Gibson v Commonwealth of Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE FULL COURT (WA)

CITATION:   GIBSON -v- COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA & ANOR [2000] WASCA 290

CORAM:   MALCOLM CJ

PIDGEON J
IPP J

HEARD:   12 SEPTEMBER 2000

DELIVERED          :   12 SEPTEMBER 2000

PUBLISHED           :  10 OCTOBER 2000

FILE NO/S:   FUL 43 of 2000

BETWEEN:   PAUL ANTONIO GIBSON

Appellant

AND

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

ADRIAN VAN DER RIJT
Second Respondent

Catchwords:

Torts - Negligence - Statutes - Commonwealth as employer - Liability for negligence at common law abolished by statute unless an employee elects in writing to institute an action - An election must be made prior to commencing the action

Legislation:

Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), s 44(1) s 45(1)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     In person & Ms T Gatell Gamir (By leave of the court)

First Respondent           :     Mr L A Tsaknis

Second Respondent       :     Mr D Wallace

Solicitors:

Appellant:     In person & Ms T Gatell Gamir (By leave of the court)

First Respondent           :     Australian Government Solicitor

Second Respondent       :     Edwards Wallace

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Commonwealth v Flaviano (1996) 40 NSWLR 199

Grogan v Commonwealth [1999] 1 Qd R 30

Grogan v WBK (1998) 9 Leg Rep SL 2

Case(s) also cited:

Gibson v Repatriation Commission (1999) 55 ALD 194

Gibson v Repatriation Commission [2000] FCA 739

Walsh v Commonwealth of Australia [1998] NSWSC 223

Commonwealth of Australia v Mewett; Commonwealth of Australia v Rock; Commonwealth of Australia v Brandon HCA; S 33 of 1996; 31 July 1997

  1. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:  At the conclusion of argument on this appeal the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first and second respondents' costs of the appeal to be taxed.  The Court indicated that it would give its reasons for its decision at a later date.  Those reasons are set out below.

  2. The appellant has commenced proceedings against the respondents, claiming a range of relief.  The basis of the claims that he makes is not readily discernible from the pleadings filed by him but it does seem that he seeks to found his claims on allegations of negligence on the part of both respondents.  The appellant has had two attempts at filing statements of claim that comply with the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971.  Both these attempts were unsuccessful as both statements of claim were struck out by the learned Master.  This appeal stemmed from the order made striking out the last statement of claim filed by the appellant.

  3. The appellant was employed by the Royal Australian Air Force and, in effect, contends that the intensive training that he was obliged to undergo caused his pre‑existing but asymptomatic congenital condition of multiple osteochondromatosis to become symptomatic.  In the course of experiencing the symptoms in question, the appellant was treated by the second respondent.  It is these matters that lie at the heart of the appellant's allegations against the respondents.

  4. On 27 May 1999 the…

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Details
Case
[2000] WASCA 290
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Gibson v Commonwealth of Australia involved the appellant, who had been employed by the Royal Australian Air Force, bringing claims against the Commonwealth and a medical officer for negligence. The appellant alleged that intensive training he underwent caused his pre-existing but asymptomatic congenital condition of multiple osteochondromatosis to become symptomatic. The respondents sought to have the appellant's statements of claim struck out on the basis that the appellant had not made an election in writing to institute an action against them for damages, as required by the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).

The legal issues before the court were whether the appellant's claims against the respondents were valid and whether the appellant had complied with the statutory requirement to elect in writing to institute an action against the respondents. The court had to determine if the appellant's claims against the respondents were barred by the statutory provisions that abolished liability for negligence at common law unless an employee elects in writing to institute an action.

The court held that the appellant's claims against the respondents were invalid because the appellant had not made the requisite election in writing to institute an action against the respondents. The court found that the appellant's claims were barred by the statutory provisions that abolished liability for negligence at common law unless an employee elects in writing to institute an action. The court held that the appellant's failure to make the requisite election in writing was an irremediable defect in his statement of claim that could not be cured on the facts that existed at the date the statement of claim was issued. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal to be taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

PIDGEON J
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: At the conclusion of argument on this appeal the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first and second respondents' costs of the appeal to be taxed. The Court indicated that it would give its reasons for its decision at a later date. Those reasons are set out below. The appellant has commenced proceedings against the respondents, claiming a range of relief. The basis of the claims that he makes is not readily discernible from the pleadings filed by him but it does seem that he seeks to found his claims on allegations of negligence on the part of both respondents. The appellant has had two attempts at filing statements of claim that comply with the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971. Both these attempts were unsuccessful as both statements of claim were struck out by the learned Master. This appeal stemmed from the order made striking out the last statement of claim filed by the appellant. The appellant was employed by the Royal Australian Air Force and, in effect, contends that the intensive training that he was obliged to undergo caused his pre‑existing but asymptomatic congenital condition of multiple osteochondromatosis to become symptomatic. In the course of experiencing the symptoms in question, the appellant was treated by the second respondent. It is these matters that lie at the heart of the appellant's allegations against the respondents. On 27 May 1999 the appellant's original statement of claim was struck out by the learned Master at the instance of the respondents. The learned Master gave the appellant 42 days in which to file and serve a minute of substituted statement of claim. That time was extended and on 28 July 1999 the appellant filed the substituted statement of claim. On 12 November 1999 the respondents applied for an order striking out the substituted statement of claim. This application was upheld. The learned Master struck out the substituted statement of claim and ordered that the claims against the first and second respondents be dismissed. On 30 November 1999 the appellant filed a notice of appeal against the decision of the learned Master. The learned Registrar referred the notice of appeal to White J for directions pursuant to O 63 r 2(4). His Honour struck out the notice of appeal and ordered that there be liberty to the appellant to file a substituted notice of appeal within 21 days of the date of the order. White J ordered, however, that the substituted notice of appeal was to be directed only to the learned Master's order in relation to the appellant's claim against the second respondent and not to his order in relation to the claim against the first respondent. His Honour was of the opinion that there was an irremediable defect in the statement of claim that could not be cured on the facts that existed at the date the statement of claim was issued. And it is to that matter that we now turn. The appellant's claim against the first respondent is governed by the provisions of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). Section 44(1) of that Act provides:"Subject to section 45, an action or other proceeding for damages does not lie against the Commonwealth, a Commonwealth authority, a licensed corporation or an employee in respect of:(a)an injury sustained by an employee in the course of his or her employment, being an injury in respect of which the Commonwealth or Commonwealth authority or licensed corporation would, but for this subsection, be liable (whether vicariously or otherwise) for damages; or(b)the loss of, or damage to, property used by an employee resulting from such an injury;whether that injury, loss or damage occurred before or after the commencement of this section."Section 45(1) of the Act provides:"Where:(a)compensation is payable under section 24, 25 or 27 in respect of an injury to an employee; and(b)the Commonwealth, a Commonwealth authority, a licensed corporation or another employee would, but for subsection 44(1), be liable for damages for any non‑economic loss suffered by the employee as a result of the injury;the employee may, at any time before an amount of compensation is paid to the employee under section 24, 25 or 27 in respect of that injury, elect in writing to institute an action or proceeding against the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth authority, the licensed corporation or other employee for damages for that non‑economic loss."

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PIDGEON J

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