Gilbert v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gilbert v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1289 

Citation: Gilbert v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1289
Parties: ROY JOSEPH GILBERT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
File number: VID 971 of 2011
Judge: NORTH J
Date of judgment: 11 November 2011
Date of hearing: 21 October 2011
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Hughan with Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the Applicant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 971 of 2011

BETWEEN:

ROY JOSEPH GILBERT
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2011

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application filed on 7 September 2011 by the applicant for an extension of time to appeal from the orders of Marshall J made on 23 January 2008 is refused.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 971 of 2011

BETWEEN:

ROY JOSEPH GILBERT
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE:

11 NOVEMBER 2011

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Before the Court is an application under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) by Roy Joseph Gilbert, the applicant, for an extension of time to appeal against orders made by Marshall J on 23 January 2008. This application was filed on 7 September 2011. The rules applicable in January 2008 required a notice of appeal to be filed within 21 days of judgment: O 52 r 15 Federal Court Rules.  Consequently, the notice of appeal should have been filed by 13 February 2008, and is over three and a half years out of time. 

    THE JUDGMENT OF MARSHALL J

  2. The applicant applied to set aside the decision of the respondent, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, made on 7 June 2007, to cancel his visa on character grounds.  The applicant arrived in Australia with his family from the United Kingdom when he was eight years old and by 2007 had built up a substantial criminal record. 

  3. Marshall J explained the applicant’s visa status as follows:

    3.Mr Gilbert arrived in Australia in August 1981. On arrival in Australia, pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), as it then stood, Mr Gilbert’s parents were granted entry permits to enter Australia. Under s 6(8), as their child, Mr Gilbert was deemed to be included in the entry permit of one of his parents.

    4.The Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) and the Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1994 (“the Transitional Regulations”), effected changes to the basis upon which non-citizens who held entry permits were entitled to…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1289
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court was presented with an application by Roy Joseph Gilbert for an extension of time to appeal against orders made by Marshall J on 23 January 2008. The applicant had filed his application for an extension of time on 7 September 2011, which was over three and a half years out of the 21-day limit required by the Federal Court Rules. The applicant sought to appeal against the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to cancel his visa on character grounds. The applicant had a substantial criminal record and had arrived in Australia as a child with his family from the United Kingdom. The court was required to determine whether the applicant's application for an extension of time should be granted, and if so, on what terms.

The court considered the applicant's proposed argument on appeal that the power to cancel a visa under s 501F(3) depended on a separate source of power outside the section itself. The court rejected this argument, finding that the terms of the section and its context located the authority to cancel a visa within the section itself. The court also considered the applicant's other discretionary grounds for an extension of time, including the substantial consequences of the cancellation remaining in place and the respondent's lack of prejudice from the grant of an extension of time. However, the court found that the applicant had not provided a substantial explanation for the delay in instituting an appeal and that there was no reasonable prospect of the applicant succeeding on his fundamental contention. The court also noted that the majority view on the validity of item 7 was that it was constitutionally valid.

The court refused the applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal against the orders of Marshall J. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court found that the applicant had not provided a substantial explanation for the delay in instituting an appeal, and that there was no reasonable prospect of the applicant succeeding on his fundamental contention. The court also noted that the majority view on the validity of item 7 was that it was constitutionally valid.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application filed on 7 September 2011 by the applicant for an extension of time to appeal from the orders of Marshall J made on 23 January 2008 is refused.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

Roy Joseph Gilbert, a non-citizen, arrived in Australia from the United Kingdom with his family at the age of eight. Over the years, he accumulated a substantial criminal record. On 7 June 2007, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship decided to cancel his visa on character grounds. Gilbert applied to set aside this decision, arguing it was flawed. The case was brought before Marshall J, who determined that the Minister's decision primarily cancelled Gilbert's absorbed person visa, leading to the cancellation of his transitional (permanent) visa under s 501F(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The judgment highlighted the competing views on whether a transitional (permanent) visa could be cancelled when an absorbed person visa is cancelled. However, Marshall J found it unnecessary to decide this issue as the Minister's decision was clear in cancelling the absorbed person visa.

