Gildersleeve and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)
[2019] AATA 2955
•4 July 2019
Gildersleeve and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2019] AATA 2955 (4 July 2019)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2017/5572
Re:Julia Gildersleeve
APPLICANT
AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Brigadier AG Warner, Member
Date:4 July 2019
Date of written reasons: 23 August 2019
Place:Perth
The Tribunal:
(a)refuses to reinstate the application for review dated 17 September 2017 pursuant to s 42A(10) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act); and
(b)refuses the application for an extension of time to lodge this application for review of a decision pursuant to s 29(7) of the AAT Act.
...............[sgd].........................................................
Brigadier AG Warner, Member
CATCHWORDS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for reinstatement and application for an extension of time – whether application dismissed in error – application for reinstatement refused – whether reasonable in all circumstances to extend time for making application for review – factors – length of delay significant – explanation for delay not satisfactory – prejudice – poor prospect of success of Applicant’s substantive application – potential alternative avenue of relief – Tribunal not satisfied that reasonable in all circumstances to grant extension of time – application refused
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – ss 29(2), 29(7), 42A, 42A(1A), 42A(1B), 42A(2), 42A(8), 42A(9), 42A(10)
CASES
Bell and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2001] AATA 598
Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441
De Los Santos-Aguilar and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2014] AATA 269
Goldie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 121 FCR 383
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Kuljic v Department of Social Security (1994) 33 ALD 121
Mori and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2013] AATA 737
Re Civic Tavern Pty Ltd and ACT Liquor Licensing Board (1993) 32 ALD 381
Re Grafton and Commonwealth (1988) 16 ALD 533
Re Novosel and Comcare (2011) 121 ALD 172; [2011] AATA 182
Re Romeo and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 26 ALD 248
Ristic and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2017] AATA 2
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Roberts [2003] AATA 269
Tismanaru and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] AATA 1322
White and Repatriation Commission [2005] AATA 75Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 55 ALD 451
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Guide to Social Security Law, Department of Social Services, version 1.231 – Instruction 3.1.12
REASONS FOR DECISION
Brigadier AG Warner, Member
23 August 2019
INTRODUCTION
On 4 July 2019 the Tribunal, at the conclusion of an interlocutory hearing (the hearing) held that day, gave oral reasons for its decision. The Tribunal decided to refuse the Applicant’s application to reinstate an application for second review dated
17 September 2017 of a decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Tribunal (AAT1) made on 22 August 2017, and to refuse an application for an extension of time to lodge the application for review. The AAT1 decision affirmed a decision of an Authorised Review Officer of the Department of Human Services (the Department) made on 27 March 2017, which affirmed a decision of the Department dated
24 November 2016, to cancel the Applicant’s Disability Support Pension (DSP) with effect from 11 November 2016.
The interlocutory hearing was conducted by telephone conference. The Applicant,
Ms Gildersleeve, attended and was represented by her father, Mr Peter Hughes, who gave evidence on affirmation. Ms Sarah Dinkha represented the Secretary by telephone conference from Canberra.
Mr Hughes subsequently requested written reasons for the Tribunal’s decision.
The written reasons which follow are distilled from the edited transcript of the oral reasons given on 4 July 2019.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant had been in receipt of DSP since 28 March 2011 (Exhibit R1, para 3).
On 24 November 2016, the Department cancelled the Applicant’s DSP with effect from
11 November 2016 on the basis that the Applicant and her husband’s combined income exceeded the relevant income cut-off amount of $2,936.80 for 12 consecutive weeks.
This was because the Applicant’s husband, Mr Gildersleeve, was in receipt of income protection payments and employment income during the relevant period. An authorised review officer of the Department affirmed the cancellation decision on 27 March 2017.
On 23 May 2017, the Applicant sought review by the AAT1 and a hearing was conducted on 14 August 2017. During that hearing, Mr Hughes asserted that Mr Gildersleeve’s income did not exceed the cut-off amount for the fortnight commencing 1 September 2016 as he had not received any income from his employment at the City of Melville
(Exhibit R1, Att A para 17).
