Global Investments Ltd v Babcock and Brown LP
[2016] VSC 479
•11 August 2016
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL COURT
CORPORATIONS LIST
S CI 2013 06592
| GLOBAL INVESTMENTS LTD | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| BABCOCK & BROWN LP and others (according to the attached schedule) | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | Efthim AsJ |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 30 May 2016 and 27 July 2016 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 11 August 2016 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Global Investments Ltd v Babcock & Brown LP |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2016] VSC 479 |
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CIVIL PROCEDURE – Redacted insurance policy relied on in application to set aside default judgment – Whether plaintiff entitled to unredacted insurance policy – Privileged document – Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), s 24 – Production of unredacted insurance policy required – Costs in application to set aside default judgment.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr LWL Armstrong QC with Mr N Evans | Piper Alderman |
| For the Tenth Defendant | Mr M Jones SC with Ms K Anderson | Norton Rose Fulbright |
HIS HONOUR:
The tenth defendant, Babcock & Brown Global Investments Management Pty Ltd, applied pursuant to r 21.07 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court that the judgment entered in default of an appearance by the plaintiff, Global Investments Ltd, against the tenth defendant on 21 March 2016 be set aside. That application was heard on 30 May 2016.
On that date the following orders were made:
…
Other Matters: The plaintiff’s legal representatives undertake to keep the Babcock & Brown Limited Professional Liability Insurance Policy confidential.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The plaintiff file any further submissions by 4.00pm on 14 June 2016.
2. The tenth defendant file any submissions in reply by 4.00pm on 21 June 2016.
3. The Babcock & Brown Limited Professional Liability Insurance Policy be kept in a sealed envelope on the Court’s file, and such envelope not opened except by order of the Court.
4. The Babcock & Brown Limited Professional Liability Insurance Policy be released to the plaintiff’s legal representative forthwith.
On 23 June 2016, the Court received an email from the plaintiff’s solicitors wherein the plaintiff requested that the application be re-listed so that the following matters could be considered:
- the costs in relation to the application to set aside the default judgment;
-the form of the adjunct order sought by the plaintiff of certain insurance records; and
-an issue that arose out of order 4 made 30 May 2016, being that the Professional Liability Insurance Policy produced to the Court was redacted.
The parties subsequently agreed by consent that the default judgment be set aside.
Background
In its statement of claim, the plaintiff pleads that Babcock & Brown Rail North America LLC (‘BBRNA’) acquired a portfolio of railcars through five special purpose liability companies (‘the BBRX Five transaction’). BBSFF Rail Fund No 1 Limited (‘BBSFF’), a special purpose vehicle established by the plaintiff for the sole purpose of investing in railcar portfolios through BBRNA on behalf of Global, took up some of the shares offered for subscription by BBRNA. The plaintiff claims that it advanced US$15,000,000.00 to BBSFF to facilitate the acquisition of the shares on 21 December 2007.
The plaintiff claims that after a series of events BBRNA’s equity in its subsidiaries became worthless and it became insolvent. Its registration was cancelled on 30 December 2011.
There are eight defendants in the claim, from the tenth to seventeenth defendant. A previous statement of claim was filed but was not served, containing 19 defendants.
The tenth defendant is an Australian company that was the manager of the plaintiff for the purpose of managing and investing all of the assets of the plaintiff. The eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth defendants were employees or agents of the tenth defendant, responsible for providing investment and advisory services in relation to the BBRX Five Transaction. These defendants are known as the Advisor Defendants.
Allegations have been made that the Advisor Defendants, on behalf of and as agents of the tenth defendant, made representations that were false and engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct; that the tenth defendant breached its fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; that the tenth defendant breached a management agreement it had entered into with the plaintiff; and the tenth defendant and the Advisor Defendants also breached their common law duty to the plaintiff to take reasonable care in making certain representations to the plaintiff. In the prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to s 1041 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and s 12GF of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), equitable compensation, damages for breach of contract and damages for negligence.
