Giri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2018] FCA 754
•7 May 2018
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Giri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 754
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Giri v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2807 File number: NSD 2095 of 2017 Judge: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 7 May 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal interlocutory judgment of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether leave to appeal should be granted – whether decision of primary judge attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by appellate court – application dismissed
MIGRATION – judicial review – cancellation of Subclass 573 (Higher Education Sector) visa pursuant to s 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection – where visa was subject to ongoing conditions pursuant to cl 573.6 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – cancellation of visa due to visa holder not complying with a condition of the visa – failure to meet cl 573.611(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – cancellation of visa due to breach of condition 8202 in Schedule 8 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of decision to cancel visa – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed decision to cancel visa – where applicant challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in judicial review proceedings commenced in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where primary judge summarily dismissed application at a show cause hearing due to failure to advance an arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where applicant now seeks leave to appeal from dismissal of review application – whether leave to appeal should be granted pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether primary judge failed to consider compelling circumstances raised in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether applicant was denied procedural fairness – where judgment of primary judge not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal – no jurisdictional error identified – application dismissed
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116, 116(1)(b), 359AA, 359A(4)(b) 360, 476, 476A
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr 44.12, 44.12(1)(a), 44.12(2)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 1.03, Sch 2 – cll 573.6, 573.611(a), Sch 8 – condition 8202
Cases cited: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 Date of hearing: 7 May 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 46 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms C Saunders of DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent made a submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 2095 of 2017 BETWEEN: KESHAV GIRI
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
WIGNEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal filed 29 November 2017 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)WIGNEY J:
In May 2014, Mr Keshav Giri, a citizen of Nepal, was granted a Subclass 573 (Higher Education Sector) visa. In May 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection cancelled Mr Giri’s visa under s 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Mr Giri applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a review of that decision. That review application was unsuccessful. The Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel Mr Giri’s visa. Mr Giri challenged the Tribunal’s decision in judicial review proceedings commenced in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary judge in the Circuit Court summarily dismissed the application at a “show cause” hearing, on the basis that Mr Giri had failed to advance an arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
In this application, Mr Giri seeks leave to appeal from the primary judge’s dismissal of his review application.
BACKGROUND
Mr Giri first arrived in Australia in 2009 and remained in Australia on two successive student visas until 12 May 2014, when he was granted the visa that is the subject of this application.
By virtue of clause 573.6 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Mr Giri’s visa was subject to certain ongoing conditions. Those conditions included, relevant to the present matter, condition 8202: see clause 573.611(a) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. Condition 8202, which is found in Schedule 8 to the Regulations that were in force at the date of the grant of Mr Giri’s visa, relevantly provided as follows:
(1)The holder (other than the holder of a Subclass 560 (Student) visa who is an AusAID student or the holder of a Subclass 576 (AusAID or Defence Sector) visa) must meet the requirements of subclauses (2) and (3).
(2)A holder meets the requirements of this subclause if:
(a) the holder is enrolled in a registered course; or
(b)in the case of the holder of a Subclass 560 or 571 (Schools Sector) visa who is a secondary exchange student – the holder is enrolled in a full-time course of study or training.
…
“Registered course” was defined in reg 1.03 of the Regulations as “a course of education or training provided by an institution, body or person that is registered, under Division 3 of Part 2 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000, to provide the course to overseas students”. As will be seen, the question whether Mr Giri was enrolled in a “registered course” as opposed to some other course is not relevant to this application, because it was and is common ground that Mr Giri had not been enrolled in any course of study since October 2014.
Pursuant to s 116 of the Act, the Minister has the power to cancel a visa in certain circumstances, including where the visa holder has not complied with a condition of the visa: s 116(1)(b) of the Act.
On 12 May 2016, a delegate wrote to Mr Giri, giving him notice of the intention to consider the cancellation of his visa. The letter informed Mr Giri that it had come to the attention of the delegate that there appeared to be a ground for cancelling his visa under s 116(1)(b) of the Act, that ground being that he was in breach of condition 8202. The letter also invited Mr Giri to comment on the ground for cancellation and give reasons why his visa should not be cancelled.
On 18 May 2016, Mr Giri wrote to the delegate and sought an extension of four weeks to respond to the notice of the intention to consider the cancellation of his visa. The following day, a delegate notified Mr Giri that “[i]n accordance with the migration legislation”, he had been provided with an extension of five working days in which to provide a written response. It does not appear that Mr Giri provided any information or contacted the delegate again.