The case initially came before Marshall J, who issued orders on 23 January 2008. Gilbert then applied for an extension of time to appeal these orders under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), filing the application on 7 September 2011. The application was more than three and a half years out of the statutory time limit, which required a notice of appeal to be filed within 21 days of the judgment, according to O 52 r 15 of the Federal Court Rules.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Before the Court is an application under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) by Roy Joseph Gilbert, the applicant, for an extension of time to appeal against orders made by Marshall J on 23 January 2008. This application was filed on 7 September 2011. The rules applicable in January 2008 required a notice of appeal to be filed within 21 days of judgment: O 52 r 15 Federal Court Rules. Consequently, the notice of appeal should have been filed by 13 February 2008, and is over three and a half years out of time. THE JUDGMENT OF MARSHALL J The applicant applied to set aside the decision of the respondent, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, made on 7 June 2007, to cancel his visa on character grounds. The applicant arrived in Australia with his family from the United Kingdom when he was eight years old and by 2007 had built up a substantial criminal record. Marshall J explained the applicant’s visa status as follows:3.Mr Gilbert arrived in Australia in August 1981. On arrival in Australia, pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), as it then stood, Mr Gilbert’s parents were granted entry permits to enter Australia. Under s 6(8), as their child, Mr Gilbert was deemed to be included in the entry permit of one of his parents.4.The Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) and the Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1994 (“the Transitional Regulations”), effected changes to the basis upon which non-citizens who held entry permits were entitled to remain in Australia.5Relevantly, reg 4 of the Transitional Regulations states that: If, immediately before 1 September 1994, a non-citizen was in Australia as the holder of a permanent entry permit that entry permit continues in effect … as a transitional (permanent) visa and permits the holder to remain indefinitely in Australia. (Emphasis added.)6The Migration Reform Act also created another form of visa known as an “absorbed person visa”. Pursuant to s 34(2) of the Act, a person who was in Australia on 2 April 1984, and who before that day “ceased to be an immigrant” was “taken to have been granted an absorbed person visa on 1 September 1994” (emphasis added).7As at 1 September 1994, Mr Gilbert was:• the holder of a transitional (permanent) visa; and• the grantee of an absorbed person visa. His Honour then examined the respondent’s decision and determined that on its proper construction the decision cancelled the applicant’s absorbed person visa. His Honour continued:27.The significance of which visa was cancelled arises from the terms of s 501(2) and the use of the word “granted”. It provides:The Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if:(a)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and(b)the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test.28Under s 501(6) a person does not pass the character test if he or she has a substantial criminal record. It is not in dispute that Mr Gilbert has a substantial criminal record. In Moore v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 161 FCR 236 at 246 a Full Court, by way of obiter dicta, observed that the power conferred on the Minister to cancel a visa only applies to visas that have been granted to a person. Where a visa has been granted to a person, s 501F(3) operates so that any other visa held by that person is cancelled. So when an absorbed person visa is cancelled the transitional (permanent) visa held by that person is also cancelled. However, the Full Court considered in Moore that that process could not operate in reverse. That is because, so it said, the transitional (permanent) visa is a visa which is not granted or deemed to be granted to a person but is held by a person as a result of the operation of the Transitional Regulations.29Contrary views to those contained in Moore in the above respect, have been expressed in Hall v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 97 FCR 387 (per Finkelstein J) and Andary v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1544 (per Dowsett J).30It is not necessary for me to express a preference in respect of the two competing approaches. That is because I consider that, in the current circumstances, the issue does not require determination. The better view is that the Minister’s decision on 7 June 2007 was that Mr Gilbert’s absorbed person visa was cancelled. That is especially clear from the “purpose” of the issues document which specifically seeks a decision on whether to cancel the absorbed