GIO Australia Limited v Lovell - [2000] TASSC 75

[2000] TASSC 75

CITATION: GIO Australia Limited v Lovell [2000] TASSC 75

PARTIES:  GIO AUSTRALIA LIMITED
  v
  LOVELL, Dianne

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 25/2000
DELIVERED ON:  26 June 2000
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  19 June 2000
JUDGMENT OF:  Blow J

CATCHWORDS:

Workers Compensation - Proceedings to obtain compensation - Determination of claims - Jurisdiction and powers of Tribunals - Tasmania - Termination of weekly payments - "Employer who disputes liability".

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), s81A(1).
Edgell Birds-Eye v Costello (1995) 4 Tas R 319; FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v De Saye 23/1992; Freemasons Homes of Tasmania v Price A2/1994, referred to.
Aust Dig Workers Compensation [143]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:  S B Carter
             Respondent:  A R Mills
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Page Seager
             Respondent:  Piggott Wood & Baker

Judgment Number: [2000] TASSC 75
Number of Paragraphs: 23

Serial No 75/2000
File No LCA 25/2000

GIO AUSTRALIA LIMITED v DIANNE LOVELL

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BLOW J

26 June 2000

This is an appeal pursuant to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ("the Act"), s63 from a determination of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal. The respondent is or was an employee of the appellant. By a claim form dated 22 November 1999 and apparently received by the appellant's insurer the following day, she claimed compensation pursuant to the Act in respect of a back injury alleged to have occurred on 19 October 1999. On 26 November 1999, in purported pursuance of the Act, s81A, the appellant served a notice on the respondent and referred to the Tribunal the matter of its liability to pay compensation and benefits pursuant to the Act. The Tribunal, constituted by a commissioner, conducted a hearing and on 9 March 2000, made a determination that the appellant had not formed the intention to dispute the respondent's claim at the time of serving the notice on her, and that the Tribunal was therefore without jurisdiction. The reference to the Tribunal was dismissed on that basis. The appellant contends that the learned Commissioner erred in law in reaching those conclusions.

The following provisions in s81A are of relevance:

"81a ¾ (1) An employer who disputes liability ¾
(a)to pay compensation by way of weekly payments for an injury referred to in section 81(1); or
(b)to pay the cost of any benefits payable under Division 2 of Part VI in respect of the injury ¾

must, within 14 days of receiving the claim for compensation in respect of the injury to the worker ¾
(c)serve the worker with written notice that the employer disputes liability ¾
(i)to pay compensation by way of weekly payments and must inform the worker of the reasons for disputing liability; or
(ii)to pay any benefits payable under Division 2 of Part VI in respect of the injury and must inform the worker of the reasons for disputing liability; and

(d) refer the matter to the Tribunal.

…
(3) The…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read GIO Australia Limited v Lovell and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2000] TASSC 75
Decision Date: 26 June 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in this matter, GIO Australia Limited v Lovell, originated from a decision of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal, which was challenged by GIO Australia Limited, the appellant, on the grounds that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make the determination it did. The dispute concerns a claim for workers' compensation made by the respondent, Dianne Lovell, following an alleged injury at work. GIO Australia Limited, the employer, contends that the Tribunal erred in determining that it had not formed the requisite intention to dispute Ms. Lovell's claim at the time of serving a notice on her, thereby concluding that the Tribunal was without jurisdiction to proceed with the matter.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the appellant, GIO Australia Limited, had formed the intention to dispute Ms. Lovell's claim at the time of serving the notice of dispute, as required by section 81A(1) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. The court examined whether the appellant had complied with the statutory requirement to serve a notice on the respondent within 14 days of receiving the claim, stating that it disputed liability. The appellant argued that the Commissioner erred in law by concluding that it had to form the intention to dispute at the time of serving the notice, rather than at a later time. The court held that the statutory language indicated that the employer must dispute liability at the time of serving the notice, and thus the Commissioner's finding that GIO Australia Limited had not disputed liability at that time was not erroneous.

Further, the court found that the notice served by GIO Australia Limited did not properly dispute liability but instead indicated that further information was needed to determine if the injury arose from employment. This notice, along with the referral to the Tribunal, did not provide evidence that GIO Australia Limited had decided to dispute liability as required by the statute. The court concluded that the appellant had not discharged the onus of proving that it had disputed liability at the relevant time, thereby affirming the Tribunal's lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the Tribunal's determination was upheld.

The court's final orders were that the appeal by GIO Australia Limited be dismissed, and the decision of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal stands as it was originally made.

Orders