Gilles v La Rosa (No 2)

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Gilles v La Rosa (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 297
Hearing dates: 4 December 2018
Decision date: 04 December 2018
Before: Basten JA; Macfarlan JA
Decision:

(1)   Dismiss the summons seeking leave to appeal from the costs order made in the Equity Division.

 

(2)   Order that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs fixed in the sum of $15,000.

 (3)   Otherwise dismiss the respondents’ motion filed 14 September 2018.
Catchwords: APPEAL – costs – application for leave to appeal – costs order in proceedings otherwise disposed of by consent – no issue of principle
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 21, 98
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.1
Cases Cited: Carolan v AMF Bowling Pty Ltd [1995] NSWCA 69
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Lee v NSW Crime Commission [2012] NSWCA 262; (2012) 224 A Crim R 94
Nichols v NFS Agribusiness Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 84
Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (Cth); Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622; [1997] HCA 6
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Joseph John Gilles (First Applicant)
Gregory George Eliades (Second Applicant)
Rosa La Rosa as Executor of the Estate of the late Giovanni La Rosa (First Respondent)
Rosa La Rosa (Second Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
L T Fermanis (Applicants)
M Castle / A D Bailey (Respondents)

  Solicitors:
Giles Payne & Co (Applicants)
S Moran & Co (Respondents)
File Number(s): 2018/184527
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
Supreme Court
Jurisdiction:
Equity
Citation:
[2018] NSWSC 920
Date of Decision:
21 June 2018
Before:
Emmett AJA
File Number(s):
2015/366603

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: The applicants seek leave to appeal from a lump sum costs order made by Emmett AJA on 21 June 2018 following the dismissal of the applicants’ summons: Gilles v La Rosa [2018] NSWSC 920.

  2. The applicants are solicitors who conduct their legal practice under the name Giles Payne & Co. It will be convenient to refer to the applicants as the Firm, as was done by Emmett AJA in the court below. The second respondent, Ms Rosa La Rosa, and her late husband, Mr Giovanni La Rosa (the Clients) had retained the Firm to act first in relation to a conveyancing transaction, in respect of which the first costs agreement was entered into. Mrs La Rosa, as executor of the estate of her late husband, is the first respondent and is the second respondent in her personal capacity.

  3. The Clients also retained the Firm in respect of proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court in which a loan relating to the conveyance was raised as an issue in Family Court proceedings between their son, Mr Salvatore La Rosa, and his former wife. The Clients entered into a second costs agreement in respect of those services. Each costs agreement contained a clause in the following terms:

“We shall have the right of security for our costs and disbursements for…

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Details
Case
[2018] NSWCA 297
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Gilles v La Rosa (No 2)*, the applicant sought leave to appeal a costs order made in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The underlying proceedings had been disposed of by consent between the parties.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether leave to appeal should be granted from the costs order. This involved considering whether there was an issue of principle that warranted appellate intervention, particularly given the consent nature of the original proceedings.

The Court of Appeal determined that no issue of principle arose from the costs order. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused. The Court reasoned that appeals from costs orders in circumstances where the substantive dispute has been resolved by consent are generally not permitted unless a significant question of law or principle is involved, which was not demonstrated in this instance.

The summons seeking leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs, fixed at $15,000. The respondents' motion filed on 14 September 2018 was otherwise dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Dismiss the summons seeking leave to appeal from the costs order made in the Equity Division.

(2) Order that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs fixed in the sum of $15,000.

(3) Otherwise dismiss the respondents’ motion filed 14 September 2018.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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