FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Girum & Kabede [2023] FedCFamC1F 728
File number(s): MLC 3674 of 2021 Judgment of: CARTER J Date of judgment: 25 August 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – modest pool – assessment of contributions – assessment of s 75(2) factors – child with special needs – whether there should be a superannuation splitting order – determination that orders enabling the wife to retain the home were just and equitable Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79 Cases cited: Aleksovski v Aleksovski (1996) FLC 92-705
Dickons v Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244
Kennon v Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757
Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 38 Date of hearing: 10 – 11 July 2023 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Cameron Allen Solicitor for the Applicant: MMH Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Timothy Byrne Solicitor for the Respondent: Shapra Lawyers ORDERS
MLC 3674 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR GIRUM
Applicant
AND: MS KABEDE
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CARTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 AUGUST 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
B Street, Suburb C
1.Within 60 days of these orders the husband do all things necessary to transfer to the wife all his right, title and interest in the property located at B Street, Suburb C VIC (‘the real property’).
2.Contemporaneously with the transfer;
(a)the wife refinance any mortgage secured over the real property into her sole name; and
(b)the husband remove at his expense any caveat lodged by him or on his behalf with regard to the real property.
Personal Loan
3.The wife assume responsibility for, and indemnify the husband fully against, the joint personal loan of the parties as owed to the Commonwealth Bank (being loan number …53).
Collection of chattels
4.Within 14 days of these orders, the parties agree on a date and time for the husband’s nominee, or for the husband in the presence of Victoria Police to personally attend the real property to collect such of the following chattels as the wife is able to locate:
(a)the husband’s vocational certificates including the certificate acquired in Country D;
(b)the husband’s photo albums that he brought from Country F including all his sporting career photos and family photos of his adult children; and
(c)the husband’s shoes and clothes.
Property to be retained by the husband
5.The husband retain for his sole use and benefit to the exclusion of the wife all other assets, resources and liabilities in his sole name and possession including, but not limited to, the following:
(a)any monies in bank accounts in his sole name;
(b)any superannuation entitlements in his name;
(c)any motor vehicles in his name; and
(d)his personal effects and chattels in his possession.
Property to be retained by the wife
6.The wife retain for her…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether it was just and equitable to make an order for the division of property between the parties. The court noted that there is no presumption in favour of altering the parties' existing entitlements, but if it was just and equitable to do so, the court could make an appropriate order under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Both parties agreed that it was just and equitable to make such an order, and the court found that this was one of the cases where the requirements of section 79(2) of the Family Law Act were fairly readily satisfied.
The court considered the proposals made by both parties for the division of assets. The husband proposed that the wife should pay him $19,304, and that each party should otherwise retain their assets and superannuation. The wife's counsel conceded that there was insufficient evidence to argue for a Kennon adjustment. The court noted that the husband's proposal would result in the wife retaining approximately 59% of the asset pool and the husband 41%. The court also considered the contributions of each party post-separation, including an incident in June 2018 when the husband crashed his vehicle into the former matrimonial home. The court ultimately determined that the incident was an accident and did not warrant an adjustment in favour of the wife.
The court made an order for the division of property between the parties, taking into account the asset pool, the contributions of each party, and the circumstances of the case. The specific details of the order were not provided in the text.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel for the wife sensibly conceded there was insufficient evidence in his client’s affidavit material to provide a foundation for a Kennon argument (Kennon v Kennon (1997) FLC 92‑757). Contributions post-separation There is some dispute regarding contributions post separation. Part of that dispute relates to an incident which occurred in June 2018, being the date of separation. At that time, a vehicle the husband was driving crashed into the former matrimonial home, causing substantial damage. The wife was in the front bedroom with some of the children at that time. The police were called to the home and conducted an investigation. Ultimately, the husband was charged with an infringement. No criminal charges were laid. The wife and children moved into rental accommodation at that time. About four months after the accident, the wife received around $12,000 from the home insurance claim. Her evidence is that a modest amount of that claim was used to effect temporary repairs on the Suburb C property, but that most of the funds were used to house her and the children elsewhere in rental accommodation for a period. She and the children returned to live in the Suburb C property about six months later. The damage caused to the property in June 2018 has only been temporarily repaired. I note the husband asserted the wife used at least part of the insurance monies to fund an overseas holiday for herself and the children, which was denied by the wife. It was the wife’s evidence that the husband deliberately and repeatedly drove into the house, in what she said was an attempt to kill her. It was the wife’s contention that the husband’s actions that day, whether deliberate or reckless, damaged the property and reduced the value of the former matrimonial home. She said that should be treated as wastage by the husband. Her counsel referred to the case of Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092. The Court in that matter determined that losses incurred by one party are generally to be shared by the parties, save where one party has embarked on a course of conduct aimed to reduce the matrimonial pool, or where one party has acted recklessly, negligently or wantonly such that the pool has been reduced. The husband objected to that approach. He said the incident was an accident, and occurred in circumstances where he had been working long hours, had consumed some alcohol and fallen asleep in the car. Whilst it is plain that substantial damage had been caused to the property, I was not provided with any evidence as to:(a)what impact the damage had on the value of the property; or(b)the costs of repairing the damage. In the absence of that evidence, it is impossible to quantify the loss the wife asserted to the value of the pool. It does appear from the photographs provided that there would need to be quite a large amount of work to repair and restore the property. Having heard the parties’ evidence about that evening, and in circumstances where there was a police investigation and the husband was not charged with any offences more serious than an infringement, I am not prepared to find that the husband deliberately damaged the home. I was more inclined to accept the husband’s evidence, that this was an accident. In those circumstances, I do not regard it as appropriate to make an adjustment in favour of the wife on the basis of the damage done to the home, particularly in circumstances where the wife has also had the benefit of a modest insurance claim being paid to her.