Gluyas v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
[2001] FCA 1322
•25 SEPTEMBER 2001
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gluyas v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2001] FCA 1322
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Judicial review - decisions of Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission not to re-open complaints against former employers of applicant - applications for extension of time to apply for orders of review of those decisions - considerations to be taken into account in exercise of discretion.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988
Disability Discrimination Act1992
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986Wedesweiller v Cole (1983) 47 ALR 528
Doyle v Chief of General Staff (1982) 42 ALR 283
Ralkon Agricultural Co Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (1982) 43 ALR 535
Duff v Freijah (1982) 43 ALR 479
Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411
Becerra v Fowell (unreported, 18 February 1983, Morling J)
Hickey v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 47 ALR 517
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344PHILIP WAYNE GLUYAS v HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
V361 of 2000
AND
PHILIP WAYNE GLUYAS v HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
V362 of 2000
RYAN J
MELBOURNE
25 SEPTEMBER 2001
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V361 of 2000
BETWEEN:
PHILIP WAYNE GLUYAS
ApplicantAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First RespondentAUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
Second RespondentJUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 SEPTEMBER 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application for an extension of time be refused.
2. The application be dismissed.
3. There be no order as to the costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V362 of 2000
BETWEEN:
PHILIP WAYNE GLUYAS
ApplicantAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First RespondentCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second RespondentJUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 SEPTEMBER 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application for an extension of time be refused.
2. The application be dismissed.
3. There be no order as to the costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V361 of 2000
BETWEEN:
PHILIP WAYNE GLUYAS
ApplicantAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First RespondentAUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
Second RespondentAND:
V362 of 2000
BETWEEN:
PHILIP WAYNE GLUYAS
ApplicantAND:
HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First RespondentCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second RespondentJUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 SEPTEMBER 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 26 May 2000 the applicant filed applications against Australia Post (V361 of 2000) and the Department of Defence (V362 of 2000) for an order of review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the AD(JR) Act”) in respect of two decisions of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (“HREOC”).
Case V361 of 2000
The decision sought to be attacked in proceedings V361 of 2000, is described as follows in the application, prepared by the applicant who appeared in person:
“The decision of the respondent that the HREOC not re-open the complaint made by the applicant against Australia Post.”
On 17 October 1999, the applicant wrote the following letter to HREOC:
‘I am writing to make a large detailed complaint against three companies, for harassment under the Human Rights Act 1986 in the first case, and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 in the other two cases.
These three cases are linked by the trigger for my complaint, an incident which took place on January 28, 1999.
1 suffer from Asperger's Syndrome … and was diagnosed in February 1997. The harassment took place as follows.
1.Australia Post (March 27, 1985 to December 29, 1991 - various levels)
2.Department of Defence (November 4, 1996 to April 21, 1997)
3.TLC Consulting Services (December 8, 1998 to January 28, 1999) [subject of another complaint, V318 of 2000]
The harassment took varying forms and has caused me long term damage. As to how much, I didn't know, until January 28, 1999, and that's why it's taken me this long to complain. I didn't know just what I was capable of when pushed. On January 28, 1999, 1 committed an offence under the criminal code when I was pushed too far by the third party (TLC Consulting Services) and I lashed out physically for the first time in my life. I hold all three parties responsible for putting me into the frame of mind 1 was in, and the fall out continues because all three have got away with what they've done to me. Until now, I hope. It is essential that I get some form of justice in this, otherwise three things remain unresolved in my life.
a.I will never be able to hold down a full time job.
b.I will never have a guarantee that 1 won't lash out again when provoked.
c.I will never have a guarantee of protection from the HREOC or the law in general.
I have attached as many details as I can about all three parties. I can only take Australia Post under the Human Rights Act for obvious reasons, but the other two I want under the Disability Discrimination Act. My working future, and possibly my social and psychological future, is now in your hands. Please accept this complaint, and investigate it. For the sake of my sanity.”
