Gleeson v Melbourne Collision Repair Centre Pty Ltd

[2025] VCC 818

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA

AT MELBOURNE

COMMERCIAL DIVISION

Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication

GENERAL LIST

Case No. CI-25-02710

JEFFERY GLEESON

v

MELBOURNE COLLISION REPAIR CENTRE PTY LTD
(ACN 628 009 861)

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JUDGE:	HIS HONOUR JUDGE WISE
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	6 June 2025
DATE OF RULING:	6 June 2025 (ex tempore)
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Gleeson v Melbourne Collision Repair Centre Pty Ltd
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2025] VCC 818

REASONS FOR RULING
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Subject:Interlocutory Injunction    

Catchwords:  Enforcement of judgment, default judgment for delivery up of motor vehicle, power to fix time and place for delivery, injunction, threat to damage or alter vehicle, post-judgment relief to preserve property, undertaking as to damages, balance of convenience, proprietary interests at risk.

Legislation Cited: County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 (Vic), County Court Act 1958 (Vic),

Cases Cited:

Ruling:

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	Mr J Gleeson KC, self-represented.
For the Defendant	No appearance.

HIS HONOUR:

1On 3 June 2025, I gave a general form of judgment in favour of the plaintiff which required the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff a Volkswagen Polo motor vehicle, registration number 1IC7OM, and that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs fixed in the sum of $1,412.60.

2The motor vehicle has not been delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff.  By summons issued at short notice today, the plaintiff seeks orders:

(1)     that the defendant be restrained until further order from damaging or otherwise interfering with the vehicle; and

(2)     that the defendant deliver the vehicle to Bayford Volkswagen, 675 Burwood Road, Hawthorn East, at 2pm on Saturday 7 June 2025.

3By way of background,  Mr Gleeson has engaged in an email correspondence with a Mr Michael Beasley of Beasley and Associates Solicitors, who apparently acted for the defendant to try and obtain redelivery of the vehicle pursuant to the judgment.

4During the course of that correspondence, the defendant has taken the position that, given that Mr Gleeson did not authorise the repairs to the vehicle, it was open to them to remove the panels that they had repaired without his authority and replace them with the damaged panels that previously were on the vehicle.

5Mr Gleeson has taken the view, correctly, I think that the order requiring redelivery does not authorise the defendant to, in some way, alter the vehicle. Certainly not to replace the work that they had done with the faulty panels or the damaged panels that were previously on the vehicle.

6Under those circumstances Mr Gleeson has sought urgent relief to restrain the defendants from doing what they have said they will do, and in essence, asking the Court to fix a time and place for the redelivery of the vehicle.

7In relation to the second order – that is, fixing a time and place for the redelivery of the vehicle – I am satisfied that I have the power to make that order pursuant to County Court Civil Procedure Rules r59.03(4), which reads:

“Where a judgment or order requires a person to do an act but does not fix a time within which the person is required to do the act, the Court may, by order, fix a time.”

8The judgment which was entered requiring redelivery of the vehicle did not fix a time for doing so.  Under those circumstances, it seems to me that I have the power to make the order No 2, and I will also fix a place for it to be redelivered.

9I will order that the defendant deliver the motor vehicle to the plaintiff at Bayford Volkswagen, 675 Burwood Road, Hawthorn East, between the hours of 12 noon and 2pm on Saturday, 7 June 2025.

10I have given the defendant a 2-hour window so that there should be no reason why there is a difficulty with compliance with this order.

11As to the first order that is sought, which is in the nature of an injunction to restrain the defendant from damaging or otherwise interfering with the vehicle, I have set out above the threat that gives rise to the plaintiff’s application.

12Mr Gleeson has read to me a number of communications which are not in his current affidavit that was filed on an urgent basis with this application.  I have required him to file a further affidavit that will exhibit that correspondence, which includes a “without prejudice” communication which he will redact, and leave open for the Court’s perusal the threat to inflict damage to the vehicle.

13During the course of my delivering these reasons, an email was received from Mr Beasley, who, confusingly, indicated that he did not act for the defendant but purported to provide some information relevant to the application.  The information that he did provide related to an assertion that the wrong defendant had been sued, and possibly also gesturing towards a claim that the defendants might have against Mr Gleeson for unjust enrichment.  This is put on the basis that he and his daughter had permitted the repairs to be carried out on the vehicle but now do not wish to pay for those services. 

