Gilbert Pitt v Mount Isa Mines Limited
[2022] FWC 1704
•5 JULY 2022
| [2022] FWC 1704 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Gilbert Pitt
v
Mount Isa Mines Limited
(U2022/5826)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT ANDERSON | ADELAIDE, 5 JULY 2022 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – extension of time – miscalculation – late awareness of filing fee waiver – no exceptional circumstances – application dismissed
Gilbert Pitt (Mr Pitt or the applicant) has applied to the Commission under s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the FW Act) for an unfair dismissal remedy in relation to an alleged dismissal by Mt Isa Mines Limited (Mt Isa Mines, the respondent or the employer) which took effect on 6 May 2022.
Mr Pitt’s application was received by the Commission on 30 May 2022.
The application is three days outside the statutory 21-day period for making unfair dismissal claims. Mr Pitt seeks an extension of time. Mt Isa Mines oppose an extension being granted.
This decision determines whether an extension of time should be granted.
I issued directions on 15 June 2022.
I heard the extension of time issue by video conference on 30 June 2022.
Mr Pitt and Mt Isa Mines were self-represented; the employer by internal legal counsel Ms McBean.
Mr Pitt gave evidence.[1] The employer filed written submissions.[2]
The facts, drawn from both oral and documentary evidence, are largely not in dispute.
Facts
I make the following findings.
Mt Isa Mines, a part of the Glencore Group, conducts mining operations at Mt Isa, Queensland.
Mr Pitt was employed by Mt Isa Mines in March 2019 as an apprentice electrician.
Issues of concern arose between Mt Isa Mines and Mr Pitt concerning alleged absenteeism, alleged failure to complete certain TAFE requirements and alleged attendance at work with a non-valid drivers licence.
Following a show cause process on 5 May 2022, Mr Pitt was called to a meeting the following day (Friday 6 May 2022) where he was informed of the outcome of that process. He was informed by the Manger – Engineering (Mr Botha) that the company considered its concerns substantiated and that his employment was terminated with immediate effect.
At the conclusion of the 6 May 2022 meeting, Mr Pitt was given a letter titled ‘Show Cause Outcome’ which stated:[3]
“…
As advised in this outcome meeting, after the show cause meeting on Thursday 5 May 2022, and having regard to the above factors, the Company has decided that the appropriate disciplinary action in these circumstances is the termination of your employment with immediate effect.
…”
Mr Pitt immediately handed back his ID card and left the worksite.
Mr Pitt was paid three weeks in lieu of notice. These monies were deposited into Mr Pitt’s bank account on 12 May 2022.
At the time of dismissal Mr Pitt went home. He believed he had been unfairly treated. He considered he had produced evidence of reasons for absences the employer should have accepted. He also believed his dismissal was harsh because he was nearing the completion of his apprenticeship (4th year) and that obtaining alternate work in Mt Isa to enable him to complete his apprenticeship would be very difficult.
At the time of being dismissed, Mr Pitt was aware of a general right of dismissed persons to claim unfair dismissal.
Five days later, on or around 11 May 2022, Mr Pitt decided to investigate his unfair dismissal rights. He was advised by his wife to search the Commission web site. He did so. He located and read information about unfair dismissal rights. He located the unfair dismissal application form (F2). He began populating the form on-line. He learned from the web site and the form that he had 21-days after his dismissal took effect to file a claim.
On reading this, Mr Pitt performed a calculation in his head. He read on the Commission web site that that the 21-day count started the day after dismissal. He counted twenty-one days from 7 May 2022. Mr Pitt miscalculated. He did not include Saturday 7 May 2022 as the first day. As a result, Mr Pitt calculated the twenty-first day as falling on Saturday 28 May 2022. Mr Pitt also read on the Commission web site that if a day for filing fell on a Saturday or Sunday, the filing could lawfully occur the following Monday. He therefore calculated that he had until Monday 30 May 2022 to file his unfair dismissal application.
