Godber v State of Queensland (Queensland Treasury)

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Godber v State of Queensland (Queensland Treasury) [2025] QIRC 193
PARTIES:	Godber, Trevor (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Queensland Treasury) (Respondent)
CASE NO:	PSA/2025/98
PROCEEDING:	Public Sector Appeal – Fair treatment decision
DELIVERED ON:	22 July 2025
HEARING DATE:	22 July 2025
MEMBER:	McLennan IC
HEARD AT:	Brisbane
ORDERS:	The Appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
CATCHWORDS:	PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – where the appeal was filed out of time – whether the appeal should be extended – consideration of explanation for delay – consideration of prejudice – consideration of prospects of success
LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTS:	Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 131, s 132, s 133 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562A, s 564 Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievances
CASES:	Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 149 QGIG 777
APPEARANCES:	Mr T. Godber, the Appellant himself. Ms S. Gray of Crown Law for the Respondent.

Reasons for Decision

Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript

On 28 May 2025, Mr Trevor Godber (the Appellant) filed an appeal in the Industrial Registry against an Internal Review decision dated 9 May 2025 made by the Queensland Treasury (the Respondent), in relation to an Individual Employee Grievance lodged by Mr Godber on 23 December 2024.
After correspondence between my Chambers and Mr Godber, Mr Godber confirmed that the decision he was seeking to appeal was in fact the "26 March 2025 (Stage 1 – Local Action, Outcome Advice) decision". Mr Godber sought leave to amend his appeal notice to reflect that the decision he was appealing was the decision made on 26 March 2025. I granted leave for Mr Godber to amend his appeal notice.
Before the question of 'whether or not the 26 March 2025 (Stage 1 – Local Action, Outcome Advice) decision was fair and reasonable' is determined, I am first required to address the jurisdictional issue of the Appeal being filed later than the legislative deadline (or 'out of time').
The question before the Commission is "whether or not the Commission should exercise its discretion to extend time for Mr Godber to appeal the original grievance outcome decision dated 26 March 2025." I advised the parties of that question in email correspondence sent via the Industrial Registry.
To inform my decision, I directed written submissions from both parties. Leave to make oral submissions was also granted.
For the reasons that follow, I find that:
·The Appellant has filed his Appeal against the 26 March 2025 decision out of time; and
·He has not provided sufficient reasons to warrant an extension of time.
Timeframe to appeal
Section 564(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (IR Act) requires that an appeal be lodged within 21 days after the day the decision appealed against is given. That is the relevant inquiry with respect to timeframes.
I am empowered by the IR Act to extend the time for giving an appeal notice.
How long out of time was the Appeal filed?
The Decision was given to the Appellant on 26 March 2025.
A decision may be appealed within 21 days.
The deadline for filing the Appeal was therefore 16 April 2025.
The date the Appeal Notice was filed was on 28 May 2025 – that is, 42 days out of time.
Should time for filing be extended?
The IR Act does not provide any criteria against which I am to determine whether or not to extend time. The question of whether to extend the time for filing an appeal is fundamentally an exercise of discretion. Such an exercise must be undertaken judicially and according to the rules of reason and justice, not arbitrarily or capriciously or according to private opinion.
The Appellant bears the positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires the indulgence of an extension of time to file the Appeal Notice.
In Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd,[1] Hall P set out the following considerations:
·the length of the delay;
·the explanation for the delay;
·the prejudice to the Appellant if the extension of time is not granted;
·the prejudice to the Respondent if the extension of time is granted; and
·any relevant conduct of the Respondent.
[1] (1995) 149 QGIG 777.
I advised the parties, in an email dated 13 June 2025 – for Mr Godber's benefit – that the Commission considers those factors in making a decision as to whether or not to extend the timeframe for appeal beyond 21 days.
Additionally, my discretion is informed by the purpose of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) (PS Act), including promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of government entities.
Also to be considered is the potential for loss of public confidence in the legal system which arises where a court is seen to accede to applications (seeking the exercise of a discretion) made without adequate explanation or justification.
I will now consider the circumstances in this matter against the abovementioned factors to determine whether I should exercise my discretion to hear this Appeal out of time.
Length of delay
The Appellant sought (and was granted) leave to amend his Appeal Notice, to nominate the 26 March 2025 decision as 'the decision' subject of this appeal. That means that the Appeal Notice was filed 42 days out of time.
The 21-day appeal period has been determined by the legislature to be the appropriate period for a person to file an appeal. That is clearly stated in the IR Act.
The character of the delay, be it excessive, reasonable or otherwise, takes its colour from the surrounding circumstances. It is true that in some cases delays of several weeks have been considered to be not excessive. However, in such cases the delay is usually accompanied by a substantial explanation such as natural disasters, extraordinary personal circumstances such as a major health issue, or the like. That is not the case here.
Mr Godber submitted that he could not have known the timeframe to appeal the original grievance outcome because the Respondent did not tell him the relevant timeframe to file an appeal.
