Giles v State of Queensland

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Giles v State of Queensland [2020] QDC 332

PARTIES:

PETER GILES

(plaintiff)

v

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

(defendant)

FILE NO:

4988/2015

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

18 December 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26, 27, 28, 29, 30 October, and 2 and 4 November 2020

JUDGE:

Reid DCJ

ORDER:

Judgment for the defendant.

Plaintiff pay defendant’s cost on standard basis since 5 March 2015.

CATCHWORDS:

CIVIL – NEGLIGENCE - PERSONAL INJURY – PSYCHIATRIC INJURY - LIABILITY – ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES - where plaintiff worked as a fire fighter with QFRS for 27 years – where he alleges he suffered psychiatric injury in the course of employment with the defendant- where the plaintiff alleges he suffered this injury at Slacks Greek fire incident in 2011 where people of Samoan origin including eight children lost their lives– where the plaintiff alleges at the night of the fire he was not adequately welfare checked by the defendant- where the plaintiff alleges that he was required to work for an excessive period - where the plaintiff is seeking damages for his injury as a result of defendant’s negligence  

LEGISLATION:

Crown Proceedings Act 1980 (Qld)

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss 305B, 305D

CASES:

Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] QCA 366

COUNSEL:

Mr T Matthews QC and Mr C Newton for the plaintiff

Mr M Grant-Taylor QC and Ms J McClymont for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

Hall Payne Lawyers for the plaintiff
Hall and Wilcox Lawyers for the defendant

Introduction

  1. On 24 August 2011 11 people of Samoan origin, including eight children, lost their lives in a tragic house fire at 60 Wagensveldt St Slacks Creek. The plaintiff was a firefighter in the employ of the then Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) and assisted in fighting that blaze. Following his attendance at the scene and because of that attendance, he has developed a significant psychiatric disorder, said to be PTSD.  He sues the State of Queensland pursuant to the provisions of the Crown Proceedings Act for damages for negligence.

  2. I have concluded his action fails for the reasons which follow.

  3. It is understandable that the plaintiff’s psychiatric condition maybe adversely affected by this outcome. It is important the plaintiff understands that I do not doubt he has developed a significant psychiatric injury following his exposure to the fire and that he understands that I do not doubt that he performed his role as pump operator on the night of the fire well. The failure of his action is unrelated to either of those issues. The role of a firefighter can be a demanding one and one that can place a significant emotional burden on those that perform that role to ensure, so far is can be done, that others in the community are safe. Unfortunately that emotional burden can become overwhelming, without fault of the individual firefighter or of his employer. This is such a case.

    Background

  4. The plaintiff was…

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Details
Case
[2020] QDC 332
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff in Giles v State of Queensland, a case before the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, sought damages for psychiatric injury sustained during his employment as a firefighter with the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS). The plaintiff, who had worked for the QFRS for 27 years, alleged that he suffered a psychiatric injury during the Slacks Creek fire incident in 2011, where a house fire resulted in the deaths of several people, including eight children of Samoan origin. He claimed that he was not adequately welfare checked by the defendant and was required to work for an excessive period, which led to his injury. The plaintiff sought damages for his injury as a result of the defendant's negligence.

The court was tasked with determining whether the defendant breached its duty of care to the plaintiff by exposing him to a foreseeable and not insignificant risk of injury, and if a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have taken the precautions alleged by the plaintiff. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the breach of duty probably caused the plaintiff's injuries. The court examined the foreseeability of the risk, the potential seriousness of the injury, and the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of injury.

After reviewing the evidence, the court found that the plaintiff did not suffer a psychiatric injury as a result of the defendant's negligence. The court accepted the plaintiff's evidence regarding his involvement in the fire and the factors that distressed him, but concluded that these factors did not amount to a breach of duty by the defendant. The court found that the plaintiff's psychiatric injury was not caused by the defendant's actions or omissions, and therefore the defendant was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries.

As a result, the court entered judgment in favour of the defendant, and ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs on a standard basis from 5 March 2015. The court emphasised that it did not doubt that the plaintiff had developed a significant psychiatric injury following his exposure to the fire, and that it did not doubt that the plaintiff performed his role as pump operator on the night of the fire well. However, the court found that the plaintiff's failure to establish a causal link between the defendant's actions and his injury meant that the defendant was not liable for his injuries.

Orders

Orders of the court

Judgment for the defendant.

