Global Issues Pty Ltd v De Stefano & Associates
[2005] VSC 273
•3 August 2005
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL AND EQUITY DIVISION
No. 5148 of 2000
| GLOBAL ISSUES PTY LTD AND ORS | Plaintiffs |
| v | |
| FRANK DE STEFANO & ASSOCIATES AND ORS | Defendants |
---
JUDGE: | KAYE J. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 2 and 3 August 2005 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 3 August 2005 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Global Issues Pty Ltd v De Stefano & Associates | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2005] VSC 273 | |
---
CIVIL PROCEDURE – Appeal against leave granted to file and serve third party notice against sixth defendant - Order 11 Supreme Court Rules – Subject matter of proceeding - Court’s discretion
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiffs | Mr M.M. Wise | Home Wilkinson Lowry |
| For the Sixth Defendant | Mr I.R. Jones | Middletons |
| For the Eighth Defendant | Mr M.D. Wyles | Mallesons Stephen Jaques |
| For the Second Third Party and the Proposed Ninth Defendant | Mr P.G. Cawthorn with Mr M.A. Belmar | Hallet West Johnston |
HIS HONOUR:
This is an appeal by the sixth defendant, St George Bank Ltd, and the eighth defendant, Crown Ltd, against an order of Master Kings made 31 January, 2005. By that order, the Master gave the second third party, Donna Joy Murdoch, leave to file and serve a third party notice against the sixth defendant. I also have before me a summons issued by First Spectrum Pty Ltd seeking to be joined as a party to the proceeding.
The original writ was issued on 20 April 2000. During the last five years the proceedings have expanded considerably. There are now five plaintiffs, eight defendants and one third party. There are a number of cross claims between the defendants. The trial and proceeding has been set down for April, 2006.
The claim made by the plaintiffs arises out of the conduct by the second defendant, Frank De Stefano, who was an accountant carrying on practice in Geelong through the first defendant, Frank De Stefano & Associates Pty Ltd. The third defendant, Maria De Stefano, is the wife of Frank De Stefano.
The five plaintiffs were each clients of De Stefano. The first defendant maintained a trust account in which it held funds on behalf of clients for investment. The claims by the plaintiffs concern sums totalling approximately $2.3m which were lodged by each of the plaintiffs with the first defendant between May 1998 and January 2000. The plaintiffs claim that De Stefano dishonestly misappropriated those funds to his own use.
The statement of claim pleads a number of different causes of action against the first and second defendants, which need not be recited for the purpose of the matters which I am required to decide. The plaintiffs’ claim against the third defendant is based on an allegation that she received some of the stolen funds.
Further, the plaintiffs seek to set aside a disposition of property by De Stefano to the third defendant as a fraudulent disposition for the purpose of avoiding the creditors of De Stefano. The fourth defendant is the Registrar of Titles, who as I understand it, is joined for conformity in relation to that claim.
The fifth defendant in the proceeding is Artway Building Services Pty Ltd, who I shall refer to as Artway. The plaintiffs allege that on 10 January 2000, De Stefano withdrew the sum of $218,231.95 from the trust account of the first defendant. That sum included $90,000 belonging to the thirdnamed plaintiff, Basil’s Plasterers Pty Ltd. The statement of claim then alleges that De Stefano used those funds to purchase six bank cheques which it provided to Artway and which Artway used to purchase a property at 55 Morey Road, Beaumaris. Basil’s Plasterers claims $90,000 from Artway. Further, it is claimed that Artway holds the property subject to a constructive trust and/or a lien in favour of Basil’s Plasterers to the extent of $90,000 received by Artway which consisted of Basil’s Plasterers’ funds.
The sixth defendant is St George Bank Ltd. Between approximately 1993 and 21 December 1999, the first defendant operated a trust account at the Swanston Walk branch of the bank. De Stefano was authorised to operate that account on his signature alone. The statement of claim alleges that between 22 November 1993 and 22 December 1999, the sixth defendant debited the first defendant’s trust account pursuant to written authorisations from De Stefano, to pay sums to a number of casinos. It is also alleged that the sixth defendant debited the trust account to make cash or other payments to/or on behalf of De Stefano. The plaintiffs claim those funds against the sixth defendant.