Having made this calculation, Mr Pitt populated the form on 11 May 2022 up to and including question 1.5 (“Are you making this application within 21 calendar days of your dismissal taking effect?”). He answered that question in the affirmative, as he was intending to file by Monday 30 May 2022.
Mr Pitt stopped after question 1.6 because he was not sure how to answer what remedy he was seeking (question 2.1).
A further five or so days later, on or around 16 May 2022 Mr Pitt saw on the Commission web site that a no-cost Workplace Advisory Service could be provided to assist persons advance their rights, and that one of the legal services was based in Townsville. Mr Pitt decided that it may be in his interests to obtain the views of a solicitor on whether he had grounds to proceed with an unfair dismissal claim. Mr Pitt, using the online tool, sought assistance of the Service.
On 18 May 2022 Mr Pitt received an emailed response. It read:
“…
Dear [Mr Pitt],
Thank you for requesting legal advice through the Workplace Advice Service.
We receive a large number of requests and rely on available appointments from our partner organisations who volunteer their services.
Unfortunately we are unable to find an appointment for you due to high demand.
What can you do next?
You can contact another organisation that may be able to provide support through the link provided below:
Alternative Organisations
A request for legal help from the Workplace Advice Service is not an application to the Commission. Some applications, like dismissal applications, have strict 21-day time limits. If you were dismissed and are nearing the 21-day time limit, you should lodge your application to the Commission as soon as possible.
If you need more information about lodging a Fair Work Commission application, please call our Helpline on 1300 799 675 or on our website through the link provided below:
Commission Forms
Thank you for interest in the Workplace Advice Service.
Kind regards,
Workplace Advice Service…”
(emphasis in original)
Mr Pitt read the response including the advice about filing within twenty-one calendar days. He continued to believe that he had until 30 May 2022 to file his claim. He saw no need to contact the Commission helpline, and did not do so.
Mr Pitt was aware from the information he had read on the Commission web site and the F2 form that a filing fee applied for the lodgement of an unfair dismissal application (“around $80” on his evidence[4]). Believing he was short of funds, he asked family and friends for assistance. He says none was forthcoming.
On 30 May 2022, the day Mr Pitt believed was his last day for filing, Mr Pitt logged back onto the Commission web site and returned to his online application. He populated the remaining parts of the form.
At 11.26am on 30 May 2022 Mr Pitt filed his application as an email attachment.
It was not until the Commission communicated with Mr Pitt after his application was filed that Mr Pitt was made aware that his application may be out of time.
On 6 June 2022, in the week after filing his application, Mr Pitt received from his former employer a Separation Certificate.[5] Mr Pitt had asked for that certificate to be sent some weeks earlier because he needed it to claim a Centrelink benefit. It was not sent until 6 June 2022. The Certificate, when sent, incorrectly identified Mr Pitt’s termination date as 10 May 2022 when in fact it was 6 May 2022.
Submissions
Mr Pitt
Mr Pitt, in his evidence and submissions, advances three reasons for the delay:
· His miscalculation, which he says was an honest mistake on a technical issue that was confusing to a lay person;
· His lack of awareness about his right to seek a waiver of the filing fee until, according to Mr Pitt, he was told by his wife “one or two days” before filing his claim; and
· The failure by Mt Isa Mines to send him a Centrelink Employment Separation Certificate or provide clarity on the reasons for his dismissal.
Mr Pitt submits that allowing his claim to proceed does not prejudice Mt Isa Mines. In contrast, he says that he would incur significant disadvantage if his claim could not proceed because he has remained unemployed since his dismissal and fears that he will not be able to complete his apprenticeship unless he moves to larger centres of employment on the east coast.
