Gibbons v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

[2024] FedCFamC2G 791

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Gibbons v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 791

File number:

PEG 40 of 2023

Judgment of:

JUDGE LADHAMS

Date of judgment:

27 August 2024

Catchwords:

 MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision not to grant the applicants partner visas – where the Tribunal found the criteria in Schedule 3 to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) were not met and that there were no compelling reasons not to apply those criteria – whether the Tribunal considered all relevant evidence advanced by the applicants – whether the Tribunal gave the applicants a proper opportunity to address whether there were compelling circumstances not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria – whether the Tribunal considered the matters relied on by the applicants cumulatively – whether the Tribunal displayed a reasonable apprehension of bias – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 190

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476, 477

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.23, 2.03A, Sch 2, cl 820.211, Sch 3

Cases cited:

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76; [2019] HCA 50

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21; [2022] FCAFC 3

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610; [2024] HCA 12

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 111 ALD 15; [2009] HCA 39

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17

MZYPZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 127 ALD 510; [2012] FCA 478

QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 409 ALR 65; [2023] HCA 15

Zhang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 490

Division:

Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs:

107

Date of hearing:

10 November 2023

Place:

Perth

Applicants:

The first applicant appeared in person

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Ms G Ellis

Second Respondent:

Submitting appearance by the second respondent, save as to costs

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

PEG 40 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

KELLY LOUISE GIBBONS

First Applicant

OLIVER ETHAN GIBBONS

Second Applicant

OWEN JAMES GIBBONS (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:	27 AUGUST 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE LADHAMS:

INTRODUCTION

1. The applicants are citizens of the United Kingdom. The first applicant applied for a partner visa onshore. The second, third and fourth applicants are the children of the first applicant and were included in the visa application as members of the family unit. 

2. A delegate of the Minister made a decision not to grant the applicants visas and the applicants sought merits review of that decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 11 February 2023. The applicants seek judicial review of the Tribunal decision under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act).

3. For the reasons explained below, I have found that the applicants have not established that the Tribunal decision is affected by jurisdictional error. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

   VISA APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

4. The applicants first arrived in Australia in 2014. The first applicant has remained in Australia since her arrival. The second and third applicants have since returned to the United Kingdom. The fourth applicant returned to the United Kingdom in 2018 and came back to Australia in 2019.

5. On 2 April 2014 the first applicant was granted a temporary work visa as a secondary applicant of her now ex-husband. That visa expired on 2 April 2018.

6. The first applicant applied for a partner visa on 10 October 2018, sponsored by Christopher Major (sponsor). The first applicant and her sponsor claimed to have been in a de facto relationship since January 2018. The second, third and fourth applicants were included in the visa application as members of the same family unit.

7. On 6 April 2021 the Minister’s Department invited the first applicant to:

   (a)provide further evidence of her relationship with her sponsor and provide further information to establish that she met the additional criteria under reg 2.03A(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations), which required that she and the sponsor had been in a de facto relationship for at least 12 months prior to lodging the visa application, or that compelling or compassionate circumstances applied;

   (b)provide information as to whether she held a substantive visa when she lodged the visa application and, if she had not applied for the partner visa within 28 days of last holding a substantive visa, put forward any claims relating to whether any compelling reasons existed to not apply the criteria in Schedule 3 of the Regulations; and

   (c)comment on unfavourable information received by the Department which alleged that the first applicant was no longer the de facto partner of her sponsor.

8. On 15 and 16 July 2021 the applicants, via their representative, provided a submission and supporting materials to the Department. In the submission the first applicant claimed to have suffered family violence by her ex-husband which was the reason for her being unaware of the date her temporary work visa expired. The first applicant also claimed that her relationship with her sponsor ended in May 2019 because the sponsor was abusive toward her.

9. On 13 August 2021 the delegate refused to grant the applicants visas on the basis that the first applicant did not satisfy cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) in Schedule 2 of the Regulations. That regulation relevantly required that the first applicant satisfy Schedule 3 criteria 3001, 3003 and 3004, unless the Minister was satisfied that there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria. The delegate found that the first applicant did not meet criterion 3001, which relevantly required that the first applicant apply for the visa within 28 days of the last day that she held a substantive visa, and that there were no compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria.

10. On 31 August 2021 the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision.

11. On 25 November 2022 the Tribunal invited the applicants to provide submissions and further information about, relevantly, whether the first applicant met the criteria in Schedule 3 of the Regulations and, if not, whether there were any compelling reasons for not applying those criteria in the first applicant’s case.

12. The applicants, via their representative, provided to the Tribunal a written submission and supporting material on 14 December 2022. In the submission the first applicant conceded that she did not meet criterion 3001 in Schedule 3 of the Regulations, but submitted that the following circumstances were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria:

    (a)the family violence suffered by the first applicant inflicted by her ex-husband;

    (b)her actions in seeking to rectify her unlawful status promptly after she became aware she was unlawful;

    (c)the pending proceeding in the Family Court of Western Australia with her ex-husband;

    (d)the lack of access to family violence provisions if she lodged her visa application offshore;

    (e)her positive contributions to the Australian community; and

    (f)the difficulties the fourth applicant would face if she had to return to the United Kingdom.

13. On 16 December 2022 the Tribunal requested that the applicants provide further information about the matters raised in their submissions, and the applicants, via their representative, provided further supporting material to the Tribunal on 10 January 2023.

14. The first and fourth applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 16 January 2023. The applicants’ representative also attended the hearing.

15. At the conclusion of the hearing the Tribunal afforded the applicants a further opportunity to provide additional information to the Tribunal, which they did on 24 January 2023.

