Goldfinch and K & S Freighters Pty Limited (Compensation)

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Goldfinch and K & S Freighters Pty Limited (Compensation) [2019] AATA 33 (18 January 2019)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2018/6610

Re:Kenneth Goldfinch

APPLICANT

AndK & S Freighters Pty Limited

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

Date:18 January 2019

Place:Sydney

The application for an extension of time is refused.

............................[sgd]............................................

Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – extension of time – Applicant failed to act within the time granted to him by the Tribunal in primary extension of time application – second extension of time application lodged - explanation for delay – whether Applicant rested on rights - where prejudice would be incurred by respondent and public by allowing extension of time – merits of substantive application – extension of time refused

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

CASES

Berkelaar v Comcare [3 July 1997] AAT V97/447

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 563

Browne v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Chappel [1998] 52 ALD 550

Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] 24 ALR 307

Comcare v Grimes [1994] 50 FCR 60

Contreras v minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 47

Crick and Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 313

Frugtniet v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] AATA 577

Hicks and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] AATA 1049

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344

Kuljic v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1994] 33 ALD 121

McKenzie and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1998] AATA 841

Mohammed v Secretary, Department of Employment [2014] AATA 611

Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] 2 ALD 634

Re Mulheron and Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] 23 ALD 309

Re Nicholson and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1990] AATA 212

Re Romeo and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1992] 26 ALD 248

Re Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Roberts [2003] 73 ALD 412

Swanton v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2017] FCA 1142

Windshuttle v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1993] 46 FCR 235

Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 37

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Dennis Pearce: Administrative Appeals Tribunal (LexisNexis, Butterworth, Australia, 2015, fourth edition)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

18 January 2019

Extension of Time application

  1. This application is made under s 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the Act).

  2. Mr Kenneth Goldfinch (the Applicant) seeks an extension of time to lodge an appeal against a decision of K&S Freighters P/L (the Respondent) denying liability to pay him compensation under s 16 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act).

  3. This matter was heard by way of interlocutory hearing on 10 January 2019 at which stage a number of matters were raised which…

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Details
Case
[2019] AATA 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Goldfinch for a second extension of time to lodge an appeal against a decision denying him compensation under the SRC Act. The initial application for compensation was made in January 2018, with liability denied in April 2018. Following a review, the determination was affirmed on 30 May 2018. Mr Goldfinch was granted a first extension of time to 20 August 2018, but failed to lodge his appeal within this period. He subsequently lodged his appeal on 12 November 2018, and upon being advised it was out of time, sought a further extension. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal heard the application for this second extension.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether it was reasonable in all the circumstances to grant a second extension of time for Mr Goldfinch to lodge his appeal, given his failure to comply with the first granted extension. This required the Tribunal to consider various factors, including the applicant's explanation for the delay, the merits of his substantive application, and any prejudice that might be incurred by the respondent and the public if the extension were granted. The Tribunal also had to balance these considerations against the applicant's right to have his case heard and the respondent's entitlement to finality in the proceedings.

In its reasoning, the Tribunal acknowledged that it had the power to entertain a second extension application and that all circumstances must be considered to determine if granting the extension was "reasonable in all the circumstances." The Tribunal noted that the applicant had previously sought and been granted an extension, indicating awareness of time limits, and had requested the original deadline himself. While recognising the applicant's general entitlement to a "day in court" and the potential strength of his claim, the Tribunal also emphasised the respondent's right to finality, particularly as it had not opposed the first extension. The Tribunal concluded that the respondent was entitled to a degree of certainty and finality, especially since it had consented to the initial extension.

Ultimately, the Tribunal was not persuaded that a second extension of time should be granted. The application for an extension of time was refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

