Gjorsevska; Secretary, Department of Social Services and (Social services second review)

Gjorsevska; Secretary, Department of Social Services and (Social services second review) [2018] AATA 1109 (3 May 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2016/6426
Re:Secretary, Department of Social Services
APPLICANT

AndJulie Gjorsevska
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member D. J. Morris

Date:3 May 2018
Place:Melbourne

The decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Tribunal dated 28 October 2016 is set aside and in substitution the original decision that the Respondent was not eligible for Disability Support Pension in relation to her 8 February 2016 claim is affirmed.
.............................[sgd]...........................................
Senior Member D. J. Morris
SOCIAL SERVICES – Disability Support Pension (DSP) – review of Social Services and Child Support Division decision - whether person qualified – whether impairments fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised – reasonable treatment for major diagnosed condition not undertaken in claim period – decision set aside and substituted with decision that Respondent not eligible for DSP in relation to this claim.
Legislation
Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s 36(1)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s 43(2A)
Social Security Act 1991, ss 94(1), 94(5)
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999, Sch 2, cl 4(1)
Secondary sources
Social Security (Tables for the Assessment of Work-related Impairment for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2011
Social Security (Active Participation for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2014
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member D. J. Morris
3 May 2018
BACKGROUND

On 8 February 2016 Mrs Julie Gjorsevska lodged a claim for Disability Support Pension (DSP). An officer of the Department of Human Services (the Department), having considered her application, rejected it on 9 April 2016. This is the original decision.
Mrs Gjorsevska requested a review of the original decision by an Authorised Review Officer (ARO), an officer of the Department not involved in the original decision. The ARO affirmed the original decision to reject the claim on 12 July 2016. Mrs Gjorsevska sought a review by the Social Services and Child Support Division of this Tribunal (the AAT1).
After conducting a hearing, on 28 October 2016 the AAT1 set aside the original decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration with a direction that Mrs Gjorsevska’s claim satisfied sections 94(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act) as at 8 February 2016, the date she lodged her claim. Claims made after 31 December 2011 are assessed by applying the Impairment Tables which came into force on 1 January 2012 under the Social Security (Assessment of Work-related Impairment for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2011 (the Determination). The Tribunal Member at the AAT1 review was satisfied that an impairment rating of 20 points could be allocated in relation to Mrs Gjorsevska’s mental health condition under Table 5 of the Determination.
On 28 November 2016 the Secretary of the Department of Social Services (the Applicant in this matter) sought a review of the AAT1 decision. That is this hearing.
The hearing was held on 8 September 2017 but was adjourned after a short period of time on the basis that Mrs Gjorsevska had not received a copy of the documents lodged by the Secretary under section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. The hearing resumed on 31 January 2018. Mrs Gjorsevska, who was represented by Ms Elsie Stockie, an advocate from Social Security Rights Victoria, gave evidence and was cross-examined by Ms Belinda Lewis, a legal officer of the Department who represented the Applicant.
The Tribunal took into account documents lodged by the Department (T-documents), as well as written Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions from both parties.
APPLICABLE LAW
Qualification for DSP under the Act
In order to qualify for DSP, a person’s claim must be assessed under section 94(1) of the Act and the qualification criteria for DSP must be satisfied. It must be established that:
(a)the person has a physical, intellectual or psychiatric impairment; and
(b)the person's impairment is of 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables; and
(c)one of the following applies:
(i) the person has a continuing inability to work;
(ii) the Secretary is satisfied that the person is participating in the program administered by the Commonwealth known as the supported wage system; and
(d)…
In terms of the criteria under section 94(1)(c) of the Act, no contention was made that Mrs Gjorsevska had participated in the supported wage system. She was therefore required to establish a ‘continuing inability to work’. Relevantly, section 94(2) of the Act provides that:
(2)A person has a continuing inability to work because of an impairment if the Secretary is satisfied that:
