Goldman v The Queen

[2021] NSWCCA 197

Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation:

Goldman v R [2021] NSWCCA 197

Hearing dates:

23 July 2021

Date of orders:

20 August 2021

Decision date:

20 August 2021

Before:

Payne JA at [1];
Davies J at [153];
Ierace J at [154]

Decision:

(1)    Leave to appeal granted;
 

(2)    Appeal dismissed.

Catchwords:

CRIME – appeals – appeal against conviction – unreasonable verdict – where applicant convicted of one count of assault but acquitted of one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, one count of indecent assault and two counts of sexual intercourse without consent – whether there was in all the circumstances a miscarriage of justice – whether the complainant was unreliable and lacking in credit – whether the nature and quality of the evidence, as a whole, and the acquittals was such that the jury ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt about the applicant’s guilt – where no reason to doubt the reliability or credibility of the complainant – appeal dismissed

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 59(1), 61, 61I, 61L

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 8

Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5(1)(b)

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 191

Cases Cited:

AH v R [2019] NSWCCA 152

Holt v R [2021] NSWCCA 140

Jafary v R [2018] NSWCCA 243

Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439; [1997] HCA 56

KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; [2001] HCA 11

Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559; [2007] HCA 30

M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63

MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; [1996] HCA 35

MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53

ML v R [2015] NSWCCA 27

Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123; [2020] HCA 12

R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35

R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; [2001] NSWCCA 290

R v Stone (Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (England and Wales), 13 December 1954, unrep)

R v TK (2009) 74 NSWLR 299; [2009] NSWCCA 151

SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Matthew Emmanuel Goldman (Applicant)
Crown (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
A Bellanto QC with T Bicanic (Applicant)
F Veltro SC with J Dewhurst (Crown)

Solicitors:
Keypoint Law (Applicant)
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)

File Number(s):

2019/206553

Publication restriction:

Pursuant to s 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the publication of information or material that identifies or is likely to lead to the identification of the complainant is prohibited.

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

District Court of New South Wales

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Date of Decision:

12 August 2020

Before:

Hock DCJ

File Number(s):

2019/206553

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

The applicant, Mr Goldman, stood trial before Hock DCJ and a jury on an indictment containing one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (count 1), one count of assault by way of choking (count 2), two counts of sexual intercourse without consent (counts 3 and 5) and one count of indecent assault (count 4). The applicant was acquitted of counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 and convicted of count 2. He was sentenced to a community correction order for a period of 24 months commencing on 14 December 2020.

The Crown case at trial was that the complainant and applicant were in a consensual intimate relationship which started in October 2016 and deteriorated over time as the applicant became progressively more aggressive and violent. It was alleged that, in 2018, the applicant pushed the complainant down a set of stairs (count 1), choked her at his parents’ house (count 2), sexually assaulted her at her home (count 3), and sexually and indecently assaulted her in his car (counts 4 and 5). The defence case was that the complainant and applicant had engaged in consensual “rough” sex throughout their intimate relationship and the choking occurred during consensual sexual intercourse.

The applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction pursuant to s 5(1)(b) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) on the ground that the guilty verdict returned on count 2 was unreasonable and could not be supported “having regard to all the evidence and the acquittals in relation to counts 1 and 3-5”. The question of whether the applicant based his claim on an alleged inconsistency between the acquittals and the conviction was controversial. The applicant’s principal submission was that there was a miscarriage of justice because the complainant was unreliable and lacking in credit and the jury ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt about the applicant’s guilt in respect of count 2. There were 19 matters said by the applicant to reflect adversely on the complainant’s credibility and reliability. Those matters broadly related to alleged inconsistencies in the complainant’s versions of events (including as to the precise number of stairs, whether the alleged sexual assault occurred in the back seat or front seat of the car and as to the nature of the relationship), alleged inconsistencies in the complaint evidence and assertions that the complainant failed to give relevant material to the police.

The Court (Payne JA, Davies and Ierace JJ agreeing) held, granting leave to appeal but dismissing the appeal:

1. It is incorrect to assume that acquittals on some counts and convictions on others necessarily denotes rejection of a complainant’s credibility or reliability. This Court must scrutinise the evidence and make its own assessment of the reasonableness of the guilty verdict. In making that assessment, the Court should properly be conscious of the advantage of a jury over an appellate court: [34]-[35] (Payne JA), [153] (Davies J), [154] (Ierace J).

MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53 at [23], [34]; AH v R [2019] NSWCCA 152 at [62]; ML v R [2015] NSWCCA 27 at [46], applied.

2. There was no inconsistency between the acquittals on counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 and the conviction on count 2. The jury’s differential verdicts were the product of its conscientious attention to the trial judge’s directions and to the evidence applicable to each count. Having regard to the immediate and consistent complaint evidence in respect of count 2, there was a logical and reasonable basis for sustaining the differentiation that the jury drew: [36], [41]-[43], [145]-[147] (Payne JA), [153] (Davies J), [154] (Ierace J).

MacKenziev The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; [1996] HCA 35 at 366, applied.

3. Having regard to the 19 matters put forward by the applicant and the evidence considered as a whole, there was no reason to doubt the reliability of the complainant’s account in relation to count 2 or the complainant’s probity or credibility. The jury were well placed to evaluate any conflicts and imperfections in the complainant’s testimony and perform their proper function. The credibility matters on which the applicant relied either did not arise or were factual matters for the jury’s determination. Those matters did not support a finding that the verdict on count 2 was unreasonable and ought to be set aside. There was no miscarriage of justice: [141]-[144], [150]-[151] (Payne JA), [153] (Davies J), [154] (Ierace J).

Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123; [2020] HCA 12 at [118], applied.

Judgment

1. PAYNE JA: On 20 July 2020, the applicant, Mr Goldman, stood trial before Hock DCJ and a jury on an indictment containing the following five counts:

1. Count 1: assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 59(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW);

2. Count 2: assault contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act;

3. Count 3: sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 61I of the Crimes Act;

4. Count 4: indecent assault contrary to s 61L of the Crimes Act; and

5. Count 5: sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 61I of the Crimes Act.

2. The applicant was acquitted of counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 and convicted of count 2.

3. The Crown case at trial was that the complainant and applicant were in a consensual intimate relationship which started in October 2016 and deteriorated over time as the applicant became progressively more aggressive and violent. It was alleged that:

1. the applicant pushed the complainant down a set of stairs at his parents’ house in 2018 (count 1);

2. the applicant choked the complainant on the night of 12 May 2018 while she was staying at his parents’ house (count 2);

3. as the complainant was getting ready at her home to attend a school formal event in September 2018, the applicant arrived at her house and sexually assaulted her (count 3); and

4. on or about 19 November 2018, while the applicant and complainant were at a friend’s party, the applicant sexually and indecently assaulted the complainant in the applicant’s car (counts 4 and 5).

4. The defence case was that the complainant and applicant had engaged in consensual “rough” sex throughout their intimate relationship.

5. In relation to count 2, the defence case was that the choking incident occurred during consensual sexual intercourse and the complainant had consented to the choking.

6. On 14 December 2020, the applicant was sentenced to a community correction order pursuant to s 8 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) for a period of 24 months commencing on that date and expiring on 13 December 2022. The Court also imposed an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order for a period of five years subject to the usual mandatory conditions and the additional condition that the applicant not approach or contact the protected person by any means whatsoever, except through the applicant’s legal representative.

Factual background

7. The complainant first met the applicant in September 2016 when she was 15 years old and in Year 10 at school. The applicant was then 16 years old and in Year 11 at school. They began a relationship in October 2016 and shortly thereafter commenced having regular sexual intercourse. The complainant gave evidence that the applicant would call her names, such as “stupid” or “fat”, which would upset her. The applicant would also be violent with her, by doing things like pinching her, bending her fingers back and kicking or slapping her, which would leave red welts, which would occasionally turn into bruises. The complainant did not tell her parents at the time because she believed they would not let her continue to see the applicant if they knew how he was treating her.

8. Over time, the applicant became increasingly jealous and controlling and attempted to socially isolate the complainant. Several of their mutual friends and acquaintances gave evidence to this effect. By about August 2018, the complainant had broken up with the applicant, but continued occasionally to engage in sexual intercourse with him. The complainant explained that she exchanged messages with the applicant, even after the events subject to counts 4 and 5, because she loved him for a very long time, was in a relationship with him, was worried about his feelings and mental health and still cared about not hurting him.

9. The complainant disclosed the circumstances giving rise to counts 4 and 5 to her mother in early December 2018. In late 2018 or early 2019, the complainant disclosed the circumstances giving rise to count 5 to the mother of one of her friends. Later in January 2019, the complainant had a telephone conversation with that person discussing whether she should report the matter to the police. The complainant first reported the matter to police on 6 February 2019.