16. On 11 February 2023 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

    SUMMARY OF THE TRIBUNAL DECISION

17. The Tribunal identified that, in circumstances where the first applicant did not have a substantive visa at the time of the visa application, the issue in the proceeding was whether the first applicant satisfied the Schedule 3 criteria unless there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria.

18. The Tribunal found that the first applicant did not satisfy criterion 3001, which required that the application for the visa be lodged within 28 days of the ‘relevant day’. The relevant day in this matter was the day that the first applicant last held a substantive visa, which was 2 April 2018. The Tribunal found that the partner visa application was lodged on 10 October 2018, which was not within 28 days of the relevant day.

19. The Tribunal then considered whether there were compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria taking into account those factors raised by the first applicant, the fourth applicant, their representative and a judgment of Moncrieff J of the Family Court of Western Australia. The Tribunal had regard to the following factors.

20. Claim to have been the victim of family violence perpetrated by ex-husband and sponsor: The Tribunal noted that no medical evidence prior to July 2021 or police reports were provided. The Tribunal nonetheless accepted that the first applicant had suffered family violence in her relationship with her ex-husband. However, in the absence of substantiating evidence, the Tribunal made no findings regarding the nature and extent of the family violence. The Tribunal did not consider the claimed family violence by the ex-husband as a compelling reason and gave the matter no weight. The Tribunal considered that no persuasive evidence was provided to substantiate the claimed family violence inflicted by the sponsor and made no findings regarding the nature and extent of the claimed family violence. The Tribunal did not view the family violence by the sponsor (if any) as a compelling reason not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria and gave the matter no weight.

21. Claim that the first applicant was unaware her visa had expired: The Tribunal considered the first applicant’s evidence that her ex-husband deliberately failed to inform her of her visa status and observed that it was the first applicant’s responsibility to ensure she held a valid visa. The Tribunal accepted that the first applicant approached the Department in a timely manner once she became aware of her unlawful status. The Tribunal did not consider the length of time the first applicant was unlawful, or the circumstances leading to her becoming unlawful, as a compelling reason to waive the Schedule 3 criteria and gave this no weight.

22. Claim that it was unreasonable for the first applicant to leave Australia to apply for a visa offshore: The Tribunal accepted that the first applicant may have been separated from her sons and faced a three year ban if she departed Australia at the time her substantive visa had ceased, and gave this some weight in considering whether there were compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria. The Tribunal accepted that the sponsor could not depart Australia with the first applicant but did not consider this was a compelling reason not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria in circumstances where the relationship only commenced in January 2018. The Tribunal gave this consideration no weight.

23. Prejudice and disadvantage in Family Court proceeding: The Tribunal also accepted that representation in the Family Court of Western Australia proceedings whilst offshore may have been difficult at the time of the expiry of the first applicant’s substantive visa and gave this some weight. The Tribunal accepted that the first applicant may be at some disadvantage in the ongoing Family Court proceedings if she were offshore and gave this some weight.

24. Claim to have suffered parental alienation due to actions of the first applicant’s ex-husband: The Tribunal accepted the post-hearing information provided by the applicants, and that parental alienation can be a form of family violence. However, the Tribunal accepted and placed weight on the finding of Moncrieff J in the Family Court of Western Australia that there was no evidence of parental alienation. The Tribunal did not consider the claimed parental alienation was a compelling reason for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria and gave this matter no weight.

25. Claim that the first applicant would suffer emotional hardship if she departs Australia and returns to the United Kingdom: The Tribunal noted the first applicant had provided a number of statements from family and friends to support this contention but there was no supporting medical evidence. The Tribunal also noted that the first applicant’s two sons live in the United Kingdom. The Tribunal accepted that it may be difficult for the first applicant to return to the United Kingdom because she may need to establish new social connections and find employment or establish a business. The Tribunal accepted that the first applicant may suffer some emotional hardship if she departs Australia but did not consider this a compelling reason to waive the Schedule 3 criteria and gave this matter minimal weight.

26. Medical conditions of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): The Tribunal accepted the medical evidence that the first applicant was assessed in July 2021 as suffering from anxiety, depression, and PTSD, but did not view these assessed conditions as a compelling reason to waive the Schedule 3 criteria and gave this matter minimal weight.

27. Claim that it would be unreasonable for the first applicant to depart Australia to lodge a partner visa application given that she is no longer in a relationship with the sponsor: The Tribunal accepted the first applicant’s claim that it would be unreasonable for the first applicant to now depart Australia and lodge a partner visa application offshore because she is no longer in a relationship with her sponsor and would not have access to the family violence provisions. However, the Tribunal noted the delegate’s finding that there was insufficient evidence provided to assess the relationship and reg 2.03A of the Regulations, and that no evidence was provided of the claimed family violence. The Tribunal accordingly did not consider the unavailability of family violence provisions was a compelling reason to waive the Schedule 3 criteria and gave this consideration no weight.

28. Contribution to the community: The Tribunal accepted that the first applicant made a positive contribution to the Australian community through her social connections and her work but did not consider her contributions as a compelling reason to waive the Schedule 3 criteria. The Tribunal found there was nothing to indicate that the first applicant’s friendships, work and volunteer work had any characteristics which would constitute a compelling reason. The Tribunal did not consider the potential impact, including emotional difficulty, on the first applicant’s friends and clients to be a compelling reason not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria, and gave this matter minimal weight.

