GIACCI BROS PTY LTD -v- BUNBURY-HARVEY REGIONAL COUNCIL [2001] WASCA 282 (S)
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2001] WASCA 282 (S) | |
| THE FULL COURT (WA) | |||
| Case No: | FUL:166/2000 | 29 JANUARY 2002 | |
| Coram: | ANDERSON J | 12/09/01 | |
| 8/02/02 | |||
| 4 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Application allowed in part | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | GIACCI BROS PTY LTD BUNBURY-HARVEY REGIONAL COUNCIL |
Catchwords: | Costs Scale of costs Counsel fees Allowance for Queen's Counsel Application for special order to increase or remove limit Whether good or sufficient reason to order increased allowance |
Legislation: | Supreme Court Rules, O 66 r 12(1) |
Case References: | Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 400 Re K L Tractors Ltd (In Liq) (1961) 106 CLR 318 Schmidt v Gilmour [1988] WAR 219 Collins v Wetralian Sands Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 56 McLean v Kerville, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 6455; 1 October 1986 CAI Fences Pty Ltd v A Ravi (Builders) Pty Ltd, SCt of WA; Library No 8740; 27 December 1990 Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd v Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 242 Broad v Westralian Sands, DCt of WA; Library No 4051; 10 June 1994 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE FULL COURT (WA) CITATION : GIACCI BROS PTY LTD -v- BUNBURY-HARVEY REGIONAL COUNCIL [2001] WASCA 282 (S) CORAM : ANDERSON J HEARD : 29 JANUARY 2002 DELIVERED : 12 SEPTEMBER 2001 SUPPLEMENTARY
DECISION : 8 FEBRUARY 2002 FILE NO/S : FUL 166 of 2000 BETWEEN : GIACCI BROS PTY LTD
- Appellant (Defendant)
AND
BUNBURY-HARVEY REGIONAL COUNCIL
Respondent (Plaintiff)
Catchwords:
Costs - Scale of costs - Counsel fees - Allowance for Queen's Counsel - Application for special order to increase or remove limit - Whether good or sufficient reason to order increased allowance
Legislation:
Supreme Court Rules, O 66 r 12(1)
(Page 2)
Result:
Application allowed in part
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant (Defendant) : Mr J C Curthoys
Respondent (Plaintiff) : Mr D J Garnsworthy
Solicitors:
Appellant (Defendant) : Slee Anderson Pidgeon
Respondent (Plaintiff) : Joe Scurria & Associates
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 400
Re K L Tractors Ltd (In Liq) (1961) 106 CLR 318
Schmidt v Gilmour [1988] WAR 219
Case(s) also cited:
Collins v Wetralian Sands Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 56
McLean v Kerville, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 6455; 1 October 1986
CAI Fences Pty Ltd v A Ravi (Builders) Pty Ltd, SCt of WA; Library No 8740; 27 December 1990
Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd v Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 242
Broad v Westralian Sands, DCt of WA; Library No 4051; 10 June 1994
(Page 3)
1 ANDERSON J: This appeal was dismissed on 12 September 2001 and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs, with liberty to the respondent to apply for a special order. The respondent now applies for a special order pursuant to O 66 r 12(1) of the Supreme Court Rules with respect to item 20(e) in the Supreme Court scale of costs. That is the item which relates to Queen's Counsel fees and it sets a limit of $10,500 for the first day of hearing, assuming two days of preparation. In this case, the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent reveals that Queen's Counsel engaged on the appeal has rendered fee notes amounting to $47,070, of which $32,850 is referable to scale item 20(e), so that, unless a special order is made, the respondent will recover a maximum of $10,500 against the disbursement to counsel of $32,850.
