Goldfinch and K & S Freighters Pty Limited (Compensation)
[2019] AATA 33
•18 January 2019
Goldfinch and K & S Freighters Pty Limited (Compensation) [2019] AATA 33 (18 January 2019)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2018/6610
Re:Kenneth Goldfinch
APPLICANT
AndK & S Freighters Pty Limited
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
Date:18 January 2019
Place:Sydney
The application for an extension of time is refused.
............................[sgd]............................................
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – extension of time – Applicant failed to act within the time granted to him by the Tribunal in primary extension of time application – second extension of time application lodged - explanation for delay – whether Applicant rested on rights - where prejudice would be incurred by respondent and public by allowing extension of time – merits of substantive application – extension of time refused
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
CASES
Berkelaar v Comcare [3 July 1997] AAT V97/447
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 563
Browne v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Chappel [1998] 52 ALD 550
Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] 24 ALR 307
Comcare v Grimes [1994] 50 FCR 60
Contreras v minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 47
Crick and Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 313
Frugtniet v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] AATA 577
Hicks and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] AATA 1049
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344
Kuljic v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1994] 33 ALD 121
McKenzie and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1998] AATA 841
Mohammed v Secretary, Department of Employment [2014] AATA 611
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] 2 ALD 634
Re Mulheron and Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] 23 ALD 309
Re Nicholson and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1990] AATA 212
Re Romeo and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1992] 26 ALD 248
Re Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Roberts [2003] 73 ALD 412
Swanton v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2017] FCA 1142
Windshuttle v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1993] 46 FCR 235
Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 37
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Dennis Pearce: Administrative Appeals Tribunal (LexisNexis, Butterworth, Australia, 2015, fourth edition)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
18 January 2019
Extension of Time application
This application is made under s 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the Act).
Mr Kenneth Goldfinch (the Applicant) seeks an extension of time to lodge an appeal against a decision of K&S Freighters P/L (the Respondent) denying liability to pay him compensation under s 16 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act).
This matter was heard by way of interlocutory hearing on 10 January 2019 at which stage a number of matters were raised which required either clarification as to the authority of the Tribunal to grant more than one extension of time or required further instructions to be sought from the Applicant. In order to allow this to occur the Tribunal granted the parties permission to make further submissions and responses, in writing, by close of business on 14 January 2019. The Tribunal is grateful to both parties for the useful supplementary submissions that were received through this process.
BACKGROUND
Mr Goldfinch made the relevant application, precise details of which are not relevant in these proceedings, seeking compensation under the SRC Act, on 8 January 2018. The Respondent denied liability on 18 April 2018 and, following the Applicant’s request for a review of this decision, affirmed that determination on 30 May 2018 (the reviewable decision).
Under the SRC Act (s 65(4)) the Applicant has 60 days in which to lodge an application for review of that determination with the Tribunal.[1] On 30 July 2018 the Applicant sought an extension of time under the Act[2] which was granted by the Tribunal on 1 August 2018. The Tribunal granted the Applicant an extension of time to 20 August 2018.
[1] The SRC Act provides for a 60 day period in which appeals may be lodged which is more extensive than the 28 days provided under the AAT Act.
[2] Although an appeal could still have been lodged by 31 July 2018.
Once again the Applicant failed to act within the time granted to him by the Tribunal. Instead, on 12 November 2018 he lodged his appeal against the reviewable decision (to deny compensation) but was advised by the Tribunal (on 14 November 2018) that his application was out of time. On 19 November the Applicant then sought a further extension of time to lodge his appeal.
That is the issue now for determination by the Tribunal.
It should be noted that the first application for an extension of time (30 July 2018) was not opposed by the Respondent but that this current application is opposed.
REASONS ADVANCED / REASONS FOR OPPOSITION
The Applicant, who had previously been self-represented, submitted through his legal advisors that
(i)He had only been made aware, by letter from the Tribunal dated 9 October 2018 that he still had to file an application for review of the reviewable decision and that it was not clear from Tribunal correspondence that he had been made aware that his extension of time grant was valid only until 20 August 2018;
(ii)It was not until the Applicant had received the Tribunal letter of 9 October 2018 that he sought competent legal advice about what further steps he needed to take to submit his appeal;
(iii)There would be no prejudice to the Respondent were a further extension of time to be granted; and
(iv)He had significant workers compensation rights and a strong case in support of his claim which would not be capable of being advanced before the Tribunal in a merits review hearing were the extension of time not to be granted.