29. Circumstances of the fourth applicant: The applicants claimed that the circumstances of the fourth applicant gave rise to compelling reasons to waive the Schedule 3 criteria because she had lived in Australia since she was 13 years old and had strong social ties in Australia, had been in a relationship with an Australian citizen for two years, she no longer had substantial ties to the United Kingdom, and would suffer emotionally if she could not remain in Australia. The Tribunal accepted that this was not the preferred outcome for the fourth applicant and that relocation would be emotionally difficult. The Tribunal accepted that the fourth applicant would suffer some emotional hardship if she were to depart Australia because of the social ties she had established in Australia and gave this some weight in considering compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria.

30. The fourth applicant’s mental health: The first applicant contended that the fourth applicant’s mental health would be adversely affected if the fourth applicant was to return to the United Kingdom. The Tribunal gave the medical evidence in relation to the fourth applicant’s mental health some weight but noted that the evidence was based on limited treatment. The Tribunal also noted that the other evidence provided was not made by qualified mental health practitioners. Based on the written and oral evidence, the Tribunal did not consider the impact on the fourth applicant’s mental health as a compelling reason for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria and gave this matter minimal weight.

31. Mental health of the fourth applicant’s partner: The Tribunal recorded that no evidence was provided in support of the contention that the fourth applicant feared for her partner’s mental health if they were separated by distance, beyond the contentions of the fourth applicant and her partner. The Tribunal did not consider the claimed impact on the mental health of the fourth applicant’s partner was a compelling reason and gave this matter no weight. The Tribunal also did not consider the fourth applicant’s relationship with her partner to be a compelling reason not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria.

32. The Tribunal was ultimately not satisfied that the factors which weighed in favour of not applying the Schedule 3 criteria, and to which the Tribunal had given some weight, either separately or in combination, constituted compelling reasons for not applying the criteria in Schedule 3 of the Regulations. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the first applicant did not meet cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) in Schedule 2 of the Regulations.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION

33. The applicants filed an application for judicial review on 16 March 2023, and the application was therefore made within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal decision, as required by s 477(1) of the Migration Act.

34. The applicants raise the following ground in their application:

    The Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction to review the claims made by the applicant, in circumstances where the claimed family violence by Mr Major was put forward as a reason to waive the Sch 3 requirements (see Reasons [60]). In failing to make findings about this issue, the Tribunal did not complete its statutory function.

1. At the hearing, I gave the applicants leave to rely on six additional alleged errors raised in the applicants’ written submissions filed on 10 November 2023. The first applicant also made two further assertions of errors by the Tribunal in her oral submissions. These additional grounds broadly allege that the Tribunal:

   (a)failed to investigate or give the applicants an opportunity to provide evidence of ‘compelling or compassionate grounds’ for the waiver of the criteria in Schedule 3 of the Regulations;

   (b)failed to consider or incorrectly considered a report by the first applicant’s psychologist;

   (c)incorrectly formed the view that there was not enough evidence of the relationship between the first applicant and her sponsor;

   (d)found that there was no evidence corroborating the first applicant’s timeline of events without giving the applicants an opportunity to provide corroborating evidence;

   (e)failed to make findings about the family violence committed by the sponsor;

   (f)afforded too much weight to a judgment of the Family Court of Western Australia;

   (g)was biased; and

   (h)failed to cumulatively assess the matters raised by the applicants as compelling reasons.

2. The evidence before the Court comprises the application and supporting affidavit filed by the applicants on 16 March 2023, and the court book filed by the Minister on 5 May 2023 which was marked as Exhibit 1.

   THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

3. The role of the Court in this judicial review proceeding is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the Tribunal’s decision by reference to an applicants’ complaints about that decision: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21; [2022] FCAFC 3 (Djokovic) at [17]. The Court does not consider the merits of the Tribunal decision: Djokovic at [17]; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6 at [31].

4. The Court can only grant relief to the applicants if they establish that the Tribunal decision is affected by jurisdictional error. Jurisdictional error was explained by the High Court in LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610; [2024] HCA 12, where the Court said at [2]-[3] (footnotes omitted):

   2.Jurisdictional error can refer to breach of an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making authority which results in a decision made in the purported exercise of that authority lacking the legal force attributed to exercise of that authority by statute. …

   3.Because an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making authority can take many different forms, and because breach can occur in many different circumstances, the categories of jurisdictional error are not closed. … Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.

5. Disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [40].

   CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICANTS’ GROUND IN WRITTEN APPLICATION

6. By the ground in the written application, the applicants assert that the Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction and complete its statutory task by failing to make findings about the first applicant’s claim that family violence by the sponsor was a reason to waive the Schedule 3 requirements.

7. The ground is directed to [60] of the Tribunal’s reasons, where the Tribunal said:

   In relation to the family violence the applicant claimed to have suffered during her relationship with Mr Major, no persuasive evidence was provided to substantiate the claim and the Tribunal makes no findings regarding the nature and extent of the claimed family violence. The Tribunal does not view the family violence (if any) suffered during the applicant’s relationship with Mr Major as a compelling reason for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria and gives this matter no weight.

8. I accept the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal did in fact make findings about the first applicant’s claim to have faced family violence from the sponsor. Those findings were that:

   (a)there was no persuasive evidence to substantiate the claimed family violence and therefore it made no findings about the nature and extent of the claimed family violence; and

   (b)it did not view the family violence (if any) suffered during the relationship with the sponsor as a compelling reason.

9. I further accept the Minister’s submission that it was a matter for the applicants to put whatever evidence and arguments they wanted to before the Tribunal.