Mt Isa Mines
Mt Isa Mines submit there are no exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of time. It contends:
· Mr Pitt was aware on repeated occasions after dismissal and prior to the 21-day deadline that he was required to file within twenty-one calendar days of his dismissal taking effect;
· Mr Pitt was aware that his dismissal took effect on 6 May 2022;
· Mr Pitt chose to file on the last day of his calculation when he could have filed earlier. He ignored advice sent to him by the Commission that a dismissed employee should file “as soon as possible” if they were “nearing the 21-day time limit”;
· Mr Pitt made a miscalculation despite having read on the Commission web site what was required of him. No one but Mr Pitt was responsible for the miscalculation. A miscalculation is not an acceptable reason for delay;
· Mr Pitt was in no doubt why he was dismissed. He was provided a Show Cause Outcome letter on 6 May 2022 which provided that information. He did not need to wait for a Centrelink Employment Separation Certificate to know why he was dismissed or lodge his claim; and
· Mr Pitt had access to multiple sources of information about his rights to seek a waiver of the application fee but did not carefully read the information before him.
Mt Isa Mines also submit that the application is weak on merit because it had valid reasons for dismissal and that Mr Pitt was on notice well prior to being dismissed of the employer’s concerns.
Mt Isa Mines further submit that it would incur prejudice in having to defend a late application, and that it would be unfair to the broader group of unfair dismissal applicants who are required to file on time and accurately ascertain their rights if a late application caused by Mr Pitt’s miscalculation is allowed to proceed.
Consideration
Section 394(3) of the FW Act provides:
“394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
…
(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”
The application can only proceed if the applicant can establish that “exceptional circumstances” exist within the meaning of s 394(3).
An applicant for an extension of time has an onus to adduce evidence in support of matters which that applicant asserts constitute exceptional circumstances.[6]
The test of “exceptional circumstances” establishes a “high hurdle” for an applicant.[7] A decision whether to extend time under s 394(3) involves the exercise of a discretion.[8]
I apply s 394(3) in the context of the Full Bench decision in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd:
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.”[9]
The principles of Nulty have been cited with approval by subsequent full benches of the Commission.[10]
Status of the application
It is not in dispute that the application is three days out of time. The first of the twenty-one days was 7 May 2022 (the day after dismissal took effect). Counting forward (including that day) the twenty-first day was Friday 27 May 2022. The three day period of delay is from 28 to 30 May 2022 (inclusive).
Mr Pitt’s application can only proceed if an extension is granted.
I now consider each of the factors in s 394(3).
Reason for the delay (s 394(3)(a))
The reason for delay in lodging an application is a factor that must be considered. The FW Act does not specify what reason or reasons for delay might fall in favour of granting an extension although decisions of the Commission have referred to an acceptable or reasonable explanation.[11] The absence of an explanation for any part of the delay will usually weigh against an applicant. Similarly, a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay will usually weigh in an applicant’s favour, though it is ultimately a question of degree and insight.[12]
However, a reasonable explanation for the delay is not needed for the whole of the period of delay or may in fact not be required at all if the circumstances are otherwise exceptional.[13]
The period of delay that requires explanation is the period commencing immediately after the time for lodging an application has expired, ending on the day on which an application is ultimately lodged. That said, regard may be had to any circumstances from the date the dismissal took effect when assessing whether the explanation for delay is acceptable or credible.[14]
I now deal with the reasons advanced by Mr Pitt for the delay.
Miscalculation
There is no general rule that a dismissed employee making a mistake results in the mistake being an acceptable reason for delay. Equally, the circumstances of mistaken conduct or a mistaken belief are relevant to determining whether an acceptable reason for delay exists or is capable of rendering the circumstances exceptional.[15]
I find that Mr Pitt made a calculation error on or about 11 May 2022. He counted twenty-one days from 7 May 2022. He did not include Saturday 7 May 2022 as the first day. As a result, Mr Pitt calculated the twenty-first day as falling on Saturday 28 May 2022. Given that he had read on the Commission web site that if a day for filing fell on a Saturday or Sunday then the filing day could lawfully be the following Monday, he calculated that he had until Monday 30 May 2022 to file his unfair dismissal application when in fact the twenty-first day was Friday 27 May 2022.
I find that this was an honest mistake in the sense that Mr Pitt wanted to file an unfair dismissal claim in the proper legal form and time frame.
Relevant also is that the mistake was not borne of anything said or done by the employer. Mr Pitt was not misled by his former employer about the date his dismissal took effect.