(aa)in a case where the person's impairment is not a severe impairment within the meaning of subsection (3B) … the person has actively participated in a program of support within the meaning of subsection (3C), and the program of support was wholly or partly funded by the Commonwealth; and
(a)in all cases--the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent the person from doing any work independently of a program of support within the next 2 years; and
(b)in all cases--either:
(i) the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent the person from undertaking a training activity during the next 2 years; or
(ii) if the impairment does not prevent the person from undertaking a training activity--such activity is unlikely (because of the impairment) to enable the person to do any work independently of a program of support within the next 2 years.
Section 94(3B) of the Act provides that:
A person's impairment is a severe impairment if the person's impairment is of 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables, of which 20 points or more are under a single Impairment Table.
Therefore, if Mrs Gjorsevska is assigned 20 points under the Impairment Tables but does not have a ‘severe impairment’ for the purposes of section 94(3B) of the Act, then the Secretary must be satisfied that Mrs Gjorsevska has met the requirements of having ‘actively participated in a program of support’ as provided in the Social Security (Active Participation for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2014. If Mrs Gjorsevska does have a ‘severe impairment’, she is only required to satisfy sections 94(2)(a) and 94(2)(b) of the Act.
What is the relevant period for considering the claim?
The Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (the Administration Act) provides, at clause 4(1) of Schedule 2, as follows:
If:
(a)a person (other than a detained person) makes a claim for a relevant social security payment; and
(b)the person is not, on the day on which the claim is made, qualified for the payment; and
(c)assuming the person does not sooner die, the person will, because of the passage of time or the occurrence of an event, become qualified for the payment within the period of 13 weeks after the day on which the claim is made; and
(d)the person becomes so qualified within that period;
the claim is taken to be made on the first day on which the person is qualified for the social security payment.
Section 36(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (the Interpretation Act) sets out in a table how a period of time is to be calculated in legislation where there is no express contrary meaning. Item 5 in the table in section 36(1) of the Interpretation Act states that if the period of time is expressed to begin from a specified day, it does not include that day.
Therefore, there are two questions for the Tribunal to consider. First, the Tribunal must consider whether Mrs Gjorsevska was qualified for DSP on the date she lodged her claim, 8 February 2016. If not, the Tribunal must then consider whether, applying the provisions of clause 4(1) of Schedule 2 of the Administration Act and the Interpretation Act, she became qualified on a day in the succeeding 13-week period from 9 February 2016 to 8 May 2016 (the claim period).
THE HEARING
The Secretary in written submissions did not dispute that Mrs Gjorsevska had impairments in the claim period and submits that she satisfied section 94(1)(a) of the Act.
The Tribunal considered the medical evidence in the T-documents and in particular a Job Capacity Assessment (JCA) report dated 3 March 2016. This JCA report had considered various medical conditions cited by Mrs Gjorsevska and corroborated by medical evidence. I am satisfied that at the time of Mrs Gjorsevska’s claims she suffered from a spinal condition, calcaneus spur of the left foot with severe plantar fasciitis, Morton’s neuroma of the right foot, a mental health condition, a condition affecting the right and left shoulders, partial hearing loss, recurrent deep vein thrombosis, a gynaecological disorder, osteoarthritis, and cancer of the breast. On the basis of the medical evidence before the Tribunal, I find that Mrs Gjorsevska satisfied section 94(1)(a) of the Act in having physical and psychological impairment as at the date she made her claim for DSP.
Should the person’s impairment be allocated 20 points or more in the claim period?
At the hearing, both parties submitted that the Tribunal should concentrate on the question of whether Mrs Gjorsevska’s mental health condition should be allocated 20 points, as the AAT1 found, and whether this condition was not fully treated and fully stabilised in the claim period. However, the Tribunal must also consider the other stated conditions of Mrs Gjorsevska to determine whether each of these conditions is ‘permanent’ within the meaning stipulated in the Determination and able to be considered for the allocation of points under the Impairment Tables.
What does ‘permanency of conditions’ mean?