The claim is made, first, pursuant to the second limb of Barnes v Addy,[1] and, secondly, pursuant to a duty of care allegedly owed by the bank to each of the defendants.
[1]1874 LR 9 Ch App 244.
The seventh defendant, Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd was sued as the successor to the Bank of Melbourne Limited. The plaintiffs’ claim against Westpac was resolved. That claim was that between December 1999 and April 2000, the first defendant maintained a trust account with the Bank of Melbourne at its Geelong Branch. De Stefano was the sole signatory of that account. Between December 1999 and April 2000, the Bank of Melbourne debited the trust account pursuant to cash cheques drawn by De Stefano and further permitted De Stefano to make substantial cash withdrawals on that trust account. The plaintiffs claim those funds under the second limb of Barnes v Addy and alternatively on an alleged breach of a duty of care.
The eighth defendant, Crown Casino Ltd, was originally joined as a third party in the proceeding. The plaintiffs’ claim against the eighth defendant, the money obtained by De Stefano in consequence of the withdrawals by him from both the sixth and seventh defendants, which were then paid to the eighth defendant. It is alleged that those amounts were money which had been stolen or embezzled and were paid to the eighth defendant for or on account of wages or bets. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim those sums pursuant to s.67 of the Lotteries, Gaming and Betting Act, 1966.
The Third Party
The second third party, Donna Joy Murdoch, to whom I shall hereinafter refer to as Murdoch, was joined in the proceedings by a third party notice dated 2 December dated 2002, served on her by the seventh defendant, Westpac. In that claim, the Westpac claims that by an agreement dated 9 June 1999, it provided an equity access loan facility to Murdoch, with a credit limit of $500,000 which was to be maintained through a designated loan account. Westpac maintains that Murdoch is indebted to it in respect to the debit balance of the loan account, which with interest, totals $185,941.
The relevance of the third party proceeding against Murdoch to the principle proceeding does not appear from the third party notice itself. Its relevance is to be understood in the context of a notice of claim served by Westpac against Artway, the fifth defendant, also dated 2 December 2002.
In that proceeding, Westpac alleges that Murdoch is a director of Artway. On 31 December 1999, Murdoch instructed Westpac to transfer the sum of $150,000 from the loan facility to the trust account maintained by the first defendant with Westpac. Westpac pleads that it complied with that instruction and debited the Murdoch loan account in the sum of $150,000 which it credited to the first defendant’s office trust account. Murdoch disputes that she gave authority for that transfer and maintains that Westpac was not entitled to debit $150,000 to the Murdoch loan account. The notice of claim then recites the acquisition by Artway of its interest in the land at 55 Morey Road Beaumaris, utilising $318,231 paid out of the first defendant’s office trust account. The claim alleges that the funds so used were in part derived from the amount transferred from the Murdoch loan account. Accordingly, Westpac maintains that Artway holds the land on trust to the extent of an interest corresponding to the proportion which the $150,000 bore to the purchase price of the land or alternatively, pursuant to a charge in equity to that extent.
Murdoch third party notice to sixth defendant
The third party notice served on behalf of Murdoch on the sixth defendant, pursuant to the order of Master Kings, contains a claim which is similar to that asserted by the plaintiffs against the sixth defendant. The third party pleads that the first defendant was retained by her as her accountant, inter alia, to hold funds on her behalf, pending investment in accordance with financial and investment advice. The third party alleges that on 7 October 1998, she paid to the first defendant an amount of approximately $1,034,000 by ANZ Bank warrant for payment into the trust account held by the first defendant at the Swanston Walk branch of the sixth defendant. Further, a sum of $45,000 was paid by cheque on 25 January 1999, for the same purpose.
The third party notice then pleads that between November 1993 and 22 December 1999, the first defendant permitted De Stefano to misappropriate funds from the trust account maintained by the first defendant with the sixth defendant. It pleads that during that period the sixth defendant debited the trust account pursuant to written authorisations from De Stefano to pay particular amounts to certain casinos, that it debited the trust account to pay cash cheques drawn to De Stefano and that it permitted De Stefano to make cash withdrawals from the trust account. As a consequence, the third party alleges that she lost $620,529 of the amount originally paid by her to the first defendant for investment in the trust account.
The claim against the sixth defendant is made on the same basis as that asserted by the plaintiffs, namely a claim based on the second limb of Barnes v Addy and a claim based on breach of an alleged duty of care.