Plaintiff pay defendant’s cost on standard basis since 5 March 2015.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is understandable that the plaintiff’s psychiatric condition maybe adversely affected by this outcome. It is important the plaintiff understands that I do not doubt he has developed a significant psychiatric injury following his exposure to the fire and that he understands that I do not doubt that he performed his role as pump operator on the night of the fire well. The failure of his action is unrelated to either of those issues. The role of a firefighter can be a demanding one and one that can place a significant emotional burden on those that perform that role to ensure, so far is can be done, that others in the community are safe. Unfortunately that emotional burden can become overwhelming, without fault of the individual firefighter or of his employer. This is such a case. Background The plaintiff was born on 1 December 1954 so is now 66. At the date of the fire he was 56. He joined the QFRS on 30 June 1986 and was retired, medically unfit, on 6 November 2013. But for his injuries, he would have had to retire only when he turned 65, on 1 December 2019. At the time of his enforced retirement he was working as a safety assessment officer at the Southport Station as part of his attempted rehabilitation following the development of his psychiatric disorder. The defendant owed the plaintiff a non-delegable duty of care to take reasonable care for his safety and avoid exposing him to unnecessary risk of injury in the course of his employment. His claim is governed by the common law, as modified by the provisions of Chapter 5, Part 8, Division 1 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (“WCRA”). The issues on liability were identified by the plaintiff’s counsel as follows:(i)was the risk of injury:(a) foreseeable, that is a risk which the Defendant knew or ought reasonably to have known (s305B(1)(a)); and(b) not insignificant? (s305B(1)(b));(ii)would a reasonable person in the position of the Defendant have taken one or more of the precautions alleged by the plaintiff in the circumstances? (s305B(1)(c) and s305B(2)); and(iii)factual causation, namely would the precautions, if taken, probably have prevented the Plaintiff from suffering his injuries? (s305D(1)(a)). Those sections provide:305B General principles(1)A person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a risk of injury to a worker unless—(a)the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought reasonably to have known); and(b) the risk was not insignificant; and(c)in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the person would have taken the precautions.(2)In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of injury, the court is to consider the following (among other relevant things)—(a) the probability that the injury would occur if care were not taken;(b) the likely seriousness of the injury;(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of injury.305D General principles(1)A decision that a breach of duty caused particular injury comprises the following elements—(a) the breach of duty was a necessary condition of occurrence of the injury (factual causation);

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The document does not assist in understanding whether he had ever been rotated from a critical incident but does show that he remained at some incidents for in excess of five, and even seven, hours. Other officers gave broadly similar evidence. Plaintiff’s Evidence The plaintiff said he drove appliance 638A to the fire. The truck was the first appliance to arrive, at 12.11am. Mr Giles described parking the appliance on the side of Wagensveldt Street opposite number 58, facing away from number 60, and towards the intersection of Wagensveldt Street with Veldt Street. I accept his evidence that the appliance was only about 12m from the corner of Veldt Street. The appliance was parked at an angle so that the left hand rear of the vehicle was nearest to the gutter and the right hand front of the appliance furthest from the gutter. When he arrived a crowd of onlookers had already gathered in Veldt Street but could not move forward onto Wagensveldt Street as police had cordoned off the top of Veldt Street. I accept that a crowd remained in that position until the appliance left at about 9am. This description of the scene is consistent with a plan drawn by the plaintiff (Exhibit 6) which I accept as generally depicting the scene. Subsequently, other appliances arrived but their exact location is not important. Appliance 638A was fitted with capacity for at least two fire hoses. These were during the morning operated by various officers, including those from 638A, namely Mr Leach and Mr Hickey with assistance from Mr Mountain, but nothing turns on that precise issue. Mr Giles’ job throughout the whole period of eight hours and 49 minutes that 638A was at the scene was to be the pump operator. He located a fire hydrant on the footpath opposite number 60, connected a hose to the hydrant and to the truck and ensured the water pressure and volume was maintained throughout the whole of the period he remained at the scene. Even though fire officers got the fire under control by 1.05.06 am, after less than an hour, the plaintiff still had to ensure there was adequate water and pump pressure until the appliance departed at about 9 am. Whilst his job was a responsible one, it was, at least after the initial set up, not a physically demanding one. The plaintiff identified in his evidence, and to doctors to whom he gave descriptions of the event, a number of factors that, he said, distressed him about his involvement with the fire. He nominated these:(1)The long duration of his continued attendance at the fire, namely eight hours and 49 minutes;(2)The large crowd, which was very close to him and from which he could clearly hear wailing, crying and other sounds of obvious distress and anguish. Many were Samoans. Over time he said his perception of this crowd noise increased, perhaps due to some abatement of other noises as the fire subsided and other appliances and officers left the scene.(3)The fact that 11 people, including eight children, died and he and the fire service could do nothing to stop that from that happening. (4)Media treatment of the event, both on the night in question and subsequently. He described the media as being “in your face” and “overhyping”. (5)His distress at being told both that a person had escaped from the fire by jumping from a window, but that other family members had not followed that lead and also of his hearing that one fire officer had looked in through a window of the residence and seen “arms and legs” everywhere.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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