Gibbons v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbons v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] FCA 462

Citation: Gibbons v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] FCA 462
Parties: PAUL EDWARD GEORGE GIBBONS v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE, ALAN SEAN SCOTT and MICHAEL JOSEPH KEELTY
File number: QUD 98 of 2010
Judge: LOGAN J
Date of judgment: 5 May 2010
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for extension of time within which to appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court – Where application for extension of time filed within the time allowed to appeal – Considerations relevant to exercise of discretion to extend time – Discretion exercised to refuse application in circumstances where proposed grounds of appeal not reasonably arguable
Legislation:

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 138

Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15

Cases cited: Gibbons v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] FMCA 115 cited
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 cited
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 followed
Date of hearing: 5 May 2010
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms K Garner
Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Phillips Fox

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 98 of 2010

BETWEEN:

PAUL EDWARD GEORGE GIBBONS
Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
First Respondent

ALAN SEAN SCOTT
Second Respondent

MICHAEL JOSEPH KEELTY
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

LOGAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MAY 2010

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 98 of 2010

BETWEEN:

PAUL EDWARD GEORGE GIBBONS
Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
First Respondent

ALAN SEAN SCOTT
Second Respondent

MICHAEL JOSEPH KEELTY
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

LOGAN J

DATE:

5 MAY 2010

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. Mr Gibbons is a former member of the Australian Federal Police.  On or about 8 October 2005, he had the misfortune to sustain serious head injuries in a motor vehicle incident.  That incident did not arise out of, or in the course of, his employment as a member of the Australian Federal Police.  On or about 17 October 2006, Mr Gibbons’ employment as an Australian Federal Police officer was terminated at the initiative of his employer.  He believed that the termination of his employment, and conduct leading up to that termination on the part of his superiors within the Australian Federal Police, constituted either direct discrimination or indirect discrimination for the purposes of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).

    Proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court

  2. Mr Gibbons instituted proceedings in the Federal…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 462
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Gibbons brought a claim in the Federal Magistrates Court, alleging discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act. The Federal Magistrates Court dismissed the claim, finding no evidence of direct or indirect discrimination by the Australian Federal Police. Gibbons sought to appeal this decision by filing an application for an extension of time within which to appeal, as the initial deadline had passed. The court was required to decide whether to grant the extension and whether the proposed grounds of appeal were reasonably arguable.

The court considered the nature of the proceedings and found that the Federal Magistrates Court had correctly identified that the case was one of alleged discrimination rather than an unfair dismissal case. The court meticulously examined the evidence and found the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court to be open on the material before it, particularly regarding the opinion of Dr Lambeth. The court was satisfied that the findings of no discrimination and the reasonableness of the requirement for Gibbons to return to work in the ACT were reasonably open based on the evidence. The proposed grounds of appeal, focusing on the nature of the proceeding and the alleged discrimination, were assessed for their arguability. The court concluded that the grounds did not have reasonable prospects of success and were not reasonably arguable.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time. The court reasoned that granting an extension in these circumstances would be futile as the grounds of appeal were not reasonably arguable. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.

ORDERS:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As to the seventh ground, though, it should be stated that the nature of the proceeding before the Federal Magistrates Court was not an unfair dismissal proceeding but rather one in respect of alleged discrimination. There can be an overlap between the two but in this case Mr Gibbons focussed only upon what he apprehended was a cause of action under the Disability Discrimination Act. He did not seek to challenge the dismissal on what one might term other industrial relations grounds such as whether or not the process leading up to his dismissal involved a transgression of industrial instruments or policies relevant to this employment such that the dismissal should be regarded as an unfair dismissal or an unlawful dismissal. Conclusion When one examines the judgment of the learned federal magistrate, one finds a careful and methodical scrutiny of the elements relevant to the establishment of a case of unlawful discrimination. His Honour was satisfied that Mr Gibbons’ underlying behavioural characteristics were exacerbated because of the injuries which he had suffered in the motor vehicle incident. That was a finding reasonably open to his Honour and reasonably open on the strength of, materially, Dr Lambeth’s opinion. That was a finding which was a necessary finding along the way in the case which Mr Gibbons sought to make. As it happened, the learned federal magistrate went on to find, though, that Mr Gibbons had not suffered either direct or indirect discrimination. He was further satisfied that Mr Gibbons had not demonstrated any discrimination by the Australian Federal Police in his employment, particularly when regard was had to his past training, qualifications, and experience. These were findings that were reasonably open to the learned federal magistrate. So too was the finding that the requirement for returning to work in the position in the ACT with the police was reasonable in the circumstances of the case. However one approaches the grounds proposed for the appeal, they do not, in my opinion, have any reasonable prospects of success, or put another way, I do not regard them as, in any way, reasonably arguable. To grant an extension of time in these circumstances would be futile. For these reasons, I dismiss the application for the extension of time.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.