Glenn Melrose v Telstra Corporation Limited

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[2023] FWC 273

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.365—General protections

Glenn Melrose
v

Telstra Corporation Limited

(C2022/7835)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT LAKE

BRISBANE, 31 JANUARY 2023

Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal – application made outside of statutory timeframe – application for extension of time dismissed.

  1. Mr Glenn Melrose (the Applicant) lodged an application with the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) pursuant to s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) to deal with a general protections dispute in relation to the termination of his employment by Telstra Corporation Limited (the Respondent). The Applicant began his employment on 1 March 2014. The Applicant was dismissed on 3 November 2022. The application was lodged with the Commission on 25 November 2022.

  1. By virtue of s.366(1) of the Act, an application under s.365 of the Act must be made within 21 days after a dismissal took effect, or in such further time as the Commission may allow under s.366(2) of the Act. The Applicant acknowledged that he lodged his application one day outside the statutory time limit. To be within time, the Applicant should have lodged his application on or before 24 November 2022.

Preliminary matters

  1. Directions were issued for the filing of material and a hearing was listed for 10.00am on 25 January 2023. At which the Respondent sought to be represented. This was not opposed by the Applicant. Even so, I am still required to consider whether permission ought to be granted under s.596 of the Act.[1] The first pre-requisite: the presence of one of the criteria under s.596(2), does not immediately invoke the right to representation but rather “involves an evaluative judgment akin to the exercise of discretion.”[2] Once that first step is satisfied, the second step “involves consideration as to whether in all of the circumstances the discretion should be exercised in favour of the party seeking permission.”[3] Given the volume of evidence and submissions provided by the parties and the nuanced legal arguments involved in considering whether the Applicant’s reasons were exceptional, I was satisfied that it would be of use to the Commission – and would not unduly prejudice the opposing party – to have the assistance of the Respondent’s legal representative. I was also satisfied that the presence of the representative would also enable the matter to be dealt with more efficiently. Accordingly, I allowed Mr Michael Tamvakologos of Seyfarth Shaw Australia to appear for the Respondent.

Was the application lodged within time?

  1. Section 366(1) of the Act requires that an application for general protections dismissal be made within 21 days after a dismissal took effect, or in such further time as the Commission may allow pursuant to s.366(2) of the Act.

  1. The Applicant lodged his application on 25 November 2022. He accepts that his application was made one day outside of the 21 days required under s.366(1) of the Act.

  1. The Respondent opposes the granting of an extension of time. It is therefore necessary to determine whether a further period should…

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Details
Case
[2023] FWC 273
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Glenn Melrose initiated an application with the Fair Work Commission (FWC) against Telstra Corporation Limited, challenging the dismissal of his employment on the grounds of general protections under the Fair Work Act 2009. The Applicant, Mr Melrose, was dismissed on 3 November 2022, and his application was lodged with the FWC on 25 November 2022, one day past the statutory 21-day limit prescribed by s.366(1) of the Act for making such an application. The core legal issue was whether the FWC should permit an extension of the statutory time limit for lodging the application under s.366(2) of the Act, considering the circumstances surrounding the delay.

The FWC Deputy President Lake meticulously assessed the application, weighing several factors to determine if "exceptional circumstances" existed, as required by s.366(2) of the Act. These factors included the reason for the delay, actions taken to dispute the dismissal, any prejudice to the employer, the merits of the application, and fairness to other similarly situated individuals. The Applicant argued that confusion caused by a new employment contract issued by the Respondent and his medical condition contributed to the delay. However, the FWC found that the Applicant's reasons were not exceptional. The confusion argument was deemed deceptive, as the Applicant had deliberately delayed accepting the new employment contract to obfuscate his termination. Additionally, the Applicant's medical condition did not prevent him from lodging the application within time, given his ability to communicate regarding other employment matters.

Ultimately, the FWC concluded that none of the Applicant's reasons qualified as "exceptional circumstances" warranting an extension of time. Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the FWC did not grant an extension under s.366(2) of the Act.

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