The evidence at trial

10. The witnesses at the trial were the complainant, the complainant’s mother, the complainant’s father, the mother of the complainant’s school friend, 11 friends and acquaintances of the applicant and complainant, the nanny who looked after the complainant’s brothers, Detective Sergeant Barham (the officer in charge of the investigation) and Senior Constable Allen (an electronic evidence specialist). The applicant did not give evidence at trial or call any witnesses.

Count 1: assault occasioning actual bodily harm (not guilty)

11. Count 1 related to events in 2018 when the complainant was at the applicant’s home with her younger brother. As she walked down the stairs, she felt what she described as a push or “kick shove” which caused her to topple over. She fell onto her bottom or lower back and slid down a couple of stairs. She could not remember how many stairs she slid down. The complainant believed the applicant used his foot but said it may have been his knee. The complainant said she was standing on the middle landing when she felt the force on her and “could only guess” there were about 10 or 15 stairs on the staircase because she had never counted them. As a result of this incident the complainant developed bruises on her bottom.

Count 2: common assault (guilty)

12. Count 2 occurred on 12 May 2018. The complainant gave evidence that the applicant would often place his hand on her neck and squeeze it during sexual intercourse. The complainant consented to this practice, which started quite early in the relationship, so long as it was not violent.

13. On this occasion, the complainant was in bed with the applicant at his home at about 10pm or 11pm. The applicant placed both his hands around the complainant’s neck and put the weight of his body down onto her neck to the point where she could not breathe. The complainant said that she started crying and begged the applicant to get off her, but he did not lessen the pressure. She could feel the “blood, like, the throbbing in my head. So, it was long enough for him to have cut the circulation of – of the veins or whatever the biological reason is”. The complainant eventually pushed him off. She described the applicant’s build as “quite athletic … he’s played a lot of sports in his life so he’s got quite strong arms”. She knew that his arms were strong because she “felt their strength in relation to – to him choking me and to pinning me down and also because you have to be very strong to play water polo”.

Count 3: sexual intercourse without consent (not guilty)

14. Count 3 related to an incident that allegedly occurred on 28 September 2018. The complainant had agreed to accompany her friend, JP, to his school formal. At about 1:02pm the complainant received a message from the applicant asking her to call him as he needed to talk urgently (a record of that message was contained in Exhibit 5). The applicant arrived at her home later that afternoon because she was getting ready to go to the formal. On the complainant’s version of events, the applicant forced himself upon her and raped her in her bedroom when she was getting dressed. The defence case was that the complainant and applicant had consensual sexual intercourse in the complainant’s bedroom on that date.

Counts 4 and 5: indecent assault (not guilty) and sexual intercourse without consent (not guilty)

15. Counts 4 and 5 allegedly occurred on the evening of 19 November 2018 at a party hosted by a mutual friend, C. The alleged offending occurred in the applicant’s car which was parked across the road from C’s house.

16. During cross-examination it was suggested to the complainant, and the complainant denied, that she had consensual intercourse with the applicant in the car and that during the act of intercourse the applicant was sitting on the seat with his legs down into the footwell of the car and the complainant was sitting across him. It was also suggested, and the complainant denied, that the applicant did not engage in any improper conduct in the back of his car that evening.

17. The applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction pursuant to s 5(1)(b) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) on the following ground:

“The verdict of guilty in relation to count 2 is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to all the evidence and the acquittals in relation to counts 1 and 3-5.”

Consideration

18. In M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63 at 492-493, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ stated:

“Where a court of criminal appeal sets aside a verdict on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, it frequently does so expressing its conclusion in terms of a verdict which is unsafe or unsatisfactory. Other terms may be used such as ‘unjust or unsafe’, or ‘dangerous or unsafe’. In reaching such a conclusion, the court does not consider as a question of law whether there is evidence to support the verdict. Questions of law are separately dealt with by s. 6(1). The question is one of fact which the court must decide by making its own independent assessment of the evidence and determining whether, notwithstanding that there is evidence upon which a jury might convict, ‘none the less it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow the verdict of guilty to stand’.

…

Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. But in answering that question the court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations.” (Footnotes omitted.)

19. Subsequently, in MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53, Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Callinan JJ considered, at [34], the reasons why a jury may arrive at a verdict of acquittal:

“[34]   Since the ultimate question concerns the reasonableness of the jury’s decision, the significance of verdicts of not guilty on some counts in an indictment must necessarily be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.  Furthermore, it must be considered in the context of the system within which juries function, and of their role in that system. A number of features of that context were emphasised in MacKenzie. They include the following. First, as in the present case, where an indictment contains multiple counts, the jury will ordinarily be directed to give separate consideration to each count. This will often be accompanied by a specific instruction that the evidence of a witness may be accepted in whole or in part. Secondly, emphasis will invariably be placed upon the onus of proof borne by the prosecution. In jurisdictions where unanimity is required, such as New South Wales, every juror must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of every element in the offence. In the case of sexual offences, of which there may be no objective evidence, some, or all, of the members of a jury may require some supporting evidence before they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the word of a complainant. This may not be unreasonable. It does not necessarily involve a rejection of the complainant’s evidence. A juror might consider it more probable than not that a complainant is telling the truth but require something additional before reaching a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. The criminal trial procedure is designed to reinforce, in jurors, a sense of the seriousness of their task, and of the heavy burden of proof undertaken by the prosecution. A verdict of not guilty does not necessarily imply that a complainant has been disbelieved, or a want of confidence in the complainant. It may simply reflect a cautious approach to the discharge of a heavy responsibility. …”

20. McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ made it clear that “imperfections of evidence” are “not uncommon in most trials” and said, at [96], in relation to the role played by the jury:

“[96]   … Experience suggests that juries, properly instructed on the law (as they were in this case), are usually well able to evaluate conflicts and imperfections of evidence. In the end, the appellate court must ask itself whether it considers that a miscarriage of justice has occurred authorising and requiring its intervention. …”

21. These principles were reiterated by the High Court in SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13. French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ, in their joint judgment, stated at [13]-[14]:

“[13] The starting point in the application of s 6(1) is that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, and the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. However, the joint judgment in M went on to say:

‘In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred.’

…

[14] In determining an appeal pursuant to s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act, by applying the test set down in M and restated in MFA, the Court is to make ‘an independent assessment of the evidence, both as to its sufficiency and its quality’. In M, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ stated:

‘In reaching such a conclusion, the court does not consider as a question of law whether there is evidence to support the verdict. Questions of law are separately dealt with by s 6(1). The question is one of fact which the court must decide by making its own independent assessment of the evidence and determining whether, notwithstanding that there is evidence upon which a jury might convict, “none the less it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow the verdict of guilty to stand”.’” (Footnotes omitted.)

22. At [22], their Honours said:

“[22]   On appeal, the task of the Court of Criminal Appeal was to make an independent assessment of the whole of the evidence, to determine whether the verdicts of guilty could be supported. There is no doubt that the Court of Criminal Appeal was not bound by the ruling of the trial judge concerning the date of the 2006 offences. However, the Court of Criminal Appeal was required to form an opinion as to the date of the 2006 offences in order to weigh the whole of the evidence. The reasons for judgment by Simpson J do not disclose that the Court of Criminal Appeal made an independent assessment of the evidence concerning the 2006 offences, and therefore the Court could not weigh the competing evidence to determine whether the verdicts of guilty could be supported.”

23. In Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559; [2007] HCA 30, a case that concerned the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct in the course of a criminal trial, Hayne J expressed the test for an intermediate appellate court (when considering whether the convictions sustained below were “unsafe or unsatisfactory”) in the following terms:

“[113]   … the question for an appellate court is whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is to say whether the jury must, as distinct from might, have entertained a doubt about the appellant’s guilt.” (Footnote omitted, emphasis in original.)

24. The High Court in Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123; [2020] HCA 12 made clear that there is no inconsistency in the formulation of the test in Libke on the one hand and in M on the other:

“[45]   As their Honours observed, to say that a jury ‘must have had a doubt’ is another way of saying that it was ‘not reasonably open’ to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the offence [Pell v The Queen [2019] VSCA 186 at [24]]. Libke did not depart from M.”

25. The jury’s advantage includes but is not limited to its capacity to see and hear the witnesses give their evidence. As the High Court explained in The Queen v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35 at [65]:

“[65]   It is fundamental to our system of criminal justice in relation to allegations of serious crimes tried by jury that the jury is ‘the constitutional tribunal for deciding issues of fact’. Given the central place of the jury trial in the administration of criminal justice over the centuries, and the abiding importance of the role of the jury as representative of the community in that respect, the setting aside of a jury’s verdict on the ground that it is ‘unreasonable’ ... is a serious step, not to be taken without particular regard to the advantage enjoyed by the jury over a court of appeal which has not seen or heard the witnesses called at trial. …” (Footnotes omitted.)