It is not clear how HREOC’s decision, of which Mr Gluyas complains in V361 of 2000 was communicated to him, but it is common ground that he was advised of it on or about 10 January 2000. It also seems to be accepted on both sides that the effect of that decision was to refuse to re-open an inquiry into Mr Gluyas’s complaint about the treatment to which he had allegedly been subjected whilst employed by Australia Post. That employment commenced in 1985 and came to an end on 30 December 1991 when the applicant accepted a voluntary early retirement package. Whilst employed by Australia Post, the applicant had made a claim under the Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (“the Compensation Act”) in respect of a “stress condition”. On 2 October 1990, a delegate of Australia Post determined that Australia Post was not liable to pay compensation to the applicant in respect of his claim and that his employment had not contributed in a material degree to the contraction or aggravation of a disease. That determination was affirmed by another delegate of Australia Post on 15 April 1991 and the applicant sought a review of that second decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”). The AAT affirmed the decision under review and, in the course of its decision published on 9 December 1991, observed:
“In view of the evidence of Dr Rose and Dr Adrian, which we accept, that the applicant's personality problem has not been caused or made worse by his employment by the respondent and that the episodes of stress have been brief, transient and self-contained, we find that there has been no causal connection between the stress in September 1990 and the later episodes of stress, and also that any rehabilitation which the applicant requires is a result of his personality disorder and not of any stress or resulting anxiety symptoms. If the respondent as a caring employer wishes to assist the applicant as an employee to manage his personality problem, we would not wish to discourage it from doing so; but clearly it has no obligation under the Act to provide rehabilitation in the circumstances of this case.
... ... ... ... ...
There is no doubt that the applicant's behaviour on 4 September 1990 amounted to misconduct and that the stress reaction was the result of that misconduct. When he gave his evidence, it was clear that he had a quite unrealistic idea of what his obligations to his employer were. He appeared not to realize that his employer is entitled to have him do his work in accordance with its requirement and that a proper way of his employer informing him of its requirements is through more senior officers giving him instructions and advice. He appeared also not to realize that his employer is entitled to require its employees to work in harmony with one another and that, in spite of his personality problem, he has an obligation to his employer to make every effort to work harmoniously with other staff. In giving evidence he said that he placed his interests above those of the respondent. Generally, he appears over the years of his employment by the respondent not to have taken seriously his obligations to his employer. He has not conducted himself in a manner appropriate to an employee at his level in the organization; often he has refused to respond appropriately to the advice, assistance and indeed the instructions of those supervising him.”
Case V362 of 2000
The underlying decision sought to be attacked if proceeding V362/00 is successful relates to the applicant’s employment with the Department of Defence from 4 November 1996 to 21 April 1997. On 4 November 1996 the applicant was appointed on probation as a Trainee Administrative Service Officer, with permanent appointment subject to his meeting relevant medical fitness and work performance standards. On 18 April 1997, the same day on which the applicant lodged his application with HREOC, the Department of Defence informed him that his probationary employment would cease in three days as he did not meet the fitness requirements. On 13 February 1998 a HREOC officer wrote to the applicant noting that he might have difficulty demonstrating unlawful discrimination on the basis of the information provided by the Department, and suggesting that he might consider withdrawing his application. On 9 March 1998 the applicant advised HREOC that he had decided not to proceed with his complaint. It was not until 26 May 2000 that the applicant filed this application for judicial review, applying for review on the ground of;
“The HREOC finding that the Department of Defence discriminated against the applicant, but successfully claims unjustifiable hardship.”
It appears that the decision of HREOC of which the applicant wishes to complain was made by Mr Sidoti, the Acting Disability Discrimination Commissioner, and notified to the applicant by letter dated 11 March 1998 which advised:
“I refer to your complaint under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (the Act) against the Department of Defence.