14None of those matters impact at this stage, because judgment in default of appearance has already been entered, requiring the delivery up of the vehicle.  The defendant has not applied to the Court to set aside that judgment.  Under those circumstances the defendant was, from the time that the judgment was given, obliged to deliver up the vehicle, and continues to be under that obligation.

15I am satisfied that the Court has the same power pursuant to s 53 of the County Court Act 1958 as the Supreme Court to compel obedience to its orders. Some of those powers lie in the powers of enforcement, including to issue warrants. The Court must also enjoy a power to issue an injunction to preserve the status quo in respect of property which it has by judgment ordered to be delivered up from damage by the defendant when this is threatened.

16The correspondence as read to me by Mr Gleeson that it is defendant’s position that it threatens to alter the state of the vehicle from the state it was in at the time judgment for delivery up was given, is confusing.  At one level there seems to be something of a concession that the defendant may have resiled from its threat.  However, in the same communications Mr Beasley purported to no longer act for the defendant.  In his email to the Court at 3.10pm he has included the following sentence:

“Apart from the new panel repairs remaining, I have no further instructions.  I have informed you about this and believe paragraph 1 of your summons is unnecessary.”

17He continues on:

“I confirm I no longer act in this matter nor do I have any other instructions.”

18It is difficult for the Court to be clear about whether Mr Beasley does act for the defendant and is therefore authorised to give, what might be, if in some proper form, an undertaking to maintain the vehicle in its current repaired condition.

19Doing the best I can, and without hearing from the defendants, I have to be satisfied that this is a proper case for the grant of an injunction.  Whether this is an interlocutory injunction where I have to be satisfied of a prima facie case or a serious question to be tried, with the balance of convenience as a second factor to be considered is a moot point.  I am prepared to approach the matter as though that is the test to be satisfied.  The nature of the injunction is not that different from a freezing order, which clearly can be given post-judgment where a defendant threatens to remove their assets from the jurisdiction of the Court so as to render the judgment of the Court nugatory.

20It is similar because, in this case, the defendant has threatened to cause damage to a vehicle which has already been the subject of a judgment to deliver up.  Under those circumstances, it seems to me that I should ensure that I am satisfied:

·        that there is a prima facie case, or a serious question to be tried, that the threat has been made.  I am so satisfied;

·        that if carried out, the threat would cause damage to the plaintiff’s proprietary interests in the vehicle thus impairing the value of the asset that is subject to judgment.  It is self-evident that this is the case; and

·        that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction as the course least likely to cause damage if it turns out that the injunction was wrongly given. 

21Mr Gleeson also notes that it may be that a defendant who is ordered to deliver up goods may well commit a contempt of court if, in the knowledge of the order, they damage the subject matter of the order.  I do not need to determine that question, but I consider it is at least possible that that is so.  Whether that contempt of court, if that is what it is, can be prosecuted in this case, given that the judgment did not have a penal order warning on it, is an entirely different question to the one before me. 

22In order to ensure that the balance of convenience is properly struck, I did ask Mr Gleeson whether he would provide the usual undertaking as to damages as the price for the grant of the injunction that he seeks.  He has informed the Court that he does give that undertaking.  It seems to me that the defendant’s position will be adequately protected as a consequence of that undertaking as to damages.

23Mr Gleeson has also advised the Court that he owns real estate in his own name which is unencumbered in a value that well exceeds the amount of the repair costs that the defendant may, on its view of the world, wish to sue for.  The amount of those repairs is $17,079.04.  Mr Gleeson has handed up a note which contains the address of that property, and I am going to annotate that document with the figure that he put as the value of the real estate.  That piece of paper will be marked and kept as a confidential exhibit at this stage.

24Under those circumstances it seems to me that the defendant’s position is adequately protected by the undertaking as to damages, and, in light of the threat that has previously been made to damage the vehicle, and the failure of the defendant to give an undertaking that it will not continue to or further damage the vehicle, it seems to me that the appropriate course is to order that the vehicle be delivered up.

25Under those circumstances I will make orders in accordance with the summons.

26I will fix Mr Gleeson’s costs in the amount of the filing fee that he has incurred for the issue of the summons.  Who should pay for those costs can be argued on another occasion, if necessary.

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Certificate

I certify that these 6 pages are a true copy of the judgment of His Honour Judge Wise delivered on 6 June 2025.

Dated: 20 June 2025

Liam Crough

Associate to His Honour Judge Wise.