26. The legal test applied to the ground of unreasonable verdict based on alleged inconsistency is one of logic and reasonableness: MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; [1996] HCA 35. In MacKenzie (at 366), Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ approved the test as stated by Devlin J in R v Stone (Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (England and Wales), 13 December 1954, unrep). In order to succeed on this ground, an applicant:

“… must satisfy the court that the two verdicts cannot stand together, meaning thereby that no reasonable jury who had applied their mind properly to the facts in the case could have arrived at the conclusion, and once one assumes that they are an unreasonable jury, or they could not have reasonably come to the conclusion, then the convictions cannot stand.”

27. The applicant submitted that the ground advanced in this appeal was not limited to a consideration of whether it was open to the jury, on the whole of the evidence, to convict the applicant. Rather, the appeal ground called for an examination of the whole of the facts and circumstances: “that goes beyond ‘the whole of the evidence’ and includes an examination of the significance of the acquittals, and what can be read into those verdicts.” Those words were taken from a passage of the judgment of Simpson J (with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Latham J agreed) in R v TK (2009) 74 NSWLR 299; [2009] NSWCCA 151, which should be set out in full:

“[127]   What is implicit in that paragraph of MFA [at [34], a portion of which is extracted above] is that, where unreasonableness of a verdict of guilty is asserted by reason of a mix of verdicts, the inquiry is wider than that stated in M. In M no question of inconsistency arose, and, in cases of that sort, the inquiry is as to the adequacy of ‘the whole of the evidence’ to support the verdict. In cases of the Jones variety, a further dimension is added: the ‘circumstances’ of the particular case. That goes beyond ‘the whole of the evidence’ and includes an examination of the significance of the acquittals, and what can be read into those verdicts.

[128]   That is not, on my reading, an adoption (for inconsistent verdict cases) of the most commonly quoted M test. The foundation for the test stated in MFA is not confined to ‘the whole of the evidence’ but incorporates ‘all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case’. That is wide enough to include matters outside the evidence, such as the impact on the reasonableness of the verdict of guilty of what may be discerned to be the explanations for the acquittals. In determining whether convictions are unreasonable, in these circumstances, the focus of the inquiry is upon any explanation, not for the convictions, but for the acquittals. If such an explanation can be found, without resort to doubts about the complainant’s credibility, the verdicts of guilty may not be unreasonable, at least not on that basis. The inquiry may also permit examination of circumstances that give ‘insight’ (Mackenzie), to the extent that is permissible, into the jury’s thinking. Having regard to the willingness of the jury, in this case, to disclose its reasoning (through its regular communications) and, more particularly, to the unusual circumstances showing a degree of dissension during the process of deliberation, that is here of some considerable relevance.

[129]   In cases where the asserted unreasonableness is founded upon inconsistency, it is not unusual to find that little, if any, attention is paid to the quality of the evidence. That was the case in Mackenzie, it was the case in Jones, and it was the case in Norris (although in each of the last two cases, supplementary matters augmenting the doubts occasioned by the acquittals were added) in the reasoning to the conclusions.

[130]   Before Jones dictates that an appellate court, faced with diverse verdicts on multiple counts, must intervene to set aside the convictions, the court must inquire whether there exists any rational explanation for the acquittals (not the convictions), other than doubts about the complainant’s credibility. If such an explanation can be found, then Jones has no application. Finding such an explanation is not always easy. Determining whether a proposed explanation is a rational one, other than by reason of the complainant’s credibility, can be even more difficult. The central question is whether the acquittals are attributable only, or principally, to doubt about the complainant’s credibility.” (Emphasis in original.)

28. The approach adopted by Simpson J remains the correct approach: Jafary v R [2018] NSWCCA 243 at [37]; Holt v R [2021] NSWCCA 140 at [108].

29. In Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439; [1997] HCA 56, the appellant was charged with three counts of sexual intercourse with a female child. The jury convicted on two of the three counts and acquitted on the other. By majority the High Court set aside the convictions. Their Honours (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ) found that the acquittal damaged the credibility of the complainant with respect to all counts in the indictment. They considered (at 453) that:

“Implicit in the appellant’s acquittal on the second count was a rejection of the complainant’s account of the events which were said to give rise to that count.”

30. In AH v R [2019] NSWCCA 152, Simpson AJA (with whom Button and Lonergan JJ agreed) observed, at [56], that it “seems that too much has been read into the judgment in Jones.”

31. In R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; [2001] NSWCCA 290, Spigelman CJ undertook an exhaustive review of decisions of this and other appellate courts since Jones, and concluded:

“[125]   This review of the authorities indicates that a reasonable jury is not obliged to have a doubt about the occurrence of some incidents about which it has only a complainant’s uncorroborated evidence, if they have such a doubt about other incidents whenever, in the latter but not the former case, there is evidence contradictory of, or failing to support, the evidence of the complainant. Any conclusion about this matter depends on the full range of relevant circumstances. …”

32. After also considering the cases in which Jones had been applied, Wood CJ at CL said:

“[212]   So understood, I do not regard Jones as an authority for the presumption previously mentioned. It does not deny to a jury the right to accept the evidence of a complainant in relation to one event, and to maintain a reasonable doubt about another event described by that witness. It leaves unimpaired the traditional instruction given to juries that they are not obliged to accept wholly or to reject wholly what a witness says, but are free to accept part and to reject part of his or her account — an instruction accepted as perfectly appropriate, if not one that should be given, in KBT v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 417 at 424, and in KRM v The Queen (2001) 75 ALJR 550 at 558 [36] …”

33. Also relevant to this appeal is the judgment of McHugh J in KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; [2001] HCA 11 where his Honour explained:

“[36]   It has become the standard practice in cases where there are multiple counts, however, for the judge to direct the jury that they must consider each count separately and to consider it only by reference to the evidence that applies to it … The universal giving of a separate consideration warning and the omission of a universal propensity warning indicates that the giving of a separate consideration warning is ordinarily sufficient to avoid miscarriages of justice in cases such as the present. This indication is confirmed by the many cases where juries acquit accused persons of some charges and convict them of others where the presentment contains multiple counts involving the same or similar offences. Indeed, so freely do juries acquit of some charges and convict of others on presentments with multiple counts that appellate courts often hear arguments that there is such an inconsistency in the verdicts that the convictions are unsafe and must be set aside [cf Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439].” (Citation supplied.)

34. Any assumption that acquittals on some counts and convictions on others necessarily denotes rejection of a complainant’s credibility or reliability was rejected in MFA: see at [34], extracted at [19] above. I agree with the conclusion of Simpson AJA in AH v R that:

“[62]   … differential verdicts, far from providing an indication that a jury has fallen down in its task, may very often provide the basis for confidence that the jury has done precisely what it has been instructed to do: consider each count separately and reach a verdict on that count, on the evidence relevant to that count.”

35. This Court must scrutinise the evidence and make its own assessment of the reasonableness of the guilty verdict. However, in making that assessment, the Court should properly be conscious of the advantage of a jury over an appellate court in that there would be aspects of the case that would not be reflected adequately in the written record: MFA at [23]; ML v R [2015] NSWCCA 27 at [46].

36. In this appeal, the question of whether the applicant based his claim of unreasonableness in any way on an alleged inconsistency between the acquittals on counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 and the conviction on count 2 was controversial. To the extent that such a case was conducted by the applicant, I reject it.

37. Whilst Mr Bellanto QC, who with Mr Bicanic appeared for the applicant, at various points in his written and oral submissions disclaimed reliance on an alleged inconsistency between the acquittals on counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 and the conviction on count 2, it will be recalled that his sole ground of appeal provided, relevantly, that the guilty verdict “is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to … the acquittals in relation to counts 1 and 3-5” (emphasis added).

38. The applicant’s written and oral submissions contained a number of references to an alleged inconsistency. For example, the applicant made the following submissions:

1. “Having regard to the jury verdicts and the issues in the case, the jury did not find the complainant to be an honest, accurate and reliable witness beyond reasonable doubt in relation to counts 1 and 3-5. Given the doubts in relation to the complainant’s credit and reliability led to acquittals in relation to those counts, these doubts carried over in relation to the consideration of count 2”;

2. “In respect of [count 3], the only reasonable explanation for the acquittal is a doubt about the credibility of the complainant. At the very least, the verdict reflected a real difficulty in respect of the nature and quality of evidence in respect of this count”;

3. “When assessing the entirety of the evidence, the deficiencies, inconsistencies and incontrovertible evidence that cuts across the complainant’s version cannot be ignored. It is a truism that one can accept some parts of a witness’ evidence and reject other parts (and indeed the jury were directed in this respect), however that is not to say that those parts that are rejected are excised from the evidence without consequence to the credit and reliability of the witness. In this case, the complainant has demonstrated herself to be thoroughly unreliable and lacking in credit”;

4. “The phrase used [in TK] is ‘significance of the acquittals and what can be read into those verdicts’… Now in using it in the manner that we have simply picks up what her Honour said in TK. We’ve used it in the sense that one has to go through the various grounds and the consequence of the grounds, but more importantly from our point of view it’s an endeavour to cover the whole of the evidence which gives rise to the difficulties we say with the complainant’s evidence”; and

5. “The point simply is that the acquittals can be taken into account and the consequence of those acquittals can be taken into account. How this Court deals with them is a matter for the Court and also relevant though is that if something can be read into the acquittals it is a matter for the Court to do so, and it really is a Markuleski point or a Markuleski approach that we advance in relation to the credit of the complainant.”