This matter was heard by way of interlocutory hearing on 10 January 2019 at which stage a number of matters were raised which required either clarification as to the authority of the Tribunal to grant more than one extension of time or required further instructions to be sought from the Applicant. In order to allow this to occur the Tribunal granted the parties permission to make further submissions and responses, in writing, by close of business on 14 January 2019. The Tribunal is grateful to both parties for the useful supplementary submissions that were received through this process.BACKGROUND Mr Goldfinch made the relevant application, precise details of which are not relevant in these proceedings, seeking compensation under the SRC Act, on 8 January 2018. The Respondent denied liability on 18 April 2018 and, following the Applicant’s request for a review of this decision, affirmed that determination on 30 May 2018 (the reviewable decision). Under the SRC Act (s 65(4)) the Applicant has 60 days in which to lodge an application for review of that determination with the Tribunal.[1] On 30 July 2018 the Applicant sought an extension of time under the Act[2] which was granted by the Tribunal on 1 August 2018. The Tribunal granted the Applicant an extension of time to 20 August 2018.[1] The SRC Act provides for a 60 day period in which appeals may be lodged which is more extensive than the 28 days provided under the AAT Act.[2] Although an appeal could still have been lodged by 31 July 2018. Once again the Applicant failed to act within the time granted to him by the Tribunal. Instead, on 12 November 2018 he lodged his appeal against the reviewable decision (to deny compensation) but was advised by the Tribunal (on 14 November 2018) that his application was out of time. On 19 November the Applicant then sought a further extension of time to lodge his appeal. That is the issue now for determination by the Tribunal. It should be noted that the first application for an extension of time (30 July 2018) was not opposed by the Respondent but that this current application is opposed.REASONS ADVANCED / REASONS FOR OPPOSITION The Applicant, who had previously been self-represented, submitted through his legal advisors that (i)He had only been made aware, by letter from the Tribunal dated 9 October 2018 that he still had to file an application for review of the reviewable decision and that it was not clear from Tribunal correspondence that he had been made aware that his extension of time grant was valid only until 20 August 2018;(ii)It was not until the Applicant had received the Tribunal letter of 9 October 2018 that he sought competent legal advice about what further steps he needed to take to submit his appeal;(iii)There would be no prejudice to the Respondent were a further extension of time to be granted; and(iv)He had significant workers compensation rights and a strong case in support of his claim which would not be capable of being advanced before the Tribunal in a merits review hearing were the extension of time not to be granted.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal is not persuaded that a second extension of time should be granted and that the Respondent is entitled to a degree of comfort and certainty in bringing this matter to a conclusion, bearing in mind that it willingly consented to the first extension of time and was thus even more entitled to regard that process as establishing a firm basis upon which this finality could be predicated.DECISION The application for an extension of time is refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal is persuaded that there is no impediment to its at least entertaining an application for a further/second extension of time.CONSIDERATION The point made in Roberts (above) was effectively restated by this Tribunal in Crick to the effect that “All the circumstances of the case must be considered, the overriding consideration being whether it is ‘reasonable in all the circumstances’ to grant the extension.”[27] All the factors outlined in Hunter Valley need to be taken into account[28] and a “calculus” (to borrow the Federal Court’s terminology[29]) arrived at balancing all the competing arguments.[27] Crick and Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 313 at [14].[28] Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 37 at [27]. [29] Contreras v minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 47 at [52]. In the first place, the granting of an extension of time in this instance would actually be a second grant, over and beyond that originally granted but not acted upon. Moreover it would be a grant made to an applicant who was well aware of the importance of adherence to time limits as evidenced by his concerns to seek an initial extension of time. The Tribunal also believes that the Applicant was aware of the 20 August deadline, not only because there is clear evidence that he was provided with this advice in writing but because this is also the date which he had himself requested in his original extension of time application. Secondly, the Applicant is generally entitled to his “day in court” with a case which seems, prima facie to be, at least, an arguable one. He should not lightly be denied this right even if he has been dilatory in seeking to enforce it. Thirdly, the Respondent is entitled to some sense of finality in these proceedings. It did not oppose the original extension of time and thus had solid grounds for expecting that there would be an established timetable for the management of its own resources needed to address any appeals process. Fourthly, it should be noted that extensions of time are not automatically available simply by application. They are granted at the discretion of the Tribunal where it is “reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.” Reasonableness means in relation to all the parties and to the overall integrity of the review system established under the Act. Finally, the Tribunal notes that its own Act enjoins it to meet is objective of providing for administrative review which is “accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick” and being “proportionate to the complexity of the matter” in a way which “promotes public trust and confidence” in its processes.[30] It is also charged with responsibility to make the “correct and preferable[31]” decision on the basis of all the material before it and to promote the “requirements of good government.”[32][30] Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s.2A.[31] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] 2 ALD 634 at [642].[32] Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] 24 ALR 307 at [335].CONCLUSION