On 31 May 2016, a delegate cancelled Mr Giri’s visa under s 116(1)(b) of the Act. The delegate found that Mr Giri had not been enrolled in a registered course of study since 28 October 2014 and therefore had not complied with condition 8202(2)(a).
On 8 June 2016, Mr Giri lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision with the Tribunal.
TRIBUNAL REVIEW AND DECISION
On 10 January 2017, the Tribunal wrote to Mr Giri and invited him to give evidence and present evidence at a hearing. On 21 March 2017, Mr Giri appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. In its statement of decision and reasons, the Tribunal noted that Mr Giri indicated in his response to the hearing invitation that he intended to call two witnesses to give evidence at the hearing. As events transpired, however, those witnesses were overseas and were unable to be contacted. The Tribunal noted that neither of the intended witnesses had provided written statements to the Tribunal. There is no indication that Mr Giri sought an adjournment of the Tribunal hearing to enable him to call those two witnesses.
The Tribunal’s reasons recorded the conduct of the hearing and Mr Giri’s evidence in relation to his employment and education history since arriving in Australia. The Tribunal also referred to the information contained in the Provider Registration and International Student Management System (PRISMS). The Tribunal noted that Mr Giri agreed in the course of the hearing that he had not been enrolled in a registered course of study since October 2014. The Tribunal accordingly found that Mr Giri was in breach of condition 8202(2).
Having found that Mr Giri had not complied with a condition of the visa, the Tribunal went on to consider whether to exercise its discretion to cancel the visa. The Tribunal noted that there were no matters specified in the Act or Regulations that it was required to consider in relation to the exercise of this discretion. In those circumstances, the Tribunal had regard to matters raised by Mr Giri as to why the visa should not be cancelled and the government policy guidelines contained in the Procedures Advice Manual issued by the Minister’s Department. The Tribunal noted that Mr Giri did not provide any material in response to the delegate’s letter of 12 May 2016 which notified him of the intention to cancel his visa, nor did he approach the Department about being unable to continue his studies due to financial difficulties.
The Tribunal noted Mr Giri’s evidence that he “faces no difficulties in returning to Nepal” and acknowledged that although there may be some financial hardship caused to Mr Giri and his parents if his student visa was to be cancelled, he had completed some courses of study in Australia which may assist him if he returned to Nepal. The Tribunal considered that there would be no one in Australia, apart from Mr Giri’s girlfriend and friends, who would be affected if his visa was cancelled. Considering Mr Giri’s circumstances as a whole, the Tribunal concluded that the visa should be cancelled and affirmed the decision under review.
THE CIRCUIT COURT PROCEEDINGS AND JUDGMENT
Mr Giri applied to the Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. His application advanced the following three grounds (as drafted):
1.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal denied me the requested four weeks to respond to the Notice. Such denial is contrary to natural justice because the Tribunal was aware that I was not represented by a registered migration agent and that I intended to have two witnesses to give evidence in support of aspects of my claim and the witnesses were overseas and were not available to give evidence. The Tribunal acted contrary to my request and failed to give me the opportunity to have enough time to present my case and denied me the opportunity to have the support from two witnesses.
2.The Tribunal was aware that I had undertaken 8 units in a Bachelor of Professional Accounting Course and that I had to discontinue because my parents would no longer afford to provide me with the financial support and that I had received advice from a student advisor that I should enrol in the Hospitality Course in order to maintain my enrolment to comply with my student visa conditions.
3.The Tribunal failed to accept the difficulties I faced caused by the earthquake in Nepal and failed to give me the opportunity to start again and failed to consider that my circumstances were beyond my control.
Mr Giri also relied on an affidavit affirmed by him, filed along with his application, which annexed the Tribunal’s decision and an affidavit of Toufic Laba Sarkis made on 6 October 2017, which annexed a transcript of the hearing conducted by the Tribunal.
In his filed response to Mr Giri’s application for judicial review, the Minister apparently indicated a willingness to concede that the application disclosed an arguable case of jurisdictional error. However, as the basis of that concession was not apparent to the primary judge, the matter was set down for hearing pursuant to r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). At such a hearing, known as a “show cause” hearing, the Circuit Court can dismiss the application if it is not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed. Rule 44.12(2) of the Circuit Court Rules makes it clear that such a dismissal is interlocutory in nature.