39. For this reason I will first address the sole ground of appeal on the contingent basis that the applicant is seeking to have this Court take into account an alleged inconsistency between the acquittals on counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 and the conviction on count 2.

40. It is only where verdicts “cannot stand together” or where “no reasonable jury who had applied their mind properly to the facts in the case could have arrived at the conclusion” that a jury’s verdict will be set aside as inconsistent: MacKenzie at 366.

41. In the present case, I have concluded that a reasonable jury who applied their minds properly to the case could have found the applicant guilty of count 2 but not guilty of counts 1, 3, 4 and 5. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider each count individually and to consider whether the elements were made out in respect of each individual count. The jury could properly have concluded that the evidence led to different verdicts. As I will explain, there is no reason to think that the complainant’s credibility was damaged by any of the 19 matters to which the applicant refers for the purposes of this appeal. It was only the reliability of the complainant’s account that raised any doubt. In this regard, it is significant that count 2 was the only count supported by immediate, electronically recorded complaint evidence which significantly supported the reliability of the complainant’s account. I set that evidence out at [64]-[66] below.

42. The jury had an opportunity to assess the complainant and the applicant. Subject to the principles I have described above, the assessment of the credibility and reliability of the complainant was very much a matter within the province of the jury.

43. I am satisfied that there is a rational explanation for the acquittals other than doubts about the complainant’s credibility. There is no reason to think by reason of the acquittals on the other counts that the jury must have had a doubt about count 2.

44. I will now address the applicant’s principal submission, that there was in all the circumstances a miscarriage of justice because the complainant was unreliable and lacking in credit, and the nature and quality of the evidence, as a whole, and the acquittals for counts 1, 3, 4 and 5, was such that the jury ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt about the applicant’s guilt in respect of count 2.

45. There were 19 matters said by the applicant to reflect adversely on the credibility and reliability of the complainant. I will address each in turn.

Count 1

Allegedly different versions of events by the complainant

46. The applicant contended that the complainant gave a number of “different versions” in relation to this allegation.

47. The complainant gave the following evidence in chief:

“Q.   What happened?

A.   I was walking down – I had my – my younger brother … was – I had brought him to Matthew’s house, because he loved Matthew’s sister, and we were upstairs. We were walking down. I don’t remember what I did to warrant this, but he – he – he pushed me down the stair and I – I tumbled and – and slipped onto my – onto my bum.

…

Q.   When you say he pushed, what was the actual action?

A.   It was – it was like a – a – like a kick shove. It wasn’t – it’s – I find it kind of hard to put into words. It wasn’t – it wasn’t a strike. It was like a – a – a push.

Q.   A push with what?

A.   His foot.

…

Q.   What part of his body contacted with your body?

A.   I – I believe it was his foot. It could have been his knee, but I – I believe it was his foot.

Q.   What part of your body did his foot or his knee contact on your body?

A.   Around my – my bum, or my lower back.

…

Q.   When you felt that part of his body on your body, what did your body do?

A.   Well, I – I toppled over. I – I couldn’t – the force was hard enough for me to fall over.

Q.   When you say, ‘fall over’, could you explain how? Did you fall forward, did you fall backwards, did you fall to the side? How did you topple over?

A.   I – my feet came out from under me, and I landed onto my bottom.

Q.   You landed on your bottom. When you landed, did you stay put where you landed, or was there further movement by you after that?

A.   I – I slid down a couple of stairs, but it’s hard for me to remember exactly how many. I – probably two or three, but I'm – I'm not 100% sure on the number.”

48. The complainant agreed with the cross-examiner that she had accidentally slipped down the stairs on another occasion when she fell heavily onto her bottom. The complainant was shown a photograph of the stairs. She agreed that the estimate of 15-20 stairs was wrong and that there were only eight stairs in that section. She said she fell down from the landing but slid at the bottom stair. It was put to her that the applicant never pushed her down the stairs. The complainant disagreed. The complainant also disagreed with the proposition that if she did fall down the stairs it was accidental:

“Q.   This was a statement made by you on that date, 30 June 2020 this year–

A.   Yeah.

Q.   –and in para 3, middle of the paragraph, you say this,

‘A.   Matthew pushed me from the middle landing. I think it was about 15-20 stairs that I fell down and at the time there was a light cream carpet on the stairs. I think [the complainant’s brother] was at the bottom on the stairs. I think my brother … was at the bottom of the stairs. He was so young at the time. I can’t exactly – I can’t remember exactly what he was doing.’

That’s what you said in that statement at that time. You agree with that?

A.   Yeah.

Q.   And is what you said there correct?

A.   Well, now that you’ve shown me a picture of the stairs I know that it was much fewer but I was just going off my memory and I was never able to count the stairs at his house. But other than–

Q.   I understand that. But without having the benefit of a photograph showing the number of stairs, the subject of your evidence, you would have said it was 15 or 20 stairs, wouldn’t you? As you did.

A.   Well, it felt like I’d fallen a lot more than nine stairs. I was very surprised when you showed me that photo just then.

Q.   I understand that. But aren’t you prepared to concede now that what you said there in your statement earlier this year was inaccurate?

A.   The number of stairs but–

Q.   That’s all right, that’s what I’m talking about?

A.   Yes, I was wrong. I miscounted the stairs.

Q.   In your evidence in this trial at p 42 on this topic on 23 July this year, you were asked some questions by the prosecutor about the fall, the push that you allege and I’m going to read to you now what I suggest your evidence was starting off at line 12,

‘A.   I – my feet came out from under me and I landed onto my bottom.

Q.   You landed on your bottom. When you landed, did you stay put where you landed or was there further movement by you after that?

A.   I – I slid down a couple of stairs but it’s hard for me to remember exactly how many. I probably – two or three but I’m – I’m not 100 per cent sure on the number’.

Is that true? Is that correct?

A.   Well, it seems different now when I look at the picture of the stairs. It was probably one or two onto the ground. But yeah, the rest of it is. It’s just - it’s just obviously me getting mixed up about how the stairs looked because I – I could only go off my memory.

Q.   You would agree your memory has failed you on this point, hasn’t it?

A.   For counting but for how I felt and – and what happened to me, no. That’s all correct. It was just the number of the stairs.

Q.   They’ve gone from 15 to 20 to two or three?

A.   No. No, that’s not right. I fell – I fell down the whole landing but I think I slid at the bottom one or – I slid at the bottom but I’d fallen down the top.”

49. Although the complainant was mistaken in her estimate about the number of stairs she fell down, she consistently maintained that she had fallen from the landing but slid down a couple of the stairs at the bottom. The complainant’s account of what occurred involved her not being able to see whether the applicant kicked or pushed her down the stairs. She initially said the applicant used his foot but then said it could have been his knee. The trial judge directed the jury that they must be satisfied that the applicant’s actions were not an accidental push or “kick shove”.

50. I reject the applicant’s submission that the complainant not knowing the precise number of stairs and whether it was a foot or a knee behind her that caused her to be injured affects her reliability in any significant way. The suggestion it affected her “probity”, if seriously pressed, must also be rejected. A mis-description of the precise number of stairs in a particular flight of stairs is such a commonplace mistake, for virtually everybody, that the reliability of an account of falling on those stairs is not called into question by mistaking their number. The applicant was behind the complainant. Her inability to discern whether a foot or a knee behind her caused her to be injured does not lead me to doubt the complainant’s reliability or credibility.

Alleged inconsistencies in the complaint evidence

51. The applicant submitted that the complainant complained only to her parents about this incident, and only then at a late stage. She told her mother that she had fallen down the stairs and did not say that she had been pushed. The complainant’s mother gave evidence that “I don’t recall whether she said pushed or tripped but it was apparent that Matthew had – had made her fall by pushing or tripping. I think she said tripped”. The complainant’s father gave evidence that the complainant may have told him she had been tripped: “She may have used that word, but the sense was that he was responsible for her falling down the stairs”.

52. The complainant gave evidence that she may have told her friends at school but did not tell her parents because she wanted to “minimise the harm [that the applicant] was doing to her.” I regard that as a perfectly reasonable explanation for this conduct, and as not affecting the reliability or credibility of the complainant.

53. The complainant eventually told her mother in October 2018, and later her father, but described what happened to her in terms of being pushed or tripped, rather than a “kick shove”. The absence of immediate and consistent complaint in respect to this count was featured in the defence closing address.

54. Whilst, perhaps, the absence of immediate and consistent complaint might have caused the jury to doubt the reliability of the complainant’s account, the lack of immediate complaint has no bearing in this case on the complainant’s credibility.