Nor is there any evidence before me that information on the Commission web site relied upon by Mr Pitt was misleading or unclear.
The calculation error by Mr Pitt was compounded by a subsequent error of judgment. I find that Mr Pitt decided that because he believed he had until 30 May 2022, then he would not need to lodge until that day, being what he believed to be the twenty-first day. That Mr Pitt did not return to his partially completed unfair dismissal application after 11 May 2022 and until the morning of 30 May 2022 supports a finding to that effect. Further, for reasons discussed below, I find Mr Pitt’s explanation that he needed to wait until that day for the Employment Separation Certificate or information about the fee waiver to be convincing.
Not only could Mr Pitt have filed earlier than the twenty-first day, in deciding not to complete his incomplete application until that final day Mr Pitt ignored specific advice that had been sent to him by the Commission. The Commission’s emailed response of 18 May 2022 to his request to access the Workplace Advisory Service advised in highlighted form that whilst a dismissed employee had twenty-one calendar days after dismissal to take action, they should file “as soon as possible” if they were “nearing the 21-day time limit”.
This Mr Pitt did not do. He did not do so primarily because he believed he had time and had no reason to doubt his calculation.
The miscalculation made by Mr Pitt was not the consequence of being confused by unclear information provided by a third party. It was his miscalculation because he did not commence the count on the day after his dismissal took effect, despite the Commission web site indicating that the day after dismissal took effect (and not the day of dismissal) is the first day of the 21-day period.
The miscalculation by Mr Pitt, accompanied by his decision to wait until the last day to file, does not weigh in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.
Unaware of right to waive filing fee
The submission by Mr Pitt that the delay was caused in part because he was unaware of his right to seek a waiver of the filing fee until, according to Mr Pitt, he was told by his wife “one or two days” before filing his claim is not convincing.
Firstly, to the extent Mr Pitt was unaware of this right, his lack of awareness was the product of his lack of attention to the information he was reading. The unfair dismissal application he sourced and started completing from the Commission web site on 11 May 2022 stated in clear terms on its front page under the heading “lodging your completed form”:[16]
“If payment of the fee will cause you financial hardship, you can apply to have the fee waived. You must apply to have the fee waived at the same time as you lodge your application. Download the waiver form [linked] from the Commission website.”
The F2 form repeated this information on the back page under the heading “Financial Hardship”.
Further, the Commission web site (and not simply the F2 form) included information about the filing fee and fee waiver rights.
Secondly, ignorance of rights under the law is not, of itself, an acceptable reason for delay.[17]
Thirdly, Mr Pitt was informed by his wife of the right to apply for a fee waiver at least one or two days before filing his application. He did not file on the day he was informed. Had he done so the delay period would have been reduced.
The explanation that Mr Pitt’s application was late because he was unaware of the right to apply for a fee waiver is not a convincing reason for the delay.
Failure to provide separation certificate or reasons for dismissal
Mr Pitt’s submission is that the delay was, in part, caused by a failure by Mt Isa Mines to send him a Centrelink Employment Separation Certificate or provide clarity on the reasons for his dismissal.
On the issue of clarity of reasons for dismissal, Mr Pitt’s submission has no force.
I am well satisfied on the evidence that Mr Pitt was aware of the reasons for his dismissal at the time of being dismissed. The letter he received on 6 May 2022 specifically referred to excessive absenteeism, failure to complete certain TAFE requirements and attendance at work with a non-valid driver’s licence whilst allegedly telling his supervisor the licence was valid. He made reference to each of these points in his application when filed, notwithstanding having received no further particulars from the employer following the dismissal.
Mr Pitt is correct that he did not receive an Employment Separation Certificate until 6 June 2022 despite asking his employer for one. However, I do not find this materially contributed to the delay. Mr Pitt sought the certificate in order to claim Centrelink benefits. He did not seek the certificate in order to obtain information necessary to file his unfair dismissal claim. To the extent the certificate would have informed Mr Pitt of a date of dismissal and reason for dismissal, I have found that Mr Pitt had insight into each of these matters from the employer’s letter given to him on 6 May 2022. As it turned out, Mr Pitt filed an application containing the relevant information without being in possession of a certificate.