On 22 August 2017, the AAT1 remitted the matter to the Department for reconsideration in accordance with the direction that the Department obtain Mr Gildersleeve’s pay record from the City of Melville for the fortnight including 1 September 2016, to enable the Department to determine: the Applicant’s entitlement to DSP for the fortnight ending
1 September 2016; and the correct date for cancelling the Applicant’s DSP (Exhibit R1, Att A).
It is presumed that the AAT1 posted its decision to the Applicant on
22 August 2017. The 28 day time limit for application to this Tribunal expired on
25 September 2017.
The Applicant applied for review with this Tribunal on 17 September 2017.
On 23 November 2017, the Department obtained Mr Gildersleeve’s payslips from the
City of Melville for the period 8 August 2016 to 16 October 2016. The payslips show that Mr Gildersleeve was in receipt of income during the fortnight 1 September 2016 to
14 September 2016 (Exhibit R1, Att B).
On 2 January 2018, the Tribunal issued a notice confirming that the Tribunal had received a written notification from the Applicant that she wanted to withdraw her application (Exhibit A3) and that the application had been dismissed with effect from
30 December 2017.
On 11 April 2019, the Applicant applied for reinstatement of the application by lodging an application for review, including an application for an extension of time, with this Tribunal (Exhibit A2).
ISSUES
In this matter, the Tribunal must decide whether the Applicant’s application for second review by this Tribunal dated 17 September 2017 should be reinstated. This requires consideration of whether the requirements set out in s 42A of the AAT Act are met and in particular whether the application was dismissed in error.
In order for the application to be reinstated pursuant to s 42A of the AAT Act
the Applicant must establish that the application was dismissed in error, and if not whether an extension of time should be granted for the Applicant to make a fresh application for review of the original decision.
EVIDENCE
The materials before the Tribunal comprised the following:
·Applicant’s submissions filed 9 May 2019 (Exhibit A1);
·application for reinstatement dated 11 April 2019 (Exhibit A2);
·two withdrawal emails received on 30 December 2017 (Exhibit A3); and
·
Secretary’s submissions opposing the reinstatement application dated
23 May 2019 including attachments A to E (Exhibit R1).
The Tribunal also heard oral evidence of the Applicant’s father, Mr Peter Hughes, at the hearing.
CONSIDERATION
The application for reinstatement.
Turning to the relevant legislation and policy, s 42A of the AAT Act deals with the discontinuance, dismissal and reinstatements of applications for review. Sections 42A(1A) and 42A(1B) of the AAT Act state as follows:
(1A)A person who has made an application to the Tribunal for a review of a decision may, in writing lodged with the Tribunal, at any time notify the Tribunal to the effect that the application is discontinued or withdrawn.
…
(1B)If notification is given in accordance with (1A) or (1AA), the Tribunal is taken to have dismissed the application without proceeding to review the decision.
Subsections 42A(8), (9) and (10) of the AAT Act provide the only power for the Tribunal to reinstate applications that have been dismissed. Subsections 42A(8) and (9) of the AAT Act are to be read together with the effect that the power to reinstate an application under s 42A(9) is only enlivened where the application has been dismissed under s 42A(2). The power in s 42A(9) of the AAT Act is not available when an application has been dismissed under s 42A(1B) following notification of withdrawal.
In the present matter the Respondent submits, correctly in the Tribunal’s view, that
s 42A(10) is the only provision that applies in considering an application for reinstatement where the application for review was dismissed pursuant to ss 42A(1A) and (1B) of the AAT Act. Subsection 42A(10) enables the Tribunal to reinstate an application only if it was dismissed in error. This is a discretionary rather than a mandatory power to reinstate, and that subsection provides as follows:
If it appears to the Tribunal that an application has been dismissed in error the Tribunal may, on the application of a party to the proceeding or on its own initiative, reinstate the application and give such directions as appear to it to be appropriate in the circumstances.
The power contained in s 42A(10) of the AAT Act is only enlivened where the Tribunal is satisfied that an application has been dismissed in error. In Goldie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 121 FCR 383 the Full Court of the Federal Court found that the reference to error in s 42A(10) is not limited to administrative error. The Court further found that the only limitations are that the Tribunal has dismissed the application and that the act of dismissal was attended with error.
