NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION: GLG Australia Pty. Ltd. v. The Nominal Defendant & Ors. [2004] NSWCA 166
FILE NUMBER(S):
40446/03
HEARING DATE(S): 8 April 2004
JUDGMENT DATE: 01/06/2004
PARTIES:
GLG Australia Pty. Ltd. - appellant
The Nominal Defendant - first respondent
Salim Fahd Tleyji - second respondent
Ready Workforce Pty. Limited - third respondent
JUDGMENT OF: Hodgson JA Tobias JA McColl JA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC 788/01
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Delaney DCJ
COUNSEL:
Mr. J. Maconachie QC with Mr. N. Polin for appellant
Mr. P. Deakin QC with Mr. P. Nolan for the first respondent
Mr. P. Neil SC for the second respondent
SOLICITORS:
CATCHWORDS:
TORTS
NEGLIGENCE - Motor accidents legislation - Workplace injury involving forklift truck - Whether injury within motor accidents legislation - Whether caused by the fault of the owner - Whether result of and caused during the driving of the vehicle - Whether motor accident insurer liable.
LEGISLATION CITED:
Motor Accidents Act 1988 s.3, 47A.
DECISION:
Appeal allowed. Parties to bring in Short Minutes of Order.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40446/03
DC 788/01HODGSON JA
TOBIAS JA
McCOLL JATuesday 1 June 2004
GLG AUSTRALIA PTY. LTD. V. NOMINAL DEFENDANT & ORS.
Judgment
HODGSON JA: On 24 August 1999, the second respondent (the plaintiff) suffered an injury at the premises of the appellant (GLG). At the time, the plaintiff was employed by the third respondent (Ready Workforce), a labour hire organisation. The plaintiff sued Ready Workforce and GLG in the District Court, claiming damages for personal injury. In his Statement of Claim, the plaintiff alleged inter alia that the injury was caused by the negligence of GLG in connection with the operation of a forklift truck, which it owned and which was driven by GLG’s employee. In its Defence, GLG alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s damages should be assessed in accordance with the Motor Accidents Act 1988.
Each defendant put on a cross-claim against the other, claiming contribution or indemnity. On the first day of the hearing before Delaney DCJ in the District Court, the first respondent (the Nominal Defendant) applied pursuant to s.47A of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 to be joined as a party to the proceedings, as being in the position of the insurer of the forklift truck, in order to argue that it had no obligation under the relevant insurance policy to indemnify GLG; and the primary judge made an order to that effect.
On 2 May 2003, the primary judge disposed of the proceedings by making orders to the following effect: verdict and judgment for the plaintiff against Ready Workforce in the sum of $72,541.98; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff against GLG in the sum of $264,740.69; that GLG was not entitled to indemnity from the Nominal Defendant; Ready Workforce and GLG to pay the plaintiff’s costs; GLG to pay the Nominal Defendant’s costs; and cross-claims dismissed.
GLG appealed from…
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- Case
- [2004] NSWCA 166
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the injury sustained by the employee, which occurred during the operation of a forklift truck in a workplace setting, constituted an "injury" for the purposes of the Motor Accidents Act 1988. This required the court to determine if the injury was caused by the fault of the owner of the vehicle and if it was the result of and caused during the driving of the vehicle, thereby engaging the liability of the motor accident insurer.
The court considered several previous decisions, including *NRMA Insurance Ltd v NSW Grain Corporation* and *AMP General Insurance v Brett*, which had established that injuries occurring during the loading or unloading of vehicles, or as an integral part of their use for delivery, could fall within the ambit of the Act. However, the court also noted the decision in *Prospect County Council v Foster*, where an injury sustained while working from a cherry-picker, and where the vehicle itself played no causal role in the accident, was held to be outside the Act. Crucially, the court observed that the definition of "injury" in the Motor Accidents Act had been amended in 1995 with the express purpose of excluding at least some workplace accidents, including, it was commented, largely excluding loading and unloading cases. Applying this amended definition and the principles from the case law, the court concluded that the injury in this instance did not fall within the scope of the Motor Accidents Act.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed. The court declared that GLG Australia Pty Ltd was entitled to an indemnity from the Nominal Defendant, which would result in a reduction of the original verdict in favour of the plaintiff. The parties were directed to bring in short minutes of order.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal allowed. Parties to bring in Short Minutes of Order.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
One such case was NRMA Insurance Ltd. v. NSW Grain Corporation (1995) 22 MVR 317. In that case, the plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment during the unloading of a grain elevator from a truck and trailer, as a result of the grain elevator falling and pinning the plaintiff by the legs. The employer was found liable in negligence, and sought indemnity from the insurer of the truck and trailer under the terms of the policy in Schedule 1 of the Motor Accidents Act 1988. The trial judge held that the employer was entitled to be indemnified under the policy, because the injury had been caused by the fault of the employer, being the owner of the vehicle, in the use or operation of the vehicle. The insurer’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, on the basis that the employer’s negligence in failing to providing a safe system of work in unloading the vehicle could be categorised as the fault of the employer in the use of the vehicle; this negligence caused the injuries to the plaintiff; and the act of unloading was a use of the vehicle at the time the plaintiff was injured. Next, in AMP General Insurance v. Brett (1999) 27 MVR 492, it was submitted that an accident which occurred when a delivery boy jumped off the back of a milk truck into the path of a motor cyclist, causing an accident, should be regarded as independent of the use or operation of the milk truck so as to take it outside the ambit of the insurance cover required by the Motor Accidents Act. In the Court of Appeal, Cole JA (at 495) said it was “an integral part of the use of a milk delivery truck that someone delivers milk from it”. Accordingly, the injury to the plaintiff was “in a direct and proximate way” a result of the use or operation of the vehicle. Beazley and Stein JJA agreed with Cole JA. The opposite result was reached in Prospect County Council v. Foster (2001) 33 MVR 228. In that case, the plaintiff had been electrocuted while working in a cherry-picker repairing electricity wires. The primary cause of the accident was the failure of a test instrument to detect that the conductors were alive, and the cherry-picker played no role in the accident, apart from bringing the plaintiff and his assistant into proximity to the live conductors where they had to carry out the necessary work. It was argued that this fell under the Motor Accidents Act 1988, on the basis that there was fault in the use or operation of the cherry-picker, because the plaintiff could only be brought into proximity to the live conductors by use of the cherry-picker. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal. It is to be noted in relation to those cases that, although the relevant insurance policy was in the same terms as that under consideration here, the relevant definition of “injury” in the Act was not. The definition relevant to the present case was introduced by the Motor Accidents (Amendment) Act 1995, commencing 1 January 1996. As indicated by the second reading speech, its purpose was to exclude at least some workplace accidents from the operation of the Motor Accidents Act, and the comment was made in this speech that it largely excluded loading and unloading cases.