The Determination states, at section 6(4) that a condition is permanent if it has been fully diagnosed by an appropriately qualified medical practitioner; fully treated; fully stabilised and more likely than not, in the light of available evidence, to persist for more than two years. Section 6 of the Determination goes on to set out what must be considered by a decision-maker as he or she considers whether a condition can be assigned points under the Impairment Tables:
Fully diagnosed and fully treated
(5) In determining whether a condition has been fully diagnosed by an appropriately qualified medical practitioner and whether it has been fully treated for the purposes of paragraphs 6(4)(a) and (b), the following is to be considered:
(a) whether there is corroborating evidence of the condition; and
(b) what treatment or rehabilitation has occurred in relation to the condition; and
(c) whether treatment is continuing or is planned in the next 2 years.
Fully stabilised
(6) For the purposes of paragraph 6(4)(c) and subsection 11(4) a condition is fully stabilised if:
(a) either the person has undertaken reasonable treatment for the condition and any further reasonable treatment is unlikely to result in significant functional improvement to a level enabling the person to undertake work in the next 2 years; or
(b) the person has not undertaken reasonable treatment for the condition and:
(i) significant functional improvement to a level enabling the person to undertake work in the next 2 years is not expected to result, even if the person undertakes reasonable treatment; or
(ii) there is a medical or other compelling reason for the person not to undertake reasonable treatment.
Note: For reasonable treatment see subsection 6(7).
Reasonable treatment
(7) For the purposes of subsection 6(6), reasonable treatment is treatment that:
(a) is available at a location reasonably accessible to the person; and
(b) is at a reasonable cost; and
(c) can reliably be expected to result in a substantial improvement in functional capacity; and
(d) is regularly undertaken or performed; and
(e) has a high success rate; and
(f) carries a low risk to the person.
Consideration of the Respondent’s medical conditions
Cancer condition
Mrs Gjorsevska underwent surgery in 2009 for interductal cancer of the breast. There was evidence before the Tribunal that she still suffers from intermittent pain with repetitive movement of her right arm and has a reduced reach owing to scar tissue and residual breast pain. She is on a course of medication for this condition, Tamoxifen, according to a medical report by her treating general practitioner, Dr Atick Abdi, dated 1 July 2013. Dr Abdi recorded this condition under the section of the report where, in the view of the medical practitioner completing the report, conditions are generally well managed and cause minimal or limited impact on the person’s ability to function.
The relevant Impairment Tables for the assessment of this condition are Table 1 – Functions requiring Physical Exertion and Stamina, or Table 2 – Upper Limb Functions. Under section 11(5) of the Determination, if a person’s diagnosed condition results in no impairment, the condition should be assessed as having no functional impact and a zero rating must be assigned. On the medical evidence before the Tribunal, Mrs Gjorsevska’s condition does not meet the descriptors under Table 1 and Table 2 for the assignment of points under these tables. The cancer condition therefore results in no functional impact. The Tribunal assigns zero points for this condition.
Foot conditions
The Secretary conceded that Mrs Gjorsevska’s foot spurs condition should be regarded as permanent in the claim period, as it was fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised. Before the Tribunal was a medical certificate of Dr Abdi dated 25 August 2015, diagnosing left calcaneus spur with severe plantar fasciitis. There was also a separately recorded diagnosis of Morton’s neuroma of the right foot. Dr Abdi was of the opinion that the condition was permanent, the symptoms were likely to persist and the impact on the Respondent was pain, reduced mobility, and that she had to wear a special boot. The JCA report in March 2016 noted that Mrs Gjorsevska was able to walk for approximately 15 to 20 minutes before needing to rest but did not use a walking aid.
The Tribunal concludes that Mrs Gjorsevska’s foot conditions are permanent and capable of consideration under the Determination. The relevant table is Table 3 – Lower Limb Function. The Respondent told the AAT1 that she was able to stand for about 20 minutes and walk for between 20 and 30 minutes, but not fast. The Tribunal does not doubt that these conditions cause discomfort to Mrs Gjorsevska. However, applying the descriptors in the Determination and on the evidence given by the Respondent herself, the Tribunal assigns a zero rating for the functional impact of these foot conditions.
Hearing condition
Mrs Gjorsevska told the AAT1 that she has difficulty with her hearing and had replaced her hearing aids which had led to some improvement. The Tribunal had before it a hearing test report from Ms Kathryn Dark, audiologist, dated 16 April 2015. Ms Dark recorded that the results were stable from the previous test performed in August 2013 and that there was:
“…mild to moderate sensorineural hearing loss in both ears, with the right ear being slightly worse (not significant).”
Mrs Gjorsevska told the Job Capacity Assessor that she had misplaced her hearing aids and planned to obtain replacements. The Tribunal notes from her evidence to the AAT1 that that occurred. It is not clear when she lost her hearing aids, and no evidence was advanced on this. The Secretary contended that, as such, the condition was not fully treated and stabilised in the claim period. The Tribunal rejects that view. It is clear that there was a long-standing diagnosis by an audiologist of partial hearing loss and, on the evidence given to the JCA in March 2016 (within the claim period), Mrs Gjorsevska said she had difficulty hearing, especially when there is background noise. This is consistent with the conclusions by Ms Dark after administering the 2015 test.
The Tribunal does not consider that circumstances where a person has lost hearing aids and is in the process of replacing them should be characterised, as it was by the Secretary, as “not utilising prescribed hearing aids” in support of the contention that reasonable treatment was not being followed. There was no evidence before me that Mrs Gjorsevska did not use hearing aids when she had them. Additionally, the descriptor in the Determination for ‘mild functional impact’ in Table 11 explicitly says that the person ‘may use a hearing aid, cochlear implant or other device’ (emphasis added). This is a set of circumstances different from a case where, for example, a person may have been prescribed certain aids but positively declines to utilise them.
While it is difficult to assess the effect of this condition on Mrs Gjorsevska with her hearing aids, taking into account the audiological evidence and the Respondent’s evidence, the Tribunal concludes that the preferable decision is that there was a mild functional impact on functions involving hearing in the claim period. The Tribunal finds that 5 points should be allocated under Table 11 for this condition.
Gynaecological condition, upper limb condition, osteoarthritis and deep vein thrombosis condition
In a DSP medical report dated 1 July 2013, Dr Abdi recorded menorrhagia with severe recurrent anaemia as the condition with the most impact on the Respondent. The Respondent told the Job Capacity Assessor that she had undergone a hysterectomy in late 2014 and that these particular symptoms had improved. There was little other information on this condition, other than that it is not recorded in some subsequent reports of Dr Abdi.
Dr Abdi recorded in his July 2013 report that Mrs Gjorsevska had deep vein thrombosis (DVT) that caused intermittent leg pain but that it was ‘stable now’. In the hearing, the Respondent said her last employment was working in a chemist warehouse and Dr Abdi had recommended she cease this type of work when the DVT spread to both legs because he felt constantly being on her feet was not desirable. Mrs Gjorsevska was asked if she could be employed seated, for instance at a desk or console, whether that would be a better option. She responded: ‘back then, yes’.
The Tribunal had before it a medical letter to Dr Abdi dated 20 May 2016 from Associate Professor Keith Lim, Director of Rheumatology at Western Health. He diagnosed ‘rheumatoid arthritis related probably to breast cancer and treatment’. Dr Lim prescribed medication which was to taper off in two or three months and then be followed up by Mrs Gjorsevska’s treating general practitioner. There was a dearth of later information on the progress of this condition.
The Tribunal had a certificate dated 22 July 2016 from Ms Leea Maeda, physiotherapist, who reported that Mrs Gjorsevska was, at that time, on a waiting list for a chronic pain group. Ms Maeda reported that the Respondent had bilateral shoulder and elbow pain and had undergone a physiotherapy course and the condition had “settled down moderately”.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that sufficient corroborative information was available in the claim period for these four conditions to be assessed as fully treated or fully stabilised, and so does not go on to consider them under the Determination.
Mental health condition
The Secretary conceded that Mrs Gjorsevska’s conditions of depression and anxiety were fully diagnosed in the claim period but argued these conditions were not fully treated or stabilised at that time.
The AAT1 heard medical evidence and evidence from Mrs Gjorsevska relevant to the descriptors under Table 5 – Mental Health Function, about the effect of these conditions on her daily life. The AAT1 stated:
The Tribunal did initially have some concerns about whether these issues existed as at the date of claim, as opposed to only now based on the more recent reports. However, having regard to the totality of the evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied that in all likelihood the same issues existed at the date of claim, consistent with Mrs Gjorsevska’s evidence.
The AAT1 accordingly was satisfied that an impairment rating of 20 points can be allocated in relation to the functional impact of these conditions on Mrs Gjorsevska at the date of claim.