The redacted insurance policy
The policy of insurance was produced to the Court pursuant to a Notice to Produce at the hearing to set aside the judgment in default on 30 May 2016. It had been referred to in an affidavit of Tricia Hobson, a solicitor of Norton Rose Fulbright representing the tenth defendant. This policy was relied on by the tenth defendant in its application to set aside the judgment in default. By reason of r 29.10 of the Supreme (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic), the tenth defendant was obliged to produce the policy for inspection. The policy produced to the Court was redacted to cover the name of the underwriter.
The tenth defendant has raised eight issues which relate to the issue of the policy being redacted.
-No indemnity has been granted by the underwriter to the tenth defendant at this stage;
-Norton Rose Fulbright is retained on the issue of coverage by the underwriters subscribing to the 2008/2009 professional indemnity insurance policy in respect of that interest. It does not act for the tenth defendant in respect of coverage;
-Norton Rose Fulbright holds a separate retainer with the liquidator on the applications before the Court. Counsel has always appeared on behalf of the liquidator and not for the underwriters on the applications before the Court;
-Norton Rose Fulbright sought to notify the plaintiff in correspondence as to the futility of this application, if default judgment was sought by the plaintiff in assessing insurance proceeds;
-the plaintiff sought access to the relevant policy and Norton Rose Fulbright held no instructions to disclose it. The policy, like all other copies of documents held in its capacity as coverage advisers to the underwriters are privileged, in accordance with the well-known principles in Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd;[1]
-the underwriters allowed the tenth defendant to disclose a version of the 2008/2009 professional indemnity policy, save for the redaction of the reference to the lead underwriter, in order to facilitate the efficient running of the applications before the Court;
-senior counsel for the tenth defendant made express reference to the document that had been provided to the plaintiff’s counsel and sought an order that the document that had been identified be produced. An order was made that the document (being the one identified) be produced and kept confidential; and
-the document produced to the Court is plainly in a form that fairly allowed the application to be heard.
[1](1997) 141 ALR 545.
The order made on 30 May 2016 for the production of the insurance policy was not opposed by the tenth defendant. There was no issue before the Court about the policy being redacted.
The plaintiff submits that it is entitled to an unredacted policy because the Notice to Produce and subsequent order required production of the insurance policy, not any redacted version. Ms Andrea Garrett, a solicitor from Norton Rose Fulbright, has deposed that the liquidator for whom she acts does not have any policy documents in its possession, and the policy that was provided to Norton Rose Fulbright by the underwriters is a privileged document. Norton Rose Fulbright does not have instructions from the underwriters to waive that privilege.
The plaintiff says the fact that the liquidator does not have an unredacted copy of the policy in its possession misses the point. The order for production simply enlivens the liquidator’s existing power to require the insurer or underwriters to produce the tenth defendant’s insurance documentation. An order for production would not be futile because the insurer and underwriters would have no tenable grounds to resist the production of a unredacted copy of the policy. Redaction is not permitted without leave of the Court and it is impossible to see how concealment of the identity of the underwriter could be justified as against the plaintiff. Even the identity of a client of a solicitor cannot be the subject of a claim for non‑disclosure on the grounds of privilege.[2]
[2]See Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 164 ALR 131 [31].
An order was made for the plaintiff to provide the insurance policy. The policy that has been provided has been redacted and in my view the onus is on the tenth defendant to justify the document being redacted.
The tenth defendant submits that the unredacted version of the insurance policy should not be required to be produced unless there is a legitimate forensic reason for the production of the document at this stage.[3]
[3]See Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2011] VSC 0003 [28].
An order was made that the document be produced. It has not been produced as required and has been redacted. It is irrelevant now whether there is a forensic purpose.
The tenth defendant submits that the document is not in its possession and it cannot produce that which it does not have. Rule 29.10(4)(b) provides:
(4)A party upon whom a notice to produce is served under paragraph (2) shall not be required to produce a document for inspection where –
(b)the document is not in that party’s possession, and the party makes and serves on the other party an affidavit in which the party –
(i)states that fact; and
(ii)states to the best of the party’s knowledge, information and belief where the document is and in whose possession it is; and
iii)where the document has been but is no longer in the party’s possession, when the party parted with it and the party’s belief as to what has become of it.