In reply, the Respondent states that:
(v)The Applicant has failed to give a satisfactory explanation for the delay in pursuing his claim;
(vi)The reviewable decision was made some six months prior to the appeal being lodged;
(vii)The delay occasions prejudice to the Respondent and
(viii)Other claimants mange to comply with time limits and restrictions.
ADVICE FROM THE TRIBUNAL
As noted above, the Tribunal granted an extension of time on 1 August 2018 extending the statutory time limit to lodge an appeal to 20 August 2018. On the same date (1 August 2018) the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant advising him of the Tribunal’s decision.
The letter to the Applicant stated:
“We have granted the application for an extension of time to apply for a review. A copy of the order is enclosed.
You must send us your application for review by [date until which EOT granted]. An application form is enclosed.”
This correspondence was sent both to the postal address given by the Applicant but also to an email address supplied by the Applicant on his initial request for an extension of time dated 30 July 2018.
On the one hand there was clearly a clerical error on the part of the Tribunal in failing to delete the template phrase “[date until which EOT granted]” and replace it with the actual date of 20 August 2018. On the other hand the Order of the Tribunal was attached and attention was drawn to this attachment in the covering letter. The Order of the Tribunal reads as follows:
“Pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, and upon written application by the Applicant dated 30th July 2018, the Tribunal extends the time for the making of an application for review of the decision of the Respondent to 20th August 2018.”
Thus while the covering letter may have admittedly been less than clear, the terms of the Order which accompanied that letter were clear about the date by which a review application had to be made.
It must be admitted and accepted that the Tribunal then added to the potential confusion in this matter when, at 8.52 am on 9 October 2018 it wrote to the Applicant asking him to forward “an application for review” on the basis that an extension of time had been granted[3]. This letter (by email) should not have been sent as the extension of time period had already expired. This error was realised by the Tribunal which, at 8.56 am (four minutes later) wrote again to both parties saying: “Apologies to both parties, please ignore the previous email this has been sent in error.”
[3] The email was copied to the Respondent.
In their supplementary submission, solicitors for the Applicant asserted that their client had advised them that:
(a)He had experienced difficulties with receipt of emails to the address given and that as a result he did not recall having received any email notifications from the Tribunal, and
(b)That in relation to both the Tribunal’s letter of 9 October 2018 and the (retracted) email of 9 October, each of which purport to attach a copy of the Tribunal’s Order of 1 August 2018, neither actually did so. As a result, he claims never to have seen the Order in question with the specified date for the original extension of time to 20 August 2018.
There were in fact two pieces of correspondence from the Tribunal sent to the Applicant on 9 October 2018. The first is a detailed letter sent by email which states that “We have granted your application for an extension of time” and states that it is enclosing a copy of the Order of 1 August. It also says: “Please also send an application for review. Your original application was only extension of time. (sic) I have included an application form for your convenience.” This first letter goes on to details matters of application fees and further processes. This letter was sent to the Applicant’s postal address in Kincumber, NSW.
The second piece of correspondence of that date (second letter), also sent to the postal address reads as follows: “Please complete the attached application for review, Your original email only had an application for an extension of time, this has been granted. To proceed with the appeal the Tribunal requires an application for review.”
The (redacted) email of 9 October 2018 attached a copy of the first letter, although the covering email message erroneously referred to it as a letter “dated 8 October 2018” instead of 9 October 2018. The Applicant advises that, once again, a copy of the relevant Order was not attached as stated in the email.
Nevertheless there was also the letter of 1 August 2018, advising of the Tribunal’s decision which has been quoted above.
The gravamen of the Applicant’s submission is that in relation to the letters of 1 August 2018 (postal delivery) and 9 October 2018 (first letter – postal delivery) both of which purported to enclose copies of the Tribunal Order, neither did.
Ignoring any email difficulties which the Applicant may have encountered, in his most recent Affidavit (itself undated but, according to his solicitors affirmed on 11 January 2019) he asserts that he “does not recall receiving by either hard copy or email a letter from the AAT dated 1 August 2018 advising of orders made by the AAT.”[4]
[4] Attachment to Applicant’s Submission dated 11 January 2019.
BASIC PRINCIPLES – EXTENSIONS OF TIME
Appeals for extensions of time may be granted by the Tribunal under section 29(7) of the Act
“.. if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.”
In dealing with extension of time applications the Tribunal is mindful of the rationale set out clearly by McHugh J in the High Court case of Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor[5] indicating why statutory time limits are an important part of the legal process. His Honour noted that:
First, as time goes by, relevant evidence is likely to be lost. Second, it is oppressive, even “cruel”, to a defendant to allow an action to be brought long after the circumstances which gave rise to it have passed. Third, people should be able to arrange their affairs and utilise their resources on the basis that claims can no longer be made against them.
