GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1196

File number: NSD 1090 of 2015
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 7 October 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether the applicants are entitled to interlocutory injunctive relief to restrain the resumption of an advertising and marketing campaign which has been the subject of an undertaking to cease the campaign and not to resume it up to and including the commencement of the hearing of certain separate questions  
Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law, s 18, s 29

Federal Court Rules 2011, r 30.01

Cases cited:

Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238

Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 106 IPR 218

Date of hearing: 2 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 105
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr R Cobden SC and Mr HPT Bevan
Solicitor for the Applicants: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr AP Coleman SC and Mr ARR Vincent
Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1090 of 2015
BETWEEN:

GLAXOSMITHKLINE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

First Applicant

GLAXOSMITHKLINE CONSUMER HEALTHCARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Second Applicant

AND:

RECKITT BENCKISER (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD

Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 OCTOBER 2016

THE COURT NOTES:

1.The undertaking given to the Court by the applicants, by their Counsel:

(a)To submit to such order (if any) as the Court may consider to be just for the payment of compensation, to be assessed by the Court or as it may direct, to any person, whether or not a party, adversely affected by the operation of the interlocutory order made below or any continuation thereof (with or without variation); and

(b)To pay the compensation referred to in (a) to the person there referred to.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

2.From the expiration of the undertaking given on 15 December 2015 by the respondent to the Court up to the final determination of the separate questions ordered on 15 October 2015 to be determined in this proceeding (including all appeals in respect of such questions) or until further or other order, the respondent be restrained, whether by itself, its servants, agents or otherwise howsoever, in trade or commerce, from publishing, distributing, exhibiting, displaying, broadcasting or communicating to the public, or causing to be published, distributed, exhibited, displayed, broadcasted or communicated to the public:

(a)The material in Annexure A to these Orders;

(b)The material in Annexure B to these Orders;

(c)The material in Annexure C to these Orders;

(d)The material in Annexure D to these Orders;

(e)The material in Annexure E to these Orders;

(f)The television commercial appearing on the USB that forms part of Annexure F to the Fast Track Originating Application filed herein on 11 September 2015; and

(g)Any matter which is substantially identical to, or substantially the same…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1196
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd (Glaxo) has brought an application against Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd (Reckitt) seeking interlocutory injunctive relief to restrain the resumption of an advertising and marketing campaign for a pain relief product. The dispute centers around Reckitt's alleged false and misleading advertising, which Glaxo claims infringes its intellectual property rights and misleads consumers. The application was heard by the Court, which needed to decide whether Glaxo was entitled to an injunction to prevent Reckitt from resuming its advertising campaign until the separate questions in the case were finally determined.

The primary legal issues for the Court to determine were whether Glaxo had demonstrated that there was a serious question to be tried, whether Glaxo would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, and whether the balance of convenience and justice favoured the grant of the injunction. Reckitt argued that Glaxo had delayed bringing the proceeding and should be denied interlocutory relief. The Court found that Glaxo had not engaged in disentitling delay. Reckitt also contended that there had been an agreement between the parties that Glaxo would not seek interlocutory relief, but the Court found that there was no such agreement. The Court needed to assess the harm to Glaxo if the injunction was not granted, the adequacy of damages as a remedy, and the balance of convenience and justice.

The Court concluded that the balance of convenience and justice overwhelmingly favoured the grant of injunctive relief. Reckitt had conceded that there was a serious question to be tried, and the consumers would be most affected by any false statements in Reckitt's advertising. The Court found that compelling evidence and arguments were required to decline the injunction, especially given that Reckitt's undertaking had been in place for ten months already. The injunction was ordered to inure for the benefit of Glaxo until the final disposition of the separate questions or until further order of the Court. The Court also ordered that Reckitt pay Glaxo's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. From the expiration of the undertaking given on 15 December 2015 by the respondent to the Court up to the final determination of the separate questions ordered on 15 October 2015 to be determined in this proceeding (including all appeals in respect of such questions) or until further or other order, the respondent be restrained, whether by itself, its servants, agents or otherwise howsoever, in trade or commerce, from publishing, distributing, exhibiting, displaying, broadcasting or communicating to the public, or causing to be published, distributed, exhibited, displayed, broadcasted or communicated to the public:

(a) The material in Annexure A to these Orders;

(b) The material in Annexure B to these Orders;

(c) The material in Annexure C to these Orders;

(d) The material in Annexure D to these Orders;

(e) The material in Annexure E to these Orders;

(f) The television commercial appearing on the USB that forms part of Annexure F to the Fast Track Originating Application filed herein on 11 September 2015; and

(g) Any matter which is substantially identical to, or substantially the same as, any of the above.