Considered overall, Mr Pitt delayed making an unfair dismissal claim until what he believed was the last available day despite having the opportunity and capacity to file earlier. His application was half-completed more than two weeks prior to lodgement but Mr Pitt did not return to it until what he thought was the last available day. He put all his eggs in the basket of having made a correct calculation when, unknown to him, he had made a counting error. To the extent he needed an exemption from the filing fee, he had access to information about fee waiver more than two weeks earlier but did not pay sufficient attention to the waiver information on the material he was reading and completing.
Considered overall, the reasons for delay, neither individually nor collectively, weigh in favour of a conclusion of exceptional circumstances.
Awareness of the dismissal taking effect (s 394(3)(b))
Mr Pitt was aware that he was dismissed with immediate effect on 6 May 2022. He was told this on that day and it was confirmed in the Show Cause Outcome letter he received that same day.
I have found that Mr Pitt was aware of the reasons for his dismissal at the time of being dismissed.
In the circumstances, this factor does not weigh in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.
Action taken to dispute dismissal (s 394(3)(c))
I have found that Mr Pitt genuinely felt wronged by his dismissal from the time he was dismissed.
In the days and weeks that followed Mr Pitt asked the employer for a Centrelink Employment Separation Certificate but did not otherwise correspond with the employer about his dismissal or the reasons for it nor put the employer on notice that he was considering litigating the dismissal.
Mr Pitt did however seek assistance of the Commission’s Workplace Advisory Service to obtain independent advice before filing his claim and, through no fault on his part, was unable to access a legal practitioner providing support to that Service.
Mr Pitt’s evidence was that he believed the calculation he had made was correct and did not obtain third party support or verification for that calculation.
In the circumstances, seeking assistance from the Workplace Advisory Service weighs somewhat but only somewhat, in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.
Prejudice to the employer (s 394(3)(d))
Mt Isa Mines point to the fact that if Mr Pitt’s application is allowed to proceed, it will have to defend late proceedings which involve cost and expense. It says it would have commenced preparation of its case at an earlier date.
There is no substance to this submission. There is no evidence that a delay of three days has materially affected the employer’s capacity to collect evidence related to the claim or otherwise create prejudice in its defence of the claim.
In any event, the nature of this type of prejudice to the employer is not unique.
However, the absence of prejudice would not itself be a reason to grant an extension.[18]
In the circumstances, this is a neutral consideration.
Merits (s 394(3)(e))
The merits of Mr Pitt’s unfair dismissal application will raise issues of valid reason and procedural fairness.
Whilst it appears that a show cause process of some nature was conducted by the employer, I have not heard evidence either on valid reason or procedural fairness.
In these circumstances, whilst reasons for dismissal were notified by the employer, evidence on valid reason would need to be tested and all relevant considerations (including the show cause process and impacts on Mr Pitt’s apprenticeship) would need to be considered.
Not having heard evidence on these issues, it is not safe to express a provisional view on these questions.
In this matter, this is a neutral consideration.
Fairness between persons in similar position (s 394(f))
Mt Isa Mines submit that it would be unfair to other employees who informed themselves of their rights and obligations and filed claims on time or who have filed late claims and not been allowed to proceed, if Mr Pitt’s late claim was allowed to proceed.
I do not agree.
Whether it is appropriate to grant an extension of time in other matters is a decision to be made in the context of each matter, according to the relevant principles in s 394 of the FW Act.
Mr Pitt’s application (either on extension of time or merit) is not likely to have a bearing on any other matter as it deals with its unique circumstances. There is no evidence that Mr Pitt’s matter is a vehicle for other matters affecting the employer or otherwise awaiting its outcome.
This is a neutral factor.
Conclusion
In the context of a 21-day statutory time limit, the period of delay (three days), whilst not lengthy, is not insignificant.