The final rationale for limitation periods is that the public interest requires that disputes be settled as quickly as possible.
[5] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at [552]-[553]. Footnotes and citations omitted.
His Honour also noted that:
An applicant for an extension of time who satisfies those conditions [i.e. the conditions laid down in the relevant Act] is entitled to ask the court to exercise its discretion in his or her favour. But the applicant still bears the onus of showing that the justice of the case requires the exercise of the discretion in his or her favour.[6]
[6] Ibid at [551].
It is generally accepted that the “check-list” outlined by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment[7] may be taken safely as a guide by this Tribunal in determining extension of time applications.
[7] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344.
That list provides as follows:
·an applicant must show an “acceptable explanation of the delay” and that it is “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend time;
·a distinction is to be made between an applicant who has “rested on his rights” and allowed the decision-maker to believe that the matter was finally concluded, and one who has continued to make the decision-maker aware that he or she contests the finality of the decision;
·any prejudice to the respondent caused by the delay;
·whether any others or the general public would suffer any prejudice as a result of the extension, or established practices be upset;
·the merits of the substantial application; and
·“considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons” in a similar position.
Wilcox J did, however, warn that:
Although the section [s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act] does not, in terms, place any onus of proof upon an applicant for extension, an application has to be made. Special circumstances need not be shown, but the court will not grant the application unless positively satisfied that it is proper so to do. The “prescribed period”….. is not to be ignored.” (Ralkon v Aboriginal Development Commission (1982) 43 ALR 535 at 530). Indeed it is the prima facie rule that proceedings outside that period will not be entertained (Lucic v Nolan (1962) 45 ALR 411 at 416). It is a precondition to the exercise of discretion in his favour that the applicant for extension show an “acceptable; explanation of the delay” and that it is “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend time. (Duff v Freijah (1982) 43 ALR 479 at 485; Chapman v Reilly, Neaves J, 9 December 1983, not reported at 7).[8]
[8] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at [348].
In its initial statement of opposition to the granting of the extension of time application the Respondent states:
“The Respondent will further address matters having regard to the principles in Hunter Valley Developments once it has the Applicant’s submissions addressing those principles.”
The Tribunal values the Respondent’s agreement that the Hunter Valley principles are a sound basis upon which this application should be assessed and so proposes to take precisely that course of action.
·Explanation of delay: The Tribunal notes the Applicant’s claim to have been somewhat confused about the date by which his review application needed to have been lodged following the initial grant of an extension of time but is also mindful of the fact that he had been provided with a copy of the Order which made clear what this date was.
·The Tribunal also notes that, in his initial application for an extension of time, the Applicant himself had specified 20 August 2018 as the date to which he sought to have that extension granted.
·It also accepts that the Applicant did not take steps to avail himself of professional legal advice until quite late in these proceedings, apparently around 1 November 2018. However in his initial extension of time application he states that he had “been advised to get a solicitor to get everything in order. Solicitor was on holidays and has just returned and now waiting on confirmation to see her.” It is not apparent to the Tribunal that this is necessarily a reference to the same Solicitor who represented the Applicant with this second extension of time application, nor when that projected appointment may have taken place.
·His current representatives then acted so that the present application was received by the Tribunal on 19 November 2018. The Tribunal accepts that unrepresented applicants may find formal Tribunal procedures confusing, although in this instance it is satisfied that the Applicant was properly and clearly informed of his obligations to act on or before 20 August 2018, which he failed to do. He did however offer further explanation that he acted to secure legal representation only after interventions of support from a family member.
·The Tribunal notes that although explanations for delays are generally sought and provided, they are not statutorily required.[9] This was made explicit by the comments of Wilcox J in Hunter Valley where he said (as set out above), “There is no onus of proof upon an applicant for extension of time though an application needs to be made.”[10]
·Resting on rights: The Respondent attests that the Applicant did rest on their rights in terms of knowing that they had to lodge an appeal against the reviewable decision by 20 August 2018 and failed to do so. In Romeo the Tribunal held that an applicant was resting on their rights when they were “properly advised on the right to seek a review and … had ample opportunity to exercise that right”[11] but failed to do so. Furthermore they state that the time which elapsed between the Applicant being notified of the decision of the Tribunal and their engaging solicitors to act on their behalf (that is from 1 August to approximately 1 November 2018) is evidence of such resting.
·By contrast the Applicant contends that he took every step necessary to pursue his claims and that he was active from the time of the first extension of time application onwards to pursue his rights. He sought legal assistance on more than one occasion.