Appeal
Both the sixth and eighth defendants appeal against the order of Master Kings, giving leave to the second third party to serve that third party notice on the sixth defendant. The sixth defendant has applied to join the eight defendant as a fourth party in the third party proceeding brought against it by Murdoch. That application has been adjourned, pending the outcome of this appeal. The eight defendant thus claims that it is a person affected by the order of the Master and has standing to appeal from it. No argument was made before me that the eighth defendant does not have standing in that respect.
The sixth and eight defendants and the plaintiffs submitted that the appeal should be allowed and that leave should not be given to Murdoch to serve the third party notice on the sixth defendant on the grounds that the service of such a notice is not authorised by Order 11 of the Supreme Court rules. Further and in any event, it is submitted that the court should refuse leave to Murdoch to bring such a third party proceeding in the exercise of the court’s discretion.
The Rules
Rules 11.01, 11.15(1) and 11.16 of the Supreme Court Rules are relevant to the first submission made by the sixth and eighth defendants and the plaintiffs. Rule 11.01 provides:
“Where a defendant claims as against a person not already a party to the proceeding (in this order called ‘the third party’) –
(a)any contribution or indemnity;
(b)any relief or remedy relating to or connected with the original subject matter of the proceeding and substantially the same as some relief or remedy claimed by the plaintiff; or
(c)that any question relating to or connected with the original subject matter of the proceeding, should be determined not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant but also as between either or both of them and the third party. The defendant may join the third party as a party to the proceeding and make the claim against him by filing and serving a third party notice.”
Rule 11.15(1) provides:
“Where a party claims as against another party to the proceeding any relief of the kind described in Rule 11.01, the party may make the claim against the other party by filing and serving a notice in accordance with this Rule –
(a)within 60 days after the service on the party of the document in the proceeding, by which a claim in respect of which the notice is served was made; or
(b)if when the document was served the other party was not a party, then within 60 days after the party became a party.”
Rule 11.16 provides as follows:
“(1)Where a third party has filed an appearance, this order shall with any necessary modification, apply as if the third party were a defendant.
(2)Where a person joined as a party (in this order called a fourth party) by a third party under this order has filed an appearance, this order as applied by this rule shall have the effect as regards such further person and any other further person or persons so joined and so on successively.
(3)A third or subsequent party may not make a claim against another person, whether that person is a party to the proceeding or not, by notice under this order, without the leave of the court.”
Mr Ian Jones, who appeared on behalf of the sixth defendant, submitted that the effect of Rule 11.16(1) was that in order to entitle a third party to issue a third party notice, any relief or remedy claimed in the third party notice must relate to or be connected with the original subject matter of the claim against that third party (pursuant to Rule 11.01(b)) or involve a question which relates to or is connected with the subject matter of the proceeding against the third party, (pursuant to Rule 11.01(c)).
Mr Jones submitted that it is not sufficient for the claim by the third party to have the connection, described in Rules 11.01(b) and (c), with the claim originally made by the plaintiff against the defendant. Rather, the relevant connection described in Rules 11.01(b) and (c) must be with the claim asserted by the defendant against the third party.
On the other hand Mr Cawthorn, who appeared with Mr Belmar for the third party, submitted that in order to entitle the third party to make a claim against a person who is already a party to the proceeding, it is sufficient if the claim so asserted either seeks relief or remedy which relates to or is connected with the original subject matter of the proceeding by the plaintiff against the defendant, (pursuant to Rule 11.01(b)), or involves a question which relates to or is connected with the original subject matter of the proceeding by the plaintiff against the defendant, (Rule 11.01(c)).
Mr Cawthorn submitted that the claim sought to be made by Murdoch against the sixth defendant, mirrors the claim made by the five plaintiffs against the sixth defendant. Accordingly, he submitted that the claim contained in the third party notice at the least involves a “question relating to or connected with the original subject matter of the proceeding”, pursuant to Rule 11.01(c).
The competing submissions in this case thus raise the question as to the meaning of the words: “The original subject matter of the proceeding” in Rules 11.01(b) and (c). In essence, the issue is whether in the context of a claim for relief by a third party against another party, the phrase: “The original subject matter of the proceeding” attaches to the original claim made by the plaintiff against the defendants or on the other hand, whether it attaches to the character of a claim made against the third party by the defendant which joined the third party in the proceeding.
