FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gilbert v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1289
Citation: Gilbert v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1289 Parties: ROY JOSEPH GILBERT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP File number: VID 971 of 2011 Judge: NORTH J Date of judgment: 11 November 2011 Date of hearing: 21 October 2011 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Hughan with Mr N Wood Solicitor for the Applicant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Knowles Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 971 of 2011
BETWEEN: ROY JOSEPH GILBERT
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 NOVEMBER 2011
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed on 7 September 2011 by the applicant for an extension of time to appeal from the orders of Marshall J made on 23 January 2008 is refused.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 971 of 2011
BETWEEN: ROY JOSEPH GILBERT
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE:
11 NOVEMBER 2011
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before the Court is an application under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) by Roy Joseph Gilbert, the applicant, for an extension of time to appeal against orders made by Marshall J on 23 January 2008. This application was filed on 7 September 2011. The rules applicable in January 2008 required a notice of appeal to be filed within 21 days of judgment: O 52 r 15 Federal Court Rules. Consequently, the notice of appeal should have been filed by 13 February 2008, and is over three and a half years out of time.
THE JUDGMENT OF MARSHALL J
The applicant applied to set aside the decision of the respondent, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, made on 7 June 2007, to cancel his visa on character grounds. The applicant arrived in Australia with his family from the United Kingdom when he was eight years old and by 2007 had built up a substantial criminal record.
Marshall J explained the applicant’s visa status as follows:
3.Mr Gilbert arrived in Australia in August 1981. On arrival in Australia, pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), as it then stood, Mr Gilbert’s parents were granted entry permits to enter Australia. Under s 6(8), as their child, Mr Gilbert was deemed to be included in the entry permit of one of his parents.
4.The Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) and the Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1994 (“the Transitional Regulations”), effected changes to the basis upon which non-citizens who held entry permits were entitled to…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 1289
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the applicant's proposed argument on appeal that the power to cancel a visa under s 501F(3) depended on a separate source of power outside the section itself. The court rejected this argument, finding that the terms of the section and its context located the authority to cancel a visa within the section itself. The court also considered the applicant's other discretionary grounds for an extension of time, including the substantial consequences of the cancellation remaining in place and the respondent's lack of prejudice from the grant of an extension of time. However, the court found that the applicant had not provided a substantial explanation for the delay in instituting an appeal and that there was no reasonable prospect of the applicant succeeding on his fundamental contention. The court also noted that the majority view on the validity of item 7 was that it was constitutionally valid.
The court refused the applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal against the orders of Marshall J. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court found that the applicant had not provided a substantial explanation for the delay in instituting an appeal, and that there was no reasonable prospect of the applicant succeeding on his fundamental contention. The court also noted that the majority view on the validity of item 7 was that it was constitutionally valid.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application filed on 7 September 2011 by the applicant for an extension of time to appeal from the orders of Marshall J made on 23 January 2008 is refused.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case initially came before Marshall J, who issued orders on 23 January 2008. Gilbert then applied for an extension of time to appeal these orders under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), filing the application on 7 September 2011. The application was more than three and a half years out of the statutory time limit, which required a notice of appeal to be filed within 21 days of the judgment, according to O 52 r 15 of the Federal Court Rules.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Such a challenge to the validity of item 7 was initially raised but not pursued in Bainbridge v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 181 FCR 569; [2010] FCAFC 2 (Bainbridge). However, Moore and Perram JJ referred to and rejected the argument, albeit by way of obiter, on the ground that item 7 does not direct a court to treat as valid what is invalid, but rather it supplies legislative authority for decisions previously lacking that authority. Buchannan J disagreed. The majority view was accepted by Stone J in Martinez v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor (2010) 115 ALD 363; [2010] FCA 448 (Martinez) and by Perram J in Truong v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2010] FCA 1188 (Truong). The applicant wishes to argue on appeal that the view expressed by Buchannan J in Bainbridge is correct. Consideration The applicant’s proposed argument on appeal is built on the foundation that s 501F(3) depends on a separate source of power to cancel a visa outside the section itself. There is no substantial reason which supports this reading of s 501F(3). The terms of the section and its context locate the authority to cancel a visa in the section itself. The section operates automatically to cancel the visa. There is no particular purpose served by the drafting technique of deeming the cancellation to have been effected by a decision of the Minister. The reference in item 7 to decisions made under s 501F does not advance the applicant’s argument. Item 7 is introduced by the words “To avoid doubt”. Thus, the legislature did not assume that a decision under s 501F(3) required validation, but took the cautious approach of making provision in the event that any argument was raised. Neither does the absence of reference to s 501F(3) in s 118 demonstrate that s 501F(3) does not itself authorise the cancellation of a visa. Section 118 does not purport to be a complete statement of the source of authority to cancel visas. Finally, no reliance can be placed on the correspondence from the Department to the applicant. The view expressed in that correspondence that the cancellation of the transitional (permanent) visa was invalid following the judgment in Sales was mistaken. So much is now accepted by the respondent. There is no reasonable prospect that the applicant would succeed on this fundamental contention. Even if he were to do so, he would also need to overcome the obiter view of the majority in Bainbridge supported in Martinez and Truong that item 7 is constitutionally valid.OTHER DISCRETIONARY GROUNDS The respondent accepts that he would suffer no prejudice from the grant of an extension of time to the applicant apart from the fact that time has elapsed. It is also obvious that the consequences to the applicant of the cancellation remaining in place are substantial. He would be sent from Australia where his family lives and which has been his home for 30 years, and he would not be permitted to return to Australia. The respondent argued that the applicant had not provided a substantial explanation for the delay in instituting an appeal. Part of the delay can be explained by the letter from the Department dated 1 August 2008 which notified the applicant that, as a result of the judgment in Sales, the cancellation of the transitional (permanent) visa was ineffective. But any comfort received from that letter was brought to an end on the receipt of the letter of 28 September 2008 in which the Department advised the applicant that, as a result of the Amending Act, the cancellation decision was operative. The applicant explained the situation thereafter in an affidavit sworn on 5 or 6 September 2011 as follows: 6.I wished to challenge that decision but believed that I could not do so and that the only avenue open to me was to apply for a special category visa. On 17 November 2010 my former solicitors wrote to me advising that they considered that my circumstances would not attract a favourable exercise of the Minister’s discretion which was required for the grant of such a visa. ….7.I then requested that my former solicitors assist me to challenge the effect of the Department’s letter dated 29 September 2008. They were unable to assist me but referred my case back to the Public Interest Law Clearing House (‘PILCH’) to see if another firm of solicitors would be willing to assist me pro bono.8.I understand that in February 2011 PILCH requested a merits assessment of my case from Mr Greg Hughan of Counsel and then, when he was unable to complete the advice by himself, a further request was made to Mr Nick Wood of Counsel in June 2011.