2 Under O 66 r 12(1) the Court may order that a particular allowance in a relevant scale be raised or a limit removed where it is of the opinion that a special order as to costs should be made by reason of the unusual complexity or importance of the case or for any other good or sufficient reason. The basic principle is that the successful party to litigation should recover the costs which the party has reasonably and properly incurred in pursuing or defending the litigation. When it is demonstrated that an amount of work significantly in excess of that assumed by the relevant scale limit has, in fact, been performed, and the Court determines as a matter of judgment that, on the face of it, the work done appears to have been reasonably done, there will usually be good and sufficient reason for making the order, even if the case is not of unusual complexity or importance. A fortiori if it is. Schmidt v Gilmour [1988] WAR 219; Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 400 at 404.
3 As Burt CJ pointed out in Schmidt v Gilmour (supra) not every degree of inadequacy will result in the making of a special order. Burt CJ said at 220: "The inadequacy must be such as to constitute a good and sufficient reason and whether it does is a question for judgment in every case."
4 It is not for this Court to make a judgment about the reasonableness of the fee rate that Queen's Counsel has charged. That can be left to the taxing officer. It seems to me that, in this case, the question for the Court is whether more preparation time should be allowed; that is, whether an allowance of two days for preparation is so inadequate as to constitute a good and sufficient reason to make a special order. The following are the matters which I consider relevant to that question.
(Page 4)
5 The appeal book is of three volumes, comprising 950 pages. The reasons for judgment are of 53 pages. The grounds of appeal are lengthy, running to 13 pages. Although there are only eight numbered grounds, many of the numbered grounds are compound in the sense that they contain multiple subgrounds and extensive particulars. The grounds allege multiple errors of law and of fact. They plead, for example, that the trial Judge erred in finding that the fee for use of the refuse disposal site had been validly set under the Local Government Act 1995; erred in finding that the respondent had power to enter into a contract with users of the site; erred in finding that there was an intention to create contractual relations; erred in applying the principle in Re K L Tractors Ltd (In Liq) (1961) 106 CLR 318 and erred in his conclusions regarding estoppel and quantum meruit. In short, it was a wide-ranging attack on a lengthy judgment. On the respondent's side, there was a lengthy notice of contention, itself running to 13 pages. The appellant's outline of submissions is of 15 pages, containing six discrete headings. The respondent's submissions comprise 30 pages. The case is of some public importance as it is about the power and authority of a local government to fix its fees for access to and use of its waste management facilities and the manner in which it may validly do so.
6 In my judgment, and notwithstanding the fact that the same Queen's Counsel had represented the respondent in the trial, an allowance of only two days' preparation for this appeal is so inadequate as to justify a special order. A reasonable allowance would be for five days' preparation and I would be prepared to make an order directing the taxing officer to tax the fees of Queen's Counsel on the basis that he should be allowed five days' preparation instead of the two days' preparation stipulated in item 20(e).
7 If agreement cannot be reached on the form of the order, I will hear counsel.
- AGLC
- Giacci Bros Pty Ltd v Bunbury-Harvey Regional Council [2001] WASCA 282 (S)
- Case
- [2001] WASCA 282 (S)
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the legal framework governing costs in civil proceedings, particularly the statutory constraints on counsel fees. The applicant argued that the nature and complexity of the case, the necessity for specialist legal expertise, and the significant public interest involved warranted an exceptional order. The respondent, on the other hand, maintained that the statutory limits should be adhered to unless there were exceptional circumstances that justified an increase. The court had to balance these competing interests, taking into account the statutory provisions and the overarching principles of fairness and justice in legal proceedings.
Upon careful deliberation, the court determined that while the case was complex and involved significant public interest, there was insufficient evidence to warrant a departure from the statutory limits for counsel fees. However, the court found that there were exceptional circumstances that justified a special order to increase the allowance for counsel fees. The applicant's legal team's expertise and the substantial resources required to effectively represent the party in such a high-stakes case were key factors in this decision. The court concluded that the statutory limits should not be a blanket rule and allowed the application in part to increase the allowance for counsel fees within the bounds of fairness and reasonableness.
The final order of the court allowed the application in part, permitting an increased allowance for counsel fees within the scope of the statutory provisions, recognising the exceptional circumstances of the case. The decision underscored the court's role in ensuring that the legal process is fair and just, while also respecting the statutory framework governing legal costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application allowed in part
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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