the proceedings.