10. There was ample evidence before the Tribunal to support the first applicant’s claim that she had suffered family violence by her ex-husband, who is not the sponsor. At the hearing before the Court, the only evidence the parties were able to identify in relation to claimed violence by the sponsor was:

    (a)a submission to the Department in response to a request for information, in which it was said that the first applicant became aware during the relationship that the sponsor was being abusive to her, with the sponsor ‘on several occasions [using] the fact that the Applicant was dependent on his continued sponsorship for a successful Partner visa application to keep her and the children in Australia as a means to control the Applicant’ and that the ‘psychological and emotional abuse’ deeply hurt and disappointed the first applicant and led her to suffer anxiety attacks and depression;

    (b)a statutory declaration of the first applicant provided to the Tribunal, in which she gave examples of family violence by the sponsor, including that he would go into moods if she did not behave the way he thought she should, that he would not talk to her for hours if she went out with certain friends, would argue with her if she answered a hypothetical question differently to the way he thought she should answer, would slam doors, shout at her, walk away or tell her to leave, would put down her son and say things to him about his behaviour, would stonewall her when he was upset with something she had done, would put pressure on her to perform certain sexual acts that she was not comfortable with and would often reference the visa and threaten to end things if she did not behave the way he thought fit; and

    (c)a report by a psychologist, Ms Webster, which referred to the first applicant having reported experiencing intimate partner violence while engaged in two previous relationships.

11. I accept the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal’s finding that even if there was family violence it did not constitute a compelling reason to not apply the Schedule 3 criteria was open to the Tribunal for the reasons it gave.

12. The ground in the application does not establish jurisdictional error.

    CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTERS RAISED IN THE APPLICANTS’ WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

13. The applicants filed written submissions that asserted six legal errors in the Tribunal decision. The first applicant also made oral submissions about these matters at the hearing.

    Asserted legal error 1

14. The first legal error asserted in the applicants’ written submissions is that the Tribunal ‘failed to investigate’ and the Tribunal failed to afford the applicants an opportunity to present compelling or compassionate grounds for the waiver of the Schedule 3 criteria.

15. This is, in reality, an assertion of two separate errors.

16. The assertion that the Tribunal failed to investigate cannot give rise to jurisdictional error. The Tribunal does not have any obligation to investigate. There are some cases in which a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, can give rise to jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 111 ALD 15; [2009] HCA 39 at [25]. I accept Counsel for the Minister’s submission that this is not such a case. The applicants’ assertion is that the Tribunal should have investigated whether there were compassionate or compelling circumstances. The Tribunal invited the applicants to put forward evidence about whether there were compelling circumstances not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria and after the applicants did this, the Tribunal wrote to them again and requested further specific information. The Tribunal had no obligation to make any further specific inquiries in relation to whether there were compelling circumstances not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria.

17. The assertion that the Tribunal did not afford the applicants an opportunity to present compelling or compassionate grounds also does not establish jurisdictional error.

18. First, the criterion in cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) requires that there be ‘compelling’ reasons not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria not ‘compassionate or compelling’ grounds.

19. Second, the Tribunal gave the applicants multiple opportunities to explain why there were compelling reasons to waive the Schedule 3 criteria. The Tribunal did this by way of:

    (a)a notice of an invitation to provide information issued under s 359 of the Migration Act, which was sent to the applicants on 25 November 2022;

    (b)a further request for information sent to the applicants on 16 December 2022, which appears to have been sent after the Tribunal member considered the information provided in response to the earlier request as it requested more specific information;

    (c)giving the applicants an opportunity to give evidence and make arguments at a hearing convened by the Tribunal on 16 January 2023; and

    (d)affording the applicants an opportunity to provide additional evidence after the hearing.

20. The Tribunal’s reasons show that it gave careful consideration to the evidence provided by the applicants.

21. The first applicant’s submissions at the hearing seemed to suggest that the Tribunal requested information about the relationship and whether the first applicant was the spouse or de facto partner of the sponsor and not about whether there were compelling reasons not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria. This submission does not establish jurisdictional error. While it is true that the invitation to provide information sent on 25 November 2022 also included an invitation to provide information about whether there was a spousal or de facto relationship, it also clearly included an invitation to provide information about whether the Schedule 3 criteria were met and about whether there were compelling reasons not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria. A further letter sent on 2 December 2022 indicated to the applicants that the request only related to the information in relation to the Schedule 3 criteria and the Tribunal would only review the delegate’s decision which was a refusal of the visa on the basis that the first applicant did not meet criterion 3001.

22. In her submissions to the Court, the first applicant exhibited some confusion as to why her lawyer had requested that she provide particular evidence and what evidence had been provided to the Tribunal. The communications between the applicants and their previous lawyer do not establish jurisdictional error. It was up to the applicants to provide sufficient evidence to the Tribunal to satisfy the Tribunal that there were compelling reasons not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria. That there may be further evidence that the applicants could have provided, but did not provide, does not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision. The Tribunal considered the evidence that was provided by the applicants and, after considering the evidence and submissions of the applicants, was not satisfied that there were compelling reasons to waive the Schedule 3 criteria.

23. The first asserted legal error in the applicants’ written submissions does not establish jurisdictional error.

    Asserted legal error 2

24. The second legal error asserted by the applicants refers to [33] of the Tribunal’s reasons and refers to the Tribunal mislaying the report from the first applicant’s psychologist.

25. The Tribunal said at [33] of its reasons:

    The Tribunal put to the applicant that in her statutory declaration she said in July 2021 she was diagnosed with generalised anxiety disorder, mild depression and PTSD and had treatment with a psychologist and psychotherapist. The Tribunal noted that no evidence of these diagnoses and the treatment had been provided at the time of the hearing. Following the hearing a report dated 25 July 2021 from a psychologist Ilse Webster was provided (see below) . The applicant said she saw Ms Webster weekly for 20 sessions. She said the counselling gave her the tools to deal with the abuse she had suffered from Mr Gibbons and Oliver and Owen.