·Prejudice to the Respondent: Although there is always inconvenience to respondents when extensions of time are granted, the overriding purpose of these extensions is to ensure that, at the end of the day, the “correct or preferable”[12] decisions are arrived at and that the Tribunal fulfils its mandate of advancing the “requirements of good government”[13] in administrative decision-making. The overall delay were this matter to proceed to a full merits hearing will be in the order of twelve months or so and the Tribunal does not regard this as unduly prejudicing the Respondent in terms of either the tests enunciated by McHugh J or in terms of comparative lengths of extensions granted in other cases by this Tribunal.[14] The Respondent has not advanced any compelling evidence of the prejudice which it might suffer[15] and in this case there appears to be no negative inherent impact of the passage of time[16] which would impact upon the Respondent.
·In this respect the Tribunal notes the comments in Roberts: “The brevity of the extension sought does not, however, lead automatically to an order extending the time just as the fact that a lengthy period of time has passed does not automatically lead to the refusal of such an order. As the authorities make clear, whether an extension will be granted is determined by balancing all relevant facts and not simply by one.”[17]
·Prejudice to the public or upsetting of established practices: There appear to be no matters which need be considered under this criterion. There is a public interest in claims being settled expeditiously, but also being settled fairly and established practices are well able to cope with delays in matters being brought to conclusion in the areas of compensation claims.
·Merits of the application: It is important to note that the Tribunal is not required to, nor indeed should it, attempt to determine the merits of the application in question, which is a matter for the substantive merits review hearing. However the Tribunal has the discretion to reject applications where it is prima facie clear that they have no prospect of success at that merits review stage.[18] In this instance the evidence before the Tribunal from the Applicant, by way of medical reports and assessments would lead to the conclusion that there is clearly a matter to be argued before the merits review hearing. It accepts that the scope of the reviewable decision is a limited one relating to questions of potential surgery or alternative treatments, nevertheless it believes that the issues between the parties are ones of some genuine contention which need to be resolved within the framework of the SRC Act.
·Comparative fairness: The Tribunal accepts the Respondent’s point that other applicants have been able to adhere to time limits and further notes that this is the second application for an extension of time where the first was not opposed by the Respondent. To that extent the Applicant is clearly seeking some sort of advantageous treatment vis-à-vis many other applicants.
[9] McKenzie and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1998] AATA 841 at [25]; Swanton v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2017] FCA 1142 at [33].
[10] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at [348].
[11] Re Romeo and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1992] 26 ALD 248 at [19].
[12] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] 2 ALD 634 at [642].
[13] Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] 24 ALR 307 at [335].
[14] For example an extension of five years was accepted as reasonable in Berkelaar v Comcare [3 July 1997] AAT V97/447.
[15] Windshuttle v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1993] 46 FCR 235 at [249-250]; Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 563 at [51]-[54].
[16] Frugtniet v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] AATA 577.
[17] Re Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Roberts [2003] 73 ALD 412 at [16].
[18] Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 563 at [29] and [56]; Kuljic v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1994] 33 ALD 121 at [122].
FURTHER EXTENSION OF TIME
The issue was raised as to whether or not there was any restriction or prohibition on the Tribunal granting further or additional extensions of time after an initial grant.
The Respondent drew attention to the decision by Deputy President Forgie in Mohammed v Secretary, Department of Employment[19] where a further extension of time was refused by the Tribunal. However on that occasion the Deputy President based her decision on the perceived lack of substance regarding the merits of the original application saying: “The prospects of success of his application have, however, proved a stumbling block for me.”[20] After analysing those prospects, the Deputy President ruled:
”This alone means that Mr Mohammed cannot succeed on a review of the decision. To grant his application for an extension in these circumstances and to allow him to direct his efforts towards gathering and presenting material to show that he meets all or any of the other seven criteria in s 10(1) would not be consistent with the exhortation in s 2A of the AAT Act to the Tribunal to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick. It would be none of those things to him and none to the Secretary who would need to allocate resources to the matter”[21]
[19] Mohammed v Secretary, Department of Employment [2014] AATA 611.
[20] Ibid at [22].
[21] Ibid at [23].
This Tribunal does not share the same opinion about this Applicant’s prospects of success at the merits hearing, and while it makes no attempt to assess those, it does not regard them as being completely without substance.
There is however other authority on this matter.
The matter was considered by Wilcox J in Comcare v Grimes[22] where, the headnote to his Honour’s judgement states:
Although the first application had been determined by refusal so that a fresh application was required, there was no impediment to the Tribunal treating the request for relisting as a fresh application for an extension of time.
[22] Comcare v Grimes [1994] 50 FCR 60.