I struggle with that argument because the Commission is a lay tribunal. Self-represented parties appear regularly at the Commission and in fact, for public sector appeals, privately engaged lawyers are not permitted. Enquiries ought to have been undertaken by Mr Godber himself to explore his appeal rights; if that was the course he wished to pursue.
In conjunction with the reasons that follow, I find that a delay of 42 days for the Appeal to be filed is significant and unreasonable in these circumstances.
Explanation for the delay
The Appellant's submissions explain the delay arose from "good faith engagement with Treasury's internal processes." Essentially, the Appellant's argument is that he did not know he could appeal the 26 March 2025 outcome advice (Stage 1 – Local Action, Outcome Advice) decision because the employer did not tell him so in that decision – neither was it apparent in the "linear" procedure recorded in the Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievances (IEG Directive) or policy.
I will address that in more detail later in this Decision, but I do not consider that is sufficiently persuasive explanation as to why the Appellant filed his appeal out of time.
The 21-day time period for an Appeal Notice to be filed has been legislated and in the absence of a compelling reason for the delay I will not extend the time for filing.
The Appellant bears the positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires the indulgence of an extension of time to file the appeal. On the evidence before me, the Appellant has not discharged that onus.
Conduct of the Respondent
The Respondent advised the Appellant of his right to ask for a Stage 2 – Internal Review of the Stage 1 – Local Action, Outcome Advice decision. That is all that is required under the IEG Directive 11/20.
The Directive does mandate that an employee must be advised of their rights to Stage 3 – External Review (including appeal to the QIRC) following a Stage 2 – Internal Review decision – but the Appellant has made it abundantly clear that is not the decision he is appealing. Notably, the Appellant would clearly have been in time to appeal the Internal Review Decision.
The Appellant complained that he did not know about the time limit prescribed for appeals to the QIRC (s 564, IR Act) because the Respondent did not tell him. However, it was reasonable and appropriate for the Respondent to abide by the procedure set out in the IEG Directive – if the Appellant sought to depart from that, it was open to him to investigate external appeal mechanisms. Section 132(4)(e) of the PS Act says an employee can file a fair treatment appeal regarding a decision about the outcome of a grievance.
But in that regard, I note s 562A(1)(b) of the IR Act says that:
(1) The commission may decide it will only hear an appeal against a directive decision, a fair treatment decision or a transfer decision under the Public Sector Act 2022 if the commission is satisfied—
(a)the appellant has used the procedures required to be used by the employee in relation to the decision under a directive under that Act, including a directive made under section 110 of that Act; and
(b)for a fair treatment decision under the Public Sector Act 2022—it would not be unreasonable to require the appellant to comply with the procedures mentioned in paragraph (a).
So, it is probable then, with respect to s 562A(1)(b) of the IR Act, that if the Appellant had filed an appeal against the 26 March 2025 decision in time, it may well have been the case that the Commission would have required him to first avail himself of the opportunities for an Internal Review, as per the IEG Directive.
There is good reason for that. The PS Act ss 131, 132 and 133 explains that a public sector employee aggrieved about a decision can appeal it. Decisions are made by Queensland Government employees constantly – it would be unworkable if every written or oral decision were to be accompanied by a note that the decision may be subject to a public sector appeal in certain circumstances and if so, there is a 21-day deadline for doing so.
Rather, the Respondent did properly advise the Appellant of his review rights, pursuant to the IEG Directive. There is nothing before me that could be considered as the Respondent contributing to the Appellant filing a delayed appeal.
Prejudice to the Appellant
The Appellant will suffer some prejudice should the Appeal be dismissed for filing out of time. The obvious prejudice is that he would lose the opportunity for an independent review of the Decision.
I have concluded above that the Appellant has limited prospects of success and therefore while I accept there is some prejudice to the Appellant, I do not consider that to be significant.
Prejudice to the Respondent
It is important to note that delay itself is considered to give rise to a general presumption of prejudice to the Respondent.
A delay in filing an appeal is a delay in the overall process. This prejudice is compounded by my conclusion that the Appeal has low prospects of success.
For those reasons, I find that the Respondent would suffer prejudice should I decide to exercise my discretion to hear the Appeal out of time.
Prospects of success
Mr Godber's prospects of success in appealing the Stage 1 – Local Action, Outcome Advice decision is low, on the basis that the Local Action decision was superseded by the Internal Review Decision, which Mr Godber has elected not to appeal.
In circumstances where there is an Internal Review Decision, Mr Godber's choice to appeal the Local Action decision significantly limits his prospects of success. That is because that decision has already been superseded by the Internal Review Decision.
Even if this appeal of the Local Action decision was filed in time, the prospects of successfully appealing the Local Action decision are low. I could only assume the Respondent would submit, and the Commission would accept, that pursuant to s 562A(1)(b) of the IR Act, for a fair treatment decision, the Appellant would be turned around to first utilise the procedures within the IEG Directive before appealing to the Commission.
The Appeal cannot succeed for those reasons.
Conclusion
I order accordingly.
Orders
1. The Appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

[2025] QIRC 193

22 July 2025