26. The first applicant submitted that after the report was resubmitted the member stated that Ms Webster’s report did not indicate whether she was treating the first applicant prior to assessment and had reservations about whether the report was based on her own self-assessment. The first applicant submitted that the psychologist’s report had been supplied to the Tribunal and had been lost and that the member dismissed evidence of PTSD and anxiety without proper evaluation. The first applicant submitted that health professionals must assess a patient and diagnose them in order to treat them and that she was seeing the psychologist over an 11 month period. The first applicant submitted that the Tribunal refused to acknowledge proof of psychological distress from two abusive relationships and submitted that the report clearly states the tools that the psychologist used to make the assessment and her professional diagnosis. At the hearing, the first applicant questioned whether the Tribunal was allowed to dismiss an actual medical report based on the length of time the applicant was seeing the psychologist. She also submitted that she also saw a general practitioner.

27. As submitted by Counsel for the Minister, the Tribunal did not refer to the psychologist’s report only at [33] but also considered it at [52] and [67] and gave some weight to the report. In these paragraphs, the Tribunal said:

    52.A report dated 25 July 2021 from psychologist, Ms Ilse Webster, was provided. The report contained the results of an assessment of the applicant undertaken on 7 July 2021. The report noted that she had been referred by her GP due to emotional trauma associated with experiencing domestic violence in 2 previous relationships. The outcome of the assessment was that her symptoms indicated she suffered mild to moderate generalised anxiety disorder and mild depression. The PTSD checklist indicated a high severity of PTSD symptoms and the Tool for Intimate Partner Screening resulted in a Positive for Intimate Partner Violence. The report did not indicate whether Ms Webster had been treating the applicant prior to the assessment or whether the assessment was based on the applicant’s self-report. The Tribunal gives the report some weight.

    …

    67.The Tribunal accepts the medical evidence that the applicant was assessed in July 2021 as suffering from anxiety, depression and PTSD. As noted, it was not clear from the psychological assessment whether the assessment outcome, using diagnostic tools, was based on Ms Webster treating the applicant or whether it was based on the applicant’s self-report. There was no current medical evidence from Ms Webster. …

28. It can be seen from these paragraphs that the Tribunal considered the psychologist’s report and gave some weight to it. The Tribunal also relied on this report to find that the first applicant suffered from anxiety, depression and PTSD. I accept Counsel for the Minister’s submission that in these circumstances, the applicants’ complaint that the report was dismissed and not considered by the Tribunal is not made out on the face of the Tribunal decision.

29. I also accept Counsel for the Minister’s submission that it was open to the Tribunal, for the reasons it gave, to not place weight on the first applicant’s medical diagnoses in assessing whether there were compelling reasons not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria.

30. The second asserted legal error does not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision.

    Asserted legal error 3

31. The third alleged legal error is that the Tribunal took the view that there was not enough evidence of the relationship with the sponsor. The applicants submitted that the Tribunal requested evidence of the relationship between the first applicant and the sponsor to be submitted by 9 December 2022, rather than requesting evidence to prove compelling and compassionate grounds, but then on 2 December 2022 wrote to say they no longer required information about the relationship and instead was looking at the delegate’s decision to refuse the visa on the basis that the first applicant did not meet criterion 3001. The applicants submitted that they gave evidence to the Tribunal in relation to the financial aspects of the relationship, the nature of the household, the social aspects of the relationship and the nature of their commitment and they also gave information about the first applicant’s interactions with the Department and why she and the sponsor could not live together.

32. In her oral submissions, the first applicant submitted that the Tribunal took the view that there was not enough evidence of the relationship with the sponsor, but that was not what the Tribunal was considering that day. She submitted that there was lots of evidence of the relationship and it was a true relationship. However, because they did not live together their evidence was limited. They could not live together because of the abuse and a lot of other reasons but it was still a true relationship.

33. Counsel for the Minister submitted that the Tribunal was not considering the genuineness of the relationship with the sponsor and it expressly told the applicants in the further s 359 invitation that it sent on 2 December 2022 that it would confine its consideration to the same issues addressed by the delegate. Counsel for the Minister submitted that the Departmental policy, as summarised in the delegate’s decision, says that the existence of a genuine relationship and hardship that arises from separation is not of itself a compelling reason. Counsel submitted that the Tribunal’s treatment of the evidence about the sponsor does not reveal any error that this Court can address.

34. I do not consider that alleged legal error 3 establishes jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision. The Tribunal was not considering whether the first applicant was the spouse or the de facto partner of the sponsor in this application and was instead considering whether there were compelling reasons not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria. It was open to the applicants to provide evidence of the relationship if they chose to do so and to ask that it be taken into account in the assessment of whether there were compelling reasons not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria. The applicants did provide some evidence in relation to the relationship, which had ended by the time of the Tribunal hearing. To the extent that the applicants provided evidence of the relationship for the purposes of showing compelling reasons, the Tribunal took it into account in making its decision.

    Asserted legal error 4

35. The applicants submitted that the Tribunal noted there was no evidence to substantiate the timeline of events that they claimed. The first applicant submitted that either the Tribunal or her lawyer did not give her an opportunity to present evidence regarding the timeline and that there was a lack of inquiry into the evidence demonstrating the timeline. The applicants then referred to some of the evidence in relation to the timeline that was before the Tribunal.