In the matter of Ristic and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2017] AATA 2 the Tribunal (at [18]) considered the application of the term ‘dismissed in error’, and in that matter the Tribunal said that:
·“Dismissed in error” comprehends any error in the application of s 42A that led to the dismissal;
·For the discretion in sub-section 42A(10) to be invoked, there must be an error which bears some relation to the dismissal;
·The error must be related to the dismissal rather than broader or peripheral circumstances; and
·An unwise withdrawal of an application does not constitute dismissal in error.
The Tribunal also has regard to the relevant conclusions of the Honourable Garry Downes J, then President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, in delivering the Hartigan Memorial Lecture in 2005:[1]
The conclusion seems to be that tribunals should act with extreme caution before ever giving consideration to the question whether a matter once determined should be revisited. Such reconsideration should be confined to the simplest and most obvious cases of manifest error.
[1]A number of authorities provide guidance as to the meaning of error in the context of a reinstatement application and its consideration. In the case of Mori and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2013] AATA 737 the Tribunal found that regret at having done something, or wishing it was not done or could be undone, having had a change of heart, does not constitute an error for the purposes of s 42A(10) of the AAT Act. In the case of De Los Santos-Aguilar and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2014]
AATA 269 the Tribunal held that the applicant bears the burden of establishing why an application should be reinstated. Further the case of Novosel and Comcare, Re (2011) 121 ALD 172; [2011] AATA 182 states that acting on legal advice subsequently suggested to be questionable, is not an error nor is acting on the basis of then existing financial or personal circumstances.Before the Tribunal, the Respondent relevantly cited White and Repatriation Commission [2005] AATA 75 where it was said that an application is not dismissed in error simply because the withdrawal is ‘unwise’ (see also Exhibit R1, para 23).
In Exhibit R1 the Respondent cites examples of dismissals in error where the Tribunal dismissed an application:
(a)in the mistaken belief that each party had consented to dismissal;
(b)because the applicant failed to comply with directions to lodge further material, even though the applicant may have been able to proceed on the material already before the Tribunal; and
(c)on the erroneous belief that service of a listing notice had been effected.
Having regard to the above examples, the Tribunal emphasises that its power to reinstate an application is discretionary. The Tribunal must always be satisfied that it would be appropriate in all the circumstances to do so.
Turning to consideration of the present application for reinstatement; in correspondence dated 2 January 2018 the Tribunal advised that it had received written notification from the Applicant advising that she wished to withdraw her application. The Applicant's notification, Exhibit A3, is contained in two emails dated 30 December 2017. The first entitled ‘Withdrawal from Appeal No 2017/5572’ states in part:
The above attachments are to confirm that having regard to the issues discussed on 16 November 2017 and the unreasonable response from DHS we have decided to withdraw from proceeding with the above appeal.
The second entitled ‘Appeal Withdrawal Ref 2017/5572’ states in part:
Acting on behalf of my daughter, Julia Gildersleeve, I wish to advise that we have decided to withdraw from the lengthy appeal process. This decision has been made having regard to points made by Rowena Wallace at the 16 November conference in which she correctly pointed out that the delay could be denying progress that might be made in progressing a fresh application for Disability Support Pension.
(The Tribunal presumes that the reference to Rowena Wallace in the second email is an error and that the intended name was Ms Rowena Hodgson the Tribunal Conference Registrar.)
The Tribunal dismissed the application accordingly with effect from 30 December 2017.
In the reinstatement application lodged 11 April 2019 the Applicant indicated that she is seeking reinstatement of the application for the following reasons:
This matter was inconclusive in that it called for further information from parties concerned [sic] were called upon to provide further information (ref 2017/P111044), We elected to go to a 2nd review but feel we were incorrectly informed at a subsequent preliminary conference on 16/11/17 where we were given to understand that all Disability Support Pensioners would have to face
re-assessment. We therefore elected to proceed directly to a fresh application, which is stringent and unfair in the circumstances. A conference was held by telephone yesterday with Susan Waring, who suggested that we should apply for a second review of the appeal conducted on 22/08/2017 as above. The basis of our claim had no reference to the reason that the Commissioner called for additional information. Our claim always was that under Section 80 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 Centrelink should only have suspended Julia’s pension, and that permanent cancellation could not be justified since Julia had committed no offence. She had faithfully reported her husband’s income every fortnight correctly and on time (Exhibit A2, page 5).