Professor Dennis Pearce in his authoritative exposition of the Tribunal’s legislation states:
“It appears from that decision (ie Comcare v Grimes) that there is no jurisdictional bar to the consideration of a second application. The AAT is in charge of its procedure and it can exercise its discretion to allow an application to proceed even though it has given a previous ruling to the contrary.”[23]
[23] Dennis Pearce: Administrative Appeals Tribunal (LexisNexis, Butterworth, Australia, 2015, fourth edition) page 88.
However Pearce notes that chances of second applications succeeding “is in most cases low”, citing authority in Browne v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Chappel.[24] Again this was a decision by Wilcox J expressed as follows:
“Although I am of the opinion, expressed in a different context in Comcare v Grimes, that it is open to an applicant to bring a second application for an extension of time under s 29(7) of the AAT Act, it is most unlikely that a second application would succeed where the first application had been dismissed on the merits”[25].
[24] Browne v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Chappel [1998] 52 ALD 550 at [563].
[25] Ibid at [563], citation omitted.
Although these appear to be the only decisions on this matter and in both instances the first application was rejected, rather than (as in this instance) granted, it does not appear to the Tribunal that any applicant is prohibited from seeking more than one extension of time, although subsequent applications may have lesser prospects of success.
By analogy, it is well established that second or subsequent appeals for reviews of reviewable decisions may be made in instances where first appeals were withdrawn or discontinued.[26]
[26] Re Nicholson and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1990] AATA 212; Re Mulheron and Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] 23 ALD 309; Hicks and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] AATA 1049.
The Tribunal is persuaded that there is no impediment to its at least entertaining an application for a further/second extension of time.
CONSIDERATION
The point made in Roberts (above) was effectively restated by this Tribunal in Crick to the effect that “All the circumstances of the case must be considered, the overriding consideration being whether it is ‘reasonable in all the circumstances’ to grant the extension.”[27] All the factors outlined in Hunter Valley need to be taken into account[28] and a “calculus” (to borrow the Federal Court’s terminology[29]) arrived at balancing all the competing arguments.
[27] Crick and Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 313 at [14].
[28] Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 37 at [27].
[29] Contreras v minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 47 at [52].
In the first place, the granting of an extension of time in this instance would actually be a second grant, over and beyond that originally granted but not acted upon. Moreover it would be a grant made to an applicant who was well aware of the importance of adherence to time limits as evidenced by his concerns to seek an initial extension of time. The Tribunal also believes that the Applicant was aware of the 20 August deadline, not only because there is clear evidence that he was provided with this advice in writing but because this is also the date which he had himself requested in his original extension of time application.
Secondly, the Applicant is generally entitled to his “day in court” with a case which seems, prima facie to be, at least, an arguable one. He should not lightly be denied this right even if he has been dilatory in seeking to enforce it.
Thirdly, the Respondent is entitled to some sense of finality in these proceedings. It did not oppose the original extension of time and thus had solid grounds for expecting that there would be an established timetable for the management of its own resources needed to address any appeals process.
Fourthly, it should be noted that extensions of time are not automatically available simply by application. They are granted at the discretion of the Tribunal where it is “reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.” Reasonableness means in relation to all the parties and to the overall integrity of the review system established under the Act.
Finally, the Tribunal notes that its own Act enjoins it to meet is objective of providing for administrative review which is “accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick” and being “proportionate to the complexity of the matter” in a way which “promotes public trust and confidence” in its processes.[30] It is also charged with responsibility to make the “correct and preferable[31]” decision on the basis of all the material before it and to promote the “requirements of good government.”[32]
[30] Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s.2A.
[31] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] 2 ALD 634 at [642].
[32] Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] 24 ALR 307 at [335].
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant was aware of the need to adhere to time limits established under the Act, something he has demonstrated by his own previous actions.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant was aware of the deadline of 20 August 2018 which was the date originally proposed by himself for his initial extension of time.
The Tribunal is not persuaded that a second extension of time should be granted and that the Respondent is entitled to a degree of comfort and certainty in bringing this matter to a conclusion, bearing in mind that it willingly consented to the first extension of time and was thus even more entitled to regard that process as establishing a firm basis upon which this finality could be predicated.
DECISION
The application for an extension of time is refused.
I certify that the preceding 51 (fifty -one) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
.................................[sgd].......................................
Associate
Dated: 18 January 2019
Date(s) of hearing: 10 January 2019 Date final submissions received: 11 January 2019 Solicitors for the Applicant: Ms O Mailian, Carrol & O'Dea (by phone) Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr D Clarke, McInnes Wilson Lawyers (by phone)
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