Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Gmitrovic v Department of Defence [2015] NSWSC 840 Hearing dates: 19 June 2015 Date of orders: 26 June 2015 Decision date: 26 June 2015 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: McCallum J Decision: Plaintiff granted leave to file fourth amended statement of claim.
Catchwords: DEFAMATION – pleadings – fourth application to amend – self-represented litigant – whether further amendment should be refused on grounds of number of prior applications – whether imputations capable of being conveyed Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ss 56-59, 64
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 14.30Cases Cited: Alex v Gridneff [2013] NSWSC 2025
Christianson v Fairfax [2012] NSWSC 1258
Dennis v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2008] NSWCA 37
Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135
McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 308Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Darko Gmitrovic (Plaintiff)
Department of Defence (First Defendant)
Danielle Pokoney (Second Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
Plaintiff in person
M Richardson (Defendants)
Plaintiff self-represented
Sparke Helmore Lawyers (Defendants)
File Number(s): 14/325942 Publication restriction: None
Judgment
-
HER HONOUR: These are proceedings for defamation commenced by Mr Darko Gmitrovic against his former employer, the Department of Defence and an employee of that department. By notice of motion, filed 11 June 2015, Mr Gmitrovic seeks leave to file a fourth amended statement of claim. This judgment determines that application.
-
The defendants oppose the application, first, on the simple basis that there have already been several attempts to bring the pleading in order and that the time has come to disallow any further amendment.
-
Authority for the proposition that the Court can and should at some point draw a line against any further amendment of the imputations in a defamation action may be found in the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Dennis v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2008] NSWCA 37 and McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 308.
-
In Dennis, the plaintiff appealed against a decision of the defamation list judge refusing leave to file a fifth further amended statement of claim. The Court refused leave to appeal, holding (at [29] per Spigelman CJ; Basten and Campbell JJA agreeing at [34] and [35]) that the Court’s mandatory obligation under s 56(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) to seek to give effect to the overriding purpose of facilitating the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings constitutes “a significant qualification” of the power to grant leave to amend a pleading under s 64 of the Act.
-
McMahon was also a plaintiff’s appeal against the refusal by the defamation list judge to allow an amendment to the imputations. The plaintiff submitted that the complexities of pleading in the defamation list, coupled with the fact that no trial date had yet been set, demanded that the amendment be allowed. The Court of Appeal categorically rejected that proposition: at [33] per Allsop P, Young JA agreeing at…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Gmitrovic v Department of Defence and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2015] NSWSC 840
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the self-represented litigant's fourth application to amend his pleadings should be refused due to the sheer number of prior amendments. The court also had to consider whether the proposed imputations were capable of being conveyed by the statements already pleaded. In addressing these issues, the court examined the principles governing amendments to pleadings, particularly in cases involving self-represented litigants, and the need to balance the right to a fair trial with the potential for vexatious litigation.
In its judgment, the court held that the number of prior applications to amend pleadings could be a factor in determining whether a further amendment should be refused. However, the court emphasised that each case must be assessed on its own merits. The court also found that the proposed imputations were capable of being conveyed by the pleaded statements, as they were inherently connected to the issues raised in the original pleadings. Consequently, the court granted the application to amend the pleadings, recognising the importance of ensuring that a self-represented litigant has a fair opportunity to present their case.
The final orders of the court included permission for the plaintiff to amend his pleadings for a fourth time, allowing him to present his case more effectively. The court provided guidance on the content of the proposed amendments, ensuring that they were narrowly tailored to the issues at hand. The decision underscored the need for courts to exercise caution and fairness when dealing with self-represented litigants, while also maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.
Background
Background to the litigation
The plaintiff first filed his statement of claim in the Federal Circuit Court, alleging defamation based on certain publications by the Department of Defence. The Department of Defence filed a defence, and subsequently, the plaintiff made a number of applications to amend his statement of claim. The plaintiff's first application sought to add new imputations and a new defendant, which was initially granted. However, subsequent applications to further amend the pleadings have been met with resistance from the Department of Defence, which has argued that the plaintiff's amendments are an abuse of process due to the number of prior applications and the lack of merit in the new imputations.
The plaintiff's third application to amend sought to introduce even more new imputations and additional defendants. The Department of Defence opposed this application, arguing that the plaintiff's attempts to continually expand the scope of his claims are without merit and an abuse of the court's process. The court had to determine whether to grant the plaintiff's fourth application to amend his pleadings and add further imputations and defendants, considering the number of prior applications and the nature of the new imputations.
The matter of Gmitrovic v Department of Defence originated in the Federal Circuit Court, where the plaintiff initially filed his statement of claim alleging defamation. The Department of Defence filed a defence, and the plaintiff subsequently made a number of applications to amend his statement of claim. The plaintiff's first application to amend was granted, allowing him to add new imputations and a new defendant. However, the plaintiff's subsequent applications to further amend his pleadings were opposed by the Department of Defence, which argued that the amendments were an abuse of process due to the number of prior applications and the lack of merit in the new imputations.
The court considered the plaintiff's third application to amend, which sought to introduce even more new imputations and additional defendants. The Department of Defence opposed this application, arguing that the plaintiff's attempts to continually expand the scope of his claims are without merit and an abuse of the court's process. The court had to determine whether to grant the plaintiff's fourth application to amend his pleadings and add further imputations and defendants, considering the number of prior applications and the nature of the new imputations.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the fourth application to amend the pleadings should be refused on the grounds that the plaintiff has already made multiple prior applications to amend.
2. Whether the additional imputations sought to be added by the plaintiff are capable of being defamatory.
Held
1. The court held that the fourth application to amend the pleadings should not be refused solely on the grounds that the plaintiff has already made multiple prior applications to amend. The court considered the overall fairness and the merits of the case in deciding to allow the amendment.
2. The court held that the additional imputations sought to be added by the plaintiff were capable of being defamatory. The court found that these imputations met the necessary criteria for defamation under Australian law.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by addressing the issue of whether the fourth application to amend the pleadings should be refused due to the number of prior applications made by the plaintiff. The court noted that while the plaintiff was self-represented and had made several prior applications to amend, this alone was not a sufficient basis to refuse the current application. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that justice is served and that the plaintiff's ability to fully present their case should not be unduly hampered by procedural technicalities. The court assessed the merits of the amendment and concluded that it was in the interests of justice to allow it, despite the previous amendments.
Turning to the second issue, the court considered whether the additional imputations sought to be added by the plaintiff were capable of being defamatory. The court examined the content of the proposed imputations and applied the legal principles established in previous defamation cases. The court noted that the imputations in question could lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society and met the necessary criteria for defamation. The court relied on the authorities that established the requirements for defamation, confirming that the proposed imputations were indeed capable of being defamatory. This part of the decision reinforces the established legal principle that certain statements can be defamatory if they harm the reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of others.
In distinguishing this case from prior authority, the court highlighted the necessity to assess each application to amend on its own merits, especially in cases involving self-represented litigants. The court departed from a strict interpretation of procedural rules to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties were not unjustly prejudiced. The binding legal principle established is that while the court has discretion to refuse further amendments, this discretion must be exercised judiciously, considering the overarching principles of fairness and justice.