person visa. It was a visa which “is taken to have been granted” to him in accordance with s 34(2) of the Act.31It is not disputed that if the Court forms the view that the Minister cancelled the absorbed person visa, as a consequence of that cancellation, s 501F(3) has the effect that the transitional (permanent) visa is also cancelled.THE DRAFT NOTICE OF APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Such a challenge to the validity of item 7 was initially raised but not pursued in Bainbridge v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 181 FCR 569; [2010] FCAFC 2 (Bainbridge). However, Moore and Perram JJ referred to and rejected the argument, albeit by way of obiter, on the ground that item 7 does not direct a court to treat as valid what is invalid, but rather it supplies legislative authority for decisions previously lacking that authority. Buchannan J disagreed. The majority view was accepted by Stone J in Martinez v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor (2010) 115 ALD 363; [2010] FCA 448 (Martinez) and by Perram J in Truong v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2010] FCA 1188 (Truong). The applicant wishes to argue on appeal that the view expressed by Buchannan J in Bainbridge is correct. Consideration The applicant’s proposed argument on appeal is built on the foundation that s 501F(3) depends on a separate source of power to cancel a visa outside the section itself. There is no substantial reason which supports this reading of s 501F(3). The terms of the section and its context locate the authority to cancel a visa in the section itself. The section operates automatically to cancel the visa. There is no particular purpose served by the drafting technique of deeming the cancellation to have been effected by a decision of the Minister. The reference in item 7 to decisions made under s 501F does not advance the applicant’s argument. Item 7 is introduced by the words “To avoid doubt”. Thus, the legislature did not assume that a decision under s 501F(3) required validation, but took the cautious approach of making provision in the event that any argument was raised. Neither does the absence of reference to s 501F(3) in s 118 demonstrate that s 501F(3) does not itself authorise the cancellation of a visa. Section 118 does not purport to be a complete statement of the source of authority to cancel visas. Finally, no reliance can be placed on the correspondence from the Department to the applicant. The view expressed in that correspondence that the cancellation of the transitional (permanent) visa was invalid following the judgment in Sales was mistaken. So much is now accepted by the respondent. There is no reasonable prospect that the applicant would succeed on this fundamental contention. Even if he were to do so, he would also need to overcome the obiter view of the majority in Bainbridge supported in Martinez and Truong that item 7 is constitutionally valid.OTHER DISCRETIONARY GROUNDS The respondent accepts that he would suffer no prejudice from the grant of an extension of time to the applicant apart from the fact that time has elapsed. It is also obvious that the consequences to the applicant of the cancellation remaining in place are substantial. He would be sent from Australia where his family lives and which has been his home for 30 years, and he would not be permitted to return to Australia. The respondent argued that the applicant had not provided a substantial explanation for the delay in instituting an appeal. Part of the delay can be explained by the letter from the Department dated 1 August 2008 which notified the applicant that, as a result of the judgment in Sales, the cancellation of the transitional (permanent) visa was ineffective. But any comfort received from that letter was brought to an end on the receipt of the letter of 28 September 2008 in which the Department advised the applicant that, as a result of the Amending Act, the cancellation decision was operative. The applicant explained the situation thereafter in an affidavit sworn on 5 or 6 September 2011 as follows: 6.I wished to challenge that decision but believed that I could not do so and that the only avenue open to me was to apply for a special category visa. On 17 November 2010 my former solicitors wrote to me advising that they considered that my circumstances would not attract a favourable exercise of the Minister’s discretion which was required for the grant of such a visa. ….7.I then requested that my former solicitors assist me to challenge the effect of the Department’s letter dated 29 September 2008. They were unable to assist me but referred my case back to the Public Interest Law Clearing House (‘PILCH’) to see if another firm of solicitors would be willing to assist me pro bono.8.I understand that in February 2011 PILCH requested a merits assessment of my case from Mr Greg Hughan of Counsel and then, when he was unable to complete the advice by himself, a further request was made to Mr Nick Wood of Counsel in June 2011.