For the reasons which I shall set out below, I am of the opinion that the latter construction, which is that contended for by Mr Jones, is correct. In other words, properly construed, where a third party seeks to assert a claim against another person pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11.01(b) or (c), that claim must either seek relief or a remedy which relates to or is connected with the subject matter of the proceeding against that third party, (Rule 11.01(b)) or involve a question which relates to or is connected with the subject matter of the proceeding against that third party, (Rule 11.01(c)).
That conclusion follows I consider, from both the drafting of Rule 11 and also from the consideration of the underlying scheme of that rule.
Standing alone, Rule 11.01 applies to the proceeding by the plaintiff against the defendant. In such a proceeding it enables the defendant to make a claim against a third party. Rules 11.15 and 11.16 then provide for a third party to make a similar claim. For that purpose, Rule 11.16(1) provides that Rule 11 applies as if the third party were a defendant. Rule 11.01 speaks in terms of the “defendant” and the “plaintiff”. As applied to a claim to be brought by a third party, Rule 11.16(1) equates the third party, which wishes to bring the claim, with the position of the defendant in Rule 11.01.
It seems clear that Rule 11.16(1) by thus transforming the third party into the defendant, in order to incorporate the scheme in Rule 11.01, similarly transforms the defendant to the action into the plaintiff for the purposes of Rule 11.01. Thus it follows that the phrase: “The original subject matter of the proceeding” as it appears in Rules 11.01(b) and (c), relates to the subject matter of the proceeding asserted by the defendant against the third party, where it is the third party who seeks to rely on it to make a claim against another person pursuant to Rule 11.
Mr Cawthorn sought to avoid this conclusion by contending that the claim by his client against the sixth defendant was made under Rule 11.15, and not Rule 11.16. Thus he submitted that Rule 11.16(1) has no application to the third party proceeding which his client sought to bring against the sixth defendant. However, if that submission was correct, it would deprive Rule 11.16(3) of any effect. Clearly, Rule 11.16 is intended to apply to any claim sought to be made by a third or subsequent party, whether against a person who was a party to the proceeding or not.
The third party proceedings prescribed by Rule 11.01 require that there be a relevant connection between the claim by the plaintiff against the defendant and the claim to be asserted by the defendant against the third party. In other words, the third party proceedings in Rule 11.01, comprehend a claim against another person by a defendant in response to the claim made against the defendant by the plaintiff. By definition, the third party is not a respondent to a claim brought by a plaintiff against a defendant. The third party is only a respondent to the claim brought against it by the defendant.
Rule 11.15 and 11.16 provide to a third party the same rights under Rule 11.01 as those provided by Rule 11.01 to the defendant who has joined the third party. Those rights are to make a claim against another person, whether a party to the action or not, which responds to the claim brought against a third party. Thus, in my view the underlying scheme and purpose of Rule 11.01 also supports the construction contended for on behalf of the sixth and eight defendants and the plaintiffs, namely that other than in the case of claims for contribution or indemnity, the claim under Rule 11 by a third party must either seek relief or remedy which relates to or is connected with the subject matter of the claim against the third party, Rule 11.01(b) or involve a question connected with the original subject matter of the claim against the third party, Rule 11.01(c).
Discretion
The conclusion which I have reached concerning the construction of Rule 11 in respect of this application is, I note, supported by observations made by the learned author of Civil Procedure Victoria, Mr Neil Williams QC, at paragraphs 11.01.45 and 11.15.0. The views there expressed by the learned author fortify me in the conclusion which I have so far reached.
Mr Cawthorn did not submit that if I were to construe Rule 11.01 in the manner thus contended for by the plaintiffs and the sixth and eighth defendants, the third party notice served by his client would conform with the requirements of Rule 11.01. It is clear that the relief or remedy claimed by Murdoch under the third party notice against the sixth defendant is not substantially the same as the relief or remedy claimed against Murdoch by the seventh defendant. Further, it is clear that the claim which Murdoch seeks to make against the sixth defendant does not involve a question relating to or connected with the subject matter of the claim made by the seventh defendant against Murdoch for the purposes of Rule 11.01(c).