3. The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the Interlocutory Application filed by the second applicant on 5 July 2016.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ANNEXURE A

ANNEXURE B

ANNEXURE C

ANNEXURE D

ANNEXURE E

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is also apparent from the above account that, when it commenced the present proceeding, Glaxo had hoped to secure an early final hearing (which, in fact, it did secure) and, for that reason, had eschewed seeking any interlocutory relief. Reckitt contests this latter proposition and wishes to argue that Glaxo delayed bringing this proceeding in the first place to such an extent that it should be denied the interlocutory relief which it now seeks. I do not think that Glaxo has been guilty of disentitling delay. OTHER EVIDENCE Reckitt placed reliance upon the circumstances in which its undertaking was given in support of a proposition that Glaxo and Reckitt struck a “bargain” after arms-length negotiations, which led to the proffering of Reckitt’s undertaking to the Court. The terms of this alleged bargain are obscure. As I understood the submission, Reckitt contended that, in return for Reckitt proffering its undertaking, Glaxo had agreed that it would not make any application in the future for interlocutory injunctive relief along the lines now sought. In support of these submissions, Reckitt relied upon certain correspondence passing between Ebsworths and Minters immediately prior to the listing before the Court on 15 December 2015. On 14 December 2015, Ebsworths had proposed to Minters that the hearing of the separate questions fixed to commence on 21 December 2015 should be vacated. Minters replied to Ebsworths in respect of that matter by letter dated the same day. In their response, Minters did not commit to agreeing to vacate the hearing date. In addition, in the second half of their letter, Minters said:In order for us to take further instructions from our clients in relation to the proposal, we would be grateful if you would please provide us with confirmation that:1. the Advertising Campaign will be suspended from 21 December 2015 until the date on which judgment is handed down in the Proceeding. As you will appreciate, 31 January 2016 is a date that bears no relevance to this Proceeding; 2. the material would also be removed from Coles and Chemist Warehouse stores. There are approximately 764 Coles and 350 Chemist Warehouse stores and therefore the prospect that the advertising would continue in those stores is of very significant concern. Your proposal includes withdrawing material from Woolworths so a difficulty with Coles is not immediately apparent. Should your client maintain its position that it is “unable to withdraw” the campaign from those stores, please provide to us a copy of the commercial terms which bring about that inability, so that we can obtain instructions. We note that we will restrict access to that material to legal representatives for the clients (including in-house counsel instructing us); 3. all outdoor advertising will be suspended (in the same manner as the other advertising); 4. the reference to “Advertising Campaign” includes all advertising containing any one or more of the Representations (as pleaded); and 5. your client would give a without admissions undertaking to the Court in respect of the suspension of the campaign. We look forward to your urgent response so that we can consider this matter further with our clients ahead of tomorrow mornings’ [sic] hearing.Yours faithfully

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, it must be remembered that, notwithstanding that this proceeding is between private litigants who compete in a very lucrative and substantial product market, the persons who will be most affected by false statements being made in Reckitt’s advertising are the consumers of the relevant over-the-counter pain relief products. In circumstances where Reckitt has conceded that there is a serious question to be tried in the present case, the Court would require compelling evidence and arguments going to the balance of convenience and justice of the case before declining to restrain the making of such statements for a further few months or so in circumstances where Reckitt’s undertaking has been in place for ten months already. CONCLUSIONS In my view, the balance of convenience and justice overwhelmingly favours the grant of injunctive relief as sought. There was some argument between the parties as to whether the injunction, if granted, should be expressed to apply only for the four days commencing 25 October 2016 upon the basis that the injunction should not extend beyond the end of the hearing of the separate questions. To restrict the life of the injunction in that way would inevitably mean that a further interlocutory hearing would be required at the end of the hearing of the separate questions. This is most unsatisfactory and the Court will not countenance such an approach. In all the circumstances and bearing in mind that the present application has been fully contested and argued, I think that the appropriate order is that the injunction inure for the benefit of Glaxo until the final disposition of the separate questions or until further or other order of the Court. In this way, if Reckitt is successful at the upcoming hearing, the injunction can be immediately dissolved. On the other hand, if it is unsuccessful and seeks to appeal, the injunction will stand subject to any consideration of the matter by the Full Court. The present Application is a discrete application. Reckitt has lost. There is no reason why it should not pay Glaxo’s costs of and incidental to the Application. I therefore propose to make an order for costs in favour of Glaxo against Reckitt. There will be orders accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

