Glen Innes Severn Council v Faint

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DETERMINATION OF APPEAL PANEL
CITATION: Glen Innes Severn Council v Faint [2024] NSWPICMP 702
APPELLANT: Glen Innes Severn Council
RESPONDENT: Diana Faint
APPEAL PANEL
MEMBER: Catherine McDonald
MEDICAL ASSESSOR: Christopher Oates
MEDICAL ASSESSOR: Doron Sher
DATE OF DECISION: 9 October 2024

CATCHWORDS: 

WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; assessment of whole person impairment after bilateral knee replacements; Medical Assessor made section 323 deduction of 1/10th; analysis of contemporaneous evidence as to arthritis; Cole v Wenaline Pty Ltd, Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Lewandowski; Southwell v Qantas Airways Limited; Medical Assessment Certificate revoked.

BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION TO APPEAL

  1. On 16 July 2024 Glen Innes Severn Council (the Council) lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by Medical Assessor Peter Honeyman, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 19 June 2024.

  2. The Council relies on the grounds of appeal under s 327(3)(c) and (d) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act):

    ·        the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and

    ·        the MAC contains a demonstrable error.

  3. The President’s delegate was satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal was made out, being that the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria with respect to a deduction under s 323 of the 1998 Act. We conducted a review of the original medical assessment, limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.

  4. Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 – Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules.

  5. The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed 1 March 2021 (the Guidelines) and the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th ed (AMA 5).

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

  1. Ms Faint suffered an injury on 16 November 2012 when she tripped while walking up a ramp. Though the main treatment immediately following the injury was for her left knee, it is agreed between Ms Faint and the Council that she suffered injury to both knees. She underwent a right total knee replacement in 2019 and a left total knee replacement in 2020. Ms Faint had undergone previous surgery to her left knee in 1998 and 2000.

  2. The matter was listed before the Personal Injury Commission (Commission) on 5 March 2024 and the disputes between the parties were resolved with the exception of the extent of the permanent impairment suffered by Ms Faint, including any deduction under s 323 of the…

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Details
Case
[2024] NSWPICMP 702
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Glen Innes Severn Council v Faint involved a dispute over the assessment of whole person impairment following bilateral knee replacements. The matter was heard in the Workers Compensation Court of New South Wales. The claimant, Faint, argued that the Medical Assessor's deduction of 1/10th under section 323 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 was erroneous. The court had to determine whether the deduction was appropriate, given the evidence of pre-existing arthritis, and whether the statutory requirements were met.

The primary legal issue was whether the Medical Assessor correctly applied section 323 in making the deduction for pre-existing conditions. The court had to assess if the deduction was based on evidence of the actual consequences of the pre-existing condition or if it was made on an assumption or hypothesis. The court also needed to determine whether the statutory approach was correctly applied, given the principles set out in cases such as Cole v Wenaline Pty Ltd, Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Lewandowski, and Southwell v Qantas Airways Limited.

The court, following the principles established in Cole and affirmed in subsequent cases, held that the deduction under section 323 must be based on evidence of the actual consequences of the pre-existing condition. The court found that the Medical Assessor erred in making an assumption that the surgery would always result in a level of residual impairment contributing to the later injury, without considering the evidence of the actual consequences of the pre-existing arthritis. Consequently, the court revoked the Medical Assessment Certificate. The court emphasised that the deduction must be made on the evidence led in each case, and assumptions or hypotheses have no role in that assessment.

The final orders of the court included the revocation of the Medical Assessment Certificate and a direction for a new assessment to be undertaken in accordance with the correct legal principles.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Griffiths AJ summarised the effect of Cole in Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Lewandowski,[6] referring also to Schmidt J’s decision in Elcheikh v Diamond Formwork (NSW) Pty Ltd (in liq):[7][6] [2023] NSWSC 334.[7] [2013] NSWSC 365.“… it is well-settled that s 323 of the 1998 Act requires a medical assessor or a Panel hearing an appeal to reach a conclusion as to whether or not any proportion of permanent impairment assessed has resulted from an earlier injury, pre-existing condition or abnormality. Moreover, that conclusion must generally be reached on the evidence adduced concerning the actual consequences of the earlier and later injury (unless the assumption provided for in s 323(2) applies). It is well to set out the following relevant paragraphs from Cole v Wenaline Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 78 at [29]–[31] per Schmidt J (emphasis added):[29] As the plaintiff argued, to so approach the exercise required to be undertaken by s 323, was to fall into an error of law. The section is directed to a situation where there is a pre-existing injury, pre-existing condition or abnormality. For a deduction to be made from what has been assessed to have been the level of impairment which resulted from the later injury in question, a conclusion is required, on the evidence, that the pre-existing injury, pre-existing condition or abnormality caused or contributed to that impairment.[30] Section 323 does not permit that assessment to be made on the basis of an assumption or hypothesis, that once a particular injury has occurred, it will always, ‘irrespective of outcome’, contribute to the impairment flowing from any subsequent injury. The assessment must have regard to the evidence as to the actual consequences of the earlier injury, pre-existing condition or abnormality. The extent that the later impairment was due to the earlier injury, pre-existing condition or abnormality must be determined. The only exception is that provided for in s 323(2), where the required deduction ‘will be difficult or costly to determine (because, for example, of the absence of medical evidence)’. In that case, an assumption is provided for, namely that the deduction ‘is 10% of the impairment'. Even then, that assumption is displaced, if it is at odds with the available evidence.[31] The reason for this statutory approach can readily be seen. It is entirely possible that a person could suffer such a catastrophic injury, that the presence or absence of any previous injury, pre-existing condition or abnormality, would make no difference at all to the impairment which resulted from the later injury. An injury which results in death, is an obvious example, albeit not one which would arise for consideration under this section. A more relevant example, in this case, is a second injury which severed the spine. Or, as was discussed in the authorities, an earlier injury which was asymptomatic, may or may not contribute to the impairment which results from a second injury. That is a matter of fact to be assessed on the evidence led in each case. An assumption of the kind here made, namely that surgery to the lumber spine, irrespective of outcome, must always result in a level of residual impairment which contributes to the level of impairment which follows a later injury, has no role to play in that assessment. What must be determined on the evidence is whether any proportion of the permanent impairment present after the second injury was due to the earlier injury.Her Honour affirmed those principles in Elcheikh and summarised the relevant steps to be taken under s 323 at [126]:As discussed in Cole v Wenaline Pty Limited at [30], in the case of a workplace injury caused by an exacerbation or acceleration of a pre-existing condition, what must be determined by a medical specialist under s 323 is:•Firstly, what the extent of the resulting impairment is.•Secondly, whether the pre-existing condition contributed to the impairment.•Thirdly, if it did, what proportion of the impairment was due to the pre-existing condition.” (emphasis in original).

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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