In the above stated reasons the Applicant contends that she decided to proceed with this application for DSP on the basis that she was ‘incorrectly informed’ that ‘all Disability Support Pensioners would have to face reassessment’. In this regard the Respondent notes, correctly, that there is information available on the Department’s website stating that recipients of DSP may be subject to reviews of their medical eligibility at any time. The Respondent further notes that it was open to the Applicant to lodge a fresh claim for DSP while also continuing with the application for review following the conference on
16 November 2017.
The Respondent relevantly cites the matter of White (see para 24 above) where the Tribunal stated:
It is doubtful whether an applicant who simply makes an unwise decision to withdraw proceedings could be said to be acting in error in the relevant sense. It may be that a decision made on the strength of bad advice might not justify the exercise of the discretion either.
The Tribunal finds no evidence of error of the type required to enliven the discretion provided in s 42A(10) of the AAT Act. Rather, the Tribunal is of the view that the Applicant made a definite and conscious decision to withdraw from the review process and focus on a fresh DSP claim.
Having carefully considered all of the evidence, the circumstances of this application and the various authorities mentioned, the Tribunal is satisfied in the present case that the application was not dismissed in error. Rather, the Tribunal is satisfied that the application was dismissed pursuant to s 42A(1B) of the AAT Act because the Applicant made a conscious decision to withdraw the application for review. Although not pivotal in the current consideration, even if it could be argued that the application had been dismissed in error the significant delay constitutes a further consideration for refusing to exercise the discretion to reinstate the application.
Conclusion – Reinstatement application
The Tribunal finds that the requirement in s 42A(10) of the AAT Act is not satisfied and as a result there is no power for the Tribunal to reinstate the application for review. It follows that the Applicant’s request for reinstatement is refused.
The Applicant’s application for reinstatement was lodged by way of a fresh application for review to this Tribunal, together with an application for an extension of time to seek that review. The Respondent notes that there is a line of authorities in favour of the Tribunal considering applications for an extension of time to seek a fresh review in circumstances where the matter has previously been dismissed by the Tribunal after the applicant withdrew their application, and the applicant did not meet the requirements for reinstatement in s 42A of the AAT Act. However, the Respondent contends that an applicant cannot seek to bypass the reinstatement provisions in s 42A of the AAT Act by lodging a fresh application for review and seeking an extension of time to do so.
The Tribunal, mindful of ensuring that every fairness be afforded the Applicant, will consider the application for an extension of time for the fresh application made on
11 April 2019 (Exhibit A2). In doing so the Tribunal has regard to the Respondent’s contention that the application for an extension of time should be refused and notes the matters of Tismanaru and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] AATA 1322 and Bell and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2001] AATA 598 relevantly cited by the Respondent (Exhibit R1, para 39) in support of that contention.
The extension of time application.
Under s 29(2) of the AAT Act an application for review must generally be lodged within
28 days of the applicant receiving notice of the decision. However, s 29(7) of the AAT Act permits the Tribunal to extend the time for the making by that person of an application to the Tribunal if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.
In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344, 348-349 the Federal Court set out a series of factors that might be of relevance under similar provisions, and it is customary for the Tribunal in determining applications for an extension of time for making an application for a review to be guided by those factors. They are as follows:
(a)…it is the prima facie rule that proceedings commenced outside that period [the prescribed period] will not be entertained…
(b)Action taken by the applicant, other than by making an application for review under the Act, is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished. A distinction is to be made between the case of a person who, by non-curial means, has continued to make the decision-maker aware that he contests the finality of the decision (who has not “rested on his rights” …) and a case where the decision-maker was allowed to believe that the matter was finally concluded…
(c)Any prejudice to the respondent including any prejudice in defending the proceedings occasioned by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension…
(d) However, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension … In this context, public considerations often intrude ... A delay which may result, if the application is successful, in the unsettling of other people … or of established practices … is likely to prove fatal to the application.