On 9 March 1998 you advised the Commission of your decision to withdraw the complaint. Accordingly, I wish to advise you that I have decided not to continue with the inquiry into the complaint, pursuant to section 71(2)(b) of the Act. The complaint has now been finalised and the file is closed.
1 wish you well in your attempt to find alternative employment in the public sector.”
Lapse Of Time
On 26 May 2000 the applicant lodged applications for review of both decisions made by HREOC on 10 January 2000 and 11 March 1998. Because of the lapse of time since the making of each decision complained of, it has been necessary for the applicant to seek an order extending the time within which he might make an application under the AD(JR) Act. Section 11(1) of the AD(JR) Act relevantly provides:
“An application to the Court for an order of review:
.....
(c)shall be lodged with a Registry of the Court and, in the case of an application in relation to a decision that has been made and the terms of which were recorded in writing and set out in a document that was furnished to the applicant, including such a decision that a person purported to make after the expiration of the period within which it was required to be made, shall be so lodged within the prescribed period or within such further time as the Court (whether before or after the expiration of the prescribed period) allows.”
The prescribed period contemplated by s 11(1)(c) is to be ascertained by reference to s 11(3) which provides:
“(3)The prescribed period for the purposes of paragraph (1)(c) is the period commencing on the day on which the decision is made and ending on the twenty-eighth day after:
(a)if the decision sets out the findings on material questions of fact, refers to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and gives the reasons for the decision‑the day on which a document setting out the terms of the decision is furnished to the applicant; or
(b) in a case to which paragraph (a) does not apply:
(i)if a statement in writing setting out those findings, referring to that evidence or other material and giving those reasons is furnished to the applicant otherwise than in pursuance of a request under subsection 13(1) not later than the twenty-eighth day after the day on which a document setting out the terms of the decision is furnished to the applicant - the day on which the statement is so furnished;
(ii)if the applicant, in accordance with subsection 13(1), requests the person who made the decision to furnish a statement as mentioned in that subsection‑the day on which the statement is furnished, the applicant is notified in accordance with subsection 13(3) of the opinion that the applicant was not entitled to make the request, the Court makes an order under subsection 13(4A) declaring that the applicant was not entitled to make the request or the applicant is notified in accordance with subsection 13A(3) or 14(3) that the statement will not be furnished; or
(iii)in any other case‑the day on which a document setting out the terms of the decision is furnished to the applicant.”
In relation to V362 of 2000, concerning the Department of Defence, there is no evidence that the applicant made any request of HREOC for a written statement of findings of fact and reasons for the decision of 11 March 1998. Accordingly, the 28 days stipulated by s 11(3) commenced to run, by virtue of s 11(3)(b)(iii), on the date on which the letter of 11 March 1998 was furnished to the applicant. On that basis, the time limit expired on or about 9 April 1998. The applicant therefore requires the Court, in the exercise of its discretion under s 11(1)(c) of the AD(JR) Act, to extend the time for the making of the application by slightly in excess of two years. In relation to V361 of 2000 there is also no evidence of a request for a statement in writing pursuant to s 13(1) of the AD(JR) Act of the reasons for the decision. Therefore the 28 days ran from 10 January 2000 meaning that the time limit expired on or about 7 February 2000, 109 days before the applicant lodged his application to this Court.