The primary judge invited Mr Giri to make submissions in relation to his review application. In his judgment, the primary judge recorded Mr Giri’s response to that invitation in the following terms (Judgment at [19]-[22]):
I invited oral submissions from Mr Giri this morning. He first drew my attention to [8] of the Tribunal’s reasons:
The Department file indicates that on 12 May 2016 the applicant was sent by email a notice to consider cancellation of his student Visa. In summary the notice set out the statutory basis for the consideration of the cancellation of the applicant’s visa. The notice informed the applicant that it appeared that he had not been enrolled in a registered course of study since 28 October 2014 and as such the applicant appeared not to meet the requirements of condition 8202(2)(a) of his Visa. The notice in summary set out the consequences for the applicant if the student Visa was cancelled. The notice invited the applicant to provide written comments as to why he [sic] student Visa should not be cancelled within five working days from the receipt of the notice. On 12 May 2016 the applicant wrote to the Department and requested that he be allowed four weeks to respond to the notice. That request was denied but he was offered an additional 5 days to respond. He provided no comments. A department delegate considered the applicant’s situation and decided to cancel his student Visa on 31 May 2016. The applicant was advised by email on 31 May 2016 that his student Visa had been cancelled.
Mr Giri confirmed to me the accuracy of the factual statements in that paragraph. Mr Giri is concerned that the Minister’s Department denied him the four week delay he sought before his visa was cancelled. As I explained to him, however, the Court is reviewing the decision of the Tribunal, not the decision of the Minister’s Department. Also, as I explained to Mr Giri, the Tribunal at [14] of its reasons was troubled that not only was Mr Giri unable to produce the documents he had told the Minister’s Department he wanted time to produce, but he was unable even to describe clearly what the documents were about.
Secondly, Mr Giri made submissions in relation to two witnesses he had hoped to call before the Tribunal. This is discussed at [9] of the Tribunal’s reasons. Mr Giri conceded in oral argument that he had been unable to contact his proposed witnesses at the time of the Tribunal hearing. The solicitor for the Minister took me to pages 1 and 33 of the transcript, which confirm that Mr Giri told the Tribunal his witnesses were no longer contactable. The transcript also reveals that Mr Giri did not seek any adjournment in order to make further attempts to get in contact with his proposed witnesses.
Thirdly, Mr Giri drew my attention to [21] of the Tribunal’s reasons. Mr Giri explained that he wanted the opportunity to complete the course which he had only partially completed. It is apparent, however, from the Tribunal’s reasons that the Tribunal was aware of Mr Giri’s wishes and took them into account in considering its exercise of discretion. The case turned on that exercise of discretion as there was no dispute that Mr Giri was in breach of the condition on his visa that he remain enrolled in a course of study.
(Footnotes omitted.)
The primary judge noted that, at the hearing, he had taken Mr Giri to the transcript of the Tribunal hearing, which was in evidence before his Honour, which “indicate[d] that the Tribunal was frank in discussing with Mr Giri its concerns about the matters bearing on its exercise of discretion”. The primary judge considered that it was “plain that the hearing opportunity afforded [to] Mr Giri was a fair one”.
In relation to ground 1, the primary judge found that there was no evidence before the court which indicated that Mr Giri sought an adjournment of the Tribunal hearing, and in the absence of such a request, the Tribunal could not have acted unreasonably in the exercise of its discretion to refuse such a request. The primary judge also found that at the hearing before the Tribunal, Mr Giri was unable to contact the two witnesses that he proposed to call. In those circumstances, no statutory obligations arose on the part of the Tribunal.
In relation to ground 2, the primary judge found that the Tribunal had considered the claims and evidence relating to Mr Giri’s reasons for discontinuing his study. The primary judge otherwise found that ground 2 failed to establish any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
The primary judge found that ground 3, in effect, cavilled with the Tribunal’s findings and went no higher than to seek impermissible merits review. His Honour found that the Tribunal had considered all the circumstances advanced by Mr Giri and that its findings were reasonably open to it.
The primary judge considered that the Tribunal had complied with its procedural fairness obligations in circumstances where Mr Giri was invited to attend, and attended, a hearing in compliance with s 360 of the Act and there was no information that enlivened the Tribunal’s obligations under s 359A of the Act.
The primary judge concluded that Mr Giri was unable to advance an arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal and accordingly dismissed the application pursuant to r 44.12(1)(a) of the Circuit Court Rules.