Changed references to dates

55. The Crown opened the case on the basis that the incident occurred in “early 2018”. During the trial, the Crown was granted leave to amend the indictment period on count 1 from January to March 2018 to the whole of 2018. The applicant submitted that this was because no evidence was adduced as to when count 1 was alleged to have occurred.

56. In examination in chief the complainant was asked if she could recall “something that happened in 2018 at [the applicant’s] house and the stairs”. She said “yes”. No further evidence was led from the complainant as to the approximate date this incident occurred. It was not suggested to the complainant in cross-examination that she had changed her evidence as to when the incident occurred or had made a prior inconsistent statement.

57. Queen’s Counsel for the applicant addressed the jury at some length in relation to the uncertainty as to the time when count 1 was said to have occurred. It was submitted that the standard or quality of the evidence in respect to count 1 was such that the jury could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. The trial judge directed the jury that they were:

“entitled to take the fact that the complainant was unable to be more specific about the date of this alleged offence when [they were] assessing her reliability if [they were] of the view that the exact date has some relevance.”

58. It may well be that the jury did take this inexactitude about dates into account, as they were entitled to do, in assessing the complainant’s reliability for the purposes of count 1. Any confusion about dates, however, has no effect in my view on whether the complainant’s account of count 2 should have been believed.

Photos of staircase

59. The defence took photographs of the stairs and introduced those photographs into evidence as Exhibit G27. They showed that there were eight stairs from the landing to the ground.

60. The applicant appears to have submitted that the Crown’s failure to take similar photographs reflects on the credibility and reliability of the complainant. That submission is without merit. The extent to which the Crown did or did not tender photographs of the stairs has nothing whatever to do with the reliability or credibility of the complainant’s evidence.

Count 2

Change in Crown case

61. The Crown opened its case on the basis that count 2 occurred during sexual intercourse, and closed on a different basis, following the complainant’s evidence that sexual intercourse may have happened earlier that evening but not at the time of the choking.

62. It was not suggested to the complainant that she had made a prior inconsistent statement on this issue. I conclude that the change in the Crown’s opening as to the precise timing of the sexual intercourse on that particular occasion has no bearing on the complainant’s credibility or reliability.

The complainant had her car

63. The applicant placed considerable emphasis on the fact that after the choking the complainant stayed overnight at the applicant’s house and left the next morning:

“Q.   What did you do afterwards? Did you stay at his house, or did you leave?

A.   I – I didn’t really know what to do. That’s why I was messaging [the nanny who looked after the complainant’s brothers]. I – I ended up staying, because I had told my parents that I was at my friend’s house, not Matthew’s house, and it was also quite late at night. Well, it was very late at night.”

64. Immediately after the incident the complainant sent a message via Facebook messenger to the nanny who looked after her brothers (Exhibits 3 and 34). The message was recorded as having been sent at 10:47pm. The complainant sent a series of messages that read as follows:

“matt and I had a huge fight
and he fucking jumped on top of me and choked me and yelled at me
like he genuinely wanted to hurt me
because he was angr
I thought he had changed
and now i’m at his crying”.

65. The nanny replied:

“what do you mean like choked you jokingly or forcefully
????”

66. The exchange continued as follows:

“[Complainant:] forcefully
like pinned me down
and i was like get off et off
and i was crying

[Nanny:] What was the argument over??
Have you got mums car just leave

[Complainant:] and now he’s upset
yeah i can leave

[Nanny:] He can’t get away with treating you like that

[Complainant:] he’s asking me what he wants me to do
i know
im so upset

[Nanny:] Just get up and go you don’t owe him an explanation
I’m sure he can figure that one out himself

[Complainant:] i told him to go to sleep
and i’m sitting on the end of the bed
crying
like hysterically

[Nanny:] What was the argument over!!!

[Complainant:] i’ll talk to him
he was being a cunt
just treating me like fucking shit

[Nanny:] There is probably no use talking to him

[Complainant:] he’s begging me to talk to him
over and over and over

[Nanny:] If he has already got that angry that you were scared he was going to hurt you you need to leave”.

67. The nanny gave the following evidence during cross-examination:

“Q.   Was it also your understanding that she had a motor vehicle?

A.   Pardon?

Q.   A motor vehicle. She had access to a motor vehicle.

A.   Yes, yes, yes.

Q.   In the course of you conversing with her by text, you suggested to her that she leave.

A.   Yes, correct.

Q.   And you said that, presumably, because she had the means to leave, if she wanted to.

A.   Correct, correct.”

68. The complainant did not give any evidence in chief of having her car at the applicant’s house on that evening. The applicant submitted that this was a deliberate omission, affecting her reliability and “probity”. It was submitted that the complainant could have left the applicant’s house at any moment.

69. I reject the applicant’s submission. The complainant’s evidence was clear. She decided to stay because she had told her parents she was staying with a friend (not the applicant) and it was very late. She did not tell her parents about the incident because she knew they would be angry that she was staying at the applicant’s house and would also be very angry with the applicant. It is unsurprising that the jury accepted the complainant’s evidence on this issue. The evidence does not give rise to any doubt about the complainant’s reliability or credibility.

70. To the contrary, the contemporaneous electronic messages between the complainant and the nanny strongly support the complainant’s reliability.

So-called “rough sex”

71. The applicant submitted that the evidence at trial established that choking and “rough sex” were part of the consensual sexual relationship between the complainant and the applicant. Exhibit G17 contained the following record of messages between the applicant and complainant dated 2 July 2018 to 3 July 2018:

“[Complainant:] ok I’ll make a deal with u
if ur super nice and call me baby and say u love and miss me and shit i will do whatever the fuck you ask me to do on wednesday
like as rough as possible before it’s considered torture not sex

[Applicant:] Anything?

[Complainant:] yeah”

72. The applicant submitted that it was significant that the complainant did not give those messages to the police.

73. I am not satisfied that there was anything established in the evidence about the method by which the police obtained electronic messages from the complainant warranting any criticism whatever of the complainant’s behaviour in providing messages. The applicant’s assertion that electronic material damaging to the Crown case was deliberately withheld by the complainant was not established by the evidence. I am not satisfied that anything affecting the reliability or credibility of the complainant was established in this regard.

The defence case in relation to count 2

74. In cross-examination it was asserted on behalf of the applicant that on 12 May 2018 the consensual sexual activity she engaged in with the applicant involved “consensual light choking” and that the reason she became angry and started crying was because the applicant had refused to perform oral sex on her. The complainant denied these assertions:

“Q.   On 13 May, that's the next day, you were messaging Mr Goldman and communicating with him on Facebook Messenger about the incident that you've given evidence of on 12 May. Do you agree with that?

A.   I – I can't remember, but – but maybe. Yeah.

Q.   Isn't this the position, that on 12 May 2018, you engaged in consensual sexual activity with Mr Goldman?

A.   Yes.

Q.   The sexual activity involved consensual light choking.

A.   No.

Q.   You asked Mr Goldman to perform oral sex on you.

A.   Maybe.

Q.   He refused.

A.   Yeah. Probably.

Q.   Sorry?

A.   Sorry. I said, ‘Probably.’

Q.   You started crying and became angry.

A.   Not about that. No.

Q.   Isn't this the position, that on 13 May, that's the day after the incident you've described in evidence, that you told Mr Goldman through social media contact that you'd started crying the night before because he'd refused to perform oral sex on you?

A.   I wouldn't have cried about that. No. It would've been something else. But it could've been – like, that could've been part of the crying, but that wouldn't – I wouldn't cry for that reason.

Q.   Isn't this the position, that during the consensual sexual activity on 12 May, that's the previous day, you actually told Mr Goldman that you very much enjoyed the choking aspect to the point that you did not want to breathe ‘in case it ended’?

A.   That's–

Q.   Is that correct?

A.   That's not what that means. No. But I – I would like to be able to see the messages so I can understand.

Q.   On 13 May 2018, you corresponded further and joked about the episode on 12 May. Is that correct?

…

Q.   On 13 May, you, in communication with Mr Goldman, joked about the incident that took place on the previous day, the 12th.

A.   I didn't remember doing that.”

75. The applicant submitted that the above cross-examination “put a different complexion on the context within which the incident was said to have occurred”. I disagree.

76. The complainant did not agree with the assertions being made to her on behalf of the applicant. She was cross-examined with the quite misleading suggestion about conversations she was alleged to have had with the applicant on 13 May 2018. No messages from that date were shown to the complainant or tendered in the defence case.

77. I reject the submission that there is a basis to conclude that there was evidence that the complainant became angry and started crying on this occasion because the applicant had refused to perform oral sex on her.

78. Nothing in this exchange reflects unfavourably upon the complainant’s reliability or credibility.

Count 3

The nature of the relationship between the complainant and applicant in the lead up to count 3

79. The nature of the relationship that existed between the complainant and applicant in the lead up and subsequent to count 3 was said by the applicant to be a significant issue at trial. It was the subject of much cross-examination. The Crown opened its case on the following basis:

“As I said, the relationship between the accused and the complainant continued into 2018 and eventually, it broke down and ultimately, it ended. But it is the Crown’s case that regardless of the state of their relationship, that before the incident in count three, which I'll talk to you about in a moment and then the incident in counts four and five, which are one in the same incident. The accused and the complainant, so before those two incidents, the accused and the complainant were not having sexual intercourse as part of any sort of relationship between them.”