In Wedesweiller v Cole (1983) 47 ALR 528, Sheppard J, at 531, reviewed a number of other authorities in which the exercise of this discretion has been considered. They included Doyle v Chief of General Staff (1982) 42 ALR 283, Ralkon Agricultural Co Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (1982) 43 ALR 535, Duff v Freijah (1982) 43 ALR 479, Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411 and Becerra v Fowell (unreported, 18 February 1983, Morling J). His Honour went on to say:
"I am inclined to agree with Morling J. in Becerra's Case … that differences are discernible in these various decisions as to the emphasis which should be given various matters in deciding whether or not an extension of time should be granted in a particular case. But I would respectfully suggest that this is not because of any fundamental disagreement amongst judges as to the approach which should be taken, but more to the need for each judge to address himself to the particular circumstances of the case before him. I do not wish to add to what has been said except to say that there will be some cases which may be decided upon considerations which affect only the immediate parties. It will be appropriate to consider whether the delay which has taken place has been satisfactorily explained, the prejudice which may be caused to an applicant by the refusal of an application, the prejudice which may be suffered by the Government or a particular department if the application is granted and, generally, what the justice of the case requires. In other cases wider considerations will be involved. In this respect I refer to what was said by Fitzgerald J. in Lucic v. Nolan, supra, at p 416. The discretion is vested in the court in completely unrestricted terms and no indication is given of the matter which the court is to consider. The discretion is therefore a very wide one and I would not wish to say more in case my doing so may have the effect of circumscribing in another case what the facts of that case require."
I respectfully adopt his Honour’s analysis of the earlier authorities and his general statement of the correct approach to applications like the present. I also consider that his Honour’s emphasis on the need for the discretion to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case is not inconsistent with the identification by Fitzgerald J in Lucic v Nolan (supra) of some of the matters which the Court may take into account in exercising this discretion. Fitzgerald J there made these observations:
"It seems broadly accurate to say that there is a legislative intention that certain standards are to be observed in respect of such decisions and actions. However, that is not the only public interest to be served. Other matters of proper public concern which are readily identifiable as relevant to the review of administrative acts and decisions include the need for finality in disputes, the efficient use of public resources, the appropriate allocation and expenditure of public funds, and also where what is in question involves promotion and discipline in the Australian Public Service, the orderly administration of that vast body. Further, the impact of an act or decision is often not confined to a particular individual who is adversely affected and wishes to challenge it; a contest for promotion is an obvious example.
The legislation contains various mechanisms to allow these different policy considerations to be balanced. Thus, for example, one of the features of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act is that it contains limitations with respect to the time for the commencement of proceedings. Where specific periods are fixed, they are quite short. That carries obvious implications. However, the time limitations are not absolute. In this, as in other matters arising under the Act, e.g. in respect of the relief which may be granted under s.16, the court is given a discretion. None the less, it must, in my opinion, be accepted that it has deliberately been made the prima facie rule that proceedings not commenced in time should not be entertained. In this respect, there is an obvious contrast between the terms of s.11(3) which provides a pre-emptive fixed period subject to a discretionary power of extension, and provisions like that of s.11(4) which do not fix any particular period but refer merely to what is in the court's opinion 'reasonable'.
I do not think that the court, in exercising its power to make exceptions in appropriate cases, should confine its attention to the consequences to the applicant of a refusal to extend time. Justice, as the ultimate object to be obtained by the exercise of the discretion, seems to me to require that regard be had to broader considerations than merely the interests of the applicant. Further, whilst there will be some matters which are relevant to the question whether time should be extended (in ordinary litigation inter partes) which are also relevant in this context, it seems to me likely that the overlap is only partial and that different emphasis is appropriate to some of the common factors. It may be that exceptional circumstances need not always be shown before time can be extended. However, I consider that an applicant for an extension of time maintains throughout the burden of showing why, in all the circumstances, the extension of time should be granted. I do not think that, given proof of certain matters by an applicant, e.g. an explanation for his delay in making application, an evidentiary onus shifts to the respondents to establish that prejudice will result if the extension is granted; nor, in my opinion, if the delay is explained and there will be no personal prejudice to the named respondents, should an extension always be granted. All else aside, there will often be no question of prejudice to a respondent decision-maker.