After the AAT1 hearing, the Secretary arranged for Mrs Gjorsevska to see Dr Dielle Felman, consultant psychiatrist, for an independent psychiatric assessment. Dr Felman saw the Respondent on 3 February 2017 and her report was before the Tribunal. Dr Felman diagnosed that Mrs Gjorsevska had Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Dr Felman’s diagnostic conclusions in this regard are broadly consistent with those of her treating general practitioner Dr Abdi, and Mr Kenan Rahmanovic, clinical psychologist. Mr Rahmanovic recorded in his report of 21 October 2015 that he had been seeing Mrs Gjorsevska since April 2015 on a fortnightly basis and that in his opinion she met the criteria for Major Depressive Disorder. Mr Rahmanovic concluded that the Respondent was undergoing therapy and was not fit for work.
Taking the history of medical assessment into account, added to by Dr Felman’s independent assessment, the Tribunal is satisfied that the diagnosis satisfies section 6(5)(a) of the Determination.
In her report, Dr Felman stated:
Despite her ongoing mood and anxiety symptoms, Ms Gjorsevska has had little in the way of psychiatric treatment. Specifically, her treatment has been limited to psychological therapy. She has not trialled medications that would usually be considered of benefit in depression and anxiety, including antidepressant medication. I note that while some patients are reticent to take medications, Ms Gjorsevska did not report that this was the case with her. She has not been referred to a Psychiatrist either.
While outside the scope of my expertise, I would also consider that Ms Gjorsevska’s pain has not been fully addressed and that her reported cognitive impairment has not been fully investigated (I note that she had not discussed the extent of her cognitive symptoms with her doctor).
Based on the information available to me including background information, Ms Gjorsevska’s self-report and findings on mental state examination, it is my opinion that there is certainly potential for further improvement with Ms Gjorsevska’s psychiatric condition, and enhanced treatment including a trial of antidepressant medication, is indeed indicated.
In my opinion, however, Ms Gjorsevska’s current level of functional impairment is not solely contributed to by her psychiatric condition. In my opinion her experience of pain contributes to her current level of impairment, as do cognitive difficulties, the latter of which I noted above have not been fully diagnosed nor treated.
In the hearing, the Respondent said she had been seeing Dr Abdi for about 14 years. She said that Dr Abdi diagnosed that she had depression and recommended that she consult with a psychiatrist, but she said she was too embarrassed and kept delaying it. She said she eventually saw Mr Rahmanovic, who as mentioned above is a clinical psychologist. She said she first saw him early in 2015 but had been referred to him earlier but ‘didn’t have the courage’ to see him.
In cross-examination, Mrs Gjorsevska said that Dr Abdi had prescribed Zoloft (an antidepressant medication) to her recently and she took this medication for about four weeks, but then ceased. She said when she told Dr Abdi she had ceased taking this medication he advised it would be to her benefit to continue to take it for a longer period. Mrs Gjorsevska said she had seen her mother and her sister prescribed with this same medication and observed some undesirable side-effects which deterred her from taking this drug. When specifically asked whether she herself felt there had been an effect (positive or otherwise) on her mental health from taking Zoloft, Mrs Gjorsevska’s response was that it was ‘too early to tell’.
Ms Stockie argued that the Tribunal should place more weight on Dr Abdi’s and Mr Rahmanovic’s diagnosis and assessment of the functional impact of this condition. Mr Rahmanovic was asked to provide comments after Dr Felman’s report and he was of the view that the Respondent satisfied the requirement for the allocation of 20 impairment points and was unable to work, because of this condition. Ms Stockie urged the Tribunal to take into account that Dr Abdi had been treating Mrs Gjorsevska for a long period, and Mr Rahmanovic regularly for some 18 months, whereas Dr Felman’s report was provided after a 90-minute examination and assessment. The Respondent’s representative submitted that therefore more weight should be put on Dr Abdi’s and Mr Rahmanovic’s conclusions than on Dr Felman’s assessment.
Ms Stockie told the Tribunal that Mrs Gjorsevska had done everything her medical advisers had told her to do, and so therefore should be regarded as having undertaken reasonable treatment for this condition.