80. During cross-examination, the complainant accepted that she had consensual sexual intercourse with the applicant irregularly:

“Q.   It's the position, isn't it, that you and Matthew were having consensual sexual intercourse regularly between September and November 2018?

A.   I don't believe it was regularly, no.

Q.   Well, irregular?

A.   Yes, according to the messages. I just don't remember them?

Q.   Would you go to your statement which is in envelope number 1 paragraph 59. You see in your statement you say this, ‘Prior to that night Matthew and I were not having sex even on a casual basis.’

A.   Yeah.

Q.   Now, the question I have for you – what do you mean by saying there, ‘Prior to that night Matthew and I were not having sex either on a casual basis’?

A.   Well that is what I believed to be true at that point, and well, you've just shown me that that is not true. But I don't remember – I didn't remember the times that we had sex, so I thought that we weren't having sex.

Q.   Okay. So the position is, leaving side the regularity aspect of it, that you were having consensual sexual intercourse with Matthew between September and November 18, even though you weren't in a formal relationship?

A.   Yep. That's sounds right.”

81. The complainant said that by September 2018 she was focused on her HSC trials. She told the applicant she was not going to have sex with him anymore but changed her mind a couple of times. The complainant agreed at one time to his request to be “friends with benefits” because she did not want the toxicity of the relationship and just wanted to see him casually.

82. I have considered this evidence carefully. The jury may have thought that it affected the complainant’s reliability about this count. The evidence has no effect on the complainant’s overall credibility.

Facebook messages on 22 September 2018

83. The applicant submitted that the ongoing casual relationship between the complainant and applicant in the lead up to count 3 was also demonstrated by Exhibit G26, which comprised a series of messages between the two on 22 September 2018 (six days prior to the allegation in count 3). An extract of those messages reads as follows:

“[Complainant:] do you wanna come over now and i’ll do what i did on Monday to you

[Applicant:] What did you do?

[Complainant:] the good bouncing thing

[Applicant:] whos home

[Complainant:] nobody

…”

84. I have considered this evidence carefully. The jury may have thought that it affected the complainant’s reliability about this count. The evidence has no effect on the complainant’s credibility.

Canberra trip – 24 August 2018

85. The applicant submitted that the nature of the relationship was also demonstrated by the overnight trip to Canberra on 24 August 2018, in which the applicant and complainant attended the Australian National University open day, went to dinner, stayed in the same apartment overnight, slept in the same bed and travelled to and from Canberra together. Exhibit G19 showed that the complainant sent the applicant a Facebook message on 25 August 2018 at 11:46pm stating “waking up in bed next to you was a dream”.

86. The complainant said in examination in chief that her mum told her that she could not go to Canberra unless she was accompanied by someone who had their driver’s licence. At the time, although she considered the relationship to be “broken up”, she still wanted to be friends with the applicant and still liked him.

87. It was put to the complainant in cross-examination that she had consensual sexual intercourse with the applicant overnight in Canberra. The complainant replied: “I think so, but I don’t remember that” and later said “I remember us kissing, but it was a very long time ago”.

88. The complainant agreed with the suggestion put to her in cross-examination that at the time of the trip to Canberra on 24 August 2018, although they were not in a “full-on romantic relationship”, she would still occasionally have consensual sexual intercourse with the applicant.

89. I have considered this evidence carefully. Whilst the jury may have thought that it affected the complainant’s reliability about this count, I reject the applicant’s submission that “it was apparent that the complainant had attempted to portray a misleading picture of the relationship at this time to the jury”. No such conclusion arises fairly on the evidence. This is not a matter that adversely affected the complainant’s credibility.

Contemporaneous messages with count 3

90. The messages contemporaneous with count 3 on 28 and 29 September 2018 were marked as Exhibit G22.

91. The complainant gave evidence in cross-examination that sexual intercourse occurred at about 5pm on 28 September 2018. Later, when shown Exhibit G22, the complainant gave the following evidence:

“Q.   You were asked this question but may I clarify, if I can take you to p 7, are you able to say looking at those messages when it was that Mr Goldman had sexual intercourse with you without your consent in terms of the sequence of those messages? Are you able to say?

A.   Well, I believe it was between his, ‘Where are you?’ [sent at 4:53pm on 28 September] and ‘Okay’ [sent at 5:45pm on 28 September], because there’s a almost hour-long gap between the messages.”

92. The complainant’s explanation for why she continued to respond to the applicant’s messages even after the alleged offending was:

“Because I have – we had a lot of history. I dated him for a long time and I – I – I never really – I didn’t want to hurt him. I know that sounds stupid for people that don’t understand that, but just I didn’t want to cause him any more pain other than breaking up with him and I was also – I’ve always been quite frightened of – of things that I say to him because he obviously knows where I live and he obviously knows when I’m at home so if he was ever angry with me he could come over and – and – and tell me that and show me that.”

93. In respect to why she sent “I’m really sorry” at 5:46pm, the complainant explained:

“Because that’s just my character I suppose. I – I felt guilty that I was hanging out with someone else even though we were broken up. I – I’ve always just apologised to him for things even though I – I don’t really need to and, yeah, that’s just – that’s just me.”

94. The applicant submitted that the messages following the alleged assault on 28 and 29 September 2018, as recorded in Exhibit G22, contained no complaint of sexual impropriety and revealed no cessation in contact. The applicant submitted that there was no complaint to anybody in the house and the series of Facebook messages were consistent with the defence case of consensual sexual intercourse. The applicant submitted that the content of Exhibit G22 was entirely at odds with the complainant’s version of events.

95. At 6:44pm, the applicant sent a link to the complainant. A screenshot of the linked page was marked Exhibit G23. It was a Facebook post which stated:

“‘did u pull out?’

first of all u called me daddy so I thought u wanted to have kids”

96. The complainant replied “yuckkk”. The applicant sought to emphasise the fact that the complainant had also “reacted” to the message from the applicant containing the link by attaching an emoji to it.

97. The complainant’s evidence was “I suppose I just didn’t really think much of it and I definitely didn’t connect it to the assault”, and it was “not true at all” that her reaction was connected to anything that had just occurred between them. The exchange during cross-examination was as follows:

“Q.   Now, in relation to the link that he sent you in exhibit G23, you reacted with a laugh, may I suggest, because, well, your reaction was a reference to what had just happened between you and Mr Goldman about two hours beforehand?

A.   That’s not true at all.

Q.   And that is, the link was a reference to, I suggest, the consensual sexual intercourse you had or that you’d just engaged in.

A.   That’s not true at all.

Q.   The reference to Mr Goldman was a reference to Mr Goldman not withdrawing his penis from your vagina prior to ejaculation?

A.   That’s not true.

Q.   The laughing reaction that came from you in reference to that link was an acknowledgement of the consensual activity that had just occurred at about 5pm on that day, that is 28 September?

A.   That’s not true.”

98. The complainant gave evidence that she was either at the formal or at pre-formal drinks when she received the message. She did not want to engage with the applicant at that point so simply just “reacted” to it and wrote “yuck”.

99. I do not draw any inference unfavourable to the complainant’s reliability or credibility based on the emoji “reaction” to the applicant’s message.

100. It was common ground that there was no immediate complaint by the complainant in respect to this count. However, there was credible evidence from the complainant explaining why she did not complain to either of her parents at the time. She did not tell her father because she felt ashamed and did not want to upset him. She did not tell her mother for the same reason and because the applicant was still there at their home. She did not want to tell anyone at the formal what had happened, or even think about it, because it was too painful to think about.

101. The complainant eventually did tell her mother about an occasion when she was getting ready for a formal and the applicant tried to force himself on her while she was getting ready in her room. Her mother could not be certain when the complainant told her this. The complainant’s mother also gave evidence that after the complainant had told her what had happened to her at C’s party (counts 4 and 5) she also told her that the applicant had raped her when she was getting ready for her formal (although she could not remember the exact words that the complainant had used).

102. JM, who knew both the applicant and complainant, gave the following evidence in cross-examination:

“There was the instance where she said that she tried to break up with him and he wasn’t sort of taking it. She said that as he had – she told me a number of occasions that every time she tried bring up breaking it off, he’d convince her to just have sex instead. And in this particular instance she messaged me afterwards saying, ‘I think I – I think he raped me. I’m not sure. I told him “No”, I didn’t consent. But he went along with it anyway.’ She said that she didn’t really know what to do at the time. She didn’t know whether it actually was rape, but she spoke to a few people afterwards and confirmed that, yes, it was.”