It is neither necessary nor desirable, if indeed it would be possible to enumerate the great variety of possibly material circumstances to be considered on an application for an extension of time. Nor, in my opinion, is it possible to identify particular circumstances or classes of circumstances which must automatically be excluded from consideration. Each individual case should be dealt with individually, giving due weight to prior decisions and what they reveal of judicial attitudes: cf. s.11(4) and (5). Whilst there are obvious reasons why there should be no attempt at a full investigation of the merits of the application for review on an application for an extension of time, I would not exclude from consideration in an appropriate case some obvious strength or weakness in an applicant's case or matters which might justify the refusal of relief, if the court has a discretion to do so where a ground for relief is made out."
Reference should also be made to the similar observations of Lockhart J in Hickey v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 47 ALR 517, at 523:
"Applications for enlargement of time to bring applications under the Judicial Review Act are not merely inter partes adversary proceedings. Questions of public interest are involved. Delay by an applicant in bringing his application is relevant. What weight the court should give to mere delay unaccompanied by prejudice, if there could be such a case under the Judicial Review Act, is entirely a matter for the court to determine in the particular case, but delay unaccompanied by prejudice is not necessarily to be placed to one side as irrelevant or as not operating against the success of the applicant's case. Delay without prejudice to the defendant in equity proceedings may not constitute laches sufficient to debar the plaintiff from equitable relief, but the Judicial Review Act is concerned with public considerations as well as private grievances attributable to decisions made under Commonwealth enactments. In some cases delay unaccompanied by prejudice may be a telling consideration against the exercise of discretion to enlarge time for bringing an application under the Judicial Review Act.
Although s.11 does not in terms place an onus on an applicant seeking an allowance for further time within which to lodge an application for an order of review, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to satisfy the court that the extension of time should be granted. It is not for the decision-maker to establish that the applicant does not have a case for an extension of time. The applicant seeks an indulgence. It is for him to prove that he is entitled to it. But the court should not surround the exercise of its discretion with unnecessary constraints such as a requirement that there be special circumstances or considerations of that kind. The statute does not require them. Nor should the courts. It is best left to the good sense of the judge hearing each case to determine whether, on the evidence before him, the court's discretion should be exercised in favour of granting an enlargement of time to bring an application for an order of review."
Extension Of Time
The applicant sought to justify an extension of time in both proceedings by pointing out that he had spent the intervening time seeking other avenues of review. In his submissions he stated:
I was under the impression that the decision of January 10, 2000 would be reviewed with cases V317 and V318 which were initially dealt with at the same time. However I subsequently found that the HREOC Act 1986 had no review process, whereas the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (until April 13, 2000) did. That confusion caused a practical delay, as I waited for the review result of the other two cases. I was advised by the legal section of the HREOC that the Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1977 was an option after the HREOC refused to answer any questions relating to the cases. I then needed a further period of time to prepare the contents of V361 for filing in the Federal Court.
…
I spent most of 1998 arguing with the Minister’s office about the issue, and then I spent most of 1999 settling back in Melbourne, getting counselling as a result of the events of Case V318, maintaining my lifestyle as best as I could, and making the long preparation for my eventual delivery of my 250 page complaint (Cases V361, V317 and V318) in October 1999. The preparation to move house also ate into my time.In considering whether or not to use my discretion and grant the application for an extension of time it is necessary to consider all of the circumstances of the case, not merely the interests of the applicant. The proceedings numbered V361 of 2000 are designed to activate or revive an inquiry into events which took place in the course of the applicant’s employment by Australia Post from 1985 to 30 December 1991. No application was made to HREOC until the applicant’s letter of 17 October 1999, almost eight years after the events took place. After HREOC declined to investigate his complaint any further, the applicant took over four months to lodge his application for review. In considering this issue the long delay in lodging the initial complaint must be taken into account, as going to the prejudice that the respondents may suffer if this application is granted and it is ultimately held that HREOC should investigate the complaint. As Wilcox J said in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344, at 349;
“Any prejudice to the respondent including any prejudice in defending the proceedings occasioned by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension”.