The claim by the seventh defendant against Murdoch is in debt. It arises out of the equity loan facility agreement entered into between Murdoch and the seventh defendant. The claim sought to be made by Murdoch against the sixth defendant, which I have summarised above, is of an entirely different nature and does not involve any relevant question relating to or connected with the subject matter of the claim by the seventh defendant against Murdoch.
For those reasons, I hold that the third party proceeding sought to be brought by the second third party against the sixth defendant is not a claim authorised by Rule 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
The conclusion which I have reached so far is sufficient to dispose of this appeal. However if I had come to the opposite conclusion, namely that Rule 11.01 does authorise the service of a third party notice, nonetheless I would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the application of the second third party to serve that notice, in the exercise of the court’s discretion.
There has been considerable delay by the third party in asserting her claim against the sixth defendant. In her affidavit in support of the application, Mrs Murdoch has deposed that she first became aware of the fraudulent acts of De Stefano in April 2000. The plaintiffs’ solicitors thereafter offered that she participate as a plaintiff in the proceeding. However at that time she was unwilling to be involved with such an action because of the potential costs.
Subsequently, she was served with the third party notice by the seventh defendant in December 2002. Again, she did not then choose to assert her claim against the sixth defendant. A mediation took place in May 2004 but the claim against the third party by the seventh defendant was not resolved.
The second third party then sought to make an application for summary dismissal in respect of the claims made against both the fifth defendant and herself. Those applications were refused by Master Evans in September 2004.
An application by the seventh defendant to sever the proceedings against the fifth defendant and against the third party was refused in November 2004. It was only after those interlocutory steps failed that the third party sought to assert the claim against the sixth defendant, which is contained in the third party notice.
No doubt the third party had her own reasons not to prosecute the claim earlier. However the principal proceedings have now been on foot for in excess of five years. They have been set down for trial in April 2006 on an estimate of a trial lasting approximately ten weeks. In that context and in light of the circumstance that the third party had been joined in the proceeding for approximately two years before she sought to assert the claim set out in the third party notice, it is self-evident that there has been considerable delay by her in making the claim.
The claim which the third party seeks to make against the sixth defendant is in many respects similar to the claim by the plaintiffs against the sixth and eighth defendants. If the third party were to make those claims in the context of the current proceeding, a number of the issues contained in it would be common with the issues and claims made by the current plaintiffs against the sixth and eighth defendants.
However, there are other issues involved in the claim to be made by the third party against the sixth defendant which are not common with the claims made by the plaintiffs against the sixth and eighth defendants. In particular, there is a significant issue as to whether the third party or First Spectrum Pty Ltd, or some other person, had the relevant legal interest in the amounts paid to De Stefano’s trust account and which are the subject of the claim sought to be made by the third party notice. There is also an issue as to how that amount was constituted. In her affidavit the third party states that the whole of the sum of $1,034,000 consisted of the proceeds of the sale of real estate at Clifton Hill. However, there is other material which suggests that only $700,000 was realised from that sale. In addition, the claim by the third party may also involve issues as to the tracing of the funds alleged to have been lodged by the third party with the first defendant.
I would expect that a number of interlocutory steps need to be taken in respect of the issues arising from the claim thus sought to be made in the third party notice. In addition, the sixth defendant will need to investigate the claim and prepare its case in response to that claim. The sixth defendant would also seek to join the eighth defendant, Crown Ltd as a third party to that claim. Thus, if the third party were permitted to make the claim in the proceedings, it would, I consider, have the potential to significantly disrupt and encumber the progress of the proceeding to trial.
In addition, First Spectrum Pty Ltd desires to make the same claim against the sixth defendant as is made by the third party, but as an alternative to the third party. That potential claim by First Spectrum Pty Ltd arises because of the issue relating to whether the First Spectrum Pty Ltd, or Murdoch, owned the funds which were lodged with the first defendant’s trust account. Thus First Spectrum Pty Ltd has applied by summons to be joined as a ninth defendant to these current proceedings.
If the third party were permitted to make the claim within the current proceedings, which is asserted by the third party notice, it may be necessary to permit First Spectrum Pty Ltd to also make that claim as an alternative, albeit as a ninth defendant.