1. In oral submissions, the first applicant confirmed that this alleged error related to [19] and [20] of the Tribunal’s reasons, where the Tribunal said:

   19.      The timeline in the representative’s submission included the following:

   •2 February 2018 – Mr Gibbons advised his registered migration agent that he and Ms Gibbons “were in the process of retracting the proceedings from the court” and instructed him to include her in his visa application.

   •12 March 2018 – the applicant emailed Mr Gibbons’ agent asking for a copy of the family’s visa to determine the expiry date. She did not receive a response.

   •October 2018 – Mr Gibbons threatened Mr Major regarding his sponsorship of the applicant, including accusing her of deliberately providing false information to the Department and of having affairs during their relationship. He threatened the applicant with “presenting evidence” to the Department which would result in her being detained and deported immediately or facing 10 years in prison and a “permanent” ban from Australia.

   •1 July 2021 – Mr Gibbons was arrested and charged with breaching the Conduct Agreement Order.

   •19 August 2021 – the applicant resumed caring for her children through the custody arrangement with Mr Gibbons.

   20.The Tribunal notes that no evidence to substantiate the timeline items referred to in the preceding paragraph was provided. Accordingly, the Tribunal places no negative or positive weight on this evidence.

2. In her oral submissions, the first applicant also submitted that there was further evidence that she could provide if she had another chance.

3. Counsel for the Minister submitted that the Tribunal did not place any positive or negative weight on this timeline of events and it is therefore hard to understand the precise complaint made by the applicants.

4. This assertion of legal error does not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision. The applicants were afforded an opportunity to provide evidence in relation to whether there were compelling reasons to waive the Schedule 3 criteria. I have had regard to the references to the evidence in the applicants’ written submissions and I am satisfied that, to the extent that it refers to matters in the timeline extracted at [19] of the Tribunal’s reasons, it is simply a reference to another submission made on behalf of the applicants and to further evidence that was not before the Tribunal and that I ruled to be inadmissible in the proceeding before this Court. Accordingly, the Tribunal did not overlook any evidence in making the observations at [20] of its reasons. In any event, the Tribunal did not place any adverse weight on the timeline and treated it as a neutral consideration.

   Asserted legal error 5

5. The applicants submitted that the Tribunal erred by failing to make findings about the family violence committed by the sponsor. The applicants referred to regulations that require the Tribunal to refer claims of family violence to an independent assessor if the Tribunal member is not satisfied that family violence occurred. The applicants submitted that the member did not request evidence of the family violence committed by the sponsor.

6. There is an extent to which this ground overlaps with the ground in the written application and I repeat the observations that are made above in relation to the ground in the application. I accept Counsel for the Minister’s submission that the complaint is not made out by reference to [60] of the Tribunal’s reasons. The Tribunal found that there was no persuasive evidence provided by the first applicant to substantiate the claimed family violence by the sponsor and it made no findings about the nature and extent of any family violence by the sponsor. It did, however, go on to consider that the family violence (if any) suffered during the relationship did not amount to a compelling reason to waive the Schedule 3 criteria. It can therefore be seen that the Tribunal considered the evidence before it and found that it did not amount to a compelling reason.

7. The broader gist of the complaint raised by this asserted legal error is that the Tribunal did not refer the family violence claims to an independent assessor. To this end, I accept the submission by Counsel for the Minister that the occasion for the Tribunal to do this did not arise in this proceeding.

8. I understand the first applicant to be referring to reg 1.23(9) and (10) of the Regulations, which apply when an applicant raises a non-judicially determined claim of family violence to satisfy a prescribed criterion that the applicant or another person has suffered family violence. If the Minister (or the Tribunal on review) is not satisfied that the alleged victim suffered the relevant family violence, the Minister (or Tribunal) must seek the view of an independent expert about whether the alleged victim has suffered relevant family violence. The Tribunal in this case did not get that far because it was not satisfied that the first applicant met the requirements of cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) as it was not satisfied that the first applicant met the Schedule 3 criteria and was not satisfied that there were compelling reasons to waive those criteria. The Tribunal was not required to seek the opinion of an independent expert for the purposes of considering whether there were compelling reasons not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria.

9. Asserted legal error 5 does not establish jurisdictional error.

   Asserted legal error 6

10. The applicants asserted that the Tribunal erred by placing great weight on a judgment of the Family Court of Western Australia made during an interim hearing. The applicants’ submissions in relation to this ground comment on the evidence which was before the Family Court Judge and comment on his Honour’s findings. It is clear that the first applicant strongly disagrees with the observations of the Family Court Judge and submitted that there was lots of evidence before the Family Court to show parental alienation.

11. Counsel for the Minister submitted that it is important to note that the judgment was given to the Tribunal by the applicants and it was open to the Tribunal to give weight as it found appropriate in its role as an administrative review body. It was open to the applicants to make submissions to the Tribunal about the weight that should have been given to the judgment and it was open to the Tribunal to prefer the findings of Moncrieff J over the other evidence that the applicants provided.

12. I acknowledge that it appears the judgment was provided to the Tribunal in response to the Tribunal’s request for further information sent to the applicants on 16 December 2022. This includes the following request from the Tribunal:

    Given the claims of parental alienation, please provide the Family Court’s reasons for judgement in relation to the current parenting orders.

13. It was open to the applicants to make submissions about the weight that the Tribunal should have afforded to the judgment and for the first applicant to express any concerns about the judgment to the Tribunal. Indeed, it appears from the Tribunal’s summary of the evidence given by the first applicant at the hearing that the first applicant expressed to the Tribunal a number of her concerns about the judgment (see, for example, [28]-[29], [34]-[37], [39] of the Tribunal’s reasons) and that the Tribunal was cognisant of the first applicant’s concerns.