The tenth defendant relies on this rule and submits that it therefore does not have to produce the document. I note that pursuant to r 29.04(c)(ii), the tenth defendant is required to state to the best of its knowledge information and belief as to the whereabouts of the document. It has not done so. That rule does not apply.
Section 530B of the Corporations Act (2001) (Cth) provides:
(1)A person is not entitled, as against the liquidator of a company:
(a)to retain possession of books of the company; or
(b)to claim or enforce a lien on such books;
but such a lien is not otherwise prejudiced.
(2)Paragraph (1)(a) does not apply in relation to books of which a secured creditor of the company is entitled to possession otherwise than because of a lien, but the liquidator is entitled to inspect, and make copies of, such books at any reasonable time.
(3)A person must not engage in conduct that results in the hindering or obstruction of a liquidator of a company in obtaining possession of books of the company.
(3A)Subsection (3) does not apply if the person is entitled, as against the company and the liquidator, to retain possession of the books.
Note:A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (3A), see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code.
(4)The liquidator of a company may give to a person a written notice requiring the person to deliver to the liquidator, as specified in the notice, books so specified that are in the person's possession.
(5)A notice under subsection (4) must specify a period of at least 3 days as the period within which the notice must be complied with.
(6)A person must comply with a notice under subsection (4).
(6A)Subsection (6) does not apply to the extent that the person is entitled, as against the company and the liquidator, to retain possession of the books.
Note:A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (6A), see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code.
(6B)An offence based on subsection (6) is an offence of strict liability.
Note:For strict liability , see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
(7) In this section:
“liquidator” includes a provisional liquidator.
The liquidators of the tenth defendant are required to obtain the books of the company and that, in my view, includes complete copies of the company’s insurance policies.
The question of who had paid for these policies was raised by me during the hearing. On instructions, but without evidence, senior counsel for the plaintiff stated that these policies were not paid by the tenth defendant but by a parent company of the tenth defendant. That does not change the situation. The tenth defendant is entitled to the policies that were bought on its behalf for the protection of its employees and/or the company itself. I will order that the liquidators produce an unredacted copy.
Norton Rose Fulbright acts for the underwriters, whoever they may be, and also acts for the liquidator. They knew this application was made before this Court and could have notified the underwriters to attend if any objection was to be made about producing these policies.
I note that the underwriters are indemnifying the costs of the liquidator of the tenth defendant in defending this application for the production of the insurance policies, and in bringing the application to set aside the default judgment against the tenth defendant. The tenth defendant does not have any assets. The liquidators have appeared before this Court on two occasions. The first in order to, as was put to the Court by senior counsel, fulfil its duty to the insurer to defend any action brought against the company. That took into account the application to set aside the default judgment.
The second reason the liquidators were before the Court was to make submissions in relation to the costs of the application to set aside the default judgment, and to oppose the production of an unredacted insurance policy or other insurance policies on the basis that they were not in the possession of the tenth defendant or, alternatively, were of no relevance. In my view, the liquidators have a duty to collect assets and provide them to the creditors. Here, the liquidators are funded by the insurer, yet the tenth defendant is not indemnified for the purposes of the claim against it, and the liquidators appear to be doing everything within their power to obstruct a creditor of the company. In my view, it appears that the liquidators are not fulfilling their duty to a creditor of the company. It is assisting an insurer to the detriment of a creditor of the company.
The question of conflict relating to the legal representatives of the insurer and the tenth defendant was not raised by the plaintiff. It is an issue that may need to be considered in the future.
The production of earlier policies
The plaintiff seeks the production of the tenth defendant’s indemnity insurance policy or policies that were current between the period of 2006 and 2009, including any cover notes, certificates of insurance, policy schedules, standard terms and conditions or other documents that form part of the insurance contract(s). That application was made by summons dated 25 May 2016.
Gregory John Whyte, the solicitor acting on behalf of the plaintiff, has produced to the Court excerpts of the plaintiff’s 2007 and 2008 annual reports which describe the role of Mr Julian Blackley, the eleventh defendant, and Sylvia Wiggins in the management of the tenth defendant. He deposes that:
(a)under the 2008 Policy a third party claim is considered to be “made” when the Assured’s Management first:
A.“becomes aware of any fact, circumstance or event which could reasonably be anticipated to give rise to a Claim at any future Time.”