The procedure thus proposed would have the effect that the third party Murdoch would be making a claim as a third party which is in reality a claim made by a plaintiff. At the same time, First Spectrum would make the same claim as an alternative to Murdoch, either as a ninth defendant or as an added third party.
To say the least, such a set of proceedings would be quite extraordinary. More importantly, it would inevitably complicate and burden the interlocutory steps to be taken in the present action and add an unnecessary layer of complexity to the trial of this proceeding in April next year. There is no guarantee that the interlocutory steps which need to be taken in the claim to be asserted by Murdoch and/or First Spectrum, could be undertaken and completed without interfering with the progress of the existing action to trial.
On the other hand, there is no reason why the claim sought to be asserted by the third party and First Spectrum Pty Ltd against the sixty defendant could not be made in a separate action issued by both those parties as plaintiffs. Such a procedure would be manifestly far simpler, and would not entangle and burden the progress of the existing action. It must be remembered that it is the third party who seeks an indulgence from the court by seeking leave to assert its claim by a third party notice. She has delayed for a considerable time before deciding to make that claim against the sixth defendant. In my view it is only just that she should not be permitted to bring that claim in the existing proceeding where by doing so she may significantly disrupt the progress of the existing proceeding to trial. To permit her to do so would be unfair and unjust to the existing parties, and in particular to the plaintiffs.
The third party and First Spectrum Pty Ltd are of course at liberty to bring an action by separate proceeding. If they were to bring such an action, the question as to whether such an action would be either consolidated with the present proceeding, or the question whether the trial of the two actions would be heard at the same time, would be a matter for the Listing Master or for the Judge allocated to the management of the present proceeding.
However and in any event, as I have already remarked, the third party and First Spectrum may bring an action independently of these proceedings. While that course of procedure may not be as convenient to them, any such inconvenience is significantly outweighed by the potential disruption to the current proceedings and by the unfairness to the parties to those proceedings if I permitted the third party to make the claim in the present proceedings.
For those reasons, it is in any event, not appropriate to give leave to the third party to bring a third party notice against the sixth defendant, even if contrary to the views which I expressed earlier, such a notice is otherwise authorised by the rules. Thus, for that additional reason, the appeal from the order of Master Kings should be allowed.
First Spectrum Pty Ltd
As I stated above, First Spectrum Pty Ltd has also issued a summons seeking to be joined as a party to these proceedings. A proposed amended third party notice has been exhibited to the affidavit of Ms Murdoch, who is a director of that company. That document makes it plain, as I have already stated, that First Spectrum Pty Ltd, would be seeking to assert the same claim as that sought to be asserted by the third party against the sixth defendant but as an alternative to the third party.
It was considered necessary to seek to join First Spectrum on that basis in the event that a court determines that First Spectrum and not Murdoch have the legal interest in the sums claimed against the sixth defendant. In view of the conclusion which I have reached about the third party notice, it would follow that there would be no purpose in acceding to the application made by First Spectrum.
Conclusion
For the reasons which I have so far expressed, I have thus come to the conclusion that the appeals of the sixth and eighth defendants should be allowed.
Accordingly and subject to hearing from counsel I propose the following orders:
(1)That the appeals by the sixth and eighth defendants by notices of appeal each dated 24 June 2005, against the order of Master Kings, made 31 January 2005, whereby she allowed the second third party to file and serve a third party notice against the sixth defendant are allowed.
(2)In lieu of the order so made by Master Kings I order that the summons issued by the secondnamed third party, dated 16 December 2004, be dismissed.
(3)Pursuant to Order 77.03(2)(b), I grant special leave to First Spectrum Pty Ltd to bring its summons dated 19 July 2005 before a judge.
(4)I dismiss the summons issued by First Spectrum Pty Ltd, dated 19 July 2005.
[Discussion]
(5)I order that the second third party pay the costs of the plaintiffs and of the sixth defendant of the summons dated 16 December 2004, including reserve costs.
(6)I order that the second third party pay the costs, including the reserve costs, of the plaintiff, sixth defendant and eight defendant of the appeal and I grant the second third party a certificate under s.4 of the Appeal Costs Act in respect of those costs.
(7)I order that First Spectrum Pty Ltd pay the costs of the plaintiffs, sixth defendant and eighth defendant, including reserve costs, of the summons of 19 July 2005.
---
1
0
0