103. I have carefully considered this evidence. None of it causes me to doubt the credibility of the complainant.

Complainant nevertheless went to the formal on this evening

104. The applicant submitted that it was significant that the complainant nevertheless went to the school formal and after party and returned home well after midnight. During cross-examination, her date, JP, gave evidence that the complainant “seemed fine”, “nothing out of the ordinary”.

105. The complainant gave evidence explaining why she did not complain to either of her parents at the time. She was ashamed it had happened and did not want to upset them. She did not tell JP or anyone at the formal because she did not want to tell her date that she had seen the applicant that evening and did not want to have to explain something so terrible. It was painful and she didn’t want to think about it.

106. This evidence does not affect the reliability or credibility of the complainant.

Counts 4 and 5

Exhibits 10 and 30 issue

107. Exhibit 10 comprised two photographs of the complainant taken on the applicant’s phone at 11:27pm and 11:40pm on 19 November 2018 at a party. The complainant gave evidence that the photos were not taken that night and that she was at the beach at that time. When it was put to her that she was incorrect, the complainant replied “I still strongly believe that I was at the beach at that time based on when I arrived home and how I arrived home.”

108. The next day, a statement of agreed facts pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) was tendered. It recorded that “the two photographs contained in Exhibit 10 were taken by the accused’s mobile phone on 19 November 2018 at 11:27pm and 11:40pm in the vicinity of [the location of the party].”

109. The applicant submitted that this evidence demonstrated that even when the complainant “strongly believes” something she is “plainly and demonstrably wrong”.

110. I have concluded that Exhibits 10 and 30 might demonstrate that the complainant was mistaken about the clothing she wore on the evening of 19 November 2018 and where she was that night at particular times.

111. At best for the applicant, exhibits 10 and 30 show that the complainant’s evidence was not in those respects accurate. The evidence does not cause me to harbour a doubt about the complainant’s credibility.

Amended indictment

112. The applicant submitted that the amendment of the indictment on counts 4 and 5 from “on 19 November 2018” to “on or about 19 November 2018” was to reflect the possibility that the alleged incident occurred after midnight. It was submitted that the complainant’s evidence that she was not at the relevant location by that time was contrary to an agreed fact.

113. Again, whilst the complainant’s evidence might have been unreliable in this relatively minor detail, this issue does not cause me the slightest doubt about the complainant’s credibility. This is particularly so in circumstances where the Crown agreed to this fact only after the complainant gave her evidence.

Contemporaneous Facebook messages in relation to counts 4 and 5

114. Records of Facebook messages between the complainant and applicant contemporaneous to counts 4 and 5 were tendered and marked as Exhibit 8. The complainant said that at some time she had deleted three messages from the exchange in Exhibit 8 (“why”, “that’s why I came” and “please come”). The defence tendered another record of that Facebook conversation which included the deleted messages (Exhibit G13) and a lengthier record of that same conversation (Exhibit G24).

115. The applicant submitted that the evidence in Exhibits G13 and G24 demonstrated that the complainant wanted the applicant to attend the party, even after the alleged conduct in counts 1, 2 and 3 had occurred, and that there was continued friendly contact entirely inconsistent with the allegation relating to counts 4 and 5.

116. Those messages show that the applicant sent a message to the complainant on the day after C’s party asking the complainant if she regretted anything. The complainant gave the following evidence:

“Q.   Then he says, ‘Fair enough. Do you regret anything?’ And you respond, ‘Nah.’ What did you take it to mean by him asking, ‘Do you regret anything?’

A.   He meant the entire night, and I was still in the mindset that I couldn't tell him the truth, because he would be very angry at me.

Q.   Sorry?

A.   I was just going to say, he knows where I live. So if I had upset him or made him angry, I was frightened for my safety.

Q.   So you wrote, ‘Nah,’ in answer to him for what reason?

A.   Because I was frightened for my safety if I had told him the true feelings, that I was – that I–

Q.   What were your true feelings?

A.   That I was upset, and that I felt that I had been violated the night before, and that I felt unsafe and scared and ashamed.”

117. The complainant’s reluctance to confront the applicant was understandable in the context of their relationship.

118. I do not accept that it was proved that any electronic message was deleted by the complainant in circumstances where a doubt would be raised about her credibility or reliability. As I have earlier found, the building blocks of any such submission, being what the police asked the complainant to provide and the steps the police took to obtain that material, was simply not established. Nothing about this evidence causes me to doubt the complainant’s credibility.

Front seat/back seat issue

119. The complainant gave evidence that she and the applicant did not at any point go into the front seat of the applicant’s car on the night of the incident. The defence case was that the pair first got into the front seat, and then moved to the back seat to engage in consensual sexual activity.

120. It was put to the complainant in cross-examination that when they initially sat in the applicant’s car they sat in the front seat before moving to the back seat. The complainant denied this.

121. The only evidence supporting the assertion that they were at one point in the front seat was that of an acquaintance PB, who said that he saw the applicant and complainant in the front seat of the applicant’s car when he arrived at the party.

122. PB’s evidence about this topic was completely unreliable. As at the time of the trial, PB’s recollection was that the party was in August 2018, rather than November. He did not remember what time he arrived at the party. He parked his car behind the applicant’s car. His recollection was that he saw the complainant and the applicant sitting in the front seat but he said that he could be mistaken and could be remembering the facts incorrectly given it was a number of years ago and his memory was not perfect. In cross-examination, in answer to a series of leading questions, he said that he did not believe he was mistaken.

123. It was a matter for the jury what to make of this evidence. At best for the applicant, it could only reflect on the complainant’s accuracy of recollection rather than her honesty. I do not think the evidence touches on the credibility of the complainant.

Complaint evidence

124. The applicant submitted that the complaint evidence in relation to counts 4 and 5 “did not assist” the complainant. The applicant contended that:

1. the mother of the complainant’s friend, BM, gave evidence that the complainant said the sexual activity occurred in a bedroom;

2. the complainant’s mother gave evidence that the complainant told her that the applicant “pushed her down onto the ground when they were outside and that he had ended up raping her in his car”;

3. PB gave evidence that the complainant told him, “He tried to kiss me, and he tried to have sex with me, he moved on top of me”;

4. CK’s evidence was that the complainant told him the applicant was not successful; and

5. RZ gave evidence that the complainant told her that the applicant had kissed her and had asked her for some form of sexual encounter.

125. I accept that the complaint evidence given in respect to counts 4 and 5 varied in the terms in which it was given. That evidence was, however, consistent with the distress suffered by a young woman who had just been sexually assaulted. PB observed the complainant at the party to be distraught and distant, avoiding eye contact and struggling to find her words. The complainant told him that the applicant threatened to commit suicide when she rejected his sexual advances.

126. CK’s evidence was that when the complainant returned to the party after having left with the applicant, she looked upset and as if she’d been crying. She told him that the applicant had forcibly climbed on top of her and pulled his penis out in the car and she had pushed him off and said, “No.”

127. RZ, who was at the party, also observed the complainant to be upset and crying. She said that the complainant told her that the applicant had forced himself onto her after she had said “No”, kissed her when she didn’t want it, forced himself on her without her consent and asked for some sort of sexual encounter without her consent. EF, who was also at the party, saw the complainant and the applicant leave and the complainant return alone about 15-25 minutes later. He did not recall speaking to the complainant that night but she later confided in him that there had been a sexual interaction with the applicant that she did not want. He could not recall the exact words used.

128. The complainant’s mother gave evidence that on or about 17 December 2018, the complainant told her that the applicant had raped her in his car. She said that she was crying and pushing him away but in the end she froze. The complainant’s mother also said that the complainant told her that the applicant had pushed her onto the ground and that he had ended up raping her in the car. That was her recollection when she came to make her statement in March 2019.

129. The complainant’s father gave evidence that the complainant told him before he flew to Adelaide in December 2018 that the applicant convinced her to go outside and then tried to force himself on her on the night of C’s party. She initially suggested that he was not successful, but later told her father that the applicant had raped her. The complainant said that she felt the applicant was blaming her for feeling sad and she felt some responsibility for how he was feeling. It happened outside the house but near the party and after it happened she went inside. She said she did not want to tell police, that it was just her word against his, that she was drunk, and people would be less likely to believe her as a result.

130. BM gave evidence that at the end of 2018 or beginning of 2019, the complainant told her that she had been sexually assaulted by her boyfriend. They had broken up and were at a party together when he made gestures that he wanted to have sex. She said no and he prevented her from leaving the room until she had sex with him. When she returned to the party she was crying and upset and told another person at the party what had happened. BM made a note of this conversation on 10 July 2020 after she was contacted by police. The conversation she recorded was not “word for word” and included that the complainant had told her that the incident occurred in a bedroom.

125. The trial judge gave the following direction to the jury about how to assess the evidence of complaint:

“There is evidence that suggests differences in [the complainant’s] account that may be relevant to her truthfulness or reliability. There is an important direction that I must give you about that. Experience shows that people may not describe a sexual offence in the same way each time. Trauma may affect people differently, including affecting how they recall events. It is common for there to be differences in accounts of a sexual offence, both truthful and untruthful accounts of a sexual offence may contain differences. It is entirely up to you as the jury to decide whether or not any differences in the complainant’s account are important in assessing her truthfulness and reliability.”