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL – GROUNDS AND SUBMISSIONS
Mr Giri sought leave to appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court. Leave to appeal was required because the dismissal of Mr Giri’s case pursuant to r 44.12 of the Circuit Court Rules was an interlocutory decision. Section 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides that an appeal shall not be brought from an interlocutory judgment unless the Court or a Judge gives leave.
In considering whether leave to appeal should be granted, the first limb of the relevant test involves a consideration of whether, in all the circumstances, the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by an appellant court: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-400.
It is convenient, then, to consider whether Mr Giri has demonstrated that the decision of the primary judge is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave. The starting point is the grounds set out in the application for leave to appeal and the proposed grounds of appeal. The application for leave to appeal contained the following two grounds (as drafted):
1.His Honour Judge Driver’s judgment failed to consider the compelling circumstances involved the three grounds filed in Court on 18 April 2017.
2.His judgment dismissing my application is a denial of natural justice.
Mr Giri’s draft notice of appeal advances one proposed ground in the following terms (as drafted):
1.His Honour Judge Driver delivered his judgment on 16 November 2017. I wish to make a comment that the way he treated me during the hearing was based on understanding and respect but His Honour took into consideration the Respondent’s submissions which I do not agree with because of the following reasons:
a)In Court Book page 48 point 8 I wrote to the Department on 12 May 2016 and requested that I be allowed four weeks to respond to the Notice. The Tribunal denied me the requested four weeks to respond to the Notice and I believe that the denial should not be done because I needed time to respond and such time was not given.
b)Even though I agreed that I had not been enrolled in a registered course of study since October 2014 this was justified by the exceptional circumstances which were accepted by the Tribunal yet the Tribunal failed to exercise its discretion based on my difficulties caused by the earthquake in Nepal and the financial difficulties suffered by my parents who could not at the time continue supporting me.
c)The circumstances were beyond my control and while I agree that the Tribunal considered the circumstances but the Tribunal failed to act on it and use its discretion in my favour while His Honour did not accept my arguable case of jurisdictional error I ask the Federal Court to reconsider the judgment because my circumstances at the time were extremely different.
Mr Giri did not file any written submissions on the application.
At the hearing of the application, Mr Giri did make some oral submissions. In substance, however, he simply repeated what he had put to the Circuit Court judge. He referred to the fact that the Department had denied his request for a further four weeks to submit evidence in response to the notice of the intention to consider cancelling his visa, and had instead only given him five days to submit the material. He submitted that that was insufficient. He also submitted that he did not know what to do to progress the matter and therefore did not provide anything in response to the Department’s invitation.
Mr Giri referred to the fact that the major reason why his visa should not be cancelled was the financial difficulties he was under. He submitted that his parents had suffered financial and other difficulties as a result of the earthquake in Nepal and that it was not possible for him to provide all the evidence in response to the Department’s invitation.
In relation to the Tribunal’s conduct of his review application, Mr Giri referred to the fact that he had requested the opportunity to call evidence from two witnesses but by the time of the Tribunal hearing, those witnesses had returned to Nepal. He submitted that he had told the Tribunal that he had only completed half of his course and wanted to complete the entire course. He submitted that he had explained all his circumstances to the Tribunal but the Tribunal did not consider them.
IS THE JUDGMENT ATTENDED BY SUFFICIENT DOUBT TO WARRANT LEAVE TO APPEAL?
The judgment of the primary judge is not attended by any, or any sufficient, doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. Mr Giri’s proposed grounds of appeal and submissions reveal a misunderstanding of the role of the Circuit Court in conducting judicial review and the role of this Court in considering appeals from the Circuit Court.
Ground 1 in the application for leave to appeal contends that the primary judge failed to consider the “compelling circumstances” raised in the court below. That contention cannot be made out. It was not for the primary judge to consider Mr Giri’s circumstances and decide whether or not his visa should be cancelled. The Circuit Court’s jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the Tribunal’s decision and its conduct of the review and determining whether it fell into jurisdictional error.
The question for the Circuit Court was whether the Tribunal had considered what was said to be the “compelling circumstances” raised by Mr Giri. To the extent that Mr Giri contended that the primary judge erred in not finding that the Tribunal had failed to consider the circumstances surrounding his inability to remain enrolled in a course of study, that contention also has no merit. The Tribunal took into account the matters raised by Mr Giri, as well as the guidelines contained in the Department’s manual, in considering whether to exercise its discretion to cancel the visa.
Considering Mr Giri’s circumstances as a whole, including his financial difficulties and the earthquake in Nepal, the Tribunal concluded that the visa should be cancelled. It cannot be said that the Tribunal failed to consider any of the circumstances advanced by Mr Giri as to why his visa should not have been cancelled.