In this case Australia Post would suffer considerable prejudice if the application for extension were granted and it were held that HREOC should now entertain the substantive claim. Since the events complained of took place in the early 1990s, substantial changes within the structure of Australia Post have occurred, including the closure of both facilities at which the applicant was employed, together with significant changes in personnel and reductions in staffing. Most of the persons to whom the applicant refers in his complaint and who would be key witnesses have since left the employ of Australia Post, making the gathering of evidence very difficult. The granting of an extension of time would not conduce to finalising the issues which the applicant seeks to raise. Nor would it result in an efficient use of public resources. Of course, the attainment of a just outcome is the primary consideration to be taken into account in exercising this discretion. Accordingly, if the merits of the applicant’s case were so compelling as to outweigh the prejudice which would be occasioned to Australia Post by ventilating his complaints, by allowing those merits to be investigated at this remove of time, that may require the grant of the application. However, the applicant’s underlying claim that his work at Australia Post aggravated his stress condition has been rejected on a number of occasions by many different authorities, including the AAT which based its decision on the evidence of two psychiatrists who both found that the applicant’s personality disorder had antedated his employment by Australia Post. Nor has the applicant demonstrated how HREOC’s decision not to reopen his complaint can constitute a contravention of s 5(1)(a) and (e) of the AD(JR)Act. Therefore, I am not persuaded on the available material that the strength of his claim for a review of the relevant decisions is such as to outweigh the very real prejudice that Australia Post might suffer if the extension of time were granted.
Very similar considerations apply to the proceedings numbered V362 of 2000. In that case the events in question took place later in time, namely 1996 to 1997. However the delay in lodging the claim for review was considerably longer, over two years. The explanation given by the applicant was substantially the same as that given in V361 of 2000, namely that he had been pursuing other means of redress. What these other avenues were was not fully explained. However, at the hearing of this matter, the applicant said he had been attempting to contact the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel in relation to his complaint, although he also stated that his last communication with the Minister’s office was in late 1998. That contact does not fully explain the substantial delay in lodging his application, as a result of which delay the respondents would suffer prejudice if an extension of time were granted. For over two years the Department of Defence has conducted its affairs on the basis that this complaint had been finalised. There may also be difficulties in contacting key witnesses who have since left the employ of the Department of Defence. Nor are these obstacles overcome by the applicant’s prospects of succeeding on the merits against HREOC, or ultimately, the Department. It is difficult to see how he could successfully establish a denial of natural justice as contemplated by s 5(1)(a) of the AD(JR) Act, given that the complaint was withdrawn at his request, and there is no evidence of any threat or duress compelling him to take that course. The applicant’s alternative invocation of s 5(1)(e) and s (2)(e) based on an allegation of improper exercise of power, lacks substance. The Acting Disability Discrimination Commissioner of HREOC who made the decision had express statutory power under the Disability Discrimination Act to decide not to continue with the inquiry in the circumstances and there is nothing to suggest that the power was exercised for an ulterior purpose or otherwise than in good faith or that its exercise was infected by any of the other errors enumerated in s 5(2).
For these reasons each application for an extension of time must be refused and each substantive application must, accordingly, be dismissed. However, having regard to the disability from which the applicant suffers, the fact that the circumstances of each complaint arose out of contracts of employment with two substantial public sector employers, and the fact that these proceedings represented the first attempt by the applicant to achieve curial redress of his grievances, I shall make no order as to the costs of either application.
I certify that the preceding seventeen (17) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Ryan. Associate:
Dated: 25 September 2001
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person. The First Respondent was excused from further appearance upon its indicating that it would abide the result of the applications. Counsel for the Second Respondent in V361 of 2000: Ms S Rey Solicitor for the Second Respondent in V361 of 2000: Blake Dawson Waldron Counsel for the Second Respondent in V362 of 2000 Mr R Frazetto Solicitors for the Second Respondent in V362 of 2000 Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 22 September 2000 Date of Judgment: 25 September 2001
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