132. The inconsistencies in the accounts given by the complainant to various people may have affected the weight accorded by the jury to this evidence in their assessment of whether they could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of either counts 4 or 5.

133. Having carefully considered that evidence it does not cause me any doubt about the credibility of the complainant. It has no bearing on whether the complainant’s evidence on count 2 was reliable or credible, or whether the jury could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of that count.

Balance of issues

Repeated assertions that the complainant failed to give the police relevant material

134. As I have already explained, the applicant asserted in a variety of ways that the complainant deliberately deleted or withheld social media communications in an attempt to portray a selective and misleading picture to the jury.

135. I reject the applicant’s submission as baseless. Simply put, although that suggestion was made repeatedly to the complainant, there was no evidence to support it.

136. The complainant denied these assertions and correctly pointed to the fact that there were other messages she did provide that disclosed that she did want the applicant to attend the party on 19 November 2018. In paragraph 7 of her statement dated 17 July 2020, she told police that there was a message missing from Exhibit 8 from her to the applicant concerning the party and the message was along the lines of “I want you to come”.

137. There was no evidence about what the police told the complainant was relevant and about what they wanted. The complainant was asked by police to clarify certain matters. She did. The police did not ask her to provide any further messages between her and the applicant.

138. The officer in charge, Detective Sergeant Barham, gave evidence and confirmed that she did not ask the complainant for any additional messages and did not seek access to her phone or social media accounts. Her evidence was that the applicant’s phone (which had been seized by police) was downloaded in its entirety. It was her understanding that the entire download of the phone was served as an item and if there were any Facebook conversations there they would have been captured in the download.

139. It turns out that the officer who conducted a forensic examination of the applicant’s phone gave evidence that the Facebook application was installed but he did not attempt to access that application or to download chats from Facebook messenger. These actions of a junior police officer are hardly the fault of the complainant. The submission that there was any deliberate withholding of evidence must be rejected.

140. I accept the Crown’s submission that any failure by police to properly investigate the applicant’s phone and ask the complainant to comment on specific relevant messages was not a matter that reflected adversely upon the complainant’s honesty or credibility.

Conclusion and orders

141. Having regard to the 19 matters put forward by the applicant considered as a whole, I do not doubt the reliability of the account given by the complainant in relation to count 2. That account was given contemporaneously in the electronic communications which were in evidence. Much less do I doubt the “probity” or credibility of the complainant. None of these matters, considered alone or collectively, cast any doubt upon her truthfulness or credibility more generally.

142. Having reviewed all of the evidence, I have concluded that this was not a case where the complainant’s evidence contained “discrepancies, or display[ed] inadequacies, of such a character as to require the jury to have entertained a doubt as to guilt” in respect of count 2: Pell at [118]. Considered both separately and together, the 19 matters said to bear upon the credibility and reliability of the complainant do not support a finding that the verdict on count 2 is unreasonable and ought to be set aside. No miscarriage of justice occurred.

143. Count 2 was the only count on the indictment where the complainant’s evidence was supported by immediate and consistent complaint. The complaint set out in Exhibits 3 and 34 was admissible as evidence of the truth and provided powerful support for the complainant’s account.

144. I accept that it is not enough to simply point to the existence of Exhibits 3 and 34, in a “piecemeal fashion”, to sustain the jury verdict on count 2. I have not done so. Upon a consideration of the whole of the evidence I do not harbour the slightest doubt about the complainant’s credibility or reliability. Much less do I consider that the jury must have had such a doubt in relation to count 2.

145. To the extent that the applicant persists in the submission that if the jury, having acquitted the applicant on counts 1, 3, 4 and 5, should not have believed the complainant on count 2, I reject it. Where there are multiple counts, it is standard practice for the judge to direct the jury that they must consider each count separately and to consider each count only by reference to the evidence that applies to it. Consistently with that practice, the trial judge gave the following direction to the jury in her Honour’s summing up:

“Because the counts are so related in time and surrounding circumstances the matters are being heard together as a matter of common sense and convenience but in fact there are five separate trials taking place, a trial in respect of each count on the indictment and you need to consider each count separately and independently and the general directions of law I give you apply equally in respect of each count.

There is no legal requirement that the verdicts which you will return must be the same. The Crown Prosecutor and Mr Bellanto addressed you generally on the basis that you would find the same verdict whether it be guilty or not guilty in respect of all of the counts but you are not bound to find that way because the facts are for you and you alone to determine. In this case there are different facts and circumstances surrounding the different counts even though there is a common thread running through all of them and those different facts and circumstances could justify different verdicts. Of course the fact that there are so many counts on the Indictment is not an invitation to you to compromise on your own individual decisions.

…

As I have said and I hope I have made clear in the case of any witness, including the complainant, you are not bound to accept or reject everything the witnesses told you in the witness box. You can reject part of what a witness says but accept some other part of the witness’ evidence if there is a valid reason for you to do so. You are therefore entitled at law to accept the complainant’s evidence which supports one or more of the counts on the Indictment, but reject her evidence in respect of another count on the Indictment.

But before you bring in different verdicts in respect of the different counts there must be a logical and rational basis for that decision. There must be something about the evidence of the complainant or the evidence in general which supports a finding that you could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt she is honest and accurate and therefore reliable in respect of one of the counts but yet have a doubt about her reliability in respect of another or other counts on the Indictment.

If for any reason you have a doubt about the reliability of the complainant in respect of any of the allegations she makes against the accused, then of course you must take that into account when assessing her reliability on any of the other allegations which make up a count on the Indictment.

It is only if after taking that matter into account that you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant’s evidence in respect of a particular charge is both honest and accurate that you could convict the accused on that count.

…

You must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant is both an honest and accurate witness, and therefore a reliable witness, in relation to the evidence she has given you about each count.

…

… The care that you must use when examining the evidence of the complainant flows from the fact that the Crown has to prove its case against the accused, and prove it beyond reasonable doubt, and can only rely on the evidence of the complainant to fulfil that obligation.

I am not suggesting you are not entitled to convict the accused on the evidence of the complainant. Clearly you are entitled to do so but only after you have carefully examined her evidence.”

146. Her Honour made it clear in that direction that it was necessary to consider the complainant’s evidence on the other counts in assessing her credibility in respect to count 2: see Markuleski at [186]-[188]. There is no basis for this Court to find that the jury did not follow her Honour’s directions.

147. The jury’s verdict in respect to count 2 can readily be reconciled with the not guilty verdicts given in respect to counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 and is consistent with the jury approaching the question of whether the Crown had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt with caution and in accordance with the directions it was given. The jury’s verdict on count 2 does not reflect a “piecemeal approach”. The jury’s differential verdicts were the product of its conscientious attention to the trial judge’s directions and to the evidence applicable to each count. Having regard to the immediate and consistent complaint evidence, there was a logical and reasonable basis for sustaining the differentiation that the jury drew in relation to count 2.

148. It was open to the jury to have found the complainant to be an honest, accurate and reliable witness to the point where they could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the applicant’s guilt in respect to count 2. It was also open to the jury to find that any benefit of a reasonable doubt that they may have afforded the applicant in respect to the other counts on the indictment did not affect their finding in respect to count 2. It was significant that the trial judge also provided the jury with extensive directions and assistance in how to go about assessing the reliability of witnesses.

149. There is no rule that in cases where several offences depend upon the evidence of a single complainant, acquittal on one or more counts compels the conclusion that the jury must necessarily have regarded the complainant generally as an untruthful witness or that the complainant’s credibility was undermined in respect of the counts upon which they have returned guilty verdicts: MFA at [35] and [89].

150. The complainant gave evidence at trial over a period of four days. She was cross-examined over three days. I have read that transcript carefully. She gave careful and considered responses. She did not embellish her evidence and made appropriate concessions. She was frank in her evidence about her continued contact with the applicant. The jury were well placed and able to evaluate any conflicts and imperfections in the complainant’s testimony and perform their proper function.

151. The credibility matters on which the applicant relied either do not arise (the so-called destruction of social media evidence) or were factual matters that were matters for the jury’s determination. The jury had the benefit of seeing and hearing the complainant give evidence. The jury plainly listened carefully and followed the directions they were given. No miscarriage of justice occurred.

152. For the foregoing reasons I propose the following orders:

1. Leave to appeal granted;

2. Appeal dismissed.

153. DAVIES J: My own examination of the evidence satisfies me that it was open to the jury to convict the applicant in respect of count 2, notwithstanding the acquittals on counts 1, 3, 4 and 5.  For the reasons given by Payne JA, I do not have a doubt about the applicant's guilt in relation to count 2.

154. IERACE J: I agree with Payne JA.

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Decision last updated: 20 August 2021