It follows that the primary judge did not fall into error by finding, in paragraph 27 of his judgment, that the Tribunal had “considered all of the circumstances advanced by Mr Giri, and that its findings were reasonably open to it on the material before it”. Mr Giri’s complaint that the primary judge did not consider his “compelling circumstances” amounts to little more than a request that the Court engage in merits review.
Ground 2 of the application for leave to appeal alleges a denial of procedural fairness or natural justice by the primary judge. There is no evidence or other basis to sustain such an allegation. There is nothing whatsoever to suggest that Mr Giri was given anything but a fair hearing and a meaningful opportunity to present his case before the Circuit Court.
An allegation that a Circuit Court judge denied an applicant procedural fairness is a serious allegation that should not be made lightly and must ordinarily be supported by compelling evidence. Mr Giri did not attempt to support his allegation with any evidence, nor did he point to anything in the primary judge’s judgment which supported such an allegation. Mr Giri’s argument appeared to be no more than that he was denied procedural fairness because the primary judge dismissed his application. That argument is entirely unmeritorious.
It should also be noted in this context, that Mr Giri’s contention that he was denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal is equally unmeritorious. The primary judge was correct to reject it. The Tribunal complied with all its statutory obligations in relation to the conduct of the review. It invited Mr Giri to attend a hearing before it in compliance with s 360 of the Act. At that hearing, the Tribunal relied on Mr Giri’s own admission that he had not been enrolled in a registered course of study since October 2014, as well as the information about his enrolment in the PRISMS’s records.
There is no information that would have enlivened the Tribunal’s obligations under s 359A or 359AA to invite Mr Giri to comment on material adverse to him. The information contained in the PRISMS’s records was expressly drawn from information contained in the delegate’s decision, a copy of which was provided for Mr Giri’s application for review and therefore fell within the exception in s 359A(4)(b) of the Act.
In respect to the contention that the Tribunal denied Mr Giri the opportunity to have the support from two witnesses, the primary judge recorded in his judgment that he had taken Mr Giri to parts of the transcript of the Tribunal hearing which was in evidence before his Honour where he had confirmed to the Tribunal that his witnesses were no longer contactable. Mr Giri did not seek an adjournment of the Tribunal hearing to allow him to call those witnesses. In those circumstances, the Tribunal cannot be said to have denied Mr Giri procedural fairness with respect to his proposed witnesses. The primary judge did not err in so finding.
Ground 1(a) of the draft notice of appeal in essence does no more than cavil with the decision of the delegate to deny him four weeks to respond to the initial notice that the Department was considering cancelling his visa and to give him an additional five days instead. Neither the Circuit Court nor this Court in considering whether leave to appeal should be granted has jurisdiction to review that decision or process (see ss 476 and 476A of the Act). As was apparently explained to Mr Giri at the hearing before the primary judge, the Circuit Court was concerned with reviewing the decision of the Tribunal, not of the Minister’s delegate. It should also perhaps be noted that while ground 1(a) also refers to the Tribunal denying him the request for four weeks, there is nothing to suggest that Mr Giri made such a request to the Tribunal.
Ground 1(b) and (c) of the draft notice of appeal simply repeat the contention that the Tribunal failed to consider the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of Mr Giri’s visa. For reasons already given, that contention has no merit. Mr Giri’s request that this Court “reconsider” his circumstances is also misconceived. The Court’s appellate jurisdiction is limited to considering whether the Circuit Court erred in determining Mr Giri’s application for judicial review. The Court has no power to reconsider Mr Giri’s circumstances nor, it might be added, did the Circuit Court.
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
The primary judge’s reasons for summarily dismissing Mr Giri’s application were detailed and carefully considered. His Honour was correct to conclude that Mr Giri’s application failed to raise any or any arguable case of jurisdictional error. Mr Giri has not demonstrated otherwise. The decision of the primary judge is accordingly not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court. Mr Giri’s application for leave to appeal must accordingly be dismissed.
Mr Giri has not provided any relevant reason why he, as the unsuccessful party, should not be required to pay the Minister’s costs. Unfortunately, like many applicants in his position, all he could submit was that he was not in the financial position to meet any costs order. That alone is not a sufficient reason to withhold a costs order in favour of the Minister. Mr Giri should accordingly be ordered to pay the Minister’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Wigney. Associate:
Dated: 23 May 2018
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