SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCI 2021 0044
| ERMANNO GIURINA AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF C NACINOVICH | Applicant |
| v | |
| GREATER GEELONG CITY COUNCIL | First Respondent |
| and | |
| BUILDING APPEALS BOARD | Second Respondent |
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| JUDGES: | KENNEDY and WALKER JJA and MACAULAY AJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 5 November 2021 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 18 November 2021 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2021] VSCA 318 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2021] VSC 103 (Whelan JA) |
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Judicial review – Application for leave to appeal - Review of Building Appeals Board decision to refuse to cancel emergency order – Review of additional emergency order decision of municipal building surveyor – Whether judge erred in finding emergency orders were confined to dangers arising out of condition of buildings – Effect of failure to properly serve emergency order – Leave to appeal refused – Building Act 1993 ss 102, 105, 105B, 142, and 236 – Building Regulations 2018 regs 177 and 178.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application by applicant executor to represent himself in separate capacity as lawyer – Applicant already represents estate – Application misconceived.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | In person | |
| For the First Respondent | Mr S P Woolley | Harwood Andrews |
KENNEDY JA
WALKER JA
MACAULAY AJA:
The applicant, Ermanno Giurina, is the executor of an estate whose assets include a property at 120 Elizabeth Street, Geelong West (‘the Property’). He is also admitted as an Australian lawyer, but does not hold a practising certificate.
On 12 August 2019, the municipal building surveyor of the first respondent, Greater Geelong City Council (‘the Council’), made, or purported to make, an emergency order under s 102 of the Building Act 1993 (‘the Act’) concerning the Property (‘the first Emergency Order’). The surveyor refused a request by the applicant to cancel that order, and the applicant appealed that refusal to the second respondent, the Building Appeals Board (‘the Board’), under s 142 of the Act. The Board rejected that appeal.
The first Emergency Order required the applicant to cause the Property to be inspected by the municipal building surveyor and others. After the Board rejected the applicant’s appeal, an inspection was carried out and a second emergency order was then made, or purportedly made, by the municipal building surveyor on 9 September 2019 (‘the second Emergency Order’). That second Emergency Order required the owner of the Property to carry out demolition and other work.
The applicant issued a judicial review proceeding under Order 56 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (‘the Rules’). Amongst other things, he sought an order setting aside the Board’s decision concerning the first Emergency Order, an order setting aside the second Emergency Order, and an order declaring that the second Emergency Order is null and void.
A judge dismissed the judicial review proceeding, with costs.[1] The applicant seeks leave to appeal that decision. For reasons expressed below, we consider that the judge was correct, that none of the proposed grounds have any prospect of…
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- Case
- [2021] VSCA 318
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the applicant's amended originating motion did not challenge any actions taken after the second emergency order was made. Instead, the applicant sought orders that the second emergency order be set aside and declared null and void. The court noted that the applicant's submissions did not refer to relief directed to steps taken in reliance on the second emergency order. The court also highlighted that the applicant did not seek leave to further amend his originating motion to include orders for unlawful entry and/or unlawful demolition. Despite the non-compliance with the service provision, the court found that it did not affect the orders that were the subject of this proceeding. The court concluded that the judge did not err in finding that the emergency orders were confined to dangers arising out of the condition of the buildings. The court also found that the failure to properly serve the emergency order did not affect the validity of the court's decision. Therefore, the court refused the application for leave to appeal.
The final orders of the court were that the application for leave to appeal be dismissed, and the applicant pay the Council's costs of the application. The court also found that the applicant's application to represent himself in a separate capacity as a lawyer was misconceived and refused it. The court found that the applicant was already representing the estate in this matter and that it would not be appropriate for him to represent himself in a separate capacity.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The amended originating motion did not challenge any actions taken after the making of the second Emergency Order. As set out above,[32] the applicant instead sought orders that the second Emergency Order be set aside (para 5), and an order declaring ‘that the [second Emergency Order] is null and void’ (para 6).[33] [32]Above, [26].[33]Cf the amended application for leave to appeal before this Court which seeks the following at para 8 of ‘Orders sought’: ‘An order in addition declaring that the second Emergency Order is null and void ab initio and a declaration that all work carried out by the [Council] pursuant to the second Emergency Order was unlawful’ (emphasis added). The amended originating motion is consistent with the applicant’s written submissions. Thus, notwithstanding an extended discussion of the Court’s power to grant declaratory relief, the applicant affirmed that he sought the orders specified in his amended originating motion, including an order declaring that the second Emergency Order was null and void ab initio. His written submissions did not refer to relief directed to steps that were, or may in the future be, taken in reliance on that order. The applicant also identified the utility in seeking declaratory relief in relation to the second Emergency Order as being that it would prevent the Council from seeking to recover costs under s 123(1), and would also enable him to seek damages for unlawful entry and unlawful demolition.[34] [34]See, in particular, ‘Outline of submissions of Ermanno Giurina’, 22 June 2020, [82], [84]. The transcript references provided also do not take the matter further for the applicant. Rather, they confirm that the applicant was seeking to obtain orders that the emergency orders were ‘unlawful’ or ‘incorrect’ so as to affect matters in the future, including as a ‘basis’ for later initiating proceedings for damages. It is also of significance that the applicant never sought leave to further amend his amended originating motion to include orders in respect of the unlawful entry and/or unlawful demolition. This is notwithstanding that he was well able, consistent with his legal qualifications, to seek other amendments.[35][35]The applicant amended his originating motion below to include the challenge to the second Emergency Order. He also amended his application for leave to appeal in this Court to include proposed ground 7. Thus, at no stage below did the applicant seek any orders directed to the steps taken after, and in reliance on, the second Emergency Order. Although, then, there was non-compliance with the service provision contained in s 105(2), this has no effect on the orders the subject of this proceeding. Proposed ground 7 is: As mentioned above, this proposed ground raises the same issue as a preliminary application made to this Court that the applicant be granted leave ‘to represent the Applicant’. Extensive material was filed by both parties in relation to this matter, and the applicant was given an opportunity to supplement this material by way of oral submissions.