The Tribunal does take into account the significant clinical history Mrs Gjorsevska has had with Dr Abdi and the fact that, while she commenced seeing Mr Rahmanovic relatively recently, she has seen him regularly and he therefore has a good insight into her mental health situation. However, the Tribunal must also consider that Mr Rahmanovic is not able to prescribe antidepressants whereas Dr Abdi is, and for a reason not explained had not decided to do so until relatively recently, and after the claim period. At least trialling the effect of such medication on a patient with what objectively seems to be long-standing mental health conditions was apparently not contemplated by Dr Abdi before, or if it was, this course of treatment was not pursued, and there was no material before the Tribunal as to why this might have been the path chosen.
A particular treatment option may be considered but not adopted due to some reasonable physiological or other reasons; that did not appear to be the case here. Mrs Gjorsevska did not evince any marked personal resistance to trying such medication, other than what she told the Tribunal about the effect on other family members. She is consistently shown by the medical reports to have been historically compliant with medical treatment and able to complete courses of medication for her other ailments. The fact that Dr Abdi has not only recently prescribed her with antidepressants but urged her to continue to take them means, in this respect, his views as the long-standing treating general practitioner are not at odds with those of Dr Felman, a consultant psychiatrist. It boils down to the fact that Dr Abdi had not chosen to prescribe antidepressants until after the claim period.
On the basis of the evidence from the Respondent and the assessment of Dr Felman that Mrs Gjorsevska may benefit from a course of antidepressant medication but this had not been tried, the Tribunal finds that her mental health conditions while fully diagnosed cannot be regarded as fully treated or fully stabilised in the claim period. Treatment with antidepressant medication was available, but this treatment had not occurred in relation to the condition at the date of the claim or in the 13-week period thereafter. There was no argument put to the Tribunal that there was a medical or other compelling reason why Mrs Gjorsevska had not undertaken this treatment. Her treating general practitioner did not appear to have had a medical reason not to prescribe this medication, because after the claim period, he urged her to persist in taking the medication after she reported to him that she had stopped.
The Tribunal is not qualified to say whether a course of antidepressant medication will lead to an improvement in Mrs Gjorsevska’s mental health conditions. The Tribunal is required to look at the terms of the Determination and decide, on balance, whether there was a reasonable treatment available, which was not undertaken. I place significant weight on the conclusions of Dr Felman in this regard, given her professional background as a psychiatrist, that this was a course of treatment that may have had a beneficial impact on Mrs Gjorsevska’s psychiatric conditions.
In summary, while I accept Mrs Gjorsevska has significant mental health conditions which are diagnosed, I find that these conditions were not able to be categorised as ‘permanent’ in the terms required by the Determination for the allocation of impairment points because on the evidence they were not fully treated or stabilised at the date of claim or within the 13-week period thereafter. I find that no points can therefore be allocated for these conditions.
Conclusion
The Tribunal has found that the Respondent should be allocated 5 impairment points in the claim period. As section 94(1)(b) of the Act requires that a person’s impairment must be allocated 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables, Mrs Gjorsevska’s DSP claim made on 8 February 2016 cannot succeed. Given that section 94 is a conjunctive section of the Act, all parts of it must be satisfied in relation to a DSP claim. In this circumstance, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to go on to consider whether the Respondent had a continuing inability to work at the time of her claim.
DECISION
The decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Tribunal dated 28 October 2016 is set aside and in substitution the original decision that the Respondent was not eligible for Disability Support Pension in relation to her 8 February 2016 claim is affirmed.

I certify that the preceding 46 (forty-six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member D. J. Morris

...........................[sgd].............................................
Associate
Dated: 3 May 2018

Date(s) of hearing: 8 September 2017 and 31 January 2018

Advocate for the Applicant: Ms Elsie Stokie

Solicitors for the Respondent: Ms Belinda Lewis

[2018] AATA 1109

3 May 2018

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Administrative Law

Statutory Interpretation

Legal Concepts

Appeal

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction

Standing

Date(s) of hearing:	8 September 2017 and 31 January 2018
Advocate for the Applicant:	Ms Elsie Stokie
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Ms Belinda Lewis