While I am prepared to accept that Reckitt has committed to certain levels of expenditure for the rest of this calendar year in respect of marketing and advertising and has also committed significant expenditure to retailers in respect of such material, I am not satisfied that the commitments made cannot satisfactorily and productively be deployed in respect of advertisements which are not of the type which comprise the campaign. That is to say, I am not satisfied that Reckitt has committed to significant ongoing expenditure in respect of the proposed recommencement of the campaign which expenditure cannot be productively utilised for other marketing and advertising materials in the event that injunctive relief is granted.CONSIDERATIONThe Relevant Principles (Interlocutory Injunctions) In Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238 at 254–262 [44]–[74], the Full Court explained the principles which govern the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief in private litigation. In particular, at 256 [53], their Honours cited the well-known passage from the judgment of Mason ACJ (as his Honour then was) in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 at 153 where his Honour said:In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. Here, as I have already noted, Reckitt has conceded for present purposes that Glaxo has established that there is a serious question to be tried or a prima facie case in respect of the claim for injunctive relief made by Glaxo in its Application. After discussing whether proof of irreparable harm was a necessary ingredient in the Court’s consideration of such an application (at 259–260 [61]), the Full Court said at 260–261 [62]–[69]:62The assessment of harm to the plaintiff, if there is no injunction, and the assessment of prejudice or harm to the defendant, if an injunction is granted, is at the heart of the basket of discretionary considerations which must be addressed and weighed as part of the Court’s consideration of the balance of convenience and justice. The question of whether damages will be an adequate remedy for the alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s rights will always need to be considered when the Court has an application for interlocutory injunctive relief before it. It may or may not be determinative in any given case. That question involves an assessment by the Court as to whether the plaintiff would, in all material respects, be in as good a position if he were confined to his damages remedy, as he would be in if an injunction were granted (see the discussion of this aspect in Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (8th edn, 2010) at pp 383–389; at pp 397–399; and at pp 457–462). 63The interaction between the Court’s assessment of the likely harm to the plaintiff, if no injunction is granted, and its assessment of the adequacy of damages as a remedy, will always be an important factor in the Court’s determination of where the balance of convenience and justice lies. To elevate these matters into a separate and antecedent inquiry as part of a requirement in every case that the plaintiff establish “irreparable injury” is, in our judgment, to adopt too rigid an approach. These matters are best left to be considered as part of the Court’s assessment of the balance of convenience and justice even though they will inevitably fall to be considered in most cases and will almost always be important considerations to be taken into account. 64Gleeson CJ also observed in Lenah Game Meats (at [18]), that, where there is little or no room for argument about the legal basis of the applicant’s claimed private right, the court will be more easily persuaded at an interlocutory stage that a prima facie case has been established. The court will then move on to consider discretionary considerations, including the balance of convenience and justice. But, as his Honour also observed at [18]:The extent to which it is necessary, or appropriate, to examine the legal merits of a plaintiff’s claim for final relief, in determining whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, will depend upon the circumstances of the case. There is no inflexible rule. 65The resolution of the question of where the balance of convenience and justice lies requires the Court to exercise a discretion. 66In exercising that discretion, the Court is required to assess and compare the prejudice and hardship likely to be suffered by the defendant, third persons and the public generally if an injunction is granted, with that which is likely to be suffered by the plaintiff if no injunction is granted. In determining this question, the Court must make an assessment of the likelihood that the final relief (if granted) will adequately compensate the plaintiff for the continuing breaches which will have occurred between the date of the interlocutory hearing and the date when final relief might be expected to be granted. 67As Sundberg J observed in Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wyeth (2009) 81 IPR 339 at [15], when considering whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, the issue of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience and justice favours the grant of an injunction are related inquiries. The question of whether there is a serious question or a prima facie case should not be considered in isolation from the balance of convenience. The apparent strength of the parties’ substantive cases will often be an important consideration to be weighed in the balance: Tidy Tea Ltd v Unilever Australia Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 405 at [416] per Burchett J; Aktiebolaget Hassle v Biochemie Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 57 IPR 1 at [31] per Sackville J; Hexal Australia Pty Ltd v Roche Therapeutics Inc (2005) 66 IPR 325 at [18] per Stone J; and Castlemaine Tooheys at 154 per Mason ACJ. 68It may also be necessary to consider and evaluate the impact that the grant or refusal of an injunction will have or is likely to have on third persons and the public generally.69In Patrick at [65] and [66], Brennan CJ and McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, in a joint judgment, expressly adopted a passage from Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (5th edn, 1997) (at pp 402–403), which may be summarised as follows: (a)In assessing the balance of convenience in an interlocutory injunction application, the interests of the public and third persons are relevant and have more or less weight according to other material circumstances;(b)Whether those interests tend to favour the grant or the refusal of an injunction in any given case depends upon the circumstances of that case; and(c)Hardship visited upon third persons or the public generally by the grant of an interlocutory injunction will rarely be decisive.