The reasons for delay, neither individually nor collectively, weigh in favour of a conclusion of exceptional circumstances.
There would be disadvantage to Mr Pitt as he would not get his day in court to litigate the fairness of his dismissal. Whilst of obvious concern to Mr Pitt, this does not particularly weigh in favour of exceptional circumstances as it would be common that dismissed employees filing late and denied an extension of time would feel aggrieved at being unable to litigate the merits of their claim.
The limited action Mr Pitt took to follow up his dismissal with the Workplace Advisory Service weighs somewhat, but only somewhat, in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.
Mr Pitt’s mistakes were not caused by others; they were his. He made a mistake in calculation. He then made a mistake by not carefully reading the application form in relation to waiver of filing fees. He then made an error of judgement in waiting until the very last day to file. As observed by the Commission in Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited:[19]
“…a decision to wait to do something until the last possible moment is fraught with risk. Mr Shaw had the whole of the 21-day period during which he could have made the application. He chose to wait until the last day. Mr Shaw elected to take the risk and, in doing so, he was caught out by his earlier miscalculation.”
Whilst taking into account that Mr Pitt was a lay person, each of these mistakes was avoidable even to a lay person, given the information on the Commission web site to which Mr Pitt had access, and the information he was sent.
Considered overall, and whilst the period of delay is not lengthy, I am not satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist.
Disposition
There being no exceptional circumstances, the time for lodgement of application U2022/5826 cannot be extended.
Being out of time, the application must be dismissed.
An order[20] giving effect to this decision is issued in conjunction with its publication.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
G Pitt, on his own behalf
S McBean with J Mathot-Soudakoff and S Peterson, of and on behalf of, Mount Isa Mines Limited
Hearing details:
2022
Adelaide (by video)
30 June
[1] A1 Statement (email) 7 June 2022; A2 Statement with attachments (email) 22 June 2022
[2] By email 28 June 2022
[3] A2 attached letter 6 May 2022
[4] The filing fee at the relevant date was $74.90
[5] A2 attachment (legible version sent by Mr Pitt by email to the Commission 30 June 2022)
[6] Smith v Canning Division of General Practice[2009] AIRC 959
[7] Lombardo v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations[2014] FWCFB 2288 at [21]
[8] Halls v AR & MA McCardle & Sons Pty Ltd and Ors [2014] FCCA 316
[9] [2011] FWAFB 975 at [13]. See also Cheval Properties Pty Ltd t/as Penrith Hotel Motel v Smithers[2010] FWAFB 7251 at [5]
[10] John Mamur v Coles Group Supply Chain Pty Ltd[2020] FWCFB 4954 at [7] and [19]; Dennis Obel v Central Desert Regional Council[2021] FWCFB 167 at [6]
[11] Manoj Ellikuttige v Moonee Valley Racing Club Inc[2018] FWCFB 4988 at [30] and [36]
[12] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters[2019] FWCFB 3288, at [35]-[45]
[13] Stogiannidis (Ibid); Elliott v LEAP Legal Software Pty Ltd t/a LEAP Legal Software[2018] FWCFB 3288
[14] Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited[2015] FWCFB 287 at [12]; Ozsoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd[2014] FWCFB 2149 at [31] – [33]; Perry v Rio Tinto Shipping Pty Ltd T/A Rio Tinto Marine[2016] FWCFB 6963; Czoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149
[15] Mihajlovic v Lifeline Macarthur[2013] FWC 9804; Ayub v NSW Trains[2016] FWCFB 5500; Foyster v Bunnings Group Limited [2017] FWCFB 3923
[16] Mr Pitt’s F2 page 1
[17] Ellikuttige v Moonee Valley Racing Club Inc[2018] FWCFB 4988 at [30]; Linda Connor v Paul Kirk, Roberts & Co[2015] FWC 7335; Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 at 299 – 300; Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd[2011] FWAFB 975; Collins v Bunnings Group Limited[2016] FWC 7080
[18] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 at 299-300
[19] [2014] FWC 3903 at [28]
[20] PR743306
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