(e) The merits of the substantial application are properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted …
(f) Considerations of fairness as between the applicants and other persons otherwise in a like position are relevant to the manner of exercise of the Court’s discretion …
The courts have provided some further guidance. In the matter of Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441 the Full Federal Court held that although the provision of an acceptable explanation for delay in lodging an application is not an essential precondition for the favourable exercise of the discretion to grant an extension of time for the lodging of that application, “it is to be expected that such an explanation will normally be given, as relevant to the matter to be considered…”.
In a further relevant matter, that of Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999)
55 ALD 451, Katz J establishes that in determining the question of an extension of time the Tribunal should weigh together all relevant factors.
In the present application the Respondent contends that the factors for consideration include length of delay, awareness of appeal rights and explanation for the delay, prejudice to the general public, and the prospects of success (R1, para 45).
The Tribunal will now consider the relevant factors.
Length of delay
The Applicant states that she received the AAT1 decision on 16 November 2017
(Exhibit A2, p 5). However, the Applicant’s initial request for review of the decision prepared by her father is dated 16 September 2017 and commences as follows:
I apologise for taking so long to forward this request for further review. Unfortunately my preparation has been interrupted by Microsoft updates and computer problems (Exhibit R1, Att C).
In terms of the relevant timings the Respondent submits (Exhibit R1, paras 47-51) that the AAT1 posted its decision to the Applicant on 22 August 2017. The 28 day limit to lodge an appeal in this Tribunal expired on 25 September 2017. The application for an extension of time was lodged on 11 April 2019 and therefore the application for review is one year,
six months and 17 days late. The Respondent’s submission is supported by the evidence.
The length of delay involved in any case will be a relevant consideration, and in the matter of Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Roberts [2003]
AATA 269 it was stated at [16] that ‘[t]he brevity of the extension sought does not, however, lead automatically to an order extending the time…’.
The Tribunal having considered this factor, finds that taken alone the significant length of delay in this matter mitigates against the granting of an extension of time.
Awareness of appeal rights and explanation for the delay
The reasons for delay provided by the Applicant are not compelling or satisfactory. Rather, they are an explanation of why the previous application was withdrawn and what the Applicant considers to be the relevant issues to be determined.
When the Tribunal sends a decision to an applicant it is normally sent under cover of a letter explaining the rights of appeal and the time limit of 28 days. There is no evidence that this practice was not followed in the present matter. The Applicant did apply for a review of the AAT1 decision on 17 September 2017, which was within the prescribed
28 day time limit, but subsequently withdrew that application on 30 December 2017.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant was aware of her appeal rights and the timeframe within which an appeal must be lodged, and further that the Applicant has not provided a satisfactory explanation for a delay of more than a year and a half.
In a number of cases often cited by the Tribunal, and in these proceedings relevantly cited by the Respondent at [61] of Exhibit R1 – Re Grafton and Commonwealth (1988)
16 ALD 533, Re Romeo and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 26 ALD 248, Re Civic Tavern Pty Ltd and ACT Liquor Licensing Board (1993) 32 ALD 381, the Tribunal declined to grant an extension of time as it was satisfied that the applicant in each case was fully aware of the right to seek review of the decision in question and did nothing.The Tribunal, having regard to all the evidence and the authorities mentioned above, finds that this factor weighs against granting an extension of time.
Prejudice
The Tribunal accepts the Respondent’s general proposition that it is in the public interest that there is an end to the appeal process. Time limits are imposed to ensure that there is a predictable and orderly conclusion to the process, and that the public interest and the interests of those applicants who comply with the prescribed time limits are not unsettled by perceptions of unfairness and uncertainty if an extension of time was permitted where the justice of the case does not permit that it should occur.
