SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCI 2017 0027
| GIPPSREAL LTD | Applicant |
| V | |
| DAVID ANTHONY ROSS | First Respondent |
| and | |
| RICHARD ALBARRAN | Second Respondent |
---
| JUDGES: | WARREN CJ, KYROU and HANSEN JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 26 July 2017 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 20 September 2017 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2017] VSCA 257 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2016] VSC 753 (Cameron J) |
---
CORPORATIONS – Receivers appointed under charge – Remuneration – Deeds of appointment and indemnity – Each provided for cap of $15,000 plus GST – Separate indemnity for receivers that defence of litigation at mortgagee’s request be ‘at the expense’ of mortgagee – Construction – Whether cap applied to indemnity – If so, whether mortgagee waived reliance on cap.
EQUITY – Equitable lien – Receivers – Care, preservation and realisation of assets – Entitlement to lien – Uncertainty as to whether any amount that could attract lien – Inquiry.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application to amend reply to allege waiver refused on first day of trial – Reasons for judgment found waiver established – Procedural fairness denied.
---
| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr J L Evans QC | Oakleys Legal |
| For the Respondents | Mr A R Kirby | Evans Ellis Lawyers |
WARREN CJ
KYROU JA
HANSEN JA:
This is an application for leave to appeal from the judgment and orders of a judge in the Trial Division on a claim by David Anthony Ross and Richard Albarran (‘the receivers’), as receivers and managers of Action Cycles Pty Ltd (‘Action Cycles’) against their appointor Gippsreal Ltd (‘Gippsreal’) for remuneration in connection with the receivership. The claim was based upon an indemnity or, alternatively, an equitable lien. As against that, Gippsreal contended, essentially, that the receivers’ entitlement was limited to a sum of $15,000 (plus GST) referred to in two deeds under which the receivers were appointed. There was no dispute that the receivers had performed the work in respect of which remuneration was sought, or as to the amount claimed in respect thereof.
Following a trial in July 2016, the judge delivered judgment in December 2016.[1] Her Honour upheld Gippsreal’s contention that there was a cap on remuneration of $15,000 but found that Gippsreal had by its conduct waived its right to rely on the cap. Her Honour further found that the receivers could rely on an equitable lien in relation to work in respect of a secured property being vacant land at Cowes. Subsequently, on 16 February 2017, the judge ordered that:
(1)there be judgment for the receivers for $107,544.37, being an amount calculated by the parties in light of the judge’s findings, and interest of $6,953.01;
(2)the assessment of the outstanding amounts of the receivers’ fees which are properly subject to an equitable lien in accordance with [165] and [166] of the Reasons be referred to an associate judge for hearing and determination; and
(3)Gippsreal pay the receivers’ costs of the proceeding on a standard basis, subject to the receivers paying Gippsreal’s costs of an application to…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Gippsreal Ltd v David Anthony Ross and Richard Albarran and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] VSCA 257
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was the interpretation of the cap in the deed of appointment and indemnity. Specifically, the court needed to ascertain whether the cap applied to the indemnity for litigation costs and, if it did, whether the mortgagee had waived their right to rely on the cap. The court also considered whether the mortgagee's procedural fairness was compromised when it refused an application to amend the reply to include an allegation of waiver on the first day of the trial, only to find the waiver established in its reasons for judgment.
The court held that the cap applied to the indemnity for litigation costs and that the mortgagee had not waived their reliance on the cap. The indemnity provision was part of the overall remuneration, and therefore, subject to the cap. The court found that the mortgagee had not acted unfairly in refusing the amendment application. The receivers' entitlement to an equitable lien over the assets was uncertain and required further inquiry.
The court ordered that the receivers' remuneration be capped at $15,000 plus GST, including the indemnity for litigation costs. The court further ordered that an inquiry be conducted into the receivers' entitlement to an equitable lien over the assets. The court did not grant procedural fairness to the mortgagee in relation to the amendment application, but this did not affect the outcome of the case.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Prior to the trial, an application to amend the reply to allege waiver of the cap on remuneration was refused on the first day of the trial. The trial proceeded, and the reasons for judgment were handed down subsequently, finding that the mortgagee had waived reliance on the cap on remuneration. The receivers argued that the refusal to allow the amendment on the first day of trial was a denial of procedural fairness.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the cap on remuneration applied to the indemnity for the defence of litigation.
2. If the cap applied to the indemnity, whether the mortgagee waived reliance on the cap.
3. Whether the refusal to allow the amendment on the first day of trial denied procedural fairness.
Held
1. The court concluded that the cap on remuneration applied to the indemnity for the defence of litigation.
2. The court held that the mortgagee did not waive reliance on the cap.
3. The court found that the refusal to allow the amendment on the first day of trial denied procedural fairness.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the deeds of appointment and indemnity which specified a cap of $15,000 plus GST on the remuneration of the receivers. The court noted that the indemnity for the defence of litigation was also to be at the mortgagee’s expense, raising the question of whether the cap applied to this indemnity. The court considered the language of the deeds and found that the cap applied to all forms of remuneration, including the indemnity for litigation defence. This conclusion was based on the broad language used in the deeds and the absence of any indication that the indemnity for litigation defence was to be excluded from the cap.
In addressing the second issue, the court assessed whether the mortgagee had waived its reliance on the cap. The mortgagee had argued that it had waived the cap by not objecting to the receivers’ claims for remuneration that exceeded the cap. However, the court held that there was no evidence of a clear and unequivocal waiver by the mortgagee. The court emphasised that a waiver must be clearly established and could not be inferred from silence or inaction. The mortgagee’s failure to object did not constitute a waiver of its right to enforce the cap.
Finally, the court turned to the issue of procedural fairness. The receivers sought to amend their reply to include an allegation that the mortgagee had waived reliance on the cap. The trial judge refused to allow this amendment on the first day of the trial. The receivers argued this denial was unfair. The court agreed, noting that the reasons for judgment later found that the mortgagee had indeed waived the cap. The court found that the denial of the amendment on the first day of trial, when the judgment was yet to be delivered, denied the receivers procedural fairness. The court held that the receivers should have been allowed to amend their pleadings to include the allegation of waiver, as it was a matter of substantial justice.