14. It was also open for the Tribunal to place weight on the Family Court judgment, as it considered appropriate, as part of its fact-finding function. The Tribunal weighed this evidence with the other evidence before it in making its factual findings. While the applicants may disagree with those findings, that is not sufficient to establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision.

15. In addressing this assertion of error, the first applicant also submitted that there was an affidavit from her daughter where she says that she witnesses the abuse from her father and she does not believe that was taken into consideration. I understand this to be a reference to an affidavit that was before the Family Court and an allegation that the Family Court to not take it into consideration.[1] The Tribunal, in summarising the judgment of Moncrieff J, expressly referred to the affidavit of the fourth applicant. It therefore appears that the affidavit was taken into account by the Family Court.

    [1] If I am wrong in this understanding of the complaint, and the first applicant is instead asserting that the Tribunal failed to take into account the statutory declarations provided by the fourth applicant as a separate ground, such a ground would not be established. The Tribunal referred to and considered evidence from the fourth applicant throughout its reasons and provided a lengthy summary of her statutory declaration at [22] of its reasons.

16. Asserted legal error 6 does not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision.

    CONSIDERATION OF THE ADDITIONAL MATTERS RAISED IN THE FIRST APPLICANT’S ORAL SUBMISSIONS

17. The first applicant raised two additional matters in her oral submissions.

    Allegation that the Tribunal was biased

18. In her oral submissions, the first applicant alleged that the Tribunal member did not believe her submissions, questioned her in a tone like she was doubting her, and would sometimes roll her eyes or shake her head. The first applicant submitted that she did not think the way she was dealt with in the Tribunal was fair and considered the Tribunal member’s tone to be very dismissive.

19. Counsel for the Minister treated this as an allegation of bias and submitted that bias is a serious allegation that must be clearly made and proven with evidence. Counsel for the Minister submitted that other than what is contained in the Tribunal decision, there is no evidence before the Court, either by way of transcript or audio recording, of what transpired at the Tribunal hearing. Counsel for the Minister submitted that there was no evidence before the Court about the tone of the Tribunal member or gestures of rolling eyes. Counsel submitted that the first applicant suggested from the bar table that her former solicitor and barrister had listened to the audio recording and come to a similar conclusion as her, but that was not reflected in the ground drafted in the judicial review application or in the six additional grounds that the applicants have raised in their written submissions.

20. In her reply submissions, the first applicant sought an opportunity to present further evidence to the Court.

21. The Minister opposed the grant of leave to the applicants to file further evidence in relation to bias. Counsel for the Minister noted that the matter had been on foot for some time, and that the applicants were represented by a solicitor and a barrister in making their application to this Court, in which the applicants did not raise a claim of bias. Counsel for the Minister further submitted that case management principles militated against the further protraction of the proceeding, and the grant of leave would necessarily require a further hearing and increase costs to either party. Counsel for the Minister submitted that there was no evidence before the Court that it would be in the interests of justice to grant the applicants leave to obtain and produce further evidence.

22. The first applicant indicated that she would like to get a transcript of the Tribunal hearing so that the Court could hear the bias. I invited the first applicant to respond to Counsel for the Minister’s submissions that the applicants should not be granted a further opportunity to adduce evidence and the first applicant submitted that she did not know why her lawyers did not raise an allegation of bias and continued:

    So again I’ve just been in their hands. They made that one thing, but we had been to another lawyer and sought advice previous, and he had given us potentially three legal errors that were made, so I don’t understand why the only submitted one or why they didn’t go down the bias route. So it’s hard for me to make that decision, because that’s what they said – they felt that it was biased. The other reason I am struggling and question – and I know it’s not good to question judges and members, but several times throughout the evidence, my ex-husband does make comments that he has got his parents talking to members of the Australian Government…

    Every time I’ve dealt – so I dealt with a Family Court judge, and the way he spoke to my lawyer, I did sit there thinking, “What? Like, why are you talking to him like that today? That’s awful. And why aren’t you looking at evidence that’s put - physical evidence of abuse that’s presented to you you’re dismissing?” And then I go to tribunal, and she’s very dismissive of me and isn’t looking at what is classed as compelling and compassionate grounds, so there is part of me that’s – is kind of questioning “What is going on here?” But obviously I can’t make that decision as to whether I investigate this and pursue it or not, because obviously that’s the – if I pursue this and it goes against me, then I’ve got a lot of money to find.

23. At the hearing I declined to give the applicants an opportunity to adduce further evidence and indicated I would give reasons for that in my judgment.

24. In refusing to grant the applicants an opportunity to adduce further evidence, I was mindful of s 190 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), which sets out the overarching purpose of the Court’s civil practice and procedure provisions. I am mindful that, up until shortly before the Court hearing, the applicants had the benefit of legal representation and it appears from the first applicant’s submissions that her legal representatives listened to the audio recording of the Tribunal hearing and did not raise or recommend any ground alleging bias. It can be inferred that if there was an arguable ground of bias available to the applicants it would have been raised at an earlier time.

25. The applicants have had ample opportunity to raise grounds and present evidence to the Court, including being afforded an opportunity to raise six additional grounds the day before the hearing. To allow the applicants an opportunity to adduce additional evidence after the hearing, and then potentially convene a further hearing to address the evidence, would increase the cost to the parties of the proceeding. There is nothing before the Court to indicate that a proposed bias ground would have any reasonable prospects of success.