Although the Respondent has not made a submission regarding prejudice to the Secretary should an extension of time be granted, in submissions related to the reinstatement consideration the Respondent contended that “[r]einstating the application would prejudice the Secretary, due to the administrative cost of reopening and participating further in the matter” (Exhibit R1, para 33). The Tribunal considers that this contention applies equally to the extension of time application and concludes that the factor of prejudice weighs against granting an extension of time.
Prospects of success of the substantive application
It is not necessary or appropriate for the Tribunal to conduct a merits review of the Applicant’s substantive application at this interlocutory stage. However, it is appropriate for the Tribunal to consider the merits of that application as part of the process of determining this application for an extension of time for lodging the substantive application.
Relevantly the Tribunal notes the statement of von Doussa J in the matter of Kuljic v Department of Social Security (1994) 33 ALD 121, 122, to the effect:
One of the principal considerations to be addressed in deciding whether it is fair and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time is whether the merits of the proposed appeal are such that if an extension of time is granted there is some prospect of success in the appeal. If a consideration of the merits indicates that there is no question to be agitated on the appeal, and there is no prospect of success, it would be futile to grant an extension of time and most unjust to the respondent to subject the respondent to the costs of defending a pointless appeal.
In the present matter the Applicant claims that the AAT decision of 22 August 2017 (Exhibit R1) is wrong because:
Our claim always was that under Section 80 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 Centrelink should only have suspended Julia’s pension, and that permanent cancellation could not be justified, since Julia had committed no offence. She had faithfully reported her husband’s income every fortnight correctly and on time (Exhibit A2, page 5).
The Tribunal records, and reassured the Applicant of this during the hearing, that there is no suggestion in the Tribunal’s consideration that there had been any offence or wrongdoing by the Applicant.
In considering the merits of the substantive application the Tribunal reviewed the AAT1 decision, the relevant legislation and policy and all the evidence and submissions before it. The Tribunal particularly notes instruction 3.1.12 of the Social Security Guide, which states:
An employment income nil rate period starts on the date of effect of the nil rate determination and runs until 6 fortnights after the end of the instalment period in which the nil rate determination happened. In effect an employment income nil rate period can last up to 6 to 7 fortnights, or until the recipient’s social security pension or benefit is reinstated due to a drop in income whichever is the earlier. If the recipient doesn’t have their income support reinstated their payment is cancelled at the end of an employment income nil rate period.
The notes attached to the Applicant’s application for reinstatement state in part:
It is also evident that the income leading to cancellation of the pension occurred through administrative bungling between Melville Council and WA Super. Also note that the unusual circumstances only exceeded the 6 fortnights by a bare margin (Exhibit A2, Notes relevant to Centrelink letter of 27 March 2017).
This statement appears to concede that the Applicant’s combined income exceeded the relevant cut-off limit for six fortnights, albeit due to unusual circumstances and only by a bare margin.
The Tribunal’s consideration supports a conclusion that the Applicant’s DSP was correctly cancelled on 11 November 2016 and that there are very poor prospects of a different favourable decision should the matter proceed to review by the Tribunal. It follows that this factor weighs against granting an extension of time.
Alternative avenue of relief
Although the Respondent made no submissions regarding alternative avenues of relief, the Respondent’s conclusion in Exhibit R1 (para 81) states in part “…and there are alternative avenues for relief potentially available to the Applicant”. The Tribunal notes that it was open to the Applicant to lodge a fresh claim for DSP.
Conclusion – Extension of time application
Having carefully considered the evidence and weighed the relevant factors, the Tribunal finds that in all the circumstances it is not reasonable to grant the requested extension of time.
DECISION
It follows from the above that the Applicant’s application for reinstatement of her application dated 17 September 2017 for second review by this Tribunal is refused, and the associated application for an extension of time with respect to the application for review is also refused.
I certify that the preceding 62 (sixty -two) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Brigadier AG Warner, Member
....[sgd]....................................................................
Associate
Dated: 23 August 2019
Date of hearing: 4 July 2019 Representative for the Applicant: Mr Peter Hughes Representative for the Respondent: Ms Sarah Dinkha
Justice Garry Downes, ‘Finality of Administrative Decisions: The Ramifications of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597’ (Hartigan Memorial Lecture, Brisbane,
30 November 2005) <
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