B.(Clause 7(c) of the Policy).
(b)the Assured means BBL and its subsidiaries (including BBGIM) – and includes their directors;
(c)the ‘Assured’ under that definition, and in any event BBGIM’s actual ‘management’ included, in August 2008, Ms Sylvia Wiggins and Mr Julian Blackley as directors of BBGIM (and Mr Blackley was also BBGIM’s CEO);
(d)Mr Blackley raised the Collateralisation Obligation and Everest Loan Term (as defined in the Statement of Claim) with Gil’s board during a board meeting on 12 August 2008. Ms Wiggins was in attendance at this board meeting.
(e)there was email traffic involving Mr Blackley and Ms Wiggins later in August recording the plaintiff’s Board’s increasing concerns regarding the Collateralisation Obligation and Everest Loan Term, and the developments that gave rise to the claims now set out in the Statement of Claim.
(f)those developments were plainly such as could lead to a claim against BBGIM (as indeed has happened), and Blackley and Wiggins were fairly on notice of the plaintiff’s Board’s concerns before the end of August 2008.
Based on the affidavit of Mr Whyte, it is submitted that there are grounds to expect that the Assured, which includes Babcock and Brown Limited and the tenth defendant and its directors under the extended definition in the 2008 policy, were on notice of a claim by the time of the plaintiff’s board meeting on 12 August 2008 or the email traffic on 29 August 2008. The plaintiff submits that it follows that the policy before September 2008 will be relevant to the decision by the plaintiff whether to proceed against the tenth defendant. It says production ought to be ordered on that basis.
The tenth defendant opposes the production of the insurance policies because it submits that it does not have those policies in its possession. I have dealt with that issue previously. These policies are, in my view, documents that the liquidator will be able to obtain as a book of the company.
The tenth defendant also submits that there is no material to demonstrate that the policies are relevant to any issues or the parties. The statement of claim refers to conduct commenced in November 2007 by the Babcock and Brown entities. A request for policies going back to 2006 is not unreasonable in such circumstances. The plaintiff is seeking to obtain information regarding whether there is a fund and what response was made to claims made in respect of earlier conduct by the parties and if there is a policy that responds to that conduct.
Pursuant to s 24 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), a person must use reasonable endeavours to ensure that legal costs and other costs incurred in connection with the civil proceeding are reasonable and proportionate to the complexity or importance of the issues in dispute. Here, the plaintiff, if it is given the insurance policies, can make an informed decision as to whether it intends to proceed against the tenth defendant and other defendants, or whether it is futile to do so. The Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), in my view, requires the production of these policies.
Costs
Chronology
A chronology relevant to the application to set aside the default judgment, which goes to costs, is as follows:
- in February 2012, the tenth defendant was placed into liquidation;
- on 28 November 2014, on an application by the plaintiff, the tenth defendant was reinstated;
- on 6 February 2015, Messrs Preston and McKenzie were appointed as joint and several liquidators in the winding up of the tenth defendant, effective from 8 December 2014;
- on 10 February 2015, the plaintiff filed a statement of claim;
- on 14 May 2015, the Advisor Defendants filed a defence and counterclaim;
- on 23 June 2015, a reply and defence to counterclaim was filed by the plaintiff;
- on 21 August 2015, the Advisor Defendants filed and served an amended defence and counterclaim;
- on 5 February 2016, a letter was sent to the tenth defendant’s directors and liquidators which advised that the plaintiff intended to enter default judgment if a notice of appearance was not filed and served by 12 February 2016;
- on 15 February 2016, the plaintiff received a letter from the liquidators requesting that the plaintiff not enter default judgment and confirming that if default judgment was entered, the tenth defendant would likely become insolvent and a process would commence to convert the current members voluntary liquidation into a creditors voluntary liquidation;
- on 23 February 2016, the plaintiff received a letter from the liquidators advising that the tenth defendant had written to the solicitors acting for the underwriters of the potentially relevant insurance policy;
- on 1 March 2016, an email was sent by Tricia Hobson of Norton Rose Fulbright for the underwriters to the liquidators, informing them that they were investigating and seeking instructions from the underwriters of the financial, professional and liability insurance policy issued to the plaintiff;
- on 7 March 2016, Ms Hobson sent a further email to the liquidators requesting that they notify the plaintiff’s solicitor and seek to ensure that no steps would be taken which were prejudicial to her clients whilst she was obtaining urgent instructions from the underwriters to that issue;
- on 8 March 2016, the plaintiff sent an email to the liquidators advising that the plaintiff would not confirm that it would refrain from entering default judgment given that one year had passed since the tenth defendant had first been put on notice that the plaintiff intended to apply for default judgment;
- on 21 March 2016, the plaintiff entered default judgment against the tenth defendant;
- on 31 March 2016, the liquidators advised Norton Rose Fulbright there had been no correspondence or discussions with the plaintiff’s solicitors since the previous email forwarded on 8 March 2016;
- on 31 March 2016, the plaintiff sent an email to the liquidators advising that default judgment had been entered against the tenth defendant;
- on 6 April 2016, Norton Rose Fulbright wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors in Brisbane in respect to the default judgment, advising that they intended to seek an order to set aside the default judgment against the tenth defendant.
The plaintiff submits that the tenth defendant should pay its costs for the following reasons:
- the tenth defendant conceded that the default judgment was regularly entered and there is no reason to depart from the rule that an order to set aside a regularly entered judgment will be set aside on terms that the defendant pays the plaintiff’s costs;[4] and
- the plaintiff’s consent to the orders setting aside the default judgment was provided in circumstances where a new argument was raised by the tenth defendant for the first time at the hearing. This does not justify departure from the general rule that an order to set aside a regularly entered judgment will be on terms that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs.
[4]See Permanent Custodians Ltd v El Ali (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1391.
The argument raised by the tenth defendant, which led to consent orders that the judgment in default be set aside, was raised in written submissions which were received by the plaintiff on the morning of the hearing. There was correspondence in May 2016 between the parties in which the solicitors for the tenth defendant made reference to some matters which were raised at the hearing. This correspondence is not sufficient in my view to have put the plaintiff on notice of all of the grounds raised in the submissions. There is nothing in the correspondence which prevents the plaintiff from obtaining an order for its costs to be paid by the tenth defendant.
The tenth defendant submitted that the plaintiff should not have contested the application to set aside the default judgment and that costs would have been saved. In my view, when hearing the application, the plaintiff did not act inappropriately. It only became aware of the defendant’s submission shortly prior to the hearing and it was appropriate for the plaintiff to contest the application.
The defendant says that the Court should consider the following matters which relate to the reasonableness of the initial application by the plaintiff applying for judgment in default, which include:
- at the time of applying for default judgment the plaintiff was well aware that the parties in the same position as the tenth defendant had put forward substantial defences to the statement of claim;
- at the time of applying for default judgment the plaintiff also knew that the insurers of the tenth defendant were urgently looking into matters, knowing that the underwriters had recently commenced investigating coverage under the Babcock & Brown Limited Professional Liability Insurance Policy; and
- at the time of applying for default judgment the plaintiff must be taken to have known the effect of the Court’s rules and the fact of the substantial defences that the individual defendants had put forward in terms of time or costs. The plaintiff must have known that it could not proceed to a quantum hearing in advance of the trial against the individual defendants. It would therefore not be better off in terms of time or costs in obtaining a default judgment.
In my view, none of these matters assist the tenth defendant. It is true that the plaintiff did know that parties in a similar position to the tenth defendant had filed substantial defences. That does not necessarily mean that the tenth defendant would put in the same defence. The plaintiff gave the defendant and the insurer ample time to file defences, but nothing was filed. The plaintiff was entitled to enter judgment.
The tenth defendant submits that if the Court considers the plaintiff should receive an award of costs of some kind it is relevant to take into account the following matters:
- the plaintiff was promptly informed of the tenth defendant’s intention to file a defence as soon as it was advised that default judgment had been obtained;
- to the extent that the default judgment was seen as a vehicle to access insurance proceeds, the plaintiff had been advised as early as 6 April 2016 that the tenth defendant was in breach of policy conditions; and
- on 2 May 2016, the plaintiff was further advised of the breach of policy conditions and the adverse impact that would have on policy response.
I note that even at the time of the letter of 2 May 2016, the plaintiff did not have the insurance policy. Production of it had been resisted, even though the tenth defendant was referring to the policy in correspondence. In these circumstances, there is nothing in my view to displace the ordinary presumption regarding who pays the costs of such applications to set aside judgments.
The tenth defendant also raised that the plaintiff was unable to provide a reasoned argument on the contested application as to why the tenth defendant could not be said to have a defence on the merits. It appeared to me that the tenth defendant would have a defence on the merits, but in Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Lefkovic,[5] Tadgell J stated:
A defendant who seeks the exercise of the court's discretion to set aside a default judgment ordinarily needs at least to show a possible defence on the merits. This is not shown merely by producing a draft pleading which, if the allegations it contains could be proved, would entitle the defendant to succeed at trial. There must be some evidence tending to support them. This I take to be axiomatic and evidence is not provided by a draft pleading.[6]
[5](Unreported), Supreme Court of Victoria, Tadgell J, (24 June 1992).
[6]Ibid 7.
The tenth defendant failed to provide evidence which demonstrates a possible defence on the merits. It should have provided such evidence, as is required, but did not. The judgment would have been set aside but the defendant would have been required to provide evidence first. This does not assist the tenth defendant on the question of costs.
After the hearing concluded before me in relation to the setting aside of the default judgment, the parties were asked to exchange submissions, which they did. It was after submissions were exchanged, and prior to the hearing on 27 July 2016 that the plaintiff agreed to the default judgment being set aside. The plaintiff’s submissions were made on the basis that the default judgment should not be set aside. No costs will be awarded in relation to those submissions. The plaintiff will be entitled to its costs from the tenth defendant up to and including the date of the hearing of the application to set aside the judgment in default. Those costs will be paid on a standard basis.
The plaintiff seeks that there be an order for the immediate taxation of costs. It relies on the Court of Appeal decision in Setka v Abbott MP (No 2),[7] where the Court of Appeal stated that the factors which may warrant an immediate taxation of costs are:
[7][2013] VSCA 376 (‘Setka’).
- the prospect of considerable delay in completion of the proceedings;
- the issue the subject of the interlocutory order is discrete from what will finally require determinations; and
- the party against whom the substantive order was made was guilty of unsatisfactory conduct.
There is no doubt that the issue before the Court was a discrete issue. There has been a delay in the proceedings because the tenth defendant is yet to file a defence and there has been no discovery. The liquidators have been without funds and it is understandable that they have not taken any steps to defend the case, but they should have notified the insurer. The tenth defendant was deregistered in November 2012 and was reinstated in November 2013. The liquidators were appointed in February 2015. A statement of claim was filed in April 2015, with the first statement of claim being filed in November 2013. There has been an inordinate delay on behalf of the liquidators after the second statement of claim was filed in notifying the insurer of the claim.
The insurer did not have a great amount of time by which to investigate and conclude whether it would indemnify the tenth defendant prior to the default judgment being entered. Costs are not being sought against the insurer but against the tenth defendant.
The liquidators for the tenth defendant did not act appropriately as they did not notify the insurer as they should have. They ignored the warnings given to them by the plaintiff and due to their inactivity, judgment was entered. The liquidators should pay the plaintiff’s costs forthwith as all of the three criteria in Setka have been met in favour of the plaintiff.
SCHEDULE OF DEFENDANTS
BABCOCK & BROWN GLOBAL INVESTMENTS
MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (ACN 118 871 140)
Tenth Defendant
JULIAN BLACKLEY
Eleventh Defendant
EMMA YIM
Twelfth Defendant
DOMINIC MILLGATE
Thirteenth Defendant
PETER HOCKING
Fourteenth Defendant
MARK JUAN
Fifteenth Defendant
BRAD HOPWOOD
Sixteenth Defendant
TIM ELLEN
Seventeenth Defendant
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2
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