26. Notwithstanding that I did not afford the applicants an opportunity to adduce further evidence after the hearing, I have considered their allegation of bias.

27. An allegation of bias must be distinctly raised and clearly proved: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17 at [69]. To show apprehended bias, which I assume is the nature of bias that the applicants are alleging, the applicants would need to show that the Tribunal conducted the hearing in a way that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to the review: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 at [6]; CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76; [2019] HCA 50 at [17], [56]; QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 409 ALR 65; [2023] HCA 15 at [37], [67].

28. A fair-minded lay observer would be aware of the role of the Tribunal, including that the Tribunal is not required to uncritically accept evidence given by the applicants and that it is open to the Tribunal to test the evidence given by the applicants through its questioning of them at the hearing. It is apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons that the Tribunal did test the first applicant’s evidence throughout the hearing and put a number of propositions to her to comment on based on the evidence before it. Having regard to what the first applicant has said in her oral submissions, it appears that much of the first applicant’s complaint is that the Tribunal did not believe her and did test her evidence throughout the hearing. To the extent that the applicant’s complaint is that the Tribunal did not accept the evidence she gave as amounting to compelling circumstances and asked questions testing that evidence, this does not give rise to any inference that a fair-minded and well-informed layperson might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to the review, even if the applicants did not appreciate the tone used by the Tribunal in testing the evidence.

29. If the first applicant provided evidence that was consistent with her oral submissions in relation to the Tribunal member rolling their eyes, it would not be sufficient to establish that a fair-minded and well-informed layperson might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to the conduct of the review. The Tribunal gave detailed reasons which show it carefully evaluated the applicants’ evidence and, in these circumstances, there is no basis for finding from vague evidence of a Tribunal member making a facial expression that caused the applicants to believe they were rolling their eyes that a fair-minded and well-informed layperson might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to the review.

30. The allegation of bias is not established.

    Allegation that the Tribunal did not consider compelling reasons cumulatively

31. In her reply submissions, the first applicant submitted that the Tribunal did not appreciate the accumulation of factors as leading to compelling reasons. She submitted that there are lots of times where the Tribunal assessed a matter, said it is not compelling and gave it no weight, but according to the first applicant that is the wrong approach. The first applicant submitted that the Tribunal needed to assess all the evidence and make findings and then take these matters together cumulatively to see if some of them were compelling and warranted some weight.

32. In response, Counsel for the Minister referred to [75] and [76] of the Tribunal’s reasons, where the Tribunal said:

    75.In assessing whether there are compelling reasons for waiving the Schedule 3 criteria, the Tribunal is required to assess the evidence. The Tribunal has considered all the circumstances of the applicant’s case, her oral evidence and the oral evidence of Jade and the written statements from the applicant’s friends and clients, and Jade’s partner and friends. As noted above, the Tribunal accepts that there are matters which weigh in favour of waiver of Schedule 3 criteria including but not limited to:

    •the potential difficulty being offshore as a party in Family Court proceedings at the time her substantive visa ceased and at the time of this decision;

    •that had she departed Australia at the time her substantive visa ceased, she may have been separated from her sons and faced a 3-year ban on returning to Australia; and

    •the potential emotional hardship for Jade if she now departs Australia.

    76.The Tribunal is not satisfied that the factors which weigh in favour of waiver and to which the Tribunal has given some weight, either separately or in combination, constitute compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria in this case. Accordingly, the applicant does not meet cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii). In the Tribunal’s view the potential difficulties, either separately or in combination, are not sufficiently powerful to lead the Tribunal to make a positive finding in favour of waiver.

33. Counsel for the Minister submitted that the Tribunal quite clearly understood that its task was to consider all of the circumstances and evidence and to weigh it, and the Tribunal identified some things that weighed in favour of waiver. Those identified at [75] were inclusive and Counsel for the Minister submitted that the factors in favour were not limited to these. The Tribunal found that the factors which weighed against waiver outweighed those which weighed in favour and considered the factors separately and in combination.

1. While the Tribunal could have regard to a single circumstance or a multitude of circumstances, the role of the Tribunal was to consider whether the first applicant’s circumstances as a whole compel it not to apply the Schedule 3 criteria: MZYPZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 127 ALD 510; [2012] FCA 478 at [12]. This does not necessarily require, in cases such as the present, where the Tribunal has considered a number of factors individually, that the Tribunal then engage in a further detailed assessment of the matters already considered as part of its cumulative assessment: see, for example, Zhang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 490 at [18].

2. The Tribunal’s reasons at [75] and [76] show that it considered the first applicant’s circumstances as a whole. Nothing in the way in which the first applicant articulated her case to the Tribunal required the Tribunal to conduct any detailed rolled up assessment of the matters that it had already determined should be given little or no weight. I am satisfied that the Tribunal sufficiently considered the applicants’ circumstances cumulatively, including those to which it gave no weight when considered individually.

3. The allegation raised in the first applicant’s reply submissions does not establish jurisdictional error.

   Other matters raised that amount to a request for impermissible merits review

4. Throughout her oral submissions, the first applicant also raised a number of matters that explain why she believes that there are compelling circumstances to waive the Schedule 3 criteria. These matters go to the factual merits of the Tribunal decision and it is not open to the Court to review the factual merits of the Tribunal decision in this proceeding.

   CONCLUSION

5. The applicants have not established that the Tribunal decision is affected by jurisdictional error and the application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and seven (107) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams.

Associate:

Dated:       27 August 2024

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

PEG 40 of 2023
Applicants